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get_threat_status

Read-only

Retrieves a named threat's status by CVE ID or name, including vulnerable items, affected CIs, remediation tasks, linked changes, exceptions, and security incidents.

Instructions

Status of one named threat across Vulnerability Response and Security Incident Response, with links: the CVE library entries (CISA KEV flag and due date, EPSS, scores), every vulnerable item with its CI, state, risk and target date, affected CIs and the services that depend on them, remediation tasks, linked changes and their states, exception requests, and security incidents that mention the threat. Give CVE IDs, a name, or both. Read-only

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "get_threat_status"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cveNoOne or more CVE IDs, comma separated, e.g. "CVE-2026-109618,CVE-2026-109619"
nameNoThreat name to match in remediation tasks and security incidents, e.g. "PHP2Shell"
limitNoMax vulnerable items to list (default 100)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv5.1.0

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=true, and the description only repeats "Read-only", which adds nothing beyond the annotations. It does supply useful behavioral context by disclosing that results are aggregated across VR and SIR records and linked objects, but it says nothing about permissions, execution cost, or truncation beyond the limit parameter.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and scope are front-loaded, followed by the input guidance and the read-only note. The middle enumeration is long but each item is substantive output information rather than filler; it could be tightened but nothing is clearly wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description must describe return values, and it does so in detail. For a three-parameter read-only aggregation tool, the main remaining gap is invocation guidance and behavior when both cve and name are supplied, not missing output detail.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents cve, name, and limit, including the default of 100. The one piece of added meaning is that CVE IDs and name can be combined ("or both"), but the definition does not explain how the two are combined or how ambiguity between them is resolved.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The definition gives a specific verb and resource ("Status of one named threat") and scopes it to two named modules, Vulnerability Response and Security Incident Response. It then enumerates exactly what is returned (CVE library entries, KEV flag, EPSS, vulnerable items, CIs, remediation tasks, changes, exceptions, incidents), so an agent can distinguish it from a generic threat-intelligence lookup.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Give CVE IDs, a name, or both" tells the agent how to invoke it, and the module scoping implies when it is relevant. But there is no explicit when-to-use versus when-not-to-use guidance, no mention of the likely alternative (get_threat_intelligence), and no prerequisites stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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