get_vulnerability

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations (readOnlyHint=true, openWorldHint=true) already communicate the safe read-only nature and external context. The description adds that the result includes CVSS score and affected CIs, which is useful but does not disclose any further behavioral nuances like error handling or permission needs.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single concise sentence, front-loaded with the action and object, and contains no redundant or filler information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple retrieval tool with one parameter, a read-only annotation, and no output schema, the description is complete and sufficient. It clarifies what details are returned and matches the expected behavior.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The single parameter 'number_or_sysid' is fully described in the schema (100% coverage) with examples. The tool description does not need to add more, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb ('Get') and identifies the resource ('specific vulnerability entry') with expected fields (CVSS score, affected CIs). It clearly distinguishes from sibling tools like list_vulnerabilities and update_vulnerability by focusing on retrieving a single entity's detail.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Implied usage is clear: use when you have a vulnerability number or sys_id and need full details. However, no explicit comparison with alternatives (e.g., list_vulnerabilities for browsing) is given, and there are no exclusions or when-not-to-use statements.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.