list_vulnerability_groups

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, and open-world behavior, so the description is not responsible for the safety profile. It adds useful behavioral context by disclosing the descending risk-score ordering, the underlying entity/table identity, and related operations for membership and SLA reporting.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two compact sentences and front-loads the core purpose before filters and related tools. Technical parentheticals are justified because they identify the precise entity and table.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a six-parameter list tool with full schema coverage and annotations, the description supplies the essential purpose, filters, ordering, and related operations. It does not describe return fields or pagination behavior, and there is no output schema to compensate, but those gaps are moderate rather than severe.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all six parameters are already documented in the schema. The description mentions the main filter dimensions but does not add syntax, constraints, or edge-case behavior beyond what the schema provides, making the baseline score of 3 appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource — "List Vulnerability Groups" — and anchors it to the exact table `sn_vul_vulnerability`, with additional identifying context such as the sys_class label and number prefix. This makes the entity distinguishable from broader vulnerability and remediation-task siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear invocation context: filter by state, risk score, or assignment group, and results are ordered by descending risk score. It also routes the agent to `add_vi_to_remediation_task` for membership changes and SLA tools for TTR status, though it does not explicitly state when to choose this tool over sibling list tools such as `list_remediation_tasks`.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.