get_security_incident

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already provide readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, openWorldHint=true, which inform the agent of safe, read-only behavior. The description adds that it returns 'full details', implying completeness. No contradictions.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is extremely concise (one sentence) with no redundant information. It front-loads the action and resource, making it efficient for an agent to parse.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple retrieval tool with one parameter and comprehensive annotations, the description is sufficient. It explains what it retrieves and how to identify the incident. The absence of output schema is compensated by stating 'full details', which sets expectations.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 100% schema description coverage, the baseline is 3. The description does not add any parameter semantics beyond what is already in the schema ('Security incident number (SIR...) or sys_id'). It is adequate but not value-adding.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the verb 'Get' and the resource 'full details of a security incident', and specifies the identifier as 'number or sys_id'. It distinguishes from sibling tools like 'list_security_incidents' (which lists) and 'update_security_incident' (which modifies), and also from 'get_incident' for regular incidents.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implicitly indicates usage for retrieving a single incident by identifier, but does not explicitly state when to use this tool over alternatives like 'list_security_incidents' or 'get_record'. No exclusions or when-not-to-use guidance is provided.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.