get_threat_intelligence

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint. Description adds that it queries threat intelligence data but does not disclose other behaviors like pagination, rate limits, or error handling. No contradiction with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Single sentence with a dash for listing data types. Front-loaded with action and resource. Efficient but could benefit from bullet points or additional structure for readability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Lacks explanation of output format or interpretation of results. With no output schema, the description should elaborate on what the query returns (e.g., fields, count). Annotations cover safety but not completeness.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema has 100% description coverage for all three parameters (query, type, limit). Description does not add extra meaning beyond the schema; it only lists example data types (IOCs, actors, campaigns) without linking to parameters.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Description clearly states the verb 'Query' and the resource 'threat intelligence data', specifying content types: IOCs, threat actors, campaigns. It distinguishes from sibling get_ tools by focusing on threat intelligence rather than a single record type.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus siblings like search_cmdb_ci or list_vulnerabilities. The description implies use for threat intelligence queries but does not provide when-not or alternative tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.