get_risk

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds only that it returns 'full details' — no note on permissions, error behavior when an identifier is not found, or record scope.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single sentence with the action and identifier front-loaded and zero filler. Nothing can be trimmed without losing meaning.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple read-only getter with a fully documented single parameter and annotations covering safety, the description is essentially complete; only a disambiguation from get_risk_statement/list_risks is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the parameter description already explains 'RKxxxxxxx or 32-char sys_id'; the description's example 'RK0020310' adds only a concrete format sample. Baseline 3 applies since the schema carries the parameter detail.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Get full details of a single Risk') plus the identifier forms, so an agent can tell it retrieves one risk record. It does not distinguish itself from the closely-named sibling get_risk_statement, leaving some ambiguity in a large GRC toolset.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The need for a single risk's full details is implied, and list_risks is the obvious alternative for browsing, but the description never says when to use this rather than list_risks or get_risk_statement. No exclusions or prerequisites are given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.