Premiere Pro MCP Server

Inspect Interchange Artifact

inspect_interchange_artifact

Read-onlyIdempotent

Identify the real structure of a caller-selected interchange file by hashing its bytes and detecting OTIO, FCP7 xmeml, FCPXML, or EDL; AAF/OMF remain opaque.

Instructions

Read caller-selected artifact bytes, hash them and identify actual OTIO/FCP7 xmeml/FCPXML/EDL structure. AAF/OMF are bounded opaque-byte evidence only. File existence, parsed structure, round-trip and licensed-host/destination evidence remain distinct.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`path`	Yes	Absolute caller-selected local file path. Referenced media is never opened automatically.
`format`	No	Requested format; XML root bytes distinguish FCP7 xmeml from FCPXML. AAF/OMF semantic parsing is unavailable.
`idempotency_key`	No	Optional client-chosen key (1-128 chars of A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ : -) for this intended edit. Pass a fresh key per edit and reuse it only when retrying that same edit, for example after a client-side timeout. A repeat with the same tool, key and arguments is not run again: while the first call is running it fails with IDEMPOTENCY_IN_PROGRESS (poll get_last_operations); after it finished it returns the original outcome marked replayed. A definite failure with nothing applied (receipt outcome not_applied) may be retried with the same key. Reusing a key with different arguments fails with IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED. Scoped to this MCP session (the stdio server process or one HTTP session) and held in memory only (200 keys, 1 hour); it does not survive a restart or reconnect. Read-only invocations are never deduplicated.
`expected_cep_target`	No	Optional reviewed CEP sequence/clip identity and exact tick ranges. Checked before every generated command; UXP refuses this CEP-only guard.
`expected_project_path`	No	Optional absolute saved-project path. Every generated CEP command refuses before its body when the active project differs or is unsaved. UXP commands refuse this CEP-only guard; local-only tools do not inspect Premiere. Omit to keep existing behavior.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`ok`	Yes	Whether the tool completed successfully.
`data`	No	Tool-specific result data when ok is true; on failure, diagnostic detail when the tool provides it.
`tool`	Yes	The registered MCP tool name.
`error`	No	Failure detail when ok is false.
`receipt`	No	Versioned common mutation receipt; success never implies rendered verification.
`idempotency`	No	Present when idempotency_key deduplicated this call: replayed is true when the original outcome was returned instead of running again.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedv1.25.0Oct 24, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / idempotency_key

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Optional client-chosen key (1-128 chars of A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ : -) for this intended edit. Pass a fresh key per edit and reuse it only when retrying that same edit, for example after a client-side timeout. A repeat with the same tool, key and arguments is not run again: while the first call is running it fails with IDEMPOTENCY_IN_PROGRESS (poll get_last_operations); after it finished it returns the original outcome marked replayed. A definite failure with nothing applied (receipt outcome not_applied) may be retried with the same key. Reusing a key with different arguments fails with IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED. Scoped to this MCP session (the stdio server process or one HTTP session) and held in memory only (200 keys, 1 hour); it does not survive a restart or reconnect. Read-only invocations are never deduplicated.",
+  "maxLength": 128,
+  "minLength": 1,
+  "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]+$",
+  "type": "string"
+}

addedOutput schema / properties / idempotency

Added value: +{
+  "additionalProperties": true,
+  "description": "Present when idempotency_key deduplicated this call: replayed is true when the original outcome was returned instead of running again.",
+  "type": "object"
+}

Addedv1.24.0Oct 12, 2026

TDQS

A3.7/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, non-destructive, idempotent, closed-world), so the bar is lower, yet the description still adds real context: it hashes bytes, only recognises structure rather than attesting existence, and flags that round-trip and licensed-host/destination evidence are separate concerns. That prevents an agent from over-reading the result as a validity guarantee. It stops short of saying referenced media is never opened or that missing files error out.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two to three short sentences, front-loaded with the verb and resource, with no repetition of the title. The wording is dense with internal jargon ('bounded opaque-byte evidence', 'remain distinct') that costs some clarity, but nothing is padded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and all five parameters are fully described in the schema. What is missing is the selection rationale among the many inspection siblings and whether the target file must already exist, but for a read-only single-path tool the description is close to complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so path, format and the CEP guard objects are already fully documented in the schema and the baseline is 3. The description adds only the notion of 'caller-selected artifact bytes' and does not explain how the format parameter interacts with byte-level sniffing beyond what the schema's enum descriptions already say.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence names specific verbs (read, hash, identify) and a specific resource (caller-selected interchange artifact), and enumerates the formats it can structurally parse versus the ones it cannot (AAF/OMF). It is clear what the tool does, but it never distinguishes itself from the format-specific siblings (inspect_otio_interchange, inspect_fcpxml_interchange, inspect_cmx3600_edl, inspect_interchange_loss_report), so an agent cannot tell when this general tool beats those.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: 'AAF/OMF are bounded opaque-byte evidence only' sets a capability boundary, and the final sentence implies the tool does not establish file existence or round-trip validity. There is no explicit 'use this when…' or 'prefer X instead' statement despite five similarly-named inspection siblings.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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