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CISO Assistant MCP Server

CISO Assistant MCP Server

Api webhooks audit sinks destroy

ciso_assistant_api_webhooks_audit_sinks_destroy
DestructiveIdempotent

Deletes an audit-log forwarding destination (AUDIT_SINK) by ID; set confirm when the client cannot answer a destructive-action prompt.

Instructions

Admin-managed audit-log forwarding destinations (kind=AUDIT_SINK). Folder/IAM

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "ciso_assistant_api_webhooks_audit_sinks_destroy"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYes
confirmNoExplicitly confirm this destructive operation. Needed only when the client cannot answer a confirmation prompt.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv2.3.12
    • addedInput schema / properties / confirm
      Added value: +{
      +  "default": false,
      +  "description": "Explicitly confirm this destructive operation. Needed only when the client cannot answer a confirmation prompt.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  2. First observedv2.3.6

TDQS

C2.1/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true and openWorldHint=true, so the description is not required to re-state the safety profile, but it should add context such as irreversibility or effects on downstream log forwarding. Instead it offers only the opaque fragment "Folder/IAM", which could mean folder scoping, IAM permission requirements, or audit-log category, and never mentions that the sink is permanently removed or that the schema's confirm flag exists for this destructive path. No annotation contradiction, but very little added value.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is short and the resource identification is front-loaded, which is good. However, the trailing "Folder/IAM" fragment is cryptic filler that does not communicate anything actionable, and the whole description omits the one thing an agent most needs — the verb.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, irreversible mutation with no output schema, the description should tell the agent what is removed and any prerequisites (admin rights, confirm flag usage). None of that is present, so the agent cannot determine consequences of the call from the definition.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 50%: the required `id` has no description at all, and the description never explains that `id` must be an existing audit-sink identifier (as opposed to a webhook endpoint id). The description does not compensate for the uncovered parameter as required at this coverage level.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose2/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description is a noun phrase describing what audit sinks ARE ("Admin-managed audit-log forwarding destinations (kind=AUDIT_SINK)") rather than a verb describing what the tool DOES. The action (destroy/delete) is only inferable from the tool name and the destructiveHint annotation, so an agent reading the description alone could mistake this for a describe/list tool. The parenthetical kind does at least distinguish it from the webhook endpoints siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No when-to-use guidance is given, and none of the obviously related siblings are named (audit_sinks_retrieve, audit_sinks_list, audit_sinks_update, audit_sinks_create, audit_sinks_replay_create). The fragment "Folder/IAM" hints at a permission or scoping prerequisite but is too terse to act on. The agent gets no instruction on when deletion is appropriate versus updating or disabling a sink.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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