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CISO Assistant MCP Server

CISO Assistant MCP Server

Api threats destroy

ciso_assistant_api_threats_destroy
DestructiveIdempotent

Deletes a threat record by ID through the CISO Assistant API, requiring explicit confirmation for this destructive operation.

Instructions

API endpoint that allows threats to be viewed or edited.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "ciso_assistant_api_threats_destroy"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYes
confirmNoExplicitly confirm this destructive operation. Needed only when the client cannot answer a confirmation prompt.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv2.3.12
    • addedInput schema / properties / confirm
      Added value: +{
      +  "default": false,
      +  "description": "Explicitly confirm this destructive operation. Needed only when the client cannot answer a confirmation prompt.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  2. First observedv2.3.6

TDQS

D1.9/5.0
Behavior1/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false and idempotentHint=true, but the description never mentions deletion, irreversibility, cascade effects, or what happens to linked objects. Worse, 'viewed' implies a read-only capability, which directly conflicts with readOnlyHint=false and the destroy semantics. This is an annotation contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is a single short sentence with no filler, so structurally it is efficient. However, the brevity comes at the cost of accuracy — the one clause present is the wrong clause for a deletion endpoint.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, open-world, non-read-only operation with no output schema, the description should state consequences, permanence, and confirmation behavior. None of that is present, so an agent cannot judge risk from the definition alone and must rely entirely on annotations.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 50%: the 'confirm' flag is documented in the schema itself, but 'id' is undocumented and the description contributes nothing about either parameter. With half the parameters lacking schema descriptions, the description needed to explain the identifier and confirmation semantics but does not.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose2/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description says the endpoint 'allows threats to be viewed or edited', which describes read/update behavior rather than the deletion this tool actually performs. The tool name says 'destroy' and annotations say destructive, so the sentence is effectively a generic DRF docstring that misrepresents the verb. It does not distinguish this tool from siblings like ciso_assistant_api_threats_retrieve or ciso_assistant_api_threats_update.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance about when to delete a threat versus using threats_update or threats_retrieve, and no mention of prerequisites such as required permissions or dependency checks. The 'viewed or edited' phrasing could actively steer an agent toward this destructive endpoint when it wanted a read. No alternatives are named.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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