Api resilience asset assessments destroy

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, openWorldHint=true, and idempotentHint=true, so the safety profile is covered structurally. The description adds nothing beyond the name — no statement about cascade effects, permanent data loss, or authorization requirements that a delete operation would warrant.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The text is a single duplicated identifier — technically short, but this is under-specification rather than conciseness. There is no front-loaded statement of purpose to build on.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation with no output schema, an undocumented parameter, and no annotations explaining consequences, the description provides nothing an agent needs in order to call it safely or correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

One required parameter (id) with 0% schema description coverage, and the description supplies no meaning at all — not even that 'id' identifies the assessment to delete. With a non-empty parameter set and no compensation, this is a clear gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description is simply the tool's own identifier restated, so it is tautological rather than explanatory. An agent can infer 'delete a resilience asset assessment' from the name tokens, but nothing in the description states the verb-resource relationship or distinguishes it from sibling destroy tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance on when to use this tool versus the many sibling destroy endpoints (ciso_assistant_api_asset_class_destroy, ciso_assistant_api_resilience_business_impact_analysis_destroy, etc.), nor any preconditions such as required permissions or irreversibility warnings.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.