ciso_assistant_api_threats_retrieveRetrieve a single threat record by ID from CISO Assistant, returning only authorized fields with restricted data masked.
Return a single object with unauthorized related fields masked.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v2.3.6Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint and destructiveHint=false, but the description adds a genuinely non-obvious behavioral trait: unauthorized related fields are masked in the returned object. It does not explain the authorization model or error behavior, but the masking disclosure is real value beyond the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single efficient sentence with no filler, and the key fact (single object, masked fields) is front-loaded. It is under-specified rather than padded, so it earns high marks on structure without reaching 5.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read tool with one parameter and a safety profile already covered by annotations, the description is minimally adequate. However it omits the resource name, id semantics, and any mention of behavior for missing/unauthorized records, leaving clear gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% and the description says nothing about the single 'id' parameter—not its meaning (threat identifier), format, or expected failure when the id is unknown. With a mandatory parameter whose semantics are wholly undocumented, the description fails to compensate for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states the operation returns a single object but never names the resource (threat) explicitly, relying on the tool name and title to carry that. It is not a pure tautology because it adds the masking detail, but an agent cannot distinguish it from siblings like threats_object_retrieve or threats_retrieve from the description alone.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no statement of when to use this versus the many sibling threat endpoints (list, object_retrieve, cascade_info_retrieve, ids_retrieve), nor any prerequisite or exclusion. The caller must infer usage purely from the name.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.