Api threats object retrieve

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true and destructiveHint=false, yet the description claims the endpoint allows threats to be "edited," implying mutation capability this operation does not have. That is a direct contradiction of the structured safety profile rather than value added beyond it.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One short sentence with no padding, so there is no verbosity problem; however brevity here comes from boilerplate under-specification rather than discipline, and nothing is front-loaded that helps an agent decide to call it.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-record retrieve with no output schema and an undocumented id parameter, the description should at least state what a threat object is and how the id is obtained. It instead leaves the agent with a misleading edit claim and no return-value expectations.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and the single required parameter (id) is undocumented in both schema and description — no indication of format (UUID vs slug vs integer ref_id), source, or behavior when the id is unknown. With only one parameter the gap is small, but the description does nothing to compensate for the zero coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description restates the tool name/title: "API endpoint that allows threats to be viewed or edited" adds only the resource noun (threats) and the generic verb "viewed." It gives no signal about what distinguishes this from the many sibling threat tools (threats_list, threats_retrieve, threats_object_retrieve, threats_cascade_info_retrieve), leaving the agent unable to tell object_retrieve from retrieve or list.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance, no mention of the required id lookup or how to obtain one, and no routing to alternatives such as the list endpoint for browsing. The only usage-adjacent statement ("viewed or edited") actively misdirects toward a write path that the annotations say does not exist.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.