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now-sdk-ext-mcp

now-sdk-ext-mcp

by sonisoft-cnanda
OverviewSchemaSourceRelated ServersDiscussionsAdmin
TypeScript
Remote

Update ACL

update_acl
DestructiveIdempotent

Modify an ACL’s fields such as roles, condition, script, and active state, capturing each verified change in a specified update set. Confirm who gains or loses access before applying.

Instructions

Change an access control's fields (roles: add_acl_role / remove_acl_role). This is a security change: before calling it, tell the user who gains or loses access and get their go-ahead. It elevates its own session to security_admin (only for ACL tools; other tools stay unelevated) and writes into the named update set, verifying each write by reading it back. On an ACL that already has code (a script or javascript: condition), switching it on, changing its operation or turning admin overrides off also needs permission to run code. Deactivating (active=false) is a security change too: other ACLs, the parent table's, or the default then decide, and switching off a Deny-Unless ACL can only widen access.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scopeNoThe ACL's application: its scope name (e.g. "x_acme_app"), or "global". Give this or scope_id.
activeNoActivate (true) or deactivate (false).
scriptNoScript that sets `answer`. Also turns on advanced, so the form shows it (the platform runs it either way). Code on an ACL runs on the instance at every check, so setting it needs permission to run code as well as to write.
sys_idYesThe ACL's sys_id.
instanceNoThe ServiceNow instance auth alias to connect to. This is the alias configured via `snc configure` (e.g., "myinstance", "prod", "test"). The user will typically refer to this by name when saying things like "on my myinstance instance". If not provided, falls back to the SN_AUTH_ALIAS environment variable.
scope_idNoThe ACL's application by sys_scope sys_id, instead of scope.
conditionNoEncoded query condition the record must meet. A javascript: value in it is code: it needs permission to run code as well as to write.
operationNoOperation name.
update_setYessys_id of an In progress update set of that application (create one with create_update_set). Every write is captured there and verified; the user's own current update set is left as it is.
descriptionNoDescription. The platform may write its own on first save.
decision_typeNoallow (Allow-If; create_acl default) or deny (Deny-Unless: checked first, grants nothing on its own). update_acl: omit to leave it.
admin_overridesNoWhether admin passes regardless (the form's Admin overrides). create_acl default: true; update_acl: omit to leave it.
acknowledge_upgrade_skipNoOnly for an installed Store application, and only after the user has reviewed it: upgrades of that application then skip this ACL until the customization is reviewed.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv5.5.0

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Adds substantial context beyond the annotations: scoped elevation to security_admin (ACL tools only), writes captured in a named update set with read-back verification, the additional code-run permission needed for script/condition/operation changes, and the widened-access risk of deactivating a Deny-Unless ACL. The only gap is return-value shape, which no output schema covers either.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core mutation and the approval requirement; security caveats follow in a logical order. The third and fourth sentences are dense and run long, but each carries non-obvious operational information, so little is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 13-parameter destructive mutation with no output schema, the description covers the risky dimensions well: elevation scope, update-set capture and verification, permission escalation for code fields, and deactivation semantics. What it does not cover is what the call returns on success or failure, which an agent would need to confirm the change.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds genuine meaning: roles are not a field here and must be handled via add_acl_role / remove_acl_role, active=false changes which other ACL decides, and script/condition carry extra permission requirements. This goes beyond restating the schema text.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Change an access control's fields') and immediately disambiguates the field-level scope by routing role edits to add_acl_role / remove_acl_role. An agent can distinguish this from create_acl, delete_acl, and the role tools without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a hard precondition (tell the user who gains or loses access and get approval before calling) and names the alternative tools for role changes. It does not explicitly contrast with update_metadata_record or state when to prefer this over a generic record update, so it falls short of full when/when-not coverage.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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