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now-sdk-ext-mcp

now-sdk-ext-mcp

List ACLs

list_acls
Read-only

Lists ServiceNow access control records and their roles by table, name, scope, or scope ID to audit permissions and determine which users can access records, fields, UI pages, or endpoints.

Instructions

List access controls (sys_security_acl) with their roles. Needs at least one of table, name, scope or scope_id. table returns the table's own ACLs: table, table.* and table.<field> (not the parent tables'; list those too). Roles on one ACL are alternatives; snc_internal among them lets every internal user pass.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameNoExact ACL name, e.g. incident.short_description or a UI page name.
typeNoACL type: record, ui_page, rest_endpoint, client_callable_script_include, ...
scopeNoOnly this application's ACLs: a scope name, or "global".
tableNoACLs of this table: the table, table.* and table.<field>.
activeNoOnly active (true) or inactive (false) ACLs.
elevateNoRead elevated to security_admin, so roles hidden until then show their names. Ask the user first.
instanceNoThe ServiceNow instance auth alias to connect to. This is the alias configured via `snc configure` (e.g., "myinstance", "prod", "test"). The user will typically refer to this by name when saying things like "on my myinstance instance". If not provided, falls back to the SN_AUTH_ALIAS environment variable.
scope_idNoOnly this application's ACLs, by sys_scope sys_id.
operationNoOperation name: read, write, create, delete, execute, ...

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv5.5.0

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint; the description adds real domain behavior: the mandatory filter, the fact that table filtering excludes parent-table ACLs ('list those too'), and the security semantics that roles on one ACL are alternatives and snc_internal admits every internal user. It does not discuss result size, paging, or ordering for a potentially large list.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences: what it lists, what input is required, then the per-filter and role semantics. Every clause carries information, though the nested parenthetical about parent tables reads a bit awkwardly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a nine-parameter read-only listing tool with no output schema, the description covers the critical gap (no required parameters) and the key filter semantics, and it indicates that roles accompany each result. Paging and result-shape detail are absent but are secondary for a safe read operation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so each parameter is already documented, and the description mostly echoes the `table` semantics. The one genuine addition is the cross-parameter constraint ('needs at least one of...'), which the schema cannot express since no fields are required. Beyond that it adds little parameter-level meaning.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence names a specific verb and resource and even the underlying table (sys_security_acl), and adds that roles are returned with each ACL. This clearly separates it from get_acl (single record) and from the create/update/delete_acl siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states a concrete invocation precondition: at least one of table, name, scope or scope_id must be supplied, which is essential since the schema marks nothing required. It also clarifies which ACLs a `table` filter does and does not cover. It stops short of naming alternatives such as get_acl for a single known ACL.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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