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@proof-holdings/mcp-server

@proof-holdings/mcp-server

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by ProofHoldings
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TypeScript
Hybrid

upload_approval_channel_keys

Destructive

Registers an approval channel's RSA-4096 keypair: validates the public key, computes the key ID, and stores the client-side encrypted private key so human approvals can be verified.

Instructions

Upload an encryption keypair for an approval channel. The server validates the RSA-4096 public key and computes the key ID. Note: the encrypted_private_key is already encrypted client-side with the user's password — the server never sees the password. The owner sets that password in the dashboard under Settings → Approvals password (https://proof.holdings/dev).

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "hitl_id": "<hitl_id>",
      "public_key": "<public_key>",
      "encrypted_private_key": "<encrypted_private_key>",
      "kdf_salt": "<kdf_salt>"
    },
    "name": "upload_approval_channel_keys"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dek_ivNov2 envelope: the IV of that wrapping
dek_tagNov2 envelope: the GCM tag of that wrapping
hitl_idYesApproval channel ID
kdf_saltYesBase64url-encoded PBKDF2 salt
public_keyYesPEM-encoded RSA-4096 SPKI public key
wrapped_dekNov2 envelope: the data key wrapped under the master key
backup_dek_ivNov2 envelope: the IV of the recovery wrapping
backup_dek_tagNov2 envelope: the GCM tag of the recovery wrapping
backup_wrapped_dekNov2 envelope: the data key wrapped under the recovery code
encrypted_private_keyYesJSON-serialized encrypted private key envelope (PBKDF2-SHA256+AES-256-GCM)

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
kidYesThe stored key's id
messageYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.10.0

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With annotations already declaring readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=true, the description still adds real substance: the server validates the RSA-4096 public key, computes the key ID, and never sees the user's password because the private key is encrypted client-side, plus where the owner sets that password. What it omits is the destructiveness detail matching the annotation — whether uploading replaces or invalidates an existing keypair for the channel.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and its validation behavior are front-loaded in the first two sentences, followed by the security note and a clearly separated ACCESS block. The dev URL and the closing 'call this tool again' instruction are slightly operational clutter for a tool description, but nothing is redundant enough to obscure the main point.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 10-parameter mutation tool with a full output schema and annotations already covering the safety profile, the description supplies the encryption model, validation behavior, and credential prerequisite an agent needs before calling. The remaining gap is lifecycle behavior — whether an upload overwrites existing keys — which matters given destructiveHint=true but is not addressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema fully documents all ten fields including the optional v2 envelope parameters (wrapped_dek, dek_iv, dek_tag, backup_*). The description reinforces two key semantics — the PEM-encoded RSA-4096 public key and the client-side-encrypted private key envelope — but adds nothing about the remaining fields, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'Upload an encryption keypair for an approval channel,' and scopes it further with 'The server validates the RSA-4096 public key and computes the key ID.' The purpose is unambiguous, but the description never distinguishes this from the closely named sibling upload_hitl_keys, leaving the agent to guess which keypair store it targets.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage guidance is limited to access prerequisites: it says a Proof account and PROOF_API_KEY are required and explicitly rules out start_login as a way to enable this tool, which is a genuinely useful exclusion. It says nothing about when to call this versus get_approval_channel_keys, delete_approval_channel_keys, or upload_hitl_keys, so the choice of tool is only implied by the name.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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