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@proof-holdings/mcp-server

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delete_hitl_keys

Destructive

Delete the encryption keypair from a HITL config to revoke decryption access; existing ciphertexts become permanently unreadable. Requires a Proof API key.

Instructions

Delete the encryption keypair from a HITL config. WARNING: Existing ciphertexts will become permanently unreadable.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
hitl_idYesHITL config ID

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, but the description adds the concrete downstream consequence that existing ciphertexts become permanently unreadable and documents the auth requirement. Those are exactly the behavioral details the structured hints do not convey, so it materially adds beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The action and its destructive warning are front-loaded in the first sentence, and the access note is isolated in a separate block. It is efficient; the access paragraph is slightly verbose but every part (env var, restart, start_login caveat) is actionable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter destructive tool with annotations and no output schema, the definition covers the safety warning and the auth gate adequately. Nothing critical is missing, though it does not note whether the deletion is idempotent or what the response looks like.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single hitl_id parameter is documented in the schema. The description adds no syntax, format, or acceptance detail beyond what the schema already provides, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (Delete) and resource (the encryption keypair) scoped to a HITL config, so an agent can distinguish it from delete_hitl (which removes the config) and from get_hitl_keys/upload_hitl_keys. The resource is named precisely rather than as a vague 'hitl operation'.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The ACCESS block gives clear prerequisites (needs a Proof account, set PROOF_API_KEY and restart) and explicitly warns that start_login does NOT unlock this tool, which prevents a common failed-attempt path. It never spells out when to prefer this over delete_hitl or revoke-style alternatives, so it stops short of full when/when-not routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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