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@proof-holdings/mcp-server

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delete_hitl_keys

Destructive

Delete the encryption keypair from a HITL config; existing ciphertexts become permanently unreadable. Use only when you intend to remove key access.

Instructions

Delete the encryption keypair from a HITL config. WARNING: Existing ciphertexts will become permanently unreadable.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
hitl_idYesHITL config ID

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
messageNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.7.2
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": {},
      +  "properties": {
      +    "message": {}
      +  },
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, but the description adds a concrete consequence those annotations cannot express: existing ciphertexts become permanently unreadable. It also discloses a real access precondition (a Proof account with PROOF_API_KEY set, server restart, and no start_login path), which is exactly the kind of operational context annotations cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose comes first, then the destructive warning, then the access requirement, so severity is front-loaded and each block carries distinct information. The ACCESS paragraph is a little telegraphic ('start_login does NOT open this tool'), but no sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the description covers the destructive outcome and the authentication prerequisite. The one gap is whether the keypair can be restored afterwards via upload_hitl_keys, which would tell the agent how reversible this really is.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single required parameter, hitl_id, and schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already supplies its meaning ('HITL config ID'). The description adds nothing about parameter formatting or sourcing, which is acceptable given full schema coverage but earns no extra credit.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource ('Delete the encryption keypair from a HITL config'), which cleanly separates it from sibling key tools such as get_hitl_keys and upload_hitl_keys as well as from delete_hitl, which deletes a config. An agent can identify the operation without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The warning about existing ciphertexts becoming permanently unreadable makes the condition that should trigger caution explicit, and the ACCESS note tells the agent that the tool cannot be unlocked via start_login. It stops short of naming concrete alternatives (for example, whether to re-upload keys via upload_hitl_keys instead of deleting), so it is clear but not fully comparative.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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