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ProofHoldings

@proof-holdings/mcp-server

Official

remove_phone

Destructive

Remove a phone number from a Proof account, revoking its proofs and consents and updating the primary phone. Requires a code; irreversible.

Instructions

Remove a phone number from the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type phone_remove and targets [this phone id]. Revokes every proof of the number and your own consents naming it, declines pending confirmations waiting on it, flags approval setups left with no approver, deletes the record and its messenger links, signs out your other devices, and names the new primary phone — your Proof of Me circles then reach you there. Refused for the number you signed in with, for your only way to sign in, and for your last phone while circles are active (circles_need_phone: add another phone first, or archive the circles). Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesPhone record ID

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, but the description goes far beyond them: it lists revoked proofs and consents, declined pending confirmations, flagged approver-less setups, deleted messenger links, sign-out of other devices, new primary selection, and states 'Cannot be undone.' This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure for a mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action and the mandatory 2FA prerequisite before the effect list and refusal rules. The effects are packed into one long run-on sentence, which is dense but every clause conveys a distinct consequence, so little could be cut without losing value.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers action, prerequisite auth flow, exhaustive side effects, refusal conditions with remedies, irreversibility, and access setup. With no output schema needed for a delete operation, nothing an agent needs to invoke this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter ('id', Phone record ID) with 100% schema description coverage, so the schema already carries the semantics. The description adds only the indirect hint that this id is the target used in the 2FA code flow, not extra format or sourcing detail. Baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Remove a phone number from the account') and is trivially distinguishable from siblings like remove_email or set_primary_phone. The scope of what is removed and the effects are made explicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states the prerequisite 2FA flow (start_2fa_for_action with action_type phone_remove and targets [this phone id]) and enumerates the exact conditions under which the call is refused (signed-in number, only sign-in method, last phone with active circles), including the remediation ('add another phone first, or archive the circles').

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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