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@proof-holdings/mcp-server

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start_2fa

Start a two-factor authentication challenge for sensitive actions, sending a verification code via a chosen channel and returning a session ID to poll until verified.

Instructions

Start a two-factor authentication challenge for a sensitive operation. Sends a verification code via the chosen channel. Returns a session ID, and for messaging channels: deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display).

Agent usage — full 2FA flow: (1) Call start_2fa with the appropriate action_type and channel. (2) Present the challenge, and do NOT announce a message the server did not send: email is the ONLY channel it dispatches on. On telegram/whatsapp the user opens deep_link and sends the message themselves; on sms they send sms_message to a number from sms_dids; the response's own instructions field says which. On email, a 200 carrying requires_email_selection: true and available_emails means nothing was sent and no session exists — ask which address and call again with email_id. For telegram/whatsapp, pass deep_link to render_auth_link; for sms, show sms_message. Never hand qr_text to a link renderer — it is the link already rendered as QR art, so print it verbatim inside a fenced code block only when a real terminal needs the QR. (3) Poll get_2fa_status with the returned session_id until status is "verified" (the user enters the code on their device) or "expired". (4) If verified, proceed with the protected operation (e.g. create_api_key). If expired, inform the user and offer to restart. Typical channels: "telegram" or "email". For email, the user may receive a magic link instead of a code — the backend handles this automatically.

The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
channelYesChannel to receive the verification code
targetsNoThe ids the step-up is FOR — the grant is bound to exactly these and refused for any other request (`reason: target_mismatch`). revocation_bulk: the asset id you will pass to revoke_asset (one code per asset); phone_remove / email_remove: the phone or email record id; domain_remove: the domain id; profile_delete: the project id; account_delete: your own user id (get_current_user). Leave out for the other action types.
email_idNoSpecific email ID for email channel (optional)
action_typeYesThe sensitive action requiring 2FA

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.6.0
    • changedInput schema / properties / action_type / enum
      Previous value: -[
      -  "api_key_view",
      -  "api_key_create",
      -  "api_key_revoke",
      -  "api_key_regenerate",
      -  "phone_add",
      -  "phone_remove",
      -  "email_add",
      -  "email_remove",
      -  "account_delete"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "api_key_view",
      +  "api_key_create",
      +  "api_key_revoke",
      +  "api_key_regenerate",
      +  "phone_add",
      +  "phone_remove",
      +  "email_add",
      +  "email_remove",
      +  "account_delete",
      +  "revocation_bulk",
      +  "domain_remove",
      +  "profile_delete",
      +  "phone_primary",
      +  "email_primary"
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / targets
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "The ids the step-up is FOR — the grant is bound to exactly these and refused for any other request (`reason: target_mismatch`). revocation_bulk: the asset id you will pass to revoke_asset (one code per asset); phone_remove / email_remove: the phone or email record id; domain_remove: the domain id; profile_delete: the project id; account_delete: your own user id (get_current_user). Leave out for the other action types.",
      +  "items": {
      +    "maxLength": 256,
      +    "minLength": 1,
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "maxItems": 25,
      +  "minItems": 1,
      +  "type": "array"
      +}
  2. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=false, but the description adds substantial operational behavior: which channel actually dispatches, that a 200 with `requires_email_selection: true` means nothing was sent and no session exists, that the grant is bound to `targets` and refused with `reason: target_mismatch`, and that users never see tool results. This is exactly the context annotations cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose, then the flow in numbered steps, so scanning is easy and the renderer/polling warnings earn their place. It is dense and long for a 4-parameter tool, with some repetition about channels, but nearly every sentence carries actionable routing or safety information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, and the description compensates fully by naming the returned fields (session ID, deep_link, qr_code, qr_text, instructions, sms_message, sms_dids, requires_email_selection, available_emails) and what each means for the agent's next step. Nothing needed to invoke the tool or handle its result is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, but the description still adds meaning beyond it: it directs `email_id` usage when `requires_email_selection` is returned, ties `channel` to concrete downstream behavior, and warns never to pass `qr_text` to a link renderer. It adds channel-level semantics the enum alone does not convey.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'Start a two-factor authentication challenge for a sensitive operation,' and the following flow sentence clarifies scope precisely. However, a near-identical sibling `start_2fa_for_action` exists and the description never distinguishes this tool from it or from `start_2fa_for_action`'s role, so an agent must guess between two similarly named starters.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit numbered flow (call start_2fa, present challenge, poll get_2fa_status, then proceed), names the alternatives (`get_2fa_status` for polling, `render_auth_link` for telegram/whatsapp links, `create_api_key` as the downstream protected op), and states channel-specific when/when-not rules (email dispatches, telegram/whatsapp/sms require the user to send the message).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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