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@proof-holdings/mcp-server

@proof-holdings/mcp-server

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get_confirmation

Read-only

Retrieve a confirmation by ID to view its status, response, and proof token for verification.

Instructions

Get a confirmation by ID. Returns the full confirmation including status, response, and proof token.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesConfirmation ID

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesMongoDB ObjectId
statusYesStatus of a confirmation request. A confirmation that times out is `denied`, with `response.channel` `system` and `response.text` `timeout`.
hitl_idYes
messageYesThe stored ciphertext envelope, echoed back verbatim. The server never sees the plaintext, so this is never the human sentence — the approver decrypts it in their browser.
resendsNoEvery "Send again" (`POST /confirmations/{id}/resend`), oldest first, the last 50 kept. Absent from an API that predates it.
responseNoThe decision and its evidence (null while pending)
created_atYes
timeout_atNoWhen this confirmation will time out
updated_atYes
proof_tokenNoSigned proof of the decision, approval or denial alike, naming who decided (`decided_by`, plus `authorization_id` for an approver); null while pending and for a system denial (`response.channel` is `system`)
resolved_atNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.7.2
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": {},
      +  "description": "A HITL confirmation request",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "created_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "hitl_id": {
      +      "allOf": [
      +        {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        {}
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "id": {
      +      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "message": {
      +      "description": "The stored ciphertext envelope, echoed back verbatim. The server never sees the plaintext, so this is never the human sentence — the approver decrypts it in their browser.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "proof_token": {
      +      "description": "Signed proof of the decision, approval or denial alike, naming who decided (`decided_by`, plus `authorization_id` for an approver); null while pending and for a system denial (`response.channel` is `system`)",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "resends": {
      +      "description": "Every \"Send again\" (`POST /confirmations/{id}/resend`), oldest first, the last 50 kept. Absent from an API that predates it.",
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": {},
      +        "properties": {
      +          "actor": {
      +            "additionalProperties": {},
      +            "properties": {
      +              "api_key_id": {
      +                "type": [
      +                  "string",
      +                  "null"
      +                ]
      +              },
      +              "kind": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              }
      +            },
      +            "required": [
      +              "kind",
      +              "api_key_id"
      +            ],
      +            "type": "object"
      +          },
      +          "at": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "channels": {
      +            "items": {
      +              "additionalProperties": {},
      +              "properties": {
      +                "recipient": {
      +                  "type": "string"
      +                },
      +                "type": {
      +                  "type": "string"
      +                }
      +              },
      +              "required": [
      +                "type",
      +                "recipient"
      +              ],
      +              "type": "object"
      +            },
      +            "type": "array"
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "required": [
      +          "at",
      +          "actor",
      +          "channels"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "resolved_at": {
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "response": {
      +      "anyOf": [
      +        {
      +          "additionalProperties": {},
      +          "properties": {
      +            "action": {
      +              "type": "string"
      +            },
      +            "at": {
      +              "type": "string"
      +            },
      +            "authorization_id": {
      +              "type": [
      +                "string",
      +                "null"
      +              ]
      +            },
      +            "channel": {
      +              "type": [
      +                "string",
      +                "null"
      +              ]
      +            },
      +            "decided_by": {
      +              "type": [
      +                "string",
      +                "null"
      +              ]
      +            },
      +            "kid": {
      +              "type": [
      +                "string",
      +                "null"
      +              ]
      +            },
      +            "public_key": {
      +              "type": [
      +                "string",
      +                "null"
      +              ]
      +            },
      +            "signature": {
      +              "type": [
      +                "string",
      +                "null"
      +              ]
      +            },
      +            "signed_input": {
      +              "type": [
      +                "string",
      +                "null"
      +              ]
      +            },
      +            "text": {
      +              "type": [
      +                "string",
      +                "null"
      +              ]
      +            }
      +          },
      +          "required": [
      +            "action",
      +            "at"
      +          ],
      +          "type": "object"
      +        },
      +        {
      +          "type": "null"
      +        }
      +      ],
      +      "description": "The decision and its evidence (null while pending)"
      +    },
      +    "status": {
      +      "description": "Status of a confirmation request. A confirmation that times out is `denied`, with `response.channel` `system` and `response.text` `timeout`.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "timeout_at": {
      +      "description": "When this confirmation will time out",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "updated_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "id",
      +    "hitl_id",
      +    "message",
      +    "status",
      +    "created_at",
      +    "updated_at"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

readOnlyHint=true already covers the safety profile, and the description adds real context beyond that: the auth setup requirement and restart step, plus the fact that a proof token is part of the payload. It does not note that the proof token is sensitive output or that the confirmation may be pending, which keeps it below a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences with the purpose and return contents front-loaded, followed by a short access block. The access note is somewhat abruptly worded with a run-on 'set ... and restart ... then call' chain but every sentence carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter read tool with an output schema, an annotation covering safety, and an explicit auth prerequisite, nothing needed to invoke it correctly is missing. The output schema means return values need no further elaboration.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% for the single 'id' parameter, so the schema already documents it. The description adds no guidance on where the ID comes from (create_confirmation, list_confirmations) or its format, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb plus resource ('Get a confirmation by ID') and an explicit statement of what is returned (status, response, proof token). It is clearly distinguishable from create_confirmation, list_confirmations, and wait_for_confirmation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a useful negative routing hint ('start_login does NOT open this tool') and the prerequisite for use (a Proof account with PROOF_API_KEY). However, it never addresses the obvious alternative — wait_for_confirmation — so an agent cannot tell whether to poll this tool or block on the sibling, which is the main selection decision here.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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