@proof-holdings/mcp-server

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revoke_asset

Destructive

Revoke all proofs for a phone, email, or domain asset while keeping the asset on the account; domain revocation also removes delegations and cannot be undone.

Instructions

Revoke the proofs of one of your assets (a phone, email or domain) — the asset stays on the account. Owner only: sign in with start_login (a connection with only an API key is refused user_session_required — a key revokes a proof with revoke_proof instead), then one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type revocation_bulk and targets [this asset id], wait_for_2fa, and call again. A phone or email: every proof of that number or address is revoked; signing in with it again issues a fresh proof. A domain you own: every proof of the domain and every delegation issued from it are revoked for good, and the domain needs re-verification — re-verifying does NOT bring the delegations back. Need a temporary stop for a domain proof? Use suspend_proof instead. Status-checking verifiers see the revocation within about a minute; signature-only verifiers accept a token until it expires. Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes	Asset ID

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`type`	No
`notice`	No
`outcome`	No	`not_found` is also the answer for an asset the account does not own.
`success`	No	Always `true`
`asset_id`	No
`identifier`	No	Masked for phones and emails; a domain travels in clear.
`domain_status`	No	Domains only: `reverification_required` — the domain stays on the account and needs re-verification before anything can be issued from it.
`revoked_asset_ids`	No	Every asset of the same identifier this call revoked with it, the named one included — a phone holds one asset per channel, a domain one per verification.
`delegations_revoked`	No	Domains only: the delegations revoked with the proofs. Re-verifying does not bring them back.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedv1.7.2Nov 6, 2026

removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "properties": {
+    "asset_id": {},
+    "delegations_revoked": {
+      "description": "Domains only: the delegations revoked with the proofs. Re-verifying does not bring them back."
+    },
+    "domain_status": {
+      "description": "Domains only: `reverification_required` — the domain stays on the account and needs re-verification before anything can be issued from it."
+    },
+    "identifier": {
+      "description": "Masked for phones and emails; a domain travels in clear."
+    },
+    "notice": {},
+    "outcome": {
+      "description": "`not_found` is also the answer for an asset the account does not own."
+    },
+    "revoked_asset_ids": {
+      "description": "Every asset of the same identifier this call revoked with it, the named one included — a phone holds one asset per channel, a domain one per verification."
+    },
+    "success": {
+      "description": "Always `true`"
+    },
+    "type": {}
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

First observedv1.1.0Sep 9, 2026

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only say destructiveHint=true; the description goes far beyond by disclosing what is destroyed per asset type (all proofs of a phone/email vs all proofs plus all issued delegations for a domain), that domain re-verification does not restore delegations, that the action is irreversible, and the propagation semantics (status-checking verifiers within ~1 minute, signature-only verifiers until token expiry). Auth failure modes (user_session_required) are also named.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose and the 'asset stays' distinction are front-loaded, and the dense sentence packing (dashes, semicolons) keeps length proportional to a genuinely complex operation. It is a heavy read, but almost every clause carries operational information rather than filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers the full decision surface for an irreversible, owner-only mutation: required session state, the two-step 2FA protocol, per-asset-type consequences, alternatives, propagation timing, and re-verification caveats. An output schema exists, so return values need not be described.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% for the single `id` parameter, so the baseline is 3; the description adds meaning by explaining that the id may reference a phone, email or domain and that the resulting behavior differs materially by that type. It does not add format/syntax detail beyond that.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with the specific verb+resource ("Revoke the proofs of one of your assets") and immediately clarifies the crucial scope distinction that the asset itself stays on the account — separating it from remove_phone/remove_email/delete_domain siblings. It also names revoke_proof as the differently-scoped alternative, so an agent can discriminate without opening schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit routing: use revoke_proof instead when authenticated with only an API key, use suspend_proof for a temporary domain stop, and the exact prerequisite chain (start_login, then start_2fa_for_action with action_type revocation_bulk, wait_for_2fa, then call again) is spelled out. When-not-to-use conditions are as clear as when-to-use.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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