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@proof-holdings/mcp-server

Official

rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret

Destructive

Replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret and return the new one so you can store it. New deliveries are signed with the new secret; already queued deliveries keep the old one.

Instructions

Replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret and return the new one — this and create_webhook_endpoint are the only times a secret is returned, so store it now. New deliveries are signed with the new secret; deliveries already queued keep the secret they were queued with.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesWebhook endpoint ID

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idNoMongoDB ObjectId
urlNoHTTPS URL deliveries are POSTed to, at most 2000 characters. Private, loopback and link-local addresses are refused.
scopeNo`all` — every sub-account, present and future, plus account-level events. `selected` — only the sub-accounts in `profile_ids`; account-level events never reach it.
eventsNo
legacyNoThe endpoint converted from the account's single webhook URL — the one the deprecated `/me/settings` webhook block reads and writes.
secretNoThe signing secret — returned only in this response. Store it now.
statusNoA `disabled` endpoint receives nothing; its history and secret are kept.
created_atNo
secret_setNoWhether the endpoint has a signing secret (always true).
updated_atNo
descriptionNo
profile_idsNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.7.2

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, and the description goes well beyond that by explaining rotation semantics: new deliveries are signed with the new secret while already-queued deliveries retain their original secret. It also flags the one-time secret exposure and the account/auth prerequisite, which is exactly the extra context annotations cannot carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and its consequence are front-loaded in the first sentence, with rotation timing and access requirements following. The ACCESS paragraph is a little verbose, but each sentence carries actionable information rather than restating the name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, credential-rotating operation the description covers the action, the irreversible consequence for queued deliveries, the one-time secret exposure, and the auth setup requirement. With an output schema present, return-shape detail is not needed, so nothing essential is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the single 'id' parameter is already documented as a 24-hex webhook endpoint ID. The description adds nothing about the parameter's format or source, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first clause gives a specific verb and resource: replace a webhook endpoint's signing secret and return the new one. It also implicitly scopes itself apart from create_webhook_endpoint, but never distinguishes itself from the sibling rotate_callback_secret or update_webhook_endpoint, which an agent could easily confuse with it.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear situational context — that this is one of only two calls that ever return a secret, and that the secret must be stored immediately. It does not, however, state when an agent should rotate rather than use rotate_callback_secret or update_webhook_endpoint, so the alternative-selection guidance is incomplete.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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