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get_webhook_delivery

Read-only

Retrieve a webhook delivery attempt by ID, including request and response payloads plus retry history, to troubleshoot failed or delayed webhook events.

Instructions

Get details of a single webhook delivery attempt including request/response payloads and retry history.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`id`	Yes	Webhook delivery ID

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	Yes	MongoDB ObjectId
`url`	Yes
`status`	Yes	Delivery status
`payload`	Yes	The event body as stored. Every `proof_token` in it is null: the body POSTed to the receiver carries the token, read from its record at send time, and delivery history keeps no copy.
`attempts`	Yes
`created_at`	Yes
`event_type`	Yes	Type of webhook event. `proof.suspended`/`proof.unsuspended` fire for a delegation (`ph_dlg_`) lifecycle act on the account's own configured webhook_url — not a channel to a separately-addressed delegate (h-fix-delegation-suspend-governance). `proof.reissued`/`delegation.reissued` say a stored token was re-signed under a new key: a reference only (`proof_id` or `handle`, `kid`, `reissued_at`, `token_url`, and the `profile_id` every body carries), never the token; `proof.` does not cover `delegation.reissued`.
`profile_id`	Yes	The sub-account whose event it was. Null for an account-level event, and for deliveries recorded before #421.
`updated_at`	Yes
`endpoint_id`	Yes	The webhook endpoint it was sent to. Null for a request's `callback_url` and for a delivery to the account's settings webhook URL before the switch-over to endpoints.
`delivered_at`	Yes
`max_attempts`	Yes
`error_message`	Yes
`next_retry_at`	Yes
`response_body`	Yes	The receiver's response body.
`last_attempt_at`	Yes
`response_status`	Yes
`token_omitted_reason`	No	Why the last send carried `proof_token: null`. Every attempt, the first included, sends the token the delivery was queued with, or null: a retried delivery carries the same `proof_token` as the first attempt or `proof_token: null`, never a different token. `source_gone`: the record holding the token no longer exists, or (for a delivery stored before tokens were left out of history) could not be identified. `token_absent`: it holds no token, or there was none when the delivery was queued. `token_changed`: its token is no longer the one the delivery was queued with (re-issued or changed since). Null when every token was sent. Absent from an API that predates it.
`verification_request_id`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedv1.7.2Nov 6, 2026

removedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Removed value: -false
```

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": {},
+  "description": "Webhook delivery record",
+  "properties": {
+    "attempts": {
+      "maximum": 9007199254740991,
+      "minimum": -9007199254740991,
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "created_at": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "delivered_at": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "endpoint_id": {
+      "description": "The webhook endpoint it was sent to. Null for a request's `callback_url` and for a delivery to the account's settings webhook URL before the switch-over to endpoints.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "error_message": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "event_type": {
+      "description": "Type of webhook event. `proof.suspended`/`proof.unsuspended` fire for a delegation (`ph_dlg_*`) lifecycle act on the account's own configured webhook_url — not a channel to a separately-addressed delegate (h-fix-delegation-suspend-governance). `proof.reissued`/`delegation.reissued` say a stored token was re-signed under a new key: a reference only (`proof_id` or `handle`, `kid`, `reissued_at`, `token_url`, and the `profile_id` every body carries), never the token; `proof.*` does not cover `delegation.reissued`.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "id": {
+      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "last_attempt_at": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "max_attempts": {
+      "maximum": 9007199254740991,
+      "minimum": -9007199254740991,
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "next_retry_at": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "payload": {
+      "additionalProperties": {},
+      "description": "The event body as stored. Every `proof_token` in it is null: the body POSTed to the receiver carries the token, read from its record at send time, and delivery history keeps no copy.",
+      "properties": {},
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    "profile_id": {
+      "description": "The sub-account whose event it was. Null for an account-level event, and for deliveries recorded before #421.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "response_body": {
+      "description": "The receiver's response body.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "response_status": {
+      "anyOf": [
+        {
+          "maximum": 9007199254740991,
+          "minimum": -9007199254740991,
+          "type": "integer"
+        },
+        {
+          "type": "null"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "status": {
+      "description": "Delivery status",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "token_omitted_reason": {
+      "description": "Why the last send carried `proof_token: null`. Every attempt, the first included, sends the token the delivery was queued with, or null: a retried delivery carries the same `proof_token` as the first attempt or `proof_token: null`, never a different token. `source_gone`: the record holding the token no longer exists, or (for a delivery stored before tokens were left out of history) could not be identified. `token_absent`: it holds no token, or there was none when the delivery was queued. `token_changed`: its token is no longer the one the delivery was queued with (re-issued or changed since). Null when every token was sent. Absent from an API that predates it.",
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    },
+    "updated_at": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "url": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "verification_request_id": {
+      "type": [
+        "string",
+        "null"
+      ]
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "id",
+    "verification_request_id",
+    "endpoint_id",
+    "profile_id",
+    "event_type",
+    "url",
+    "status",
+    "attempts",
+    "max_attempts",
+    "last_attempt_at",
+    "next_retry_at",
+    "delivered_at",
+    "response_status",
+    "error_message",
+    "created_at",
+    "payload",
+    "response_body",
+    "updated_at"
+  ],
+  "type": "object"
+}

First observedv1.1.0Sep 9, 2026

TDQS

A3.7/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, and the description adds context beyond that: it discloses the payload content of the response (request/response bodies plus retry history) and an environmental auth requirement that the annotations cannot express. It does not cover rate limits or behavior for a nonexistent/malformed ID, which keeps it below a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The purpose is front-loaded in one tight sentence, and the access caveat is separated into its own block so it does not obscure the main function. Slightly more space is spent on authentication housekeeping than on the tool's actual semantics.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a simple one-parameter read tool with an output schema present, the description covers purpose, response content, and the auth blocker an agent will hit. Nothing essential is missing, since return-value structure is handled by the output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single required parameter with 100% schema description coverage ('Webhook delivery ID'), so the schema fully documents it. The description adds no format, prefix, or sourcing details about the ID, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a concrete verb and resource ('Get details of a single webhook delivery attempt') and enumerates what is returned (request/response payloads, retry history). The word 'single' implicitly separates it from list_webhook_deliveries and retry_webhook_delivery, but no sibling is explicitly named as an alternative.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The ACESS block gives a real prerequisite (PROOF_API_KEY must be set, restart required) and explicitly rules out start_login as an authentication path, which is useful routing. However, there is no guidance on when to reach for this instead of list_webhook_deliveries or retry_webhook_delivery; the usage context is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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