Skip to main content
Glama
ProofHoldings

@proof-holdings/mcp-server

Official

upload_hitl_keys

Destructive

Upload an RSA-4096 keypair for a HITL config; server validates the public key, computes key ID, and stores client-side encrypted private key without seeing your password. Requires a Proof account.

Instructions

Upload an encryption keypair for a HITL config. The server validates the RSA-4096 public key and computes the key ID. Note: the encrypted_private_key is already encrypted client-side with the user's password — the server never sees the password.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
hitl_idYesHITL config ID
kdf_saltYesBase64url-encoded PBKDF2 salt
public_keyYesPEM-encoded RSA-4096 SPKI public key
encrypted_private_keyYesJSON-serialized encrypted private key envelope (PBKDF2-SHA256+AES-256-GCM)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes beyond the annotations (destructiveHint=true) by disclosing the security model: the server validates the RSA-4096 public key, computes the key ID, and never sees the user's password because the private key is encrypted client-side. It also surfaces the auth requirement (PROOF_API_KEY), which the annotations do not. It stops short of stating what happens to existing keys on overwrite.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action and its effect, followed by a security note and a clearly delimited ACCESS block. Efficient overall, though the restart instruction is mildly procedural for a tool description.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a four-param mutation with no output schema, the description covers purpose, prerequisites, validation behavior, and the security model. The main gap is not saying whether uploads replace existing keys or how key IDs are returned, which matters given destructiveHint=true.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, and the description adds real meaning: it explains that public_key is validated as RSA-4096 and that encrypted_private_key is a client-side password-encrypted envelope the server cannot read. kdf_salt and hitl_id get no added semantics, but the security-relevant params are clarified.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Upload an encryption keypair for a HITL config") and immediately describes the server-side behavior. An agent can distinguish it from get_hitl_keys and delete_hitl_keys without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides strong prerequisite guidance (needs a Proof account, set PROOF_API_KEY, restart, then retry) and explicitly routes away from start_login as a way to unlock it. It does not, however, compare against the sibling key tools or say when uploading keys is appropriate versus regenerating them.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Deploy Server

Other Tools