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@proof-holdings/mcp-server

@proof-holdings/mcp-server

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add_verification_provider

Destructive

Add another DNS provider to an already verified domain to enable verification through that provider.

Instructions

Add an additional DNS provider for verification to an already-verified domain. Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesDomain ID
providerYesDNS provider identifier
credentialsYesProvider-specific credential key-value pairs

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesMongoDB ObjectId
domainYes
resendNoEmail-sending setup for a domain. Present once email sending has been set up.
statusYesDomain verification status. `verifying` while a check runs; `revoking` while the owner's removal or revocation cascade holds the domain; `reverification_required` after a revoked proof, until control is shown again.
proof_idNoPublic handle of the control proof backing this domain (`ph_ctl_<32 hex>`), resolved through the domain's mirroring asset — the same source `GET /me/assets` reads, so the two surfaces cannot disagree. Null when the domain has no proof, or when its proof predates the registry.
providerNoNever sent; read `detected_provider`. Kept for released SDK types; removed in the next major.
oauth_urlNoSent only by the add when Cloudflare sign-in is configured for the detected provider.
created_atYes
from_emailNo
profile_idNoMongoDB ObjectId
updated_atYes
check_countYes
dns_recordsYes
verified_atNo
proof_statusNoRegistry status of that proof. A domain row can read `verified` while its proof is `revoked` — the row records that control was once shown, the proof records whether it still stands — so a client showing domain control must render THIS. Null means no registry record, which is NOT a revocation.
error_messageNoWhy the last check failed.
provider_nameYes
http_file_pathYes
actual_dns_hostNoThe host serving the zone, when it differs from the provider that verified it.
last_checked_atNo
oauth_connectedYesWhether a Cloudflare connection is stored for this domain.
txt_record_nameYes
for_verificationYes
has_dns_mismatchYes
proof_expires_atNoWhen that proof expires — the signed token's own `exp`. `proof_status` stays `active` after this instant (nothing rewrites it), so a client must compare against the clock to tell a live proof from an expired one. Proofs inside 30 days of expiry are renewed automatically while control can still be confirmed. Carried even when `proof_id` is null (a proof that predates the registry still has a signed expiry); null when the domain has no proof, or its proof never stored one.
supports_api_keyYes
txt_record_valueYes
detected_providerYesThe DNS provider read from the nameservers; `unknown` when none matched.
for_email_sendingYes
godaddy_connectedYesWhether a GoDaddy connection is stored for this domain.
http_file_contentYes
supports_auto_dnsYesWhether the detected provider can create the verification record itself.
email_verificationNoAn email verification of the domain. The code itself is never returned.
supports_api_tokenYes
verified_providersYesEvery provider (or `email`) that has confirmed control.
verification_methodYes`auto_dns`, `manual_dns`, `http_file` or `email`.
actual_dns_host_nameNo
dns_mismatch_warningNoSent only while `has_dns_mismatch` is true.
proof_revoked_reasonNoReason the registry recorded, present only while `proof_status` is `revoked`.
verification_subtypeNoHow a provider verified the domain: by creating the record, or by confirming ownership without one.
email_sending_enabledNoNever sent; read `for_email_sending`. Kept for released SDK types; removed in the next major.
has_provider_credentialsNoSent only by the add: the account already holds credentials for the detected provider.
provider_credential_nameNoSent only by the add, with `has_provider_credentials`.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changedv1.7.2
    • removedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Removed value: -false
    • addedInput schema / properties / credentials / propertyNames
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
      +  "additionalProperties": {},
      +  "description": "Domain record",
      +  "properties": {
      +    "actual_dns_host": {
      +      "description": "The host serving the zone, when it differs from the provider that verified it.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "actual_dns_host_name": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "check_count": {
      +      "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +      "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +      "type": "integer"
      +    },
      +    "created_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "detected_provider": {
      +      "description": "The DNS provider read from the nameservers; `unknown` when none matched.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "dns_mismatch_warning": {
      +      "description": "Sent only while `has_dns_mismatch` is true.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "dns_records": {
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": {},
      +        "properties": {
      +          "name": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "priority": {
      +            "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +            "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +            "type": "integer"
      +          },
      +          "purpose": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "type": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "value": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          },
      +          "verified": {
      +            "type": "boolean"
      +          },
      +          "verified_at": {
      +            "type": "string"
      +          }
      +        },
      +        "required": [
      +          "type",
      +          "name",
      +          "value",
      +          "purpose",
      +          "verified"
      +        ],
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "domain": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "email_sending_enabled": {
      +      "description": "Never sent; read `for_email_sending`. Kept for released SDK types; removed in the next major.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "email_verification": {
      +      "additionalProperties": {},
      +      "description": "An email verification of the domain. The code itself is never returned.",
      +      "properties": {
      +        "attempts": {
      +          "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +          "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +          "type": "integer"
      +        },
      +        "email_address": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "email_prefix": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "expires_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "last_sent_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "verified_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        }
      +      },
      +      "required": [
      +        "email_prefix",
      +        "email_address",
      +        "expires_at",
      +        "attempts"
      +      ],
      +      "type": "object"
      +    },
      +    "error_message": {
      +      "description": "Why the last check failed.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "for_email_sending": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "for_verification": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "from_email": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "godaddy_connected": {
      +      "description": "Whether a GoDaddy connection is stored for this domain.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "has_dns_mismatch": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "has_provider_credentials": {
      +      "description": "Sent only by the add: the account already holds credentials for the detected provider.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "http_file_content": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "http_file_path": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "id": {
      +      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "last_checked_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "oauth_connected": {
      +      "description": "Whether a Cloudflare connection is stored for this domain.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "oauth_url": {
      +      "description": "Sent only by the add when Cloudflare sign-in is configured for the detected provider.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "profile_id": {
      +      "description": "MongoDB ObjectId",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "proof_expires_at": {
      +      "description": "When that proof expires — the signed token's own `exp`. `proof_status` stays `active` after this instant (nothing rewrites it), so a client must compare against the clock to tell a live proof from an expired one. Proofs inside 30 days of expiry are renewed automatically while control can still be confirmed. Carried even when `proof_id` is null (a proof that predates the registry still has a signed expiry); null when the domain has no proof, or its proof never stored one.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "proof_id": {
      +      "description": "Public handle of the control proof backing this domain (`ph_ctl_<32 hex>`), resolved through the domain's mirroring asset — the same source `GET /me/assets` reads, so the two surfaces cannot disagree. Null when the domain has no proof, or when its proof predates the registry.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "proof_revoked_reason": {
      +      "description": "Reason the registry recorded, present only while `proof_status` is `revoked`.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "proof_status": {
      +      "description": "Registry status of that proof. A domain row can read `verified` while its proof is `revoked` — the row records that control was once shown, the proof records whether it still stands — so a client showing domain control must render THIS. Null means no registry record, which is NOT a revocation.",
      +      "type": [
      +        "string",
      +        "null"
      +      ]
      +    },
      +    "provider": {
      +      "description": "Never sent; read `detected_provider`. Kept for released SDK types; removed in the next major.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "provider_credential_name": {
      +      "description": "Sent only by the add, with `has_provider_credentials`.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "provider_name": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "resend": {
      +      "additionalProperties": {},
      +      "description": "Email-sending setup for a domain. Present once email sending has been set up.",
      +      "properties": {
      +        "dkim_records": {
      +          "items": {
      +            "additionalProperties": {},
      +            "properties": {
      +              "name": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "priority": {
      +                "maximum": 9007199254740991,
      +                "minimum": -9007199254740991,
      +                "type": "integer"
      +              },
      +              "purpose": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "type": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "value": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "verified": {
      +                "type": "boolean"
      +              },
      +              "verified_at": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              }
      +            },
      +            "required": [
      +              "type",
      +              "name",
      +              "value",
      +              "purpose",
      +              "verified"
      +            ],
      +            "type": "object"
      +          },
      +          "type": "array"
      +        },
      +        "domain_id": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "last_checked_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "registered_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "status": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        },
      +        "verified_at": {
      +          "type": "string"
      +        }
      +      },
      +      "required": [
      +        "status",
      +        "dkim_records"
      +      ],
      +      "type": "object"
      +    },
      +    "status": {
      +      "description": "Domain verification status. `verifying` while a check runs; `revoking` while the owner's removal or revocation cascade holds the domain; `reverification_required` after a revoked proof, until control is shown again.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "supports_api_key": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "supports_api_token": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "supports_auto_dns": {
      +      "description": "Whether the detected provider can create the verification record itself.",
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "txt_record_name": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "txt_record_value": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "updated_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verification_method": {
      +      "description": "`auto_dns`, `manual_dns`, `http_file` or `email`.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verification_subtype": {
      +      "description": "How a provider verified the domain: by creating the record, or by confirming ownership without one.",
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verified_at": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "verified_providers": {
      +      "description": "Every provider (or `email`) that has confirmed control.",
      +      "items": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "id",
      +    "domain",
      +    "status",
      +    "detected_provider",
      +    "provider_name",
      +    "supports_auto_dns",
      +    "verification_method",
      +    "for_email_sending",
      +    "for_verification",
      +    "dns_records",
      +    "has_dns_mismatch",
      +    "txt_record_name",
      +    "txt_record_value",
      +    "http_file_path",
      +    "http_file_content",
      +    "oauth_connected",
      +    "godaddy_connected",
      +    "supports_api_token",
      +    "supports_api_key",
      +    "verified_providers",
      +    "check_count",
      +    "created_at",
      +    "updated_at"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  2. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag the mutation as destructive, and the description meaningfully adds that the supplied credentials will be exposed in the conversation context — a non-obvious side effect an agent must surface to the user. It also documents the auth path (PROOF_API_KEY or start_login). It stops short of saying what happens to existing providers on the domain or whether the new provider replaces anything.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose and precondition are front-loaded in the first sentence, and the exposure warning follows immediately. The ACCESS paragraph is slightly verbose with restart instructions, but each sentence is actionable rather than filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With annotations, a full-coverage schema and an output schema already present, the description only needs to cover preconditions, auth and side effects — which it does. The remaining gap is sibling disambiguation among the many DNS/credential tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns an extra point by clarifying that the credentials object is passed inline and becomes visible in context, which affects how the value should be handled. It adds nothing about the 'provider' identifier domain (e.g. valid provider strings), but the schema already carries that.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (add a DNS provider for verification) plus a meaningful precondition that the domain must already be verified. However, it never distinguishes itself from close siblings such as connect_dns_provider or create_dns_credential, so an agent still has to guess which of the DNS-credential tools is correct.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The 'already-verified domain' constraint is genuine when-to-use guidance, and the ACCESS paragraph explains how to become authorized. But there is no when-not guidance and no comparison to the several closely overlapping DNS credential tools in the sibling list, which is the main selection risk here.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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