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ProofHoldings

@proof-holdings/mcp-server

Official

remove_email

Destructive

Remove an email address from a Proof account by completing required 2FA; revokes proofs and consents, declines pending confirmations, updates Lookalike Watch alerts, and cannot be undone.

Instructions

Remove an email address from the account. Always requires one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type email_remove and targets [this email id]. Revokes every proof of the address and your own consents naming it, declines pending confirmations waiting on it, moves Lookalike Watch alerts to your remaining primary email (or stops the watch when none is left), deletes the record, signs out your other devices, and names the new primary email. Refused for the address you signed in with and for your only way to sign in. Cannot be undone.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesEmail record ID

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Far exceeds the annotations (destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false) by enumerating concrete side effects: revokes proofs, declines pending confirmations, relocates Lookalike Watch alerts, deletes the record, signs out other devices, and names the new primary email. It also states irreversibility ('Cannot be undone.') and the 2FA/auth requirement, which annotations do not cover — exactly the kind of context the bar asks for.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action, followed by effects, refusal cases, and access requirements in a logical order; every sentence carries operational weight. It is dense but not padded, with only mild verbosity in the ACCESS paragraph.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex, irreversible mutation with one parameter, no output schema, and only destructive annotations, the description supplies everything an agent needs: preconditions, full effect list, refusal conditions, auth/access requirements, and irreversibility. Nothing material is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% for the single 'id' parameter, so baseline is 3. The description adds real semantic value by clarifying that this same email id must appear in the 2FA code's 'targets' array, linking the parameter to a required prerequisite flow rather than mere schema restatement.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence states a specific verb and resource ('Remove an email address from the account'), cleanly distinguishing it from siblings like set_primary_email, remove_phone, and revoke_proof. An agent can identify the operation without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit preconditions (needs a Proof account, requires start_2fa_for_action with action_type email_remove and targets [this email id]) and explicit refusal conditions (the signed-in address, or your only way to sign in). It does not, however, route the agent to an alternative tool (e.g., set_primary_email) when the target is ineligible, so usage guidance is clear but not fully comparative.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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