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create_confirmation

Create a human-in-the-loop approval request for a configured HITL setup, sending an encrypted prompt to its channels; the first response wins.

Instructions

Create a HITL confirmation request. Sends an approval request to the channels configured on the referenced HITL config. First response wins.

Agent usage: The HITL config referenced by hitl_id must be authorized before you can create confirmations. If this returns a 403 or "not authorized" error, call request_hitl_authorization on the HITL config first, then wait for the user to approve via the messaging channel. After creating a confirmation, poll get_confirmation to check for approval/denial, or use get_confirmation_approval_link to generate a fresh link for the user.

Encryption is NOT optional: a HITL config cannot send confirmations without a keypair, the human approves by decrypting in their browser, and message must be a JSON ciphertext envelope. Plaintext is refused with 400 message_not_encrypted; an envelope sealed to another key with 400 message_key_mismatch. Choose the version by who must be able to decrypt:

  • v1 (single-recipient): wraps the content key for the config owner only. Use ONLY when there are no enrolled non-owner approvers — with approvers enrolled it is refused with 400 envelope_missing_approvers.

  • v2 (multi-recipient): additionally wraps the content key for each enrolled approver via an approver_ek map, so every approver can decrypt. Build it with the SDK encryptMessageV2(plaintext, ownerPublicKey, hitlId, approverKeys) after fetching the approvers via the SDK getApproverKeys(hitlId) (GET /api/v1/hitl/:id/approver-keys). AAD is the hitlId.

ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Set PROOF_API_KEY and restart this server, then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
hitl_idYesHITL config ID whose channels will receive the approval request
messageYesThe client-encrypted ciphertext envelope as a JSON string (v1 or v2) — NOT the human-readable text. Encrypt the sentence the approver should read; passing it directly is refused with 400 `message_not_encrypted`, because the approval page can only decrypt an envelope.
proof_expiry_daysNoPer-request proof expiry override in days (7, 30, 90, or 365)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.6.0
    • changedInput schema / properties / message / description
      Previous value: -"Human-readable description of what needs approval"New value: +"The client-encrypted ciphertext envelope as a JSON string (v1 or v2) — NOT the human-readable text. Encrypt the sentence the approver should read; passing it directly is refused with 400 `message_not_encrypted`, because the approval page can only decrypt an envelope."
    • changedInput schema / properties / message / maxLength
      Previous value: -2000New value: +10000
  2. First observedv1.1.0

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only cover the safety profile (readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false), but the description discloses far more: first-response-wins semantics, the mandatory encryption requirement, the exact 400 error codes (message_not_encrypted, message_key_mismatch, envelope_missing_approvers), v1 vs v2 envelope selection rules, AAD binding, and the Proof-account/PROOF_API_KEY prerequisite.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads purpose in one sentence, then separates operational guidance ('Agent usage:') from the encryption rules, which are organized as versioned bullets. It is dense and lengthy, but each section carries necessary failure-mode or format information rather than filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the burden well: it states what a confirmation does, what the response lifecycle looks like (approval/denial polling), auth prerequisites, and the encryption contract. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so a 3 is the baseline, but the description adds real meaning beyond the schema: it clarifies that `message` must be a sealed JSON envelope rather than human-readable text and explains how the envelope version relates to enrolled approvers and the `approver_ek` map. Only `proof_expiry_days` lacks added description (and its allowed values in schema are indirectly referenced in the prose).

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Create a HITL confirmation request') and immediately names the mechanism (sends approval requests to channels on a referenced HITL config). It is clearly distinguishable from siblings like create_hitl, get_confirmation, and list_confirmations.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly tells the agent when to use it and what to do on failure: if a 403/'not authorized' occurs, call request_hitl_authorization first, then wait; after creating, poll get_confirmation or use get_confirmation_approval_link. Alternatives and successors are named with unambiguous triggers.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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