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Split Grouped Attacker

split_grouped_attacker

Splits an attacker covering multiple capability zones into per-zone parts, moves each asset's control mappings to the matching part, and removes the original in a new model version.

Instructions

Split an attacker that stands for zones of several capabilities into the parts get_behavioural_attackers offers under splits. Mutating; creates a model version.

Name each part by its zones as the offer lists them, which is the split reviewed. In one write, each part is added holding what its zones hold, its holdings attested, stating its zones, and rated as add_attacker rates (one call per part before the write, charged to the caller: ratings says how many); every control mapping of the attacker's objective of an asset moves to each part's objective of that asset with the same privilege (they owe the same obligations); and the attacker is removed. Relay the offer to the person first. Refused with 409 split_not_offered (read the attackers again), 409 review_stale (the parts changed: read them again), 409 closure_not_offered.

A program's split is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals.

Returns {model_id, model_version, applies, credential_classes, counts, split, added, moved}: the closure's counts, the attacker split, the parts' ids and the objectives whose control mappings moved.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`parts`	Yes	Each part's zones, comma-separated, the parts separated by semicolons (e.g. "host;vendor_a;partner").
`model_id`	Yes	ID of the threat model.
`attacker_id`	Yes	The attacker to split (e.g. "T7").
`server_version`	Yes

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Addedv0.94.0Oct 25, 2026

TDQS

A4/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it declares the tool mutating, creates a model version, describes per-part addition, attestation, rating calls charged to the caller, control-mapping movement, attacker removal, refusal codes, and escalation handling. This is unusually complete disclosure for a destructive mutation tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core operation and avoids irrelevant fluff. It is dense and semicolon-heavy, which hurts readability, but most sentences carry necessary behavioral or procedural information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex mutating tool with no annotations, the description covers the essential context: mutation effects, side effects, cost, authorization escalation, refusal behavior, and return shape. An output schema exists, and the description still summarizes the return fields sufficiently.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 75%, so the schema already documents parts, model_id, and attacker_id. The description adds the useful semantic constraint that each part is named by its zones as the offer lists them, but it does not compensate for the undocumented server_version parameter.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource: it splits an attacker into the parts that get_behavioural_attackers offers under splits. It clearly establishes the operation and scope, though it does not explicitly distinguish this from the likely sibling alternative keep_attacker_whole.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It implies use when an offered split exists and adds important procedural guidance such as relaying the offer first, handling refusal codes, and not retrying after a 403 escalation. However, it never explicitly states when to choose split_grouped_attacker over alternatives like keep_attacker_whole or add_attacker.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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