Mipiti MCP Server

by Mipiti

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Python

Hybrid

Add Trust Boundary

add_trust_boundary

Adds a trust boundary to a threat model, defining allowed attack vectors and creating a new model version.

Instructions

Add a trust boundary. Creates a new model version.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`passes`	No	Optional comma-separated AttackVector values the boundary allows through (subset of "Network,Adjacent,Local,Physical"). Omit for the methodology default (passes-everything). Narrowing this set is what makes a boundary block specific attacker vectors in the deterministic reachability composer.
`sealed`	No	Optional. Set True to declare the boundary has NO lateral ingress — the only way into its zone is crossing the perimeter (an air-gap / network-segmented enclave). On its own this is a suggestion: only an ATTESTED seal lets reachability decisively rule an asset unreachable instead of indeterminate, and the attestation is recorded with ``edit_trust_boundary`` (``seal_source="attested"`` with a ``change_reason``). Default False (assume a lateral pivot is possible). Set it only when the isolation is real and attestable.
`crosses`	No	Optional comma-separated asset IDs that cross this boundary.
`model_id`	Yes	ID of the threat model.
`description`	Yes	What this boundary represents (e.g., "Public network to API server").
`server_version`	Yes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedv0.77.0Sep 9, 2026

changedInput schema / properties / sealed / description

Previous value: -"Optional. Set True to declare the boundary has NO lateral\ningress — the only way into its zone is crossing the perimeter\n(an air-gap / network-segmented enclave). A sealed boundary that\nblocks the attacker's vector lets reachability decisively rule the\nasset unreachable instead of indeterminate. Default False (assume a\nlateral pivot is possible). Set it only when the isolation is real\nand attestable."New value: +"Optional. Set True to declare the boundary has NO lateral\ningress — the only way into its zone is crossing the perimeter\n(an air-gap / network-segmented enclave). On its own this is a\nsuggestion: only an ATTESTED seal lets reachability decisively\nrule an asset unreachable instead of indeterminate, and the\nattestation is recorded with ``edit_trust_boundary``\n(``seal_source=\"attested\"`` with a ``change_reason``). Default\nFalse (assume a lateral pivot is possible). Set it only when the\nisolation is real and attestable."

Addedv0.62.1Jul 17, 2026
Removedv0.62.0Jul 17, 2026
First observedv0.57.0Jul 8, 2026

TDQS

C2.9/5.0

Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description must carry the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It only states 'Creates a new model version,' which is vague and does not explain side effects such as versioning implications, reversibility, permission requirements, or what happens to existing boundaries. The description fails to disclose any meaningful behavioral traits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is extremely concise, consisting of two short sentences. It is front-loaded with the primary action and avoids redundancy. While it is arguably under-specified, it is efficiently structured with no wasted words.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with 6 parameters, an output schema, and a complex domain (trust boundaries in threat models), the description is insufficient. It does not clearly explain the model versioning behavior, any prerequisites, or the effect on the overall model. It also fails to reference the rich parameter semantics that the schema provides, leaving the agent without a clear operational picture.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema provides detailed descriptions for 5 of 6 parameters (83% coverage), so the description is not required to explain parameters. The description adds no additional meaning beyond what the schema already offers, earning the baseline score for high schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the verb 'Add' and resource 'trust boundary', making the primary purpose obvious. However, it does not differentiate from the sibling edit_trust_boundary beyond the verb difference, and the added 'Creates a new model version' is ambiguous about whether that is a side effect or a separate action. Purpose is clear but not fully distinct.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus edit_trust_boundary or other model-modifying tools. The description does not mention prerequisites, the distinction between adding vs editing boundaries, or any context that would help an agent decide between alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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