list_threat_models

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, and it explicitly states 'Read-only; no side effects' and gives the exact return shape. It also discloses the approximate overhead of include_assessment_summary, adding useful behavioral context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three concise sentences front-load the purpose, then cover side effects, return format, and use cases without redundancy. Every sentence provides value.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers purpose, behavior, return shape, and use cases, and an output schema exists. The only notable omission is any explanation of the required server_version parameter, but that is more a schema-level gap than a description completeness failure.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 67%, and the include_assessment_summary parameter has a detailed description in the schema itself. The tool description adds usage context (discover IDs, portfolio overview) but does not clarify the required server_version parameter, leaving a minor gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with 'List saved threat models in the current workspace', using a specific verb and resource that clearly distinguishes it from siblings like list_capabilities or list_tags. It is immediately obvious what the tool does and its scope.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly says 'Use this to discover model IDs to pass to other tools, or for a portfolio overview.' The include_assessment_summary parameter description further recommends using this tool instead of calling assess_model once per model for aggregate posture queries, providing clear alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.