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Mipiti
by Mipiti

remove_trust_boundary

Remove a trust boundary from a threat model to widen reachability and drop its isolation claim. This destructive action deletes the boundary and creates a new model version, changing reachability verdicts to reachable or indeterminate.

Instructions

Remove a trust boundary from a model. Mutating and destructive: deletes the boundary and creates a new model version.

Removing a boundary widens reachability — any attacker vectors the boundary was filtering now pass freely, and its sealed/isolation claim is dropped, so CO reachability verdicts past it can flip toward reachable/indeterminate. To change a boundary's filter or seal without deleting it, use edit_trust_boundary instead.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tb_idYesID of the trust boundary to remove (e.g., "TB1").
model_idYesID of the threat model.
server_versionYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries full responsibility for behavioral disclosure. It clearly states that the operation is mutating and destructive, deletes the boundary, creates a new model version, and details the downstream security impact (widened reachability, dropped sealed/isolation claims, potential verdict flips). This is exceptional transparency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concise, front-loaded with the core purpose, and every sentence provides consequential information: what happens, the security impact, and the alternative. No redundant filler or repetition of schema fields.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation tool with no annotations, the description covers all essential context: purpose, consequences, when to use, and when to avoid. The output schema exists, so return values need no explanation. The description fully supports an agent's decision to select and invoke this tool safely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond the input schema. Schema coverage is 67% (tb_id and model_id have descriptions, server_version does not), and the description does not address server_version or elaborate on how the parameters relate to the action. The behavioral notes imply the role of tb_id but do not compensate for the missing schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Remove a trust boundary from a model.' It further clarifies that this action deletes the boundary and creates a new model version, and distinguishes from the sibling tool edit_trust_boundary by noting an alternative for changing filters or seals.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly explains when to use the tool: when you want to delete a trust boundary and are prepared for the described consequences. It also provides a clear when-not by naming edit_trust_boundary as the alternative for non-destructive modifications, making the usage context unmistakable.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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