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Mipiti
by Mipiti

Import Controls

import_controls

Import existing security controls from JSON or free text into a threat model, auto-map them to COs and deduplicate, then confirm before saving as one undoable change.

Instructions

Import existing security controls into a threat model.

Accepts structured JSON or free-text. Controls are auto-mapped to COs and deduplicated against existing ones. The parse/map/dedup runs as a background job (polled for progress), then — because this mutates the model — you are asked to confirm before the controls are saved.

The saved controls are added to the model's current controls as one change (undoable with undo_model_change); no model version is created, and it is refused while a control build holds the model. Nothing runs for them unprompted: the result's awaiting_judgement lists them, and the mitigation groups they join credit nothing and read awaiting judgement until judge_imported_controls is called (estimate first, then confirm_estimate=True).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
auto_mapNoAuto-map controls to COs using LLM (default: True).
model_idYesID of the threat model.
free_textNoFree-text controls (narrative/CSV/bullets).
source_labelNoOrigin label (e.g., "ISO 27001").
controls_jsonNoJSON array of {description, co_ids?, framework_refs?}.
server_versionYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv0.62.2
  2. Removedv0.62.1
  3. First observedv0.57.0

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully carries the burden and delivers: background parse/map/dedup with polling, a confirmation gate before mutation, undo semantics via undo_model_change, no model version created, refusal while a control build holds the model, and the awaiting_judgement lifecycle up through judge_imported_controls. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose and the JSON/free-text input modes are front-loaded, and the workflow is layered in logical order. It is dense and slightly long, but nearly every sentence conveys a distinct behavioral fact rather than filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a high-complexity mutating import with a background job, confirmation, and judgement gating, the description covers the full lifecycle, including the undo path and the refusal condition. Since an output schema exists, it needn't explain return values, and nothing material is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents the six parameters well. The description's mention of 'structured JSON or free-text' loosely maps to controls_json/free_text but adds no format or constraint detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Import existing security controls into a threat model') and immediately distinguishes its scope by noting it maps to COs and deduplicated against existing ones, setting it apart from siblings like auto_map_controls and import_compliance_framework.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context: accepts structured JSON or free-text, runs as a background job, requires confirmation before saving, and routes the agent to undo_model_change and judge_imported_controls as follow-ups. However, it never explicitly states when NOT to use it versus sibling importers (e.g., import_compliance_framework, convert_assumption_to_controls).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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