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Mipiti
by Mipiti

edit_attacker

Edit an existing attacker in a threat model. Update identity fields with LLM gate, or modify factor fields with required change reason.

Instructions

Edit an existing attacker. Only provided fields changed.

The composed likelihood is server-derived from the factor fields; to change the rating, set factor values and supply change_reason for the audit trail.

LLM-gated on identity-bearing fields (capability, archetype, position). Factor and trust_boundary edits skip the gate.

503 on evaluator outage, 502 on malformed response, 400 when factor fields are sent without change_reason.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
model_idYesID of the threat model.
positionNoNew position (optional).
archetypeNoNew archetype (optional).
capabilityNoNew capability (optional).
attacker_idYesID of the attacker (e.g., "T1").
attack_vectorNo"Network" | "Adjacent" | "Local" | "Physical".
change_reasonNoRequired when any factor field is supplied — documents the operator override of LLM-generated factors.
server_versionYes
user_interactionNo"None" | "Required".
attack_complexityNo"Low" | "High".
trust_boundary_idsNoComma-separated trust boundary IDs (replaces existing).
privileges_requiredNo"None" | "Low" | "High".
likelihood_rationaleNoNew rationale (optional).
capability_prevalenceNo"Commodity" | "Targeted" | "Rare".

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Since no annotations are provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that likelihood is server-derived, gating differs by field, and error conditions. Missing details like idempotency or permission requirements, but still provides substantial behavioral context.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concise, front-loading the core purpose, and each sentence adds value without redundancy. Error codes are listed efficiently.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool with 14 parameters and an output schema, the description covers partial update semantics, gating, likelihood derivation, and error handling. It does not discuss idempotency or output format, but the output schema exists to fill that gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With 93% schema coverage, parameters are well-documented in schema. The description adds meaning by explaining the dependency between factor fields and change_reason, and that likelihood is derived from factors, which is not fully captured in individual schema descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the action ('Edit an existing attacker') and specifies the partial update behavior ('Only provided fields changed'). This distinguishes it from sibling tools like add_attacker and remove_attacker.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description notes that identity-bearing fields are LLM-gated while factor/trust_boundary edits skip the gate, and that change_reason is required for factor edits. It also lists error codes (503, 502, 400). However, it does not explicitly compare to alternatives or state when not to use this tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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