Skip to main content
Glama
Mipiti
by Mipiti

edit_attacker

Edit an existing attacker. Only provided fields changed.

Instructions

Edit an existing attacker. Only provided fields changed.

When changing identity fields, hold to the attacker authoring contract: capability names the operations performable from the position ("From [position], the attacker can [operations] …"), not just access — otherwise the result is flagged with a quality_warning (see add_attacker).

The composed likelihood is server-derived from the factor fields; to change the rating, set factor values and supply change_reason for the audit trail.

LLM-gated on identity-bearing fields (capability, archetype, position). Factor and trust_boundary edits skip the gate.

503 on evaluator outage, 502 on malformed response, 400 when factor fields are sent without change_reason.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
model_idYesID of the threat model.
positionNoNew position (optional).
archetypeNoNew archetype (optional).
capabilityNoNew capability (optional).
attacker_idYesID of the attacker (e.g., "T1").
attack_vectorNo"Network" | "Adjacent" | "Local" | "Physical".
change_reasonNoRequired when any factor field is supplied — documents the operator override of LLM-generated factors.
server_versionYes
attest_positionNoOperator-attest the attacker's current position without changing it — e.g. to confirm a fully external attacker's empty crossed set so an objective blocked on an unpositioned attacker can be resolved. Pass ``true`` to attest.
user_interactionNo"None" | "Required".
attack_complexityNo"Low" | "High".
trust_boundary_idsNoComma-separated trust boundary IDs — the boundaries this attacker has crossed (its position). Replaces the existing set. Changing it operator-attests the position, which lets reachability trust it for a decisive verdict.
privileges_requiredNo"None" | "Low" | "High".
likelihood_rationaleNoNew rationale (optional).
capability_prevalenceNo"Commodity" | "Targeted" | "Rare".

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure, and it excels: it explains the LLM-gating behavior, the server-derived likelihood computation, the quality_warning flag for contract violations, the attestation semantics for trust_boundary_ids, and specific error codes (503, 502, 400). This is rich behavioral transparency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear paragraphs: the core edit behavior, the authoring contract, the likelihood derivation, the LLM gate, and error codes. Every sentence earns its place, and the information is front-loaded with the most important usage details first.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (15 parameters, LLM gating, attestation semantics, error handling), the description is remarkably complete. It covers the key behavioral nuances, error conditions, and cross-references to sibling tools. The output schema exists, so return values don't need explanation. This is a model description for a complex tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 93%, so the schema already documents most parameters well. The description adds critical semantics beyond the schema: the change_reason requirement context, the attestation behavior of trust_boundary_ids, and the LLM-gate implications for identity fields. It doesn't need to restate every parameter, but it adds meaningful value where it matters.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states 'Edit an existing attacker' with a specific verb and resource, and immediately clarifies the partial-update semantics ('Only provided fields changed'). It distinguishes itself from sibling tools like add_attacker and edit_asset by focusing on attacker-specific fields and behaviors.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives: it references add_attacker for the authoring contract, explains when the LLM gate applies (identity-bearing fields) versus when it is skipped (factor and trust_boundary edits), and details the change_reason requirement for factor edits. This is comprehensive usage guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Install Server

Other Tools

Latest Blog Posts

MCP directory API

We provide all the information about MCP servers via our MCP API.

curl -X GET 'https://glama.ai/api/mcp/v1/servers/Mipiti/mipiti-mcp'

If you have feedback or need assistance with the MCP directory API, please join our Discord server