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Edit Trust Boundary

edit_trust_boundary

Modify a trust boundary in a threat model by updating allowed attack vectors, isolation seal, asset crossings, or description. Creates a new model version and records the change reason for audit.

Instructions

Edit a trust boundary. Creates a new model version.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`tb_id`	Yes	ID of the trust boundary (e.g., "TB1").
`passes`	No	New comma-separated AttackVector values the boundary allows through (subset of "Network,Adjacent,Local,Physical"). Use the empty string to set "blocks all"; omit to leave unchanged. Reach-relevant — narrowing or widening this set can flip CO verdicts.
`sealed`	No	New isolation flag. True declares NO lateral ingress (the only way in is crossing the perimeter — an air-gap / segmented enclave), which lets reachability decisively rule the boundary unreachable; False assumes a lateral pivot is possible. Reach-relevant — changing it can flip CO verdicts. Setting it records an operator attestation of the seal. Omit to leave unchanged.
`crosses`	No	New comma-separated asset IDs.
`model_id`	Yes	ID of the threat model.
`description`	No	New description.
`seal_source`	No	"attested" \| "unattested". Only an operator-attested seal lets reachability decisively rule an objective unreachable past the boundary; an unattested (default/model-suggested) seal is treated as pivotable. Use "attested" to attest a boundary already marked sealed without re-toggling it; "unattested" retracts. An attested seal implies ``sealed``. Requires ``change_reason``.
`change_reason`	No	Required when ``passes``, ``sealed``, or the seal attestation actually changes. Captured in the audit trail; documents why the boundary's vector filter, isolation claim, or attestation changed.
`server_version`	Yes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Addedv0.62.2Jul 22, 2026
Removedv0.62.0Jul 17, 2026

Changed3 schema fields changedv0.60.1Jul 17, 2026

changedInput schema / properties / change_reason / description

Previous value: -"Required when ``passes`` or ``sealed`` actually changes.\nCaptured in the audit trail; documents why the boundary's vector\nfilter was tightened/widened or its isolation claim changed."New value: +"Required when ``passes``, ``sealed``, or the seal\nattestation actually changes. Captured in the audit trail; documents\nwhy the boundary's vector filter, isolation claim, or attestation\nchanged."

addedInput schema / properties / seal_source

Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ],
+  "default": null,
+  "description": "\"attested\" | \"unattested\". Only an operator-attested seal\nlets reachability decisively rule an objective unreachable past the\nboundary; an unattested (default/model-suggested) seal is treated as\npivotable. Use \"attested\" to attest a boundary already marked sealed\nwithout re-toggling it; \"unattested\" retracts. An attested seal\nimplies ``sealed``. Requires ``change_reason``."
+}

changedInput schema / properties / sealed / description

Previous value: -"New isolation flag. True declares NO lateral ingress (the only\nway in is crossing the perimeter — an air-gap / segmented enclave),\nwhich lets reachability decisively rule the boundary unreachable;\nFalse assumes a lateral pivot is possible. Reach-relevant — changing\nit can flip CO verdicts. Omit to leave unchanged."New value: +"New isolation flag. True declares NO lateral ingress (the only\nway in is crossing the perimeter — an air-gap / segmented enclave),\nwhich lets reachability decisively rule the boundary unreachable;\nFalse assumes a lateral pivot is possible. Reach-relevant — changing\nit can flip CO verdicts. Setting it records an operator attestation\nof the seal. Omit to leave unchanged."

First observedv0.57.0Jul 8, 2026

TDQS

B3.2/5.0

Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden. It does disclose one important side effect—edits create a new model version—which is valuable behavioral context for a mutation tool. However, it does not mention the audit trail, change_reason requirements, attestation implications, or whether edits are reversible.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is only two sentences and front-loads the core purpose. The first sentence is somewhat redundant with the tool name, but the second earns its keep by revealing the versioning side effect.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 9-parameter mutation tool, this is barely adequate. The rich paramether schema and presence of an output schema compensate for much of the missing detail, but the description alone does not fully convey the implications of editing a trust boundary, such as versioning consequences and the audit/change_reason context.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 89%, so the schema already explains most parameter semantics. The tool description adds no parameter-level details, but with high schema coverage the baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource ('Edit a trust boundary') and adds a meaningful distinguishing behavior ('Creates a new model version'). It clearly identifies this as the editing counterpart to add_trust_boundary and other edit_* tools, though it does not explicitly name a sibling alternative.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this tool vs. add_trust_boundary or other editing tools. The verb 'Edit' implies use for existing trust boundaries, but no exclusions, alternatives, or context signals are given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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