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Mipiti
by Mipiti

add_attacker

Add a new attacker to a threat model. Creates a new version.

Instructions

Add a new attacker to a threat model. Creates a new version.

Authoring contract: capability names the operations the attacker can perform from its position and what they achieve — not just the access or vantage point. Phrase it as "From [position], the attacker can [concrete operations] …" (e.g. "From the network path between the API server and the database, the attacker can read and alter requests and responses to exfiltrate data in transit or inject forged responses"). A capability that states only access is flagged with a quality_warning and the control objectives derived from it may be under-specified.

The caller supplies identity-bearing fields (capability, position, archetype, trust_boundary_ids); the backend LLM-reasons the factor decomposition. Override any factor post-create via edit_attacker with a change_reason. Mirror of add_asset semantics.

Three outcomes (normal create / auto-restore / similar-rejection) mirror add_asset. 503 on factor-reasoning or restore-candidate evaluator outage, 502 on malformed restore-candidate response.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
model_idYesID of the threat model.
positionNoPosition/access level.
archetypeNoArchetype (e.g., "insider", "external").
capabilityYesAttacker capability description (required).
server_versionYes
trust_boundary_idsNoComma-separated trust boundary IDs.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, and it delivers extensively. It discloses version creation, LLM-based factor reasoning, quality_warning conditions, the normal/auto-restore/similar-rejection outcome types, and specific 503/502 error causes. This goes well beyond a generic create operation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but front-loaded with the core purpose. The authoring contract paragraph is longer than typical, but it earns its place by clarifying the highest-risk parameter. The references to add_asset and error handling are efficient, though a slightly tighter structure would push it to a 5.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity and the presence of an output schema, the description covers the essential context: operation semantics, behavioral nuances, failure modes, and related tool workflows. The only minor weakness is relying on familiarity with add_asset semantics, but enough information is included to use this tool safely and effectively.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is already strong at 83%, but the description adds meaningful semantic guidance. It groups capability, position, archetype, and trust_boundary_ids as 'identity-bearing fields' and, most importantly, explains what capability should express and warns against access-only phrasing. This adds value beyond the raw schema property descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific action and resource: 'Add a new attacker to a threat model.' It also distinguishes itself from siblings by noting it is the mirror of add_asset and that edits should go through edit_attacker. The purpose is unambiguous and clearly differentiated from the many sibling mutation tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description clearly establishes when this tool is appropriate: callers create an attacker and later override factors via edit_attacker. It does not explicitly list exclusion criteria or say 'do not use for X', but the mirror-of-add_asset note and edit_attacker handoff provide practical guidance for choosing between related tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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