list_risk_acceptances

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It mentions the fields returned but does not disclose authentication needs, rate limits, or side effects. Since it is a read operation, minimal behavioral disclosure is acceptable but not exhaustive.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences: first defines the action and resource, second lists fields and use case. No wasted words, front-loaded with key information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return value explanation is unnecessary. The description covers the tool's purpose, scope, and returned fields. It lacks details on pagination or filtering, but for a simple list tool, it is reasonably complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 50% with only `model_id` described. The description implicitly connects `model_id` to the threat model but adds no further parameter details. `server_version` remains unexplained, so the description provides marginal improvement over the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool lists risk acceptances on a specific threat model, defines risk acceptances as explicitly accepted risks, and distinguishes from other list tools by specifying the resource and scope.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides a clear use case: 'inspect which gaps were intentionally accepted versus genuinely unaddressed when triaging at-risk COs.' However, it lacks explicit guidance on when not to use or alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.