List Risk Acceptances

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses entry fields, statuses, and the key semantic boundary that not-applicable objectives are excluded. It does not explicitly note side-effect-free read behavior, but 'List' strongly implies it, and the output schema covers the return structure.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core function, then explains usage, and ends with an important cautionary note distinguishing acceptances from N/A dispositions. The length is justified by the conceptual subtlety, though it could be tightened slightly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values are covered. The description explains scope, entry content, and its relationship to list_co_dispositions. Missing only server_version semantics and typical list-tool constraints like pagination, which are non-essential for correct invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 50%: model_id has a schema description while server_version does not. The description reinforces model_id with 'on a specific threat model' but never explains server_version, leaving a gap in parameter understanding.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'List all risk acceptances on a specific threat model.' It also explicitly distinguishes this from list_co_dispositions by clarifying that non-applicable objectives are not risk acceptances, making sibling differentiation clear.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It provides explicit usage context: 'Use to inspect which gaps were intentionally accepted versus genuinely unaddressed when triaging at-risk COs.' It also names the alternative tool for non-applicable objectives and suggests using both together, giving the agent clear selection guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.