Mipiti MCP Server
The Mipiti MCP Server enables AI coding agents to programmatically generate, manage, and assess security posture across threat models, controls, compliance, and evidence.
Threat Modeling – Generate, refine, query, list, rename, delete, export (PDF/HTML/CSV/JSON), and import threat models.
Entity Management – Add, edit, soft-delete, and restore assets, attackers, components, and trust boundaries.
Controls & Control Objectives – Get, create, regenerate, refine, remap, update status, import, and delete controls; manage mitigation groups (AND/OR logic); set per-CO assurance levels.
Assumptions & Attestation – Add, edit, remove, and restore assumptions; submit and list attestations; manage assumption groups on controls.
Assertions & Evidence – Submit typed assertions (28 types), attach/remove evidence, get verification reports and sufficiency checks, and submit/list/update findings with remediation preview and apply.
Risk Assessment – Assess models deterministically (mitigated/at_risk/unassessed), get workspace/model/system risk views, remediation leverage rankings, manage risk acceptances, and recompute verdicts.
Compliance Mapping – List/select frameworks (OWASP ASVS, ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIST CSF, GDPR, FedRAMP, PCI DSS, EU CRA, custom); auto-map controls, get gap reports, auto-remediate, and aggregate compliance at the system level.
Functional Conformance – Generate functional objectives and test plans, get coverage (verified/failing/untested), check gaps, and submit test evidence.
Composition (Recursive Tree) – View composition trees, list effective entities/COs/coverage with inherited credit, manage reconciliation candidates, lift/split entities across the tree, and undo operations.
Cross-Model Dependencies – Declare foundation models, create/confirm/delete reliance edges, and propose/attach foundation delegations in bulk.
Tags & Grouping – Create/delete tags, group overlapping models, get aggregate risk views, compliance reports, and signed auditor exports per tag.
Systems & Workspaces – List workspaces and systems, create systems, add models, get cross-model dependency graphs, and set organization-level maturity grades.
CWE Classification – Browse the CWE catalog and classify model control objectives against it.
Setup & Onboarding – Check setup status and complete onboarding steps.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Mipiti MCP Servergenerate a threat model for the new API endpoint"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Mipiti MCP Server
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for Mipiti — security posture platform.
Lets AI coding agents (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.) generate and manage threat models, controls, assumptions, compliance mapping, and evidence programmatically.
Hosted Endpoint (Recommended)
The Mipiti backend hosts an MCP server at https://api.mipiti.io/mcp. No installation needed — just configure your MCP client to connect.
Claude Code (quickstart)
claude mcp add --transport http Mipiti https://api.mipiti.io/mcpYou'll be prompted to log in via your browser (OAuth). That's it.
OAuth (manual config)
MCP clients with OAuth support (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor) automatically prompt you to log in via your browser. Add to your project's .mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mipiti": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.mipiti.io/mcp"
}
}
}On first connection, your MCP client opens a browser window where you approve access with your Mipiti account. Tokens refresh automatically.
API Key
For clients without OAuth support, or headless/CI environments, create an API key in Settings:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mipiti": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.mipiti.io/mcp",
"headers": {
"X-API-Key": "your-api-key"
}
}
}
}Related MCP server: mcp-server-scf
Standalone Package (Alternative)
If you prefer running the MCP server locally (e.g., for development or self-hosted instances), install the mipiti-mcp package. This is a thin HTTP client that calls the Mipiti API.
pip install mipiti-mcp
# Or run directly with uvx
uvx mipiti-mcpEnvironment Variables
Variable | Required | Default | Description |
| Yes | — | Your Mipiti API key |
| No |
| API base URL |
| No | the catalog's digest | The version clients send on every tool call. By default it names the catalog a client pins when its session starts (every tool's name, description and schemas, and the instructions), so it changes exactly when one of them changes. Setting it overrides that. |
Versions across releases
A session keeps the tool descriptions and instructions it read when it started. A call naming the current version runs. A call naming an earlier version that this package recorded (catalog_history.json) runs when the tool it calls is unchanged since then, and its result carries instructions_updated: relay it, and reconnect when convenient. A call to a tool whose description or schema changed, or naming an unknown version, is refused until the session reconnects. A change to a tool or the instructions adds its catalog to the history (python -m mipiti_mcp.record_catalog); the package's tests fail while it is missing. A tool's contract is what a client pins (its description and schemas), not its code: a change to what a tool does that a caller must know about changes its description too, or a session started before it calls the tool unaware.
Claude Code (standalone)
{
"mcpServers": {
"mipiti": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["mipiti-mcp"],
"env": {
"MIPITI_API_KEY": "your-api-key"
}
}
}
}Tools (163)
Threat Modeling
Tool | Description |
| Generate a complete threat model from a feature description. Runs a multi-step AI pipeline producing trust boundaries, assets, attackers, control objectives, and assumptions. Progress reported automatically via MCP protocol; the tool blocks until complete. Optional |
| Generate the threat model of a model saved before its inventory, once |
| Change a model's metadata: |
| Refine an existing threat model based on an instruction. Creates a new version. Only affected entity types are modified — unaffected entities are preserved server-side. An instruction that cannot be applied (a targeted change naming an entity the model does not have) writes nothing and returns |
| Ask a question about an existing threat model. It only answers; it never changes the model. |
| Get a threat model (trust boundaries, assets, attackers, assumptions, components). Use |
| List all saved threat models with IDs, titles, versions, and creation dates. Supports |
| Permanently delete a model and all its data. |
| Export as PDF, HTML, or CSV. |
| Export the self-contained JSON audit archive of the model's current state (latest version, controls, live assertions with CI verdicts, findings, decisions in force, attestations, sufficiency signatures). Independently verifiable: the verdicts in it are the origin's record of what it claimed, which is what a third party checks against the signatures. |
| Restore an audit archive into a target workspace as version 1 of a new model. Fresh |
Entity CRUD
Tool | Description |
| Targeted single-entity changes for assets. Creates a new version. Adds and edits of assets and attackers, and |
| Same for attackers. |
| Judge every live asset's and attacker's quality warning again, in the background. Creates no version; returns |
| Ask for the quality check of the assets and attackers named (every one when none is named) that have no current verdict. Estimates first; queues on |
| Accept the corrections the quality check proposed for assets and attackers, each named by |
| Settle a rating held pending beside a person's ( |
| Answer, with a fact, the flag the quality check raised about an asset or attacker (a question, a defect or an invalid verdict), naming the verdict's |
| Read one entity of any kind. An attacker also carries |
Trust Boundaries
Tool | Description |
| Returns existing trust boundaries (along with assets, attackers, assumptions). Review current boundaries before adding or modifying. |
| CRUD for trust boundaries. Defines where trust transitions occur in the system architecture. Attackers are positioned at boundaries; COs are annotated with boundary reachability. Changes auto-generate boundary assumptions for newly unreachable COs. |
Controls
Tool | Description |
| List controls with current status. Use |
| List COs with which controls cover each one. Pair with |
| What grouping the objectives by asset groups would do: the groups it would form, with their members, and the objectives formed now and after. Writes nothing. |
| Group the objectives by asset groups, or stop, naming the version read. Creates a model version; the controls' mappings move with the objectives. |
| Mark implemented or not_implemented. Requires at least one assertion first. |
| Modify a control's description with justification. Platform evaluates whether the mitigation group still covers the COs. An accepted refinement keeps the control's assertions and judges them again against the new description; nothing is superseded. |
| Propose a regeneration of the controls; it starts nothing. Supports |
| The model's proposed control build ( |
| Start the proposed build. Generating or refining a model, editing an entity and |
| Drop a held build (queued, deferred, paused or blocked): what it staged is discarded, the published controls are untouched, and the build is proposed again. A running build is paused first. |
| Every change to a version's controls, with its author. |
| Pause a model's control build (for example one started by mistake). A running build stops at its next step; everything done so far is kept unpublished, nothing new is started or billed, and nothing resumes it except |
| Resume control generation that was paused ( |
| Work on the objectives whose mitigation groups the background judge found do not cover them. Generation stops after drafting and judging unless the workspace strengthens automatically; |
| Judge every objective that has no judgement for its current controls and none queued: the diagnosis's |
| Import controls from JSON or free text, auto-mapped to COs and deduplicated. The imported controls await their judgement: the groups they join credit nothing until it is asked for. |
| Estimate, and with |
| Soft-delete with justification. Blocked if it's the only control covering a CO. |
| AI-powered gap analysis across all controls. |
| Inspect and modify how controls are grouped into mitigation paths for a CO (AND within groups, OR across groups). Platform AI-evaluates whether proposed changes preserve CO coverage. |
| Set per-CO ISO/SAE 21434 Cybersecurity Assurance Level (1-4). Persisted on the control_objectives identity side-table; survives soft-delete + revival; no new model version. |
Assumptions and Attestation
Tool | Description |
| Returns existing assumptions (along with assets, attackers, trust boundaries). Review current assumptions before adding or modifying. |
| Add an assumption, optionally linking it to COs via |
| Update description and/or linked COs. |
| Soft-delete (preserved for audit). Its CO links are cleared and its attestations retired. |
| Restore a soft-deleted assumption to active. Its CO links are not restored (set them with |
| Record that a responsible party affirmed an assumption holds. Provide |
| Attestation history for an assumption. |
| Declaratively set a control's assumption group structure: mark it externally handled by a single assumption (shorthand), clear the groups (the control's status is not changed), or express compound cases with multiple groups (within a group = AND, across groups = OR; e.g. "AWS KMS + quarterly review"). Attested groups count as active for mitigation group completeness. |
| Inspect the current assumption group structure on a control. Groups express alternative sets of external claims (within = AND, across = OR). |
| Retire the assumption linkage and propose the control build its COs owe; |
Assertions and Evidence
Tool | Description |
| The catalogue as data: every type, what it proves, its soundness class, its params (an array-valued param carries its item schema), and the class vocabulary. Read-only. |
| Submit typed, machine-verifiable claims about system properties (30 assertion types) for a control, an assumption or a functional test (name one of |
| List or delete assertions for a control. |
| Attach ( |
| Shows verified, partially verified, and unverified controls with sufficiency details. |
| Quick check: do the assertions of one control (or one functional test, with |
| Returns targeted prompts for scanning the codebase against not_implemented controls. |
| The workspace review queue, ranked: |
| Report and track negative findings (gap discovery). |
| Without |
Evidence soundness classes
Every assertion type declares the class of the fact it reports, and the class bounds what a passing verdict can establish. get_assertion_types returns it per type; the platform and the CI verifier hold their own tables equal to the catalogue's.
Class | A pass establishes | Types |
| A named construct, configuration value, dependency, file or pattern occurrence exists in the tree. Existence, not behaviour; a test file existing is presence. |
|
| A syntactic scan over a scope with no false-positive guarantee. A clean result proves the absence of the syntactic form only. |
|
| A signed statement that a named execution ran and passed at this commit. Proves the path it drove and nothing beyond it. |
|
| Every site in a declared scope that can violate the property was enumerated, and each is a declared safe form or a reviewed exception. Sound modulo the declared sink list. |
|
| The sink accepts only a declared boundary type, and every construction site of that type is default-denied. |
|
A clause that ranges over every entry of a surface (every endpoint, every query, every frame) is credited only by one of the two sound classes bound to it with covers; a test proves only the path it drove, and an attestation is a responsible party's claim. Which types carrying those classes a platform takes is a read, not an assumption: get_control_work_order's assertion_contract.sound_types names them, and where it names none the acts that remain are to scope the asset to the component the attacker actually reaches, attest a point extent with its reason, or record a risk acceptance or a not-applicable disposition. The two sound types take a declared scope, the sinks through which the property could be violated (a call, a constructor, a macro, a store to a named target such as an HDL assignment, or a module instantiation), a reviewed allowlist, and the property in one sentence; sink_default_deny adds the accepted safe_forms, typed_boundary the boundary_type and its constructors. Hardware sources are covered by the same rule.
Agent work orders & delegation
Tool | Description |
| The ticket for implementing one control: scan brief, what counts as proof (assertion contract), acceptance criteria, steps, reconcile rules, what this agent may decide on its own, open proposals, and the model's provenance. Call before implementing a control. Read-only. |
| Reconcile the model with the code: pass the paths changed since the recorded commit and your observations ( |
| Raise a change of scope or design ( |
| Proposals and escalations on a model with their status ( |
| Accept or reject a proposal. A judgment: refused with 403 and an |
| Decide whether a description-drift finding was intended (the description is behind the product) or a defect of the code, naming the control whose passing assertion closes it. A judgment: refused with 403 and an |
| What eliminating each attacker position or asset by design would remove from the matrix, ranked by critical then high at-risk objectives removed. |
| The model's decision ledger: every judgment recorded on it (finding dismissed / remediated, risk accepted, not-applicable declared, proposal accepted / rejected / reverted, assumption accepted, behavioural model answered / confirmed, a control's delta declared, a finding of its cross-check dismissed, a seal, position, privileges or surface extent attested, escalation resolved, an inventory pair decided or an entity's tags declared), newest first, with who decided and whether it was within the delegation policy. Append-only; nothing edits it. Call before raising a proposal or asking for a judgment, so you do not propose what a person rejected or ask again for what was already decided. Read-only. |
Behavioural model
A behavioural model states what a system does: its elements, the actions on them and the zones they sit in, taken from the model's description. The possible threats are read from it. An answer, an element edit and a confirmation each create a model version. A program's answer, edit, link declaration, link acceptance, confirmation, or act on the attacker closure is a judgment: it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and parked for a person unless the workspace's delegation policy admits it. Do not retry a refusal.
Tool | Description |
| A model's behavioural model: |
| Give a model that has none one. A paid action: call once for the estimate (nothing is charged or written) and relay it to the person, then with |
| Answer open questions, many in one call. The model is extracted in the background, billed to the caller, once every open owner question has an answer or when |
| Replace or add one element as a person wrote it. Voids a confirmation. |
| Remove an element the system does not have; every later extraction withholds it. Refused 409 |
| Confirm the model whose |
| The links from elements and zones to assets and trust boundaries, the proposals with the |
| Declare the asset or trust boundary an element or zone is. Creates no model version. |
| Declare every proposal as shown, naming the |
| The attacker closure of a generated model: the attackers the behavioural model's credential classes say the inventory lacks (each with its |
| Say which credential classes an attacker holds (none: it holds no credential). Its privileges follow by rule ( |
| Add the attacker the closure proposes for a credential set, holding it, its rating factors left unrated; |
| Dismiss a proposed attacker, with why, or with |
| Split an attacker standing for zones of several capabilities into the parts offered, naming each part's zones as reviewed: the parts added (one rating call each, charged to the caller), its control mappings moved to the parts of its privilege, and it removed, in one model version. Refused 409 |
| Keep an attacker offered for a split whole, with why; the split is no longer offered while that stands. Refused 409 |
| What the per-entity checks found about the inventory: per kind, the entries shown as one entity, those the checks dispute or only one side answered, parts and wholes, the decisions in force and whether every pair is covered; and the entities whose taxonomy tags are unchecked, with the declarations in force. Read-only. |
| Queue the checks the inventory lacks (tag checks, duplicate checks of uncovered pairs). The platform's share is recorded as its own request. |
| Decide that two entries are, or are not, one entity, bound to both texts (an edit of either voids it). |
| Declare the taxonomy primitives an entity answers, bound to its text; each pair must be one the taxonomy admits (422 |
| The edits to the behavioural model a control's own text commits to, each in words beside its quotes, with their status ( |
| Submit a draft of a control's delta, each edit quoting the control's text. Checked against the text by one call billed to the caller and never declared; a program's never replaces a delta a person declared. |
| Read controls' text into deltas a second time, by a call not shown the drafts. A paid action: call once for the estimate and relay it to the person, then with |
| Preview the declaration of a control's delta as served: its |
| The possible threats found per control objective, with the default questions whose answers would remove them, a page at a time: |
| Model-check the obligations the analysis could not settle, over a confirmed behavioural model. A paid action: call once for the estimate (the obligations, each module's completion prediction and runner size, the estimate and what a check does; nothing runs or is charged) and relay it to the person, then with |
| The model's live model check, else its latest: its status, what it covers, the differences an independent extraction found, and the results of its runs. A result that did not complete credits nothing. Read-only. |
|
|
Assurance
Tool | Description |
| Deterministic assessment of all COs. Returns mitigated/at_risk/unassessed with |
| Workspace-scoped triage dashboard: open findings, active risk acceptances, and at-risk COs across every model the workspace can access. Entry point when asked "what's open?". |
| Per-model Prioritized Risk View: one row per live CO with derived risk tier, asset impact, attacker likelihood, control coverage, and open-finding count. |
| Cross-model variant of |
| Per-model remediation plan: the not-yet-satisfied controls ranked by how many COs each one closes, plus a greedy minimal fix order ( |
| All risk acceptances on a model — risks explicitly accepted instead of mitigated. Includes CO id, owner, justification, status, review deadline. |
| Record that a control objective does not apply to this system (owner, justification, review deadline). The sibling of a risk acceptance: an acceptance says the exposure is real and is being carried, a disposition says the objective does not apply here at all. The objective stays in the matrix and in every coverage count, reported in its own class — what is suppressed is work (no controls generated, no coverage gap raised), never the accounting. |
| Every signed judgment on a model's objectives, both kinds. Expired and revoked entries are included: a lapsed decision is part of the audit trail. Optional |
|
|
| Have ONE control objective's mitigation group judged — the remedy for an objective reading |
Functional Conformance
Proves a feature does what it was specified to do (Capability × Condition), verified by the same assertion + CI engine as security controls.
Tool | Description |
| Derive capabilities (behaviours the feature must deliver), Given-When-Then functional objectives (walking each capability against a taxonomy of operating conditions), and a concrete implementable test per objective — so the agent implements the tests rather than deciding what to test. Requires a Pro plan; billable. |
| Read the capability decomposition: every capability, or one by |
| Read the functional objectives (the test plan). |
| Per-objective + per-test state (verified / covered / failing / untested), the Capabilities × Conditions matrix, and applicable / missing-objective / not-applicable cell accounting. |
| The agent brief: per not-yet-verified test, its implementation brief and the objectives it proves; plus objectives with no test and applicable conditions with no objective. |
| Manually register an extra test satisfying one or more objectives (generation already specifies the tests; a manual test survives regeneration). |
| Submit evidence assertions for a functional test (verified in CI, same as control evidence). |
Composition (recursive-tree effective model)
Views over the effective model — own entities composed with everything inherited from ancestor threat models on the recursive tree. Available where the deployment enables composition; where it does not, read tools return a stable empty body with flag_enabled: false and the write tool returns 503.
Tool | Description |
| Index: counts + tree metadata ( |
| Effective entity set keyed by kind (trust boundaries, components, assets, attackers, attack paths). Each entry carries provenance ( |
| Effective COs tagged with origin ( |
| Per-CO coverage with credited inheritance: |
| Per-CO reachability verdicts over the composed effective topology — same kinds ( |
| Effective AttackPath set + lifted missing/dangling suggestions computed against the composed reach surface. |
| Paginated reconciliation candidates between this model and its ancestors. Tier |
| Mutating. |
| Mutating. Promote a shared-anchor entity from two sibling descendants to their lowest common ancestor: each source's copy is soft-deleted and the inherited entity becomes canonical for every descendant of the LCA. Server re-detects field-level and attached-state conflicts against current live state; pass |
| Mutating. Inverse of |
| Undo a prior lift or split ( |
Cross-model dependencies (delegation)
Declared reliance edges (distinct from the parent/composition tree, which is containment): a model depends on a control implemented in another model — for systems built on shared services (auth, logging, shared data) rather than sub-parts. The target is always a provider control (credit terminates at a proven mechanism). Reliance is workspace-scoped: a consumer can only delegate to provider models in the same workspace (these tools don't see models across workspace boundaries). Available where the deployment enables the model tree; whether reliance carries credit is also a deployment setting.
Tool | Description |
| Mark a shared-service model as a foundation that advertises specific controls ( |
| One edge at a time. |
| A model's dependency edges (as consumer) plus who relies on it (as provider — the blast radius before changing its controls). |
| Without |
Tags (grouping)
Overlapping, semantics-free grouping of models (the Affiliation primitive) — for audit scopes, products, ad-hoc selections, or portfolios. A model may carry many tags; a tag never affects posture or credit. The group tools act on tags.
Tool | Description |
| Create or remove a tag (deleting affects the grouping only, not the member models). |
| Manage membership; a model can belong to many tags at once. A model added to a tag takes on the frameworks the tag selected. |
| Browse the workspace's tags, read one with its members, or list a model's tags. |
| The reliance edges among a tag's members, each with its status and whether it credits its objective. |
| Aggregate per-CO risk across a tag's members. Delegation-aware (a CO mitigated via a verified cross-model delegation reads as covered). |
| Make a tag a compliance/audit scope: select frameworks for the tag, propagated to its members and to every model added later. |
| Cross-model compliance coverage report scoped to a tag's members. |
| Signed auditor HTML for a tag: every member's report, after the reliance edges among the members with their status. |
Compliance
Tool | Description |
| Available frameworks: the built-ins (among them OWASP ASVS, ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIST CSF, IEC 62443, ISO/SAE 21434, PCI DSS, GDPR) and any imported. |
| Import a customer-specific framework (JSON: |
| Select frameworks for a model, or for a tag ( |
| Coverage report for a selected framework. |
| AI-powered semantic mapping of controls to framework requirements. |
| Manual control-to-requirement mapping. |
| LLM-powered gap closure — proposes new assets, attackers, and controls for uncovered framework requirements. |
Components
Tool | Description |
| Components bridge trust boundaries (security architecture) to repositories (code organization). |
Organizations
Tool | Description |
| Set per-organization level grades: |
Setup and Operations
Tool | Description |
| Check which onboarding steps are done. |
| Mark an onboarding step as done (mcp_configured, mipiti_verify_installed, ci_secret_added, ci_pipeline_added). |
CWE Classification
Tool | Description |
| Get the platform's CWE reference catalog status (current MITRE version, entry count). Reports |
| List CWE weakness classifications tagged onto a model's control objectives, with a staleness marker for tags whose catalog entry has since been deprecated, redefined, or removed. |
| Classify a model's control objectives against the platform CWE catalog. Grounded — the model may only select from the catalog's current candidates, and every returned id is re-validated before storage. |
Development
git clone https://github.com/Mipiti/mipiti-mcp.git
cd mipiti-mcp
pip install -e ".[dev]"
python -m pytest -vLocal Testing with Claude Desktop
{
"mcpServers": {
"mipiti": {
"command": "uv",
"args": ["run", "--directory", "/path/to/mipiti-mcp", "mipiti-mcp"],
"env": {
"MIPITI_API_KEY": "your-key"
}
}
}
}License
Proprietary. Copyright (c) 2026 Mipiti, Inc. All rights reserved. See LICENSE for details.
Available Tools
163 toolsaccept_behavioural_link_proposalsAccept Behavioural Link ProposalsA
Declare every link proposal as shown, in one act. Mutating; creates no model version.
Relay the proposals to the person first: read them with
get_behavioural_links and name its proposals_hash, which is the
set reviewed. Refused with 409 review_stale when a proposal has
changed since, and with 422 no_proposals when there is none. The
judgements the links re-key are queued, charged to the caller.
A program's acceptance is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation
policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and
parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
Returns the links as get_behavioural_links does, with declared.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| proposals_hash | Yes | The ``proposals_hash`` reviewed. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: it discloses the operation is mutating, creates no model version, side effects (judgements queued, charged to the caller), and precise error semantics with codes and required follow-up actions. This is far beyond what structured fields provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the core action and mutating/side-effect note, then layers workflow and error handling. The prose is dense but each sentence carries operational value; only the multi-paragraph structure adds mild length.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating, error-prone operation, the description covers prerequisites, side effects, all relevant error codes, escalation handling, and a return-value hint ('returns the links ... with declared'). Even though an output schema exists, the behavioral completeness is excellent.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
At 67% schema coverage, the description adds meaning to proposals_hash ('the set reviewed' obtained from get_behavioural_links), which is the key semantic link. model_id and server_version get no additional text, leaving a small gap for server_version.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (declare/accept) and resource (link proposals) and signals batch scope with 'every ... in one act,' which implicitly distinguishes it from the single-item declare_behavioural_link sibling. It does not explicitly name that sibling, so the differentiation is inferred rather than stated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly prescribes the prerequisite workflow (read with get_behavioural_links and pass its proposals_hash), names when it fails (409 review_stale, 422 no_proposals, 403 escalation), and gives concrete routing on failure ('Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals'). Alternatives and conditions are both covered.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
add_assetAdd AssetA
Add a new asset to a threat model. Creates a new version.
Authoring contract: name the data or resource being protected and
the security property at stake (Confidentiality / Integrity /
Availability / Usage), not a mechanism or control ("per-organization
key-wrapping material", not "KMS encryption"). An asset phrased as a
mechanism is flagged with a quality_warning and yields
under-specified control objectives. An asset that does not apply is
recorded with a non-applicability assumption or
create_co_disposition; there is no status to set.
The platform reasons the factor decomposition and composes impact
with the prompt generation uses, so factors are calibrated alike;
override one afterwards with edit_asset and a change_reason.
component_ids links the asset to the deployable units that hold it,
which feeds reachability (several for a multi-instance asset, e.g. a
session token on client and cache).
A proposal matching a soft-deleted asset is gated: it either restores
that asset (auto_restored: true, restored_asset_id,
discarded_fields; its CO tombstones revive) or is refused as similar
({accepted: false, classification: "similar", candidate_restore_id},
nothing saved). A normal create returns {model, entities, controls_carried, ...}: model is the model's id, version and title,
entities.assets the asset as created. 503: an evaluator is
unavailable, retry with backoff; 502: it answered malformed, retry.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | Asset name (required). | |
| notes | No | Optional notes. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| description | No | Optional description (recommended — feeds the factor-reasoning prompt). | |
| component_ids | No | Comma-separated component IDs scoping the asset (e.g., "CMP1,CMP2"). Empty / omitted = unscoped. Validated against components declared on the model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| security_properties | No | Comma-separated properties, e.g. "C,I,A" (default: "C"). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses version bumping, quality_warning flagging, soft-delete gating with restore-vs-refuse outcomes, response envelopes for both create and restore paths, and 503/502 retry semantics. This is far beyond what any structured field provides.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose is front-loaded and each contractual block earns its place. It is dense and slightly long, and it spends some words describing return envelopes that the output schema already covers, which is minor redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 7-param mutation on a complex domain it is essentially complete: authoring rules, linking effect, gating outcomes, error handling, and response shape are all present. The remaining overlap with the output schema slightly dilutes rather than harms completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 86%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning: component_ids 'feeds reachability' with a multi-instance session-token example, security_properties are named, and description is noted to drive the factor-reasoning prompt. This is useful semantics beyond the schema's own hints.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb+resource ('Add a new asset to a threat model') and immediately adds a versioning consequence. It distinguishes itself from the sibling edit_asset by contrasting create time versus later override.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The authoring contract is explicit about what to name the asset and what not to do (mechanisms vs protections, quality_warning consequences), and it names the alternatives for adjacent cases (create_co_disposition for non-applicable assets, edit_asset for overriding factors). It's strong guidance but stops short of a crisp 'use this instead of X when Y' routing statement across the many sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
add_assumptionAdd AssumptionA
Add an assumption. Creates a new model version. Returns {model, entities, ...}: the model's id, version and title, and
entities.assumptions the assumption as created.
Assumptions represent security properties outside the system owner's trust boundary. When linked to COs and attested, they mitigate those COs in the assessment.
Optionally attach a structured exclusion predicate (the
exclusion_* params). The reachability composer matches active
attested assumptions with predicates against COs deterministically — class-3 (deterministic computation) evidence in addition to the operator-attested class-1 evidence. Pass any subset of the fields; unspecified fields default to wildcard ("*"). When
exclusion_co_idsis non-empty, it takes precedence over the match fields.
Use this to resolve a CO whose composer verdict is
indeterminate because no structural primitive backs an
operator non-applicability claim: set exclusion_co_ids=<co_id>
(and optionally the attacker/asset/property fields), and the
composer will derive unreachable / reason: assumption_excludes
on subsequent loads, with the assumption's structured predicate as
the audit-trail cause.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| description | Yes | What is assumed (e.g., "Customer restricts CI runner egress"). | |
| linked_co_ids | No | Optional comma-separated CO IDs this assumption covers. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| assumption_type | No | "external" (default, allows manual attestation) or "non_applicability" (requires CI verification, no manual attestation). | external |
| exclusion_co_ids | No | Comma-separated CO IDs the predicate matches explicitly. When non-empty, overrides the match fields. | |
| exclusion_asset_id | No | "*" or concrete asset ID. | |
| exclusion_attacker_id | No | Predicate match — "*" wildcard (default when any other exclusion_* param is set) or concrete attacker ID. | |
| exclusion_property_match | No | "C" | "I" | "A" | "U" | "*". | |
| exclusion_attacker_vector | No | One of "Network" | "Adjacent" | "Local" | "Physical" | "*". | |
| exclusion_asset_component_id | No | "*" or concrete component ID. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are present, so the description must carry the disclosure load, and it does well: it declares the mutation's side effect (a new model version is created), describes the deterministic composer matching behavior and its downstream effect ('unreachable / reason: assumption_excludes'), and notes class-1 vs class-3 evidence. It omits reversibility (undo_model_change exists), permission/attestation requirements for the caller, and validation failure modes.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose and return shape, then domain meaning, then the exclusion-predicate mechanic, then the specific use case. Every paragraph adds new information; there is no filler or repetition, even at roughly 230 words for an 11-parameter tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For an 11-parameter mutation with an output schema and no annotations, the description supplies the domain model, the mutation side effect, predicate semantics, and the primary use case. The return-shape sentence is partly redundant with the output schema, and the attestation workflow (submit_attestation, assumption_type differences) is left to sibling schemas, so it is strong but not exhaustive.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 91%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns above that by explaining the exclusion_* family as a predicate with wildcard defaults ('unspecified fields default to wildcard'), the precedence of exclusion_co_ids, and the mechanic that makes the params meaningful. It adds little on assumption_type and server_version beyond the schema text.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Add an assumption') plus the concrete side effect ('Creates a new model version'), and explains what an assumption means in this domain. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from the sibling edit_assumption or convert_assumption_to_controls, but the add-vs-edit split is inferable from names.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives a concrete when-to-use recipe: invoke this when a CO's composer verdict is 'indeterminate' because no structural primitive backs an operator non-applicability claim, then set exclusion_co_ids=<co_id>. Also states precedence ('exclusion_co_ids takes precedence over the match fields'). It stops short of explaining when to use linked_co_ids/attestation versus the exclusion predicate path, or when a user should prefer an alternative tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
add_attackerAdd AttackerA
Add a new attacker to a threat model. Creates a new version.
Authoring contract: capability names the operations the
attacker can perform from its position and what they achieve —
not just the access or vantage point. Phrase it as "From
[position], the attacker can [concrete operations] …" (e.g. "From
the network path between the API server and the database, the
attacker can read and alter requests and responses to exfiltrate
data in transit or inject forged responses"). A capability that
states only access is flagged with a quality_warning and the
control objectives derived from it may be under-specified.
The caller supplies identity-bearing fields (capability, position,
archetype, trust_boundary_ids); the backend reasons the factors.
Override one later via edit_attacker with a change_reason.
Three outcomes (normal create / auto-restore / similar-rejection)
mirror add_asset (entities holds the attacker). 503 on
factor-reasoning or restore-candidate evaluator outage, 502 on malformed
restore-candidate response.
surface_extent says how much of the reached interface this
attacker's operations range over. An attacker ranging over the whole
interface makes the objectives it appears in for-all obligations,
which only a sound witness (typed_boundary /
sink_default_deny) can credit. Declaring it here is a statement about
the attacker's reach, taken with its change_reason: a person's is
recorded attested; a program's only under a workspace rule delegating
extent_attested, otherwise the attacker is added, the extent lands
unattested and the attestation waits for a person (the answer's
attestation.escalation_id). Only whole
is declarable on a create: narrowing to one named entry is a statement
about the objectives the attacker anchors, and a create has none yet —
add the attacker, then narrow it with edit_attacker and a
change_reason, where the narrowing is checked against the assets
those objectives defend. There is no attacker status to set.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| position | No | Position/access level. | |
| archetype | No | Archetype (e.g., "insider", "external"). | |
| capability | Yes | Attacker capability description (required). | |
| change_reason | No | Required when ``surface_extent`` is supplied — documents the declaration for the audit trail. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| surface_extent | No | ``"whole"`` when, from its position, the attacker's operations range over ANY entry of the interface it reaches (any endpoint, request, row, file, message or frame). Requires ``change_reason``. Omit to leave it undeclared, which is the ordinary case. | |
| trust_boundary_ids | No | Comma-separated ids of the boundaries the attacker has crossed. Naming them attests the position: a person's is recorded attested; a program's only under a rule delegating ``position_attested``, otherwise the position lands suggested and the attestation waits for a person (``attestation.escalation_id``). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses version creation, auto-restore and similar-rejection outcomes, 503/502 failure modes, quality-warning behavior for capability phrasing, and attestation/escalation semantics for surface_extent and trust_boundary_ids.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The response is front-loaded with the core action and version-creation effect, and its length is largely justified by the tool's complexity. It is dense and somewhat verbose in the authoring-contract and attestation sections, but the information generally earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the 8-parameter schema, high schema coverage, and existing output schema, the description is complete enough for correct invocation. It covers creation behavior, parameter semantics, error conditions, override paths, and attestation/escalation behavior without needing to restate return values.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is already 88%, but the description adds substantial meaning beyond the schema, especially for capability authoring expectations, the quality_warning consequence, change_reason being required with surface_extent, and the attestation implications of trust_boundary_ids.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the specific action and resource: 'Add a new attacker to a threat model. Creates a new version.' It also distinguishes the tool from edit_attacker for later overrides and mentions that outcomes mirror add_asset, but it does not explicitly distinguish this from the similar sibling add_proposed_attacker.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives concrete usage guidance, including that callers supply identity-bearing fields, that the backend reasons the factors, and that overrides happen later via edit_attacker with a change_reason. It also states when surface_extent can be declared versus when narrowing must happen later, though it does not explicitly compare against add_proposed_attacker.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
add_componentAdd ComponentA
Add a component to a threat model.
Components bridge security architecture to code organization. They
map trust boundaries to repos so controls can be scoped to the
codebase that implements them. They also drive the deterministic
reachability composer's asset-boundary derivation: an asset's
trust-boundary footprint is the union of its components'
trust_boundary_ids.
Generation reads no components, so add or edit them after
generate_threat_model, not before.
A component with empty repo_url is either speculative (your own
code, not linked to a repo yet) or external (e.g. a third-party
service, the customer's IdP, or other external infrastructure you
call but don't own).
The component's trust boundary tells them apart: bind an
internal-zone component to its repo via edit_component; leave an
external-zone component unbound — its component_unbound finding
is a permanent external-dependency marker, not a gap to close.
Binding by "some client code touches it" is wrong: client code for
external dependencies lives in your repo too.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | Component name (e.g., "Backend API", "Auth Worker"). | |
| path | No | Path within repo for monorepos (e.g., "services/auth"). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| repo_url | No | Repository URL (e.g., "github.com/org/backend"). Empty string is valid for speculative components — pass a real URL once you've identified the codebase. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| trust_boundary_ids | No | Comma-separated trust boundary IDs that this component spans (its deployment zone). Drives reach decisions for any asset scoped to this component. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses important behavioral traits: the tool's relationship to generation (must be called after generate_threat_model), the meaning of empty repo_url, and the permanent external-dependency marker behavior of component_unbound findings. It doesn't explicitly state side effects like whether it overwrites existing components or requires specific permissions, but the disclosed context is substantial.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is moderately long but every sentence earns its place. It front-loads the core purpose, then provides essential context about components, generation ordering, and the repo_url/trust boundary semantics. The structure is logical, though the final warning about client code could be seen as slightly tangential.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (6 params, output schema present, many siblings), the description is quite complete. It covers the tool's role, when to use it, key parameter semantics, and common pitfalls. It doesn't describe the return value, but an output schema exists, so that's not required. It could mention prerequisites like needing a valid model_id, but that's likely implied by the schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents most parameters well. The description adds meaning beyond the schema by explaining the semantic distinction between speculative and external components (empty repo_url) and how trust_boundary_ids drive reach decisions. It doesn't add detail for every parameter, but the schema covers them adequately.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function: 'Add a component to a threat model.' It goes beyond a simple definition by explaining what components are, how they relate to trust boundaries and repos, and how they drive the reachability composer. This distinguishes it from sibling tools like edit_component and add_trust_boundary.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides explicit usage guidance: 'Generation reads no components, so add or edit them after generate_threat_model, not before.' It also explains when a component with empty repo_url is speculative vs external, and explicitly warns against a common mistake ('Binding by "some client code touches it" is wrong'). This is strong, actionable guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
add_functional_testAdd Functional TestA
Hand-author a single functional test and map it to one or more objectives. Mutating.
Generation (generate_functional_objectives) already specifies the tests to implement, so use this only to register an extra test that generation did not produce; a manually-added test survives regeneration/refresh. For bulk-registering tests that already exist in your codebase, use import_functional_tests instead. This records the test at the status you claim — it does not run or verify anything; CI verification happens only when you attach TEST_EXISTS/TEST_ATTESTED evidence via submit_assertions with functional_test_id.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | No | not_implemented | implemented | verified — an operator claim only; an independent CI run is what actually verifies the test. Defaults to not_implemented. | not_implemented |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| description | Yes | What the test proves. | |
| component_ids | No | Comma-separated component ids the test exercises (optional). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| functional_objective_ids | Yes | Comma-separated objective ids the test satisfies (at least one required; get them from get_functional_objectives). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and delivers: it declares the operation mutating, discloses a durability trait ('a manually-added test survives regeneration/refresh'), and draws the critical boundary that the recorded status is a claim only and is not run or verified here. That is exactly the kind of non-obvious behavior an agent needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences, each load-bearing: purpose first, then the disambiguation against the two sibling tools, then the verification caveat. No filler and the routing information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 6-param mutation tool with an output schema already present, nothing an agent needs is missing — required inputs are covered by the schema, and the description supplies the usage, persistence and verification context the schema cannot.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents status, functional_objective_ids, component_ids and the rest. The description reinforces the status-is-a-claim semantics and points to get_functional_objectives for ids, but adds little beyond the schema text, so the baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('Hand-author a single functional test') plus the mapping side-effect ('map it to one or more objectives') and flags 'Mutating.' An agent can distinguish this from import_functional_tests and generate_functional_objectives without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says generation already specifies the tests, so use this only for an extra test generation did not produce, and names the alternative for bulk-registering existing tests (import_functional_tests). Both the when and the when-not are stated, plus a downstream note about CI verification via submit_assertions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
add_model_to_groupAdd Model To GroupA
Add a threat model to a tag. Mutating.
Links the model into the tag without moving or copying it; the model stays independently editable, and may belong to many tags. The model takes on the compliance frameworks the tag selected, marked as the tag's, so removing a framework from the tag removes it from the model again; a framework the model selected itself is left as it is.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| group_id | Yes | ID of the tag. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model to add. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations the description carries the full burden, and it does substantial work: it discloses the operation is a link not a move/copy, that the model stays independently editable and may belong to many tags, and critically that tag-selected frameworks propagate and are removed again when dropped from the tag, while self-selected frameworks persist. Missing only auth/permission or failure-mode information.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose and mutation flag in the first sentence, then a compact semantics paragraph. Every clause carries information; the framework-inheritance detail could be trimmed slightly but it is substantive rather than filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values need not be explained. For a three-parameter mutation with no annotations, the description covers the important behavioral question (inheritance/removal semantics) but omits prerequisites and error conditions, leaving a small gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%; the schema documents group_id and model_id but leaves server_version bare. The description adds useful domain meaning by equating 'tag' with group_id, but never references model_id or server_version syntax, so it only partially compensates for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Add a threat model to a tag') plus a mutation flag. Its sibling remove_model_from_group is the inverse operation, and this description is unambiguous about direction.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage context is implied rather than stated — nothing tells the agent when to prefer this over remove_model_from_group, list_model_groups, or create_group. The mutation flag gives a weak use signal but there are no explicit when/when-not conditions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
add_proposed_attackerAdd Proposed AttackerA
Add the attacker the attacker closure proposes for a credential set. Mutating; creates a model version.
Name the proposal by its credential_classes as
get_behavioural_attackers lists it (a dismissed one may be added),
and a part of the zones nobody stands at by one of its zones where
another proposal holds the same classes.
The attacker holds them, with the privileges they give and no position
but the tenant-isolation boundaries a per-tenant holder is placed at.
It is rated as add_attacker rates: one call before the write,
charged to the caller, its privileges the ones it holds gives. Where no
rating answers, or when a person accepts a parked addition, it is added
unrated (rating_source: "unrated"), and
reevaluate_threat_model_factors with unrated_only rates it.
Refused with 409 not_proposed when no attacker is proposed for
exactly that set now (read the attackers again), 409
ambiguous_proposal when several are and no zone names one (its
zones lists each), 409 closure_not_offered, 422
unknown_class.
A program's addition is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation
policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and
parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
Returns {model_id, model_version, applies, credential_classes, counts, added, rating_source}: how many proposals, dismissals and questions the
closure now holds, added, the new attacker's id, and whether a
rating answered (unrated when none did).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| zone | No | A zone of the part to add, where two proposals hold the same classes; empty otherwise. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| credential_classes | No | Comma-separated class ids of the proposal; empty for the one holding none. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does: it declares the mutation and model-version creation, the rating side effect ('one call before the write, charged to the caller'), the unrated fallback with rating_source, and permission behavior (403 plus escalation_id, parked for a person). It enumerates the failure taxonomy (409 not_proposed / ambiguous_proposal / closure_not_offered, 422 unknown_class), which is exactly the context an agent cannot get from structured fields.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose and mutation flag are correctly front-loaded, but the prose is dense and occasionally unparseable ('no position but the tenant-isolation boundaries a per-tenant holder is placed at'). The closing 'Returns {model_id, ...}' sentence partly duplicates the existing output schema, spending length on data the agent already receives.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating, escalation-prone tool this is well covered: proposal selection, zone disambiguation, rating/unrated state, error codes, and escalation polling are all present, and the output schema handles return shape. The gap is minor — server_version is unexplained and the relationship to add_attacker is unstated.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, so the schema already defines credential_classes and zone. The description still adds real sourcing semantics — credential_classes 'as get_behavioural_attackers lists it' and zone only needed 'where another proposal holds the same classes' — which tells the agent how to derive values, not just their type. server_version gets no explanation, keeping it short of a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource+scope: 'Add the attacker the attacker closure proposes for a credential set,' plus 'Mutating; creates a model version.' It implicitly separates itself from the sibling add_attacker (proposal-driven) and from dismiss_proposed_attacker, but never names add_attacker as the alternative for manual attackers, leaving one plausible confusion.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives concrete preconditions (name the proposal as get_behavioural_attackers lists it; a dismissed one may be added; use zone where another proposal holds the same classes) and prescriptive recovery on 403 ('Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals'). Missing an explicit 'use add_attacker instead when...' exclusion, so not a full when-not/alternatives treatment.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
add_trust_boundaryAdd Trust BoundaryB
Add a trust boundary. Creates a new model version. Returns {model, entities, ...}: the model's id, version and title, and
entities.trust_boundaries the boundary as created.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| passes | No | Optional comma-separated AttackVector values the boundary allows through (subset of "Network,Adjacent,Local,Physical"). Omit for the methodology default (passes-everything). Narrowing this set is what makes a boundary block specific attacker vectors in the deterministic reachability composer. | |
| sealed | No | Optional. Set True to declare the boundary has NO lateral ingress — the only way into its zone is crossing the perimeter (an air-gap / network-segmented enclave). On its own this is a suggestion: only an ATTESTED seal lets reachability decisively rule an asset unreachable instead of indeterminate, and the attestation is recorded with ``edit_trust_boundary`` (``seal_source="attested"`` with a ``change_reason``), by a person or a program the workspace delegates ``seal_attested`` to. Default False (assume a lateral pivot is possible). Set it only when the isolation is real and attestable. | |
| crosses | No | Optional comma-separated asset IDs that cross this boundary. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| description | Yes | What this boundary represents (e.g., "Public network to API server"). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden. It does disclose two non-obvious trait-level facts: the call mutates by creating a new model version, and the return shape. However it says nothing about permission/attestation requirements for the call itself or failure modes; the deeper sealed/attestation semantics live in the schema, not the description.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action and versioning side effect. The return-shape sentence is somewhat redundant given an output schema exists, and the RST-style backtick quoting is slightly noisy, but overall tight.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so spelling out the return value is unnecessary duplication. For a 6-parameter mutation tool with no annotations, the description is adequate but thin on when-to-use, prerequisites, and the relationship to edit_trust_boundary, leaving gaps an agent must infer.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents passes, sealed, crosses, model_id, and description in detail. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond the schema, which is acceptable at this coverage level.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('Add a trust boundary') and adds the important side effect that it creates a new model version. The 'Add' vs sibling 'edit_trust_boundary' distinction is inferable from naming, though the description never names the sibling explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no statement of when to use this versus edit_trust_boundary, no prerequisites (e.g., does a model/asset need to exist first, does this require a specific role), and no exclusions. Usage is only implied by the parameter set.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
answer_attacker_credentialsAnswer Attacker CredentialsA
Say which of the behavioural model's credential classes an attacker holds. Mutating; creates a model version.
Answer from what the code or the owner shows. Empty means it holds no
credential. Its privileges follow from what it holds, by rule: None
with none, High when a class may invoke an action that writes what
decides authority, Low otherwise; edit_attacker then refuses a
privileges change (409 privileges_from_holdings). A holder of a
per-tenant class is placed at every tenant-isolation boundary,
suggested. Refused with 422 unknown_class (a class the model does not
have), 409 closure_not_offered (get_behavioural_attackers reads
applies: false), 404 no_attacker.
A program's answer is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation
policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and
parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
Returns {model_id, model_version, applies, credential_classes, counts, attacker}: how many proposals, dismissals and questions the closure now
holds (read them with get_behavioural_attackers) and the attacker
as it now stands.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| attacker_id | Yes | The attacker (e.g. "T3"). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| credential_classes | No | Comma-separated class ids from ``credential_classes``; empty for none. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it states the tool is mutating, creates a model version, derives privileges by rule, places per-tenant holders at isolation boundaries, and explains refusal codes and escalation behavior. It also describes the returned object and how counts can be read elsewhere.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the purpose and mutation behavior, then proceeds through rules, refusal cases, and return shape. It is dense but appropriately sized for a complex mutating tool with no annotations, though the amount of error-code detail makes it slightly less concise than ideal.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complex mutation, refusal paths, escalation workflow, and output schema, the description is complete enough for an agent to invoke the tool correctly and handle common failures. The presence of an output schema reduces the need to explain return values, yet the description still summarizes them usefully.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, but the description adds important meaning beyond the schema for the key parameter, explaining that `credential_classes` is comma-separated, empty means no credential, and that holdings determine privileges and tenant placement. It does not explain `server_version`, which is the remaining schema gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a specific verb and resource: it says which credential classes an attacker holds, and explicitly labels the tool as mutating and version-creating. It also distinguishes the operation from related siblings by noting that `edit_attacker` refuses privileges changes and that readings come from `get_behavioural_attackers`.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It provides clear operational guidance: answer from code or owner evidence, use empty for no credential, and expect specific refusal modes such as 422 `unknown_class`, 409 `closure_not_offered`, and 404 `no_attacker`. It also tells the agent not to retry after a 403 escalation and to poll `list_proposals`, though it stops short of an explicit use-this-instead-of-sibling statement for all cases.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
answer_behavioural_questionsAnswer Behavioural QuestionsA
Answer open behavioural questions, many in one call. Mutating; creates a model version.
Answer only from what the code or the owner shows; say unknown
rather than guess, in a sentence or two. An extraction runs once every
owner question has an answer, or on extract_now=True (with no
answers, refused 409 questions_open while one is open, and 409
extraction_running while one is queued or running, or with no answer
since it started: poll it), billed to the caller (402 when short).
dry_run=True records nothing (no version, no escalation) and returns
outcome: whether the answers extract (extracts, estimate),
the questions left or raised. Dry-run, answer what is raised, then
submit once.
An answer is a fact (text), or a disposition its question lists:
not_needed, not_behaviour, unknown, as_stated; text
is then a note. A question about the model's own structure carries
structured: answer with structured naming the ids offered,
{"classes": [...]} or {"public": true}, {"zones": {id: zone}}, {"zone": z}, {"actions": [...]}, {"changes": {field: [actions]}}, {"receivers": [...]}, {"elements": [id | {"id", "secret": true}]} (a zone's contents: an id not offered is a
new element there; not_needed says it holds nothing). An offer with
new_zones
takes a zone it does not list, one with new_actors a receiver it
does not list, each added (409 id_in_use when the id names something
else). It edits the model at once. Where the code does more or less than
the sentence, add contradicts: {"direction": "code_does_more" | "code_does_less", "quote"?} (409 drift_is_defect over a defect's
sentence).
A program's answer is a judgment: refused with 403 and an
escalation_id unless delegated. Do not retry; poll
list_proposals.
With an extraction asked for, queued is true: follow it with
get_behavioural_model(view="status", wait_seconds=50).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| answers | No | JSON array of ``{"question_id", "text"?, "disposition"?, "structured"?, "contradicts"?}``, e.g. '[{"question_id": "q1", "text": "Only the owner deletes."}, {"question_id": "q3", "structured": {"classes": ["org_admin"]}}]'. | [] |
| dry_run | No | Return what the answers would do (``outcome``) and record nothing. Default False. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| extract_now | No | Extract now, with the answers collected. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and discharges it: mutation semantics (creates a model version, edits the model at once), the extraction trigger conditions, and a complete error map — 409 questions_open, 409 extraction_running, 409 id_in_use, 409 drift_is_defect, 402 when short of credit, 403 with escalation_id for program answers. dry_run's exact side-effect exemption is also stated.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Every sentence carries information, but the layout is a dense run-on: the extraction error codes are crammed into a parenthetical after 'extract_now=True', and the structured-answer grammar sits in one long block. Front-loading is good (mutation and purpose first) but scannability suffers for a definition this long.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Output schema exists so return values need no explanation, yet the description still pre-announces 'outcome', 'extracts'/'estimate', 'queued', and 'raised', which is exactly what an agent needs to branch on. Permissions (403/escalation), billing (402), idempotency (dry_run), and the required follow-up call are all covered.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 80% (baseline 3), but the description adds semantics the schema lacks: the closed set of dispositions (not_needed, not_behaviour, unknown, as_stated), the meaning of text-as-note when a disposition is used, the accepted structured shapes per question kind, and the contradicts.direction vocabulary. This materially reduces misfill risk on the hardest parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Answer open behavioural questions') and adds the key distinguishing scope 'many in one call', plus the mutation disclosure 'Mutating; creates a model version'. It never explicitly contrasts itself with the closely related extract_behavioural_model or get_behavioural_model siblings, so the differentiation is implied rather than spelled out.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit operating rules: answer only from code/owner evidence, say 'unknown' rather than guess, 'Dry-run, answer what is raised, then submit once', 'Do not retry; poll list_proposals', and 'follow it with get_behavioural_model(view="status", wait_seconds=50)'. It names the alternative tools for the escalation and status paths and gives trigger conditions for each.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
answer_entity_questionAnswer Entity QuestionA
Answer, with a fact, the flag the quality check raised about an asset or attacker. Mutating; creates no model version.
An entity's quality (on get_entity, the build proposal's flagged
entities or the review queue's entity_quality row) carries the
verdict's outcome and input_hash. Any flag may be answered:
question (answer its question), defect or invalid (answer
its warning, for instance where it reads a true claim as not
established and the documentation or the code establishes it). Answer
from the documentation or the code, stating what the system does and
where that is shown; never guess, and never weaken a true claim to clear
a flag. The answer is kept with the entity, shown to every later check of
it, and queues that entity's check again (and no other's). It decides
nothing: the verdict stands until that check runs, and the check may
still flag the entity, or propose a correction to apply with
apply_entity_proposals. Where a call's response is lost, read the
entity before answering again.
Refused 409 stale when the entity, or what it is judged with, changed
since the verdict (read it again), 409 not_flagged when no question,
defect or invalid verdict stands, 404 for an entity the model does not
hold.
Returns {entity_id, answer_id, answered_at, question, queued}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | Yes | The answer (at most 4000 characters). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| entity_id | Yes | The asset or attacker (e.g. "T-04"). | |
| input_hash | Yes | The verdict's ``input_hash`` as it was read. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden and does: it declares mutability, that no model version is created, that the answer is persisted and shown to every later check, that only this entity's check is queued, and the exact refusal codes (409 stale, 409 not_flagged, 404) with recovery guidance. It even covers the lost-response retry case.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the one-line purpose and the mutation caveat, then organized in layers (where flags come from, how to answer, what the answer does, refusals, return shape). It is dense rather than bloated, though the middle paragraph is long enough that a reader must work to find the 'never guess' rule.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 5-required-param mutation with no annotations, this covers everything an agent needs: provenance of the inputs, the staleness contract, side effects, retry semantics, and failure modes. An output schema exists, so the return description is a bonus rather than a gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is already 80%, so the baseline is 3; the description adds real meaning on top by framing ``input_hash`` as the verdict's hash 'as it was read' (a concurrency guard that explains the 409 stale refusal) and by constraining ``text`` to evidence-backed statements with no guessing and no weakening of true claims. It does not explain ``server_version``, hence not a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb+resource ('Answer, with a fact, the flag the quality check raised about an asset or attacker') and immediately names the two nearby siblings it is not: check_entity_quality (which raises flags) and apply_entity_proposals (which applies corrections). An agent can distinguish it from revalidate_entity_quality and apply_entity_proposals without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly enumerates when the tool applies — every flag kind (``question``, ``defect``, ``invalid``) and where the quality data is read from (``get_entity``, the build proposal's flagged entities, the review queue). It also states the exclusions and limits (it decides nothing, the verdict stands until the check runs) and the diagnostic paths for failure, which is more than most definitions offer.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
apply_control_changesetApply Control ChangesetA
Apply a batch of control operations atomically as ONE transaction.
Use this to reorganize a model's controls in a single step — for example to deduplicate controls (remap several onto the right objectives and delete the redundant ones at once), instead of many separate calls. All operations commit together or not at all.
Mapping-only: remap/delete/set_groups change objective mappings and retire controls but never re-author a control's description, so a kept or reused control keeps its status, evidence, and assertions. The orphan guard is evaluated on the FINAL state of the batch, so a delete paired with a covering remap or add in the same changeset is allowed; a changeset that would leave any previously-covered control objective uncovered is rejected as a whole and nothing is written.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| ops | Yes | JSON array of operation objects. Each object has an "op" of "remap", "delete", "add", or "set_groups": - remap: {"op": "remap", "control_id": "CTRL-03", "co_ids": ["CO1", "CO2"]} - delete: {"op": "delete", "control_id": "CTRL-09", "reason": "duplicate of CTRL-03"} - add: {"op": "add", "description": "...", "co_ids": ["CO5"], "mitigation_group": 1} - set_groups: {"op": "set_groups", "co_id": "CO1", "groups": {"1": ["CTRL-03"], "2": ["CTRL-04"]}} | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| change_reason | Yes | Why this reorganization is appropriate (min 10 chars). Recorded on every affected control's version history. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure and does so thoroughly. It explains atomic all-or-nothing commit, mapping-only semantics, preservation of status/evidence/assertions, and the orphan guard evaluated on the final state. This is exemplary transparency for a mutation tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is detailed but every sentence earns its place. It front-loads the core purpose, then adds necessary transaction and constraint details without repetition or fluff. The structure is well organized for a complex tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description fully addresses the tool's complexity: atomicity, operation types, orphan guard behavior, and mapping-only effects. An output schema exists, so return values are covered elsewhere. The only minor gap is server_version, which is neither described in the schema nor the description.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, so most parameter meaning is already provided by the schema. The description adds valuable context about operation behaviors but does not significantly elaborate on individual parameter semantics beyond what the schema already includes. server_version remains undocumented, but the high schema coverage keeps this at baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Apply a batch of control operations atomically as ONE transaction.' It clearly distinguishes this batch tool from single-operation siblings like remap_control and delete_control by emphasizing atomic, multi-operation changes.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly states when to use it: to reorganize controls in one step, such as deduplication, 'instead of many separate calls.' It does not explicitly name alternative tools or exclude single-operation cases, but the context is clear enough for an agent to choose correctly.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
apply_entity_proposalsApply Entity ProposalsA
Accept the quality check's corrections of assets and attackers, in one new model version.
Applying is accepting: a judgment normally the owner's. A program's is
parked for a person (refused, with escalation_id: do not retry)
unless the workspace delegates entity_correction_accepted. A doubted
claim you can establish, or take conservatively, is answered with
answer_entity_question instead; a property that does not apply is
declared not applicable, since a correction never removes one.
Read the correction as quality on get_entity (or the review
queue's entity_quality row): proposed holds the corrected words,
proposal_hash names them, input_hash the verdict, and drops
each claim the words before made that the correction does not, with why.
RELAY proposed AND drops TO THE PERSON. A correction no reader
marked is a rewording, else a narrowing; under a rule admitting only
rewording, a claim every reader missed is applied by the program: the
residual that policy accepts. It never moves a position, credentials or
components; the entity is rated for its new words, a person's rating kept
and the new one held pending (settle_entity_rating).
One outcome per entity: applied (correction_kind);
unbound (no proposal_hash: the correction and its hash are
returned); refused; property_removed (never written);
rejected (another entity, a duplicate, or internal identifiers,
reason says); stale (read it again); none; unavailable
(try again). One entity never stops the others; a model changed since it
was read writes nothing, each such item stale beside conflict.
Returns {results, version?, conflict?}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| proposals | Yes | JSON array of ``{"entity_id", "input_hash", "proposal_hash"}``, each ``input_hash`` and ``proposal_hash`` as the verdict was read. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses that applying is normally the owner's judgment, program refusal and escalation behavior, delegation conditions, partial application across entities, stale/conflict handling, and the fact that positions, credentials, and components are never moved. It also explains rating behavior and the pending settlement path.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded, but the body is dense and jargon-heavy, with long clauses such as the rewording-versus-narrowing policy that take effort to parse. The outcome list is complete but buried in prose rather than structured, so the definition is longer and harder to scan than necessary.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given a complex mutation tool with no annotations and an output schema, the description is complete enough to invoke correctly: it covers refusal, stale, conflict, partial success, and the return keys `{results, version?, conflict?}`. The remaining gap around `server_version` is minor.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%, and the description compensates for the most important parameter by explaining how `proposal_hash` names corrected words, `input_hash` names the verdict, and `drops` lists removed claims. It does not explain `server_version`, and `model_id` is left to the schema, but the core proposal semantics are substantially enriched.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening states a specific verb and resource: 'Accept the quality check's corrections of assets and attackers, in one new model version.' It distinguishes this action from related tools by naming `answer_entity_question`, `get_entity`, and `settle_entity_rating`. An agent can identify the operation without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly routes doubted claims to `answer_entity_question` instead, explains that refused corrections are parked for a person with an `escalation_id` and should not be retried unless delegation exists, and tells the agent to re-read on `stale` and retry on `unavailable`. These are concrete when/when-not rules and alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
assess_modelAssess ModelA
Run the deterministic assurance assessment over a threat model. Read-only — no LLM calls, no mutation.
Evaluates each control objective from its controls' implementation
status and returns summary counts (mitigated / at_risk /
unassessed) plus progressive metrics (defined / implemented /
verified). For LLM-based reasoning about which COs are
under-covered and what controls to add, use check_control_gaps
instead.
Use summary_only=True to get just the counts without per-CO assessments.
Paging: a read with limit that leaves pages beyond its own names a
snapshot of the whole assessment, with snapshot_expires_at. Pass
it back with each later page: the pages are then served from that one
evaluation, as of its evaluated_at, so they agree with each other and
nothing is evaluated again. A snapshot is kept for 10 minutes, and only
the 5 newest of a model, so other paged reads of the model can replace
it sooner. One not found comes back as {http_status: 410, code: "snapshot_not_found", message}: read again without it, from the first
page.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Max control objectives to return (0 = all). | |
| offset | No | Skip the first N control objectives. | |
| status | No | Optional filter — "mitigated", "at_risk", or "unassessed". | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model to assess. | |
| snapshot | No | The ``snapshot`` an earlier page named; empty (default) evaluates the model now. | |
| summary_only | No | If True, return only summary counts (no per-CO details). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden, and it does: read-only, no LLM calls, no mutation, and a detailed disclosure of snapshot paging behavior including the 10-minute retention, the 5-newest-per-model eviction, and the exact 410 snapshot_not_found recovery path. This is behavior an agent cannot infer from the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose and the sibling distinction, then output shape, then paging. The snapshot paragraph is long and uses dense inline code formatting, but every clause (expiry, eviction, error code, recovery instruction) is operationally necessary for correct paging.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, the description only needs to orient the agent, and it does so fully: read-only guarantees, the shape of the returned counts and metrics, the summary_only shortcut, and the complete stateful paging protocol including failure recovery.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 86%, so the baseline is 3; the description adds real meaning on top by explaining how limit interacts with snapshot creation, how snapshot is threaded across pages, and what summary_only changes about the response. The status filter's allowed values live only in the schema and are not reinforced, which keeps this just below a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Run the deterministic assurance assessment over a threat model') and immediately characterizes the inputs and outputs (control implementation status → mitigated/at_risk/unassessed counts plus defined/implemented/verified metrics). It also explicitly separates itself from the nearest sibling, check_control_gaps.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit routing rule: use this for deterministic assessment, use check_control_gaps when the agent wants LLM reasoning about which COs are under-covered. It also names a usage variant (summary_only=True for counts only) so the agent knows when to narrow the call.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
assign_to_componentsAssign To ComponentsA
Replace an asset's or a control's component scope. Mutating.
Components are the canonical bridge between security architecture
(trust boundaries) and code organization (repos). target_type
selects what is being scoped:
"control"— replace a control's component scope. A control scoped to one or more components is visible to coding agents working in those repos (matched via Component.repo_url + Component.path); an unscoped control is visible everywhere. Use when wiring a previously unscoped control to the component(s) that implement it, adding a second component to a cross-cutting control (e.g. "all microservices enforce JWT validation"), or correcting a wrong assignment.target_idis the control ID (e.g. "CTRL-03")."asset"— replace an asset's component scope. Linking assets to components flows boundary context into reachability derivation without giving Asset its owntrust_boundary_ids. Multi-component is the right shape for a multi-instance asset (e.g., a session token on client + cache + DB — each component handles a distinct instance).target_idis the asset ID (e.g. "A1").
Both variants are mechanical / non-AI-gated and validate only that
every referenced component exists on the model. An asset's answer
carries the model's id, version and title, and entities.assets the
asset as it now stands.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| target_id | Yes | ID of the asset or control to scope (must match ``target_type``). | |
| target_type | Yes | Either "asset" or "control" — which entity to scope. | |
| change_reason | Yes | Why this scope is appropriate (min 10 chars). Captured in the version history. | |
| component_ids | Yes | Comma-separated component IDs (e.g., "CMP1,CMP2"). Empty string = unscoped (a control becomes visible to every coding agent; an asset loses its explicit code-ownership binding). Every supplied ID must exist on the model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden well: it declares the operation mutating, explains that it replaces scope wholesale, notes both variants are 'mechanical / non-AI-gated' and validate only that components exist, and spells out the empty-string unscoped consequence. It stops short of stating permission requirements or reversibility beyond the mention of version history in the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The mutation and replace semantics are front-loaded, and the per-variant bullets are well organized. It is on the long side and some of the empty-string/unscoped detail duplicates the schema's component_ids description, but nearly every sentence carries scope semantics an agent would otherwise have to infer.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 6-parameter mutation tool with no annotations, this covers the important ground: replacement semantics, validation limits, unscoped behavior, and target_type branching. An output schema exists, so the brief return-value note is optional rather than required. Preconditions (e.g., target must exist on the model) are only implied.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents most parameters. The description adds real value beyond it: target_id examples ('CTRL-03', 'A1'), the meaning of target_type per branch, and the visibility consequences of component scoping. It does not restate component_ids syntax, but it doesn't need to.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Replace an asset's or a control's component scope') and flags it as mutating up front. The target_type enumeration makes the two operating modes explicit, so an agent can distinguish this from add_component/edit_component without reading the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives concrete when-to-use conditions per variant: wiring a previously unscoped control, adding a second component to a cross-cutting control, correcting a wrong assignment, and multi-instance assets. It also states the replacement (not additive) semantics, which is the key usage trap.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
associate_functional_testAssociate Functional TestA
Associate a functional test with one or more functional objectives.
Use this after suggest_functional_test_mappings, or to hand-map a test to
the objectives it covers. The platform verifies each association is
applicable before accepting it and returns any it declined under
rejected_mappings.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| functional_test_id | Yes | The functional test to associate. | |
| functional_objective_ids | Yes | Comma-separated objective ids the test covers. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the behavioral burden. It discloses that the platform verifies each association before accepting it and returns declined mappings under 'rejected_mappings'. This is useful behavioral context, though it does not cover side effects or idempotency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three concise sentences, each earning its place: what it does, when to use it, and what behavior to expect. No redundancy or filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with four required parameters and an output schema, the description provides essential operational context, usage timing, and behavior. It does not explain 'server_version', but the output schema and remaining context make the tool sufficiently usable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 75%, so the schema already documents most parameters. The description adds some context about the association intent and the rejection behavior, but it does not compensate for the undocumented 'server_version' parameter or add deeper meaning to the parameter values.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific operation: associating a functional test with one or more functional objectives. It names the related sibling tool suggest_functional_test_mappings, which helps distinguish this tool from other mapping-related tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit usage timing: 'Use this after suggest_functional_test_mappings, or to hand-map a test to the objectives it covers.' This clearly explains when the tool is appropriate, though it does not enumerate exclusions or alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
attach_foundationAttach FoundationA
Delegate this model's objectives to a foundation's controls, in bulk.
Without selections it is read-only: it returns candidate
(objective ↔ provider control) pairs with a match score, and nothing is
created or credited. Show them to the operator.
With selections — a list of {"source_objective_id": ..., "provider_control_id": ...}, typically the confirmed subset of those
candidates — it is mutating: each becomes a delegated draft edge that
runs LLM validation and carries no credit until confirmed with
manage_reliance(action="confirm"). Returns {created, failed}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | the consumer model. | |
| selections | No | the pairs to delegate; omit to get the candidates. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| foundation_model_id | Yes | the foundation to delegate to. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and discharges it well: it discloses that the no-selections path is read-only and creates/credits nothing, that the selections path is mutating, that edges start as 'delegated' drafts, that LLM validation runs, that no credit attaches until confirmation, and that the return is {created, failed}. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure for a mutation tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The dual-mode behavior is front-loaded and clearly partitioned by the 'Without selections' / 'With selections' structure, so every sentence earns its place. It runs a bit long, but the length is driven by necessary mutation and credit semantics rather than padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 4-parameter tool with a nested-ish selections payload and an output schema, the description covers the read-only vs mutating split, the credit/validation lifecycle, and the confirmation path, and it does not need to restate return values since an output schema exists. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75% and the schema already labels model_id, foundation_model_id, and selections. The description adds real meaning beyond the schema for 'selections' by giving the exact pair shape ({source_objective_id, provider_control_id}) and describing the typical value (the confirmed subset of candidates). server_version remains unexplained in both places, keeping this short of a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific verb and resource ('delegate this model's objectives to a foundation's controls, in bulk') and immediately distinguishes the tool from siblings like declare_foundation and manage_reliance by framing it as a bulk attachment operation. An agent can tell what it does without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit when-to-use guidance for both modes: omit 'selections' to get read-only candidate pairs, pass 'selections' to create delegated edges. It also names the follow-up tool ('manage_reliance(action="confirm")') needed to carry credit, which is exactly the routing an agent needs.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
auto_map_controlsAuto Map ControlsA
LLM-map a model's existing controls to a framework's requirements. Requires PRO tier. Mutating: writes control-to-requirement mappings. Runs as a background job (typically 20-45s); this tool waits for completion and returns the result.
Sits between the manual map_control_to_requirement (one mapping at a time) and the full auto_remediate_compliance loop (which also excludes non-applicable requirements and proposes new entities for remaining gaps). auto_map_controls only creates mappings from controls that already exist — it never adds or excludes entities.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | No | Optional single control ID to map; omit to map all of the model's controls. | |
| framework_id | Yes | ID of the compliance framework. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It clearly states the operation is mutating, runs as a background job, waits for completion, returns results, requires PRO tier, and only maps existing controls. This is strong transparency for a complex asynchronous write operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core action and constraint, followed by concise behavioral details and then sibling differentiation. Every sentence contributes useful information with minimal jargon or redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite the tool's complexity — async, mutating, tier-gated, with multiple sibling tools — the description covers what it does, how it behaves, its scope limitations, and its relationship to alternatives. The presence of an output schema means return-value detail is not required here. This is a complete and actionable description.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, so the schema already documents model_id, control_id, and framework_id. The description adds context about 'existing controls' and 'never adds or excludes entities,' which indirectly clarifies scope, but it does not add meaningful per-parameter semantics beyond the schema, especially for server_version.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb and resource: 'LLM-map a model's existing controls to a framework's requirements.' It clearly distinguishes itself from siblings by naming map_control_to_requirement and auto_remediate_compliance and explaining how auto_map_controls differs from both.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit usage placement is provided: it 'sits between' the manual single-mapping tool and the full auto-remediation loop. It also states exactly what it does not do — it never adds or excludes entities — so an agent can decide when to prefer it over alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
auto_remediate_complianceAuto Remediate ComplianceA
Automatically close compliance gaps for a framework. Requires PRO tier.
Three-phase loop: (1) auto-map existing controls to unmapped requirements, (2) exclude requirements for non-applicable taxonomy primitives, (3) suggest and apply new assets/attackers for remaining gaps.
Phase (3) routes every proposal whose name matches a soft-deleted
asset/attacker through the same restore-candidate LLM gate
add_asset uses, so reanimating a previously removed entity
reinstates its stable ID and every CO tombstone + control tied to
it (rather than spawning a duplicate fresh ID). The response
distinguishes assets_added / attackers_added (genuinely new)
from assets_restored / attackers_restored (revived soft-
deletes) and lists restored_asset_ids / restored_attacker_ids.
Proposals the gate classified as similar (or that fail-closed
on an unavailable / malformed gate response) appear under
skipped with a per-entry reason — the operator decides whether
to restore manually or rephrase.
Converges automatically: stops when fully covered or when no further progress can be made.
This runs automatically when a framework is selected, but can be re-triggered manually if the model changes.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| framework_id | Yes | ID of the compliance framework. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and delivers exceptionally. It discloses the restore-candidate LLM gate shared with add_asset, the side effect of reinstating stable IDs along with CO tombstones and tied controls, fail-closed behavior when the gate is unavailable, per-entry skip reasons, response field distinctions (restored vs newly added), and automatic convergence.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but information-dense, with purpose and prerequisite front-loaded before the phase breakdown. The phase-3 paragraph is the most verbose section, yet nearly every clause carries operational significance for a tool with this side-effect complexity. Minor tightening of the restore-candidate explanation would be possible without losing value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex mutation tool with zero annotations, the description covers prerequisites, the full operational loop, side effects on soft-deleted entities, failure modes, concurrency behavior, and trigger conditions. The output schema covers return values, so the response-field explanation is bonus. The one real gap is server_version, a required parameter whose meaning appears nowhere in the schema or description.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%: model_id and framework_id are documented in the schema, and the description adds contextual meaning by tying framework to the remediation target and noting that model changes justify re-triggering. However, server_version is a required parameter with no schema description and no description-side compensation, leaving its semantics entirely unknown.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence states a specific verb and scope: "Automatically close compliance gaps for a framework." The three-phase loop then concretely defines what 'close' means (map controls, exclude non-applicable requirements, apply new assets/attackers), which clearly differentiates it from mapping-only siblings like auto_map_controls and check_control_gaps.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear invocation context: it runs automatically when a framework is selected, can be manually re-triggered when the model changes, and requires PRO tier. However, it never explicitly names alternatives or states when not to use this tool (e.g., when only control mapping is needed versus full remediation with asset/attacker creation), leaving some routing inference to the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
check_control_gapsCheck Control GapsA
Analyze control coverage and surface control objectives that lack sufficient controls. Read-only (does not mutate the model); runs as a polled background job and uses LLM reasoning.
Complements the deterministic assess_model (which scores each
CO's mitigated / at_risk / unassessed status from control
implementation state) by reasoning about which COs are under-covered
and where new controls are needed. Use this to decide what controls
to add; use assess_model to score the current state.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, and it does so well: it explicitly states the tool is read-only, does not mutate the model, runs as a polled background job, and uses LLM reasoning. These are meaningful behavioral traits beyond what the schema alone reveals.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded: the first sentence states the core purpose, the second covers behavior, and the final paragraph distinguishes the tool from its sibling. No sentence is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers purpose, behavior, async execution, and the key alternative, and an output schema exists to cover return values. The main gap is the unexplained server_version parameter, and the description does not mention how to obtain or poll the background job's result.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50%: model_id has a description but server_version does not. The description adds no parameter-level guidance at all, leaving server_version's meaning and format unexplained. It does not compensate for the low schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses specific verbs ('Analyze', 'surface') tied to a clear resource: control coverage and control objectives lacking sufficient controls. It also explicitly differentiates itself from assess_model, making its purpose unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit guidance: used to decide what controls to add, while assess_model is used to score the current state. It also contrasts its LLM-based reasoning with assess_model's deterministic computation, so an agent can choose correctly between the two.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
check_entity_qualityCheck Entity QualityA
Ask for the quality check of the assets and attackers you name (every
one when you name none) that have no current verdict: an entity whose
quality reads unchecked, or one changed since its last check.
Without confirm_estimate it only estimates; with it, the checks are
queued and run in the background. Creates no model version.
Checking may be paid. Call it first without confirm_estimate, RELAY
THE ESTIMATE TO THE PERSON, and confirm only when they agree; never
confirm on your own. The answer says where each named entity stands:
current (its verdict answers it as it stands; it is not checked
again: to dispute it, answer its flag with answer_entity_question),
checking (its check is queued already), answered (a stored
verdict answers it and is served again, at no cost), platform_scope
(made stale by a change to the platform; checked at Mipiti's cost) and
customer_scope (checked at the caller's cost; estimate gives an
upper bound, the deeper review running only where the first pass flags).
A confirmation the caller's balance cannot cover is refused with 402 and
queues nothing; an id naming no asset or attacker of the model is refused
400 unknown_entity. Read each entity again with get_entity for its
verdict once it lands. To ask every entity again whatever is stored, use
revalidate_entity_quality.
Returns {platform_scope, customer_scope, current, checking, answered, estimate, billing, confirmed, queued, message}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| entity_ids | No | JSON array of asset and attacker ids (e.g. ``["A-17", "T-04"]``); empty for every entity. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_estimate | No | Queue the checks the estimate describes. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With zero annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses that checking may be paid, that confirmed checks queue and run in the background, that it creates no model version, which statuses are free or charged, and the exact failure modes (402 with nothing queued, 400 unknown_entity). This is precisely the cost, async, and side-effect context annotations would normally supply.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose and the no-confirm-without-consent rule are front-loaded, and every section adds decision-relevant content. It is dense and backtick-heavy, and the closing sentence plus status glossary partially restate return values the output schema already carries, which costs a little economy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a paid, asynchronous, mutating-in-effect tool with no annotations, the description covers cost, consent sequence, async behavior, status semantics, error codes, and next steps. An agent has everything needed to invoke it correctly and safely without opening other resources.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the prose adds real meaning beyond it: empty entity_ids means every entity, confirm_estimate flips from estimate-only to queued billing, and an id naming no entity returns 400. server_version and model_id get no narrative treatment, but they are self-evident from the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('ask for the quality check of the assets and attackers you name') plus the exact scope condition ('that have no current verdict', 'every one when you name none'). It also explicitly distinguishes itself from two siblings: 'answer_entity_question' for disputing a verdict and 'revalidate_entity_quality' for re-asking everything regardless of stored state.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit call protocol: 'Call it first without confirm_estimate, RELAY THE ESTIMATE TO THE PERSON, and confirm only when they agree; never confirm on your own.' It also names when to use the alternative revalidate_entity_quality and steers to get_entity to read results, leaving nothing to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
classify_model_cweClassify Model CweA
Classify a model's control objectives against the platform CWE catalog.
Grounded: the model may only select from the catalog's current-version
candidate ids, and every returned id is re-validated against the catalog
before storage — a hallucinated or deprecated id is never persisted.
Skips control objectives already tagged at the catalog's current version
unless force is set. Returns a summary:
{status, catalog_version, cos, classified, tags_written, skipped}.
404s if CWE classification is not enabled on this instance.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | re-classify control objectives even if already tagged at the catalog's current version (default false). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model to classify. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it delivers: grounding constraints, re-validation before persistence, skip-if-already-tagged behavior, force semantics, the summary shape, and a 404 failure condition.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded with the core purpose, and each subsequent clause adds distinct behavioral information without redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers return summary, idempotence, and errors, and an output schema exists, so the main gap is the unexplained required 'server_version' parameter. It is otherwise sufficiently complete for a tool of this complexity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67% and the missing description is for the required 'server_version' parameter. The description reinforces 'force' and 'model_id' but adds no meaning for 'server_version', so the agent still cannot tell what value to supply.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence names a specific verb ('Classify'), a concrete resource (a model's control objectives), and the target catalog, which makes the tool's job unmistakable and distinguishes it from sibling reads like get_cwe_catalog and get_model_cwe_tags.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description makes clear this is the tool to use when classifying against the CWE catalog, and the skip/force behavior implies idempotent reclassification. However, it never explicitly states when not to use it or names an alternative for retrieving catalog IDs or existing tags.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
complete_setup_stepComplete Setup StepA
Mark one onboarding setup step as done. Mutating: updates the workspace onboarding checklist. Call after actually performing the corresponding setup action on the user's behalf.
Check current progress with get_setup_status first to avoid re-marking completed steps. An unrecognized step_id is rejected without any state change.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| step_id | Yes | The step to mark complete, one of "mcp_configured", "mipiti_verify_installed", "ci_secret_added", "ci_pipeline_added". | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that the operation is mutating, updates the checklist, and rejects unrecognized step_id values without changing state. This is strong behavioral disclosure, though it stops short of discussing permissions, idempotency on already-completed steps, or side effects beyond the checklist.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded, with the core purpose stated in the first sentence. The subsequent sentences provide actionable usage guidance and an important failure behavior without wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers purpose, mutation semantics, call timing, and invalid-input behavior, and an output schema exists to document return values. However, the required server_version parameter is left entirely unexplained, which is a meaningful gap for an agent trying to invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema describes step_id and its allowed values, but server_version has no schema description and the tool description does not explain it either. With only 50% schema coverage, the description should compensate for the undocumented required parameter, but it never mentions server_version at all.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the specific action ('Mark one onboarding setup step as done') and the resource it affects (workspace onboarding checklist). It also explicitly identifies the operation as mutating, which distinguishes it from read-only sibling tools like get_setup_status.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit when-to-use guidance: call after performing the actual setup action. It also instructs the agent to check get_setup_status first to avoid re-marking completed steps, providing a clear workflow and an alternative tool reference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
confirm_behavioural_modelConfirm Behavioural ModelA
Confirm a model's behavioural model as reviewed. Mutating; creates a model version.
Confirm only the model whose ir_hash was reviewed, which is the one
get_behavioural_model returns. Refused with 409: review_stale
(the model is not that hash now), stale (the description changed since
it was extracted) or needs_answers (an owner question is open). An
edit voids a confirmation.
A program's confirmation is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation
policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and
parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| note | No | Optional note recorded with the confirmation. | |
| ir_hash | Yes | The ``ir_hash`` reviewed. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses the 409 refusal codes (review_stale, stale, needs_answers), that an edit voids a confirmation, and that a program's confirmation may be refused with 403 plus an escalation_id and parked for a human, with explicit 'do not retry' guidance.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose and side effect in the first line, then constraints and failure modes in descending priority. Slightly heavy with inline code markup and some repetition of the ir_hash constraint, but every sentence carries operational information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained; the description instead covers the mutation, its gating conditions, and the escalation path. For a state-changing tool with no annotations, this is complete enough for an agent to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75% (server_version undocumented), and the description adds real meaning for ir_hash by tying it to the value returned by get_behavioural_model. It does not explain server_version or the note field's effect beyond what the schema states.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource (confirm a model's behavioural model as reviewed) and immediately declares the mutating side effect (creates a model version). It distinguishes itself from read siblings by tying confirmation to the reviewed ir_hash that get_behavioural_model returns.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives a clear precondition ('Confirm only the model whose ir_hash was reviewed') and enumerates the refusal conditions that tell the agent when this call will not apply. It does not explicitly contrast with alternatives such as edit_behavioural_element or answer_behavioural_questions, so it falls short of the when-not/alternatives bar.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
convert_assumption_to_controlsConvert Assumption To ControlsA
Convert a violated or retired assumption to controls. Mutating.
Retires the assumption's CO linkage and, when any CO it covered is left
with no control, proposes a control build for those COs: the result's
proposal (null when nothing is owed) is started with
start_control_build after review, and authors the controls then.
Nothing is authored by this call. Use when an assumption is no longer
valid and the system owner needs to implement controls instead.
Side effect on control-level linkage: this assumption is also removed from every assumption_groups entry on every control that referenced it. Any group left empty by the removal is dropped; a control's status is not changed, and a control left with no group is no longer backed by an assumption. Underlying assumptions are not deleted — only the linkages.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| assumption_id | Yes | ID of the assumption to convert. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and delivers extensively: it states nothing is authored here, describes the CO-linkage retirement, the proposal behavior (null when nothing owed), and detailed side effects on assumption_groups, including that empty groups are dropped, status is unchanged, and underlying assumptions are not deleted.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action and mutability flag before the detail. The body is comparatively long but each sentence conveys a distinct behavioral fact (proposal handling, group side effects, non-deletion), so little is wasteful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex mutating tool, it covers the operation, the deferred build workflow, and all linkage side effects thoroughly. An output schema exists, yet the description helpfully explains the key 'proposal' result field, leaving no material gap for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 67%; model_id and assumption_id are documented in the schema while server_version is not. The description adds no parameter-level syntax or format detail, so it does not fully compensate for the coverage gap, though the remaining params are largely self-explanatory.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('Convert a violated or retired assumption to controls') and immediately flags its nature ('Mutating.'). It is clearly distinguishable from sibling tools like add_assumption, edit_assumption, and delete_assertion.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides explicit when-to-use guidance ('Use when an assumption is no longer valid and the system owner needs to implement controls instead') and directs the agent to the follow-up tool (start_control_build after review). It does not name when-not to use it or a direct alternative, but the context is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
create_co_dispositionCreate Co DispositionA
Record that a control objective DOES NOT APPLY to this system — a signed, expiring judgment, not a dismissal.
The sibling of create_risk_acceptance, and the distinction between them
is the claim being made. A risk acceptance says the exposure is real and we
are carrying it. A disposition says this objective does not apply here at
all — the asset is not handled the way the objective assumes, the attacker
position does not exist in this deployment, the capability is not present.
The objective is not removed. It stays in the control-objective matrix, stays in every coverage count, and is reported in its own class alongside the owner and justification recorded here. That is the point: a reviewer can see the judgment and challenge it. An objective that simply vanished would be indistinguishable from one nobody modelled.
What it does change is work: no controls are generated for the objective and no coverage gap is raised against it, because an objective that does not apply is not a gap.
review_by is required and is not a formality — the claim stops applying
on that date, and the objective returns to whatever posture its controls
give it, gap included. Choose a date by which someone can realistically
re-check that the claim still holds.
Use create_risk_acceptance instead when the objective DOES apply and the
exposure is being carried deliberately. If an objective is only unaddressed
rather than inapplicable, neither tool is right — add controls.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| owner | Yes | Who owns the judgment (name / role). They answer for it. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| review_by | Yes | ISO 8601 date the claim expires (e.g. "2027-02-06T00:00:00Z"). | |
| justification | Yes | Why the objective does not apply to this system. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| control_objective_id | Yes | The objective being declared not applicable. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of disclosing behavioral traits. It does this thoroughly: the objective remains in the matrix, no controls are generated, no coverage gap is raised, and the claim expires at review_by. This goes far beyond what the schema alone communicates.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core claim and then structured into clear behavioral, temporal, and alternative-usage sections. It is longer than strictly necessary, but the length is justified by the nuance of the tool and the need to prevent confusion with create_risk_acceptance.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given 6 required parameters, no annotations, and an existing output schema, the description covers the tool's semantics, side effects, timing constraints, and sibling distinctions thoroughly. An agent has enough information to decide when to call it and what the call will do.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is high at 83%, so the baseline is already solid. The description adds meaningful semantics beyond the schema, especially for review_by: it is 'not a formality,' the claim stops applying on that date, and the date should be realistic for re-checking. It also reinforces that owner is the accountable party.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Record that a control objective DOES NOT APPLY to this system.' It also explicitly distinguishes this from create_risk_acceptance by defining the type of claim being made, so an agent can tell the tools apart without needing to compare schemas.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit routing guidance: use create_risk_acceptance when the objective DOES apply and the risk is carried deliberately, and use neither tool when an objective is merely unaddressed rather than inapplicable. It also explains the operational consequences of using this tool, giving clear context for when it is appropriate.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
create_groupCreate GroupA
Create a tag, optionally with its first members. Mutating.
A tag groups models for viewing and reporting without asserting any
relationship between them and without moving credit. Names are unique
within the workspace (409 on a clash). Every model named in model_ids
must be one the caller can access in this workspace.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | the tag name (unique within the workspace). | |
| model_ids | No | optional initial member model ids. | |
| description | No | optional description. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, yet the description carries the full burden well: declares 'Mutating', warns uniqueness is per-workspace with 409 on a clash, and adds an access precondition ('every model named in model_ids must be one the caller can access'). That is rich behavioral detail beyond what the schema encodes.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the action and the core distinguishing property, then the necessary operational facts (uniqueness, 409, access check). Every sentence earns its place; no padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 4-param mutating tool with no annotations, the description covers mutation semantics, uniqueness/conflict behavior, and preconditions, and an output schema exists so return values need not be explained. It omits any mention of the server_version parameter or required-permission specifics, leaving a small gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75% and already documents name/model_ids/description. The description reinforces semantics — uniqueness scope for name and the access precondition for model_ids — adding value the schema does not convey, though it says nothing about model_ids being nullable or server_version.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (Create) and resource (a tag/group) and immediately disambiguates the concept: 'A tag groups models for viewing and reporting without asserting any relationship.' This distinguishes create_group from relationship-asserting siblings like attach_foundation or add_model_to_group.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Clarifies intent — grouping for viewing/reporting, not relationship assertion — which implicitly tells an agent when this is the right tool versus modeling relationships. It does not explicitly name an alternative or when-not-to-use sibling, so it falls short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
create_proposalCreate ProposalA
Raise a proposal to change a model's scope or design. Call this when the code or your analysis says the model should gain or lose a component, or that an attacker position or asset should be removed by design; do not edit the model directly for those changes. Mutating: persists a proposal record.
A proposal is a change of scope or design. Raising one is not deciding
it: a person (or an agent under a delegation rule that names the
decision) decides it with decide_proposal. Design changes are never
applied automatically. Poll list_proposals for the outcome.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | Yes | One of ``add_component`` (payload ``{name, repo_url?, path?, trust_boundary_ids?}``), ``remove_component`` (payload ``{component_id}``), ``design_change`` (payload ``{target_kind: "attacker"|"asset", target_id, design_move}``; take ``design_move`` from ``get_design_leverage``), ``assumption`` (payload ``{co_id, group_id, precondition, assumption_id?, gap?}``: a precondition about the environment that only something outside this system can meet, one declarative sentence; ``assumption_id`` names an existing assumption that states it). A precondition a person already rejected for that objective is refused. ``drift_intent`` (payload ``{finding_id, intent: "intended" | "defect", control_id?, head_commit?}``): whether a description-drift finding was intended (the description is behind the product) or a defect of the code, naming for a defect the control whose passing assertion closes it. ``description_revision`` (payload ``{description, commit_sha?, finding_ids?}``): the whole description revised to what the code at that commit does, addressing those drift findings; accepting it writes the new text and extracts the behavioural model again over it, billed to whoever accepts. A revision that changes the sentence of a finding decided a defect is accepted only by a person. Propose one where ``get_behavioural_model``'s ``drift.revision_suggested`` is true. | |
| payload | Yes | JSON object string with the fields for ``kind``. | |
| evidence | No | Optional JSON object string, e.g. ``{paths: [], symbols: [], note: ""}``, pointing at what you saw. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| rationale | Yes | Why this change is right (what in the code or design supports it). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are supplied, yet the description carries the full burden well: it declares the write nature ('Mutating: persists a proposal record'), states that raising is not deciding and that a person or delegated agent decides, and asserts 'Design changes are never applied automatically'. It also tells the agent how to observe the outcome (poll list_proposals), which is exactly the behavioral context missing from structured fields.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the imperative and the when-to-use constraint before the longer conceptual explanation of proposal/decision separation. Every sentence contributes, though the second paragraph is somewhat expansive for what it adds beyond the first.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 6-parameter mutating tool with an output schema present, the description supplies what the schema cannot: the decision workflow, the non-automatic application guarantee, and the polling path. Return-value explanation is correctly omitted since an output schema exists.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents the kind/payload coupling, evidence shape, and rationale. The description body itself adds little param-level detail beyond reinforcing the kind semantics (assumption preconditions, description_revision billing). Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Specific verb+resource: 'Raise a proposal to change a model's scope or design', followed by a definition ('A proposal is a change of scope or design'). It explicitly distinguishes itself from direct mutation tools ('do not edit the model directly for those changes') and names the paired siblings decide_proposal and list_proposals.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit trigger ('when the code or your analysis says the model should gain or lose a component, or that an attacker position or asset should be removed by design'), an explicit exclusion ('do not edit the model directly'), and routes to alternatives for the next steps (decide_proposal to decide, list_proposals to poll). Nothing is left to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
create_risk_acceptanceCreate Risk AcceptanceA
Record that an operator explicitly ACCEPTS the residual risk on a control
objective instead of mitigating it — the write counterpart to
list_risk_acceptances.
Use when a control objective's residual risk is a deliberate, documented
decision rather than an unaddressed gap: the acceptance carries an owner, a
justification, and a review deadline, and reads as active until it
expires or is revoked. Prefer this over leaving a known-and-accepted risk
implicit — it makes the decision auditable and forces a revisit by the
deadline. An accepted objective is still surfaced (as accepted, not
unaddressed) when triaging at-risk objectives.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| owner | Yes | Who owns the acceptance (name / role). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| review_by | Yes | ISO 8601 date to revisit the acceptance (e.g. "2027-02-06T00:00:00Z"). | |
| justification | Yes | Why the risk is accepted (the rationale of record). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| control_objective_id | Yes | The control objective whose residual risk is accepted. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and discharges it well: it discloses the lifecycle ('reads as active until it expires or is revoked'), the record contents (owner, justification, review deadline), and the triage effect (surfaced as accepted, not unaddressed). This adds real behavioral context beyond the bare mutation implied by 'create'. It stops short of covering permissions or revocation mechanics, which keeps it at a 4.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short paragraphs, front-loaded with the core purpose in the first sentence. Each subsequent sentence contributes a distinct fact — usage condition, lifecycle, triage effect — rather than restating schema fields. It is longer than a minimal definition but every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutation tool with six required parameters and zero annotations, the description covers purpose, when to use it, record contents, lifecycle, and downstream visibility; the output schema relieves it of explaining return values. The remaining gaps — who is authorized to accept and what server_version should contain — are minor against the strong selection and invocation guidance.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 83%, which is high, so the baseline is 3; the description adds collective framing by naming owner, justification, and review deadline as the components of an acceptance and linking review_by to expiry. It does not add per-parameter detail beyond the schema and leaves server_version unexplained, so it does not fully close that gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource — 'Record that an operator explicitly ACCEPTS the residual risk on a control objective instead of mitigating it' — and self-identifies as 'the write counterpart to list_risk_acceptances', which separates it from the read sibling. The behavior is unambiguous and goes well beyond a paraphrase of the title.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit trigger condition ('Use when a control objective's residual risk is a deliberate, documented decision rather than an unaddressed gap') and tells the agent to prefer this over leaving accepted risk implicit, citing auditability and the forced review deadline. It names the read counterpart but does not name an alternative tool for the unaddressed-gap case, so the when-not is implied rather than fully explicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
decide_drift_intentDecide Drift IntentA
Decide whether a description-drift finding (the code reported to do more, or less, than a sentence of the description) was intended or is a defect of the code. Mutating; a judgment.
intended: the description is behind the product; revise it
(create_proposal kind description_revision). defect: the
description is the design and the code is wrong; name in control_id
the control whose assertions check the behaviour as designed. The finding
closes when one of its assertions passes verification at a commit not
earlier than this decision, and while it stands an answer that would
write the defect into the model is refused (409 drift_is_defect).
A program's decision is refused with 403 and an escalation_id unless
the workspace's delegation policy names drift_intent_decided: do not
retry; report it, or raise a drift_intent proposal for a person.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| note | No | Why. | |
| intent | Yes | ``intended`` or ``defect``. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | No | For a defect, the control whose passing assertion closes it. | |
| finding_id | Yes | The description-drift finding (``list_findings``). | |
| head_commit | No | The commit you read the code at. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so: it declares the tool mutating, defines the closing condition (an assertion passing verification at a commit not earlier than the decision), and discloses two distinct failure modes (409 drift_is_defect while the finding stands, 403 escalation without the required policy grant). This is well beyond what the schema conveys.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but front-loaded: purpose first, then the two outcome branches, then closing/refusal mechanics, then the authorization caveat. Every sentence carries information, though the backtick-heavy jargon and nested parentheticals make it denser than ideal.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need not be described. For a mutating, policy-gated decision tool with no annotations, the description covers preconditions, the meaning of each branch, the failure codes, and the escalation fallback — nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is already 86%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning: it explains the semantics of the two 'intent' values, clarifies that control_id must name the control whose assertions check the behaviour as designed, and implies head_commit is the commit the code was read at. This lifts it above the schema baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence names a specific verb (decide) and a specific resource (a description-drift finding), and immediately defines the two possible outcomes ('intended' vs 'defect'). This is a semantically unique action that cannot be confused with siblings like decide_proposal or judge_objective, and it even flags the operation as mutating.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly states when each outcome applies and what to supply for each: 'intended' means revise the description via create_proposal, 'defect' means name the control in control_id. It also spells out the refusal path (403 with escalation_id unless the delegation policy names drift_intent_decided), tells the agent not to retry, and offers the fallback of raising a drift_intent proposal for a person.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
decide_inventory_pairDecide Inventory PairA
Decide that two entries of a model's inventory are, or are not, one entity. Mutating; creates no model version; a judgment.
The decision is bound to both entries' texts: while it stands it replaces
the checks' answers for the pair, and an edit of either entry voids it.
same keeps the pair shown until a person removes one of the two
(remove_entity); nothing is merged. Refused 422 two_elements for
two assets that are each an element of the behavioural model (two
elements are two things), 422 same_entity, 404 unknown_entity.
A program's decision is refused with 403 and an escalation_id unless
the workspace's delegation policy names inventory_pair_decided.
Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals.
Returns {pair, entity_kind, verdict, decided_at, objectives},
objectives counting those resting on the two entries.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| a | Yes | One entry's id (e.g. "A-12"). | |
| b | Yes | The other entry's id. | |
| verdict | Yes | ``same`` or ``different``. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| rationale | No | Why (at most 2000 characters). | |
| entity_kind | Yes | ``asset`` or ``attacker``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses that the decision is bound to both entries' texts and is voided by an edit, that 'same' merges nothing, and it enumerates specific failure modes (422 two_elements, 422 same_entity, 404 unknown_entity) plus a 403 escalation path with a 'do not retry, poll list_proposals' instruction. This is exactly the behavioral context an agent needs before invoking a mutation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The opening line front-loads the core meaning (verb, resource, and 'mutating; creates no model version; a judgment'), which is strong. The remainder is dense with useful error/auth detail, though the parenthetical aside about 'two elements are two things' and heavy backtick formatting add minor noise.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, yet the description still summarizes the return shape ({pair, entity_kind, verdict, decided_at, objectives}), and it covers mutation semantics, persistence rules, and error codes. Given the tool's complexity, nothing essential for a correct invocation is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is high (86%), so the schema documents most parameters and the baseline would be 3. The description nevertheless adds real meaning beyond the enum by explaining the downstream consequence of the 'same' verdict (pair stays shown until remove_entity; nothing merged), which the schema's '``same`` or ``different``' text does not convey.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (decide) plus the exact resource (two entries of a model's inventory) and the judgment being made (same/different entity). It readily distinguishes itself from siblings like remove_entity and get_inventory_judgements by clarifying that this records a judgment rather than performing a deletion or a read.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Clearly conveys context—this is a mutating judgment that creates no model version, and it points to remove_entity as the way to actually drop an entry when the verdict is 'same'. It does not, however, explicitly compare against sibling judgment tools (e.g., judge_objective, decide_reconciliation_candidate) or state exclusions beyond the 422 element-of-behavioural-model case.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
decide_proposalDecide ProposalA
Accept or reject a proposal. Call this only when the workspace's
delegation policy names this decision for this agent at the proposal's
tier (the delegation block of get_control_work_order says what
you may decide). Mutating: closes the proposal and applies an accepted
change.
This is a judgment. The call is refused with HTTP 403 and an
escalation_id unless the delegation policy permits it; the refusal
parks the decision for a person as a decision_request. Do not retry
a refusal: report the escalation_id, poll list_proposals for the
outcome, and continue other work.
Accepting an assumption proposal accepts the assumption: it is
created if new, attested until expires_at and bound into the group
that waited on it, which is then judged again. That is its own decision
(assumption_accepted); a rule delegating proposal acceptance does not
cover it. Rejecting one records the precondition as rejected for that
objective, so it is not proposed again, and the objective keeps its gap.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| note | No | Optional note recorded with the decision. | |
| decision | Yes | ``accept`` or ``reject``. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| expires_at | No | ISO 8601 date an accepted assumption lapses (e.g. "2027-03-29T00:00:00Z"). Applies to accepting an ``assumption`` proposal; omitted, the acceptance lasts a year. | |
| proposal_id | Yes | ID of the proposal to decide. | |
| record_only | No | Accepting parked answers to behavioural questions starts the extraction they complete, billed to whoever accepts; True records them without it. Default False. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations exist, so the description carries the full burden and does so: it declares the operation mutating, describes the 403 refusal with escalation_id, distinguishes the self-decision for accepting an assumption proposal, explains expires_at binding and re-judging, and states the persistence effect of rejection. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three dense paragraphs, front-loaded with purpose and the gating condition, then refusal handling, then per-proposal-type semantics. Long but every sentence carries actionable information; only mild redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the description still covers the mutation effect, failure mode, and decision-type-specific consequences. Nothing an agent needs to call this complex judgment tool correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 86%, so the schema already documents decision (accept/reject), expires_at, record_only, and note. The description reinforces the accept/reject semantics and the assumption-specific effect of expires_at, but adds little for model_id, proposal_id, server_version, or note. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (accept/reject) and resource (proposal), and immediately scopes it against siblings by naming get_control_work_order for the delegation policy and list_proposals for outcome polling. An agent can identify the operation and its gate without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit precondition (delegation policy must name this decision for this agent at the proposal's tier), explicit when-not behavior (refusal returns 403 and parks a decision_request), and explicit alternative actions (do not retry; poll list_proposals). This is a genuine when/when-not/alternative guide.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
decide_reconciliation_candidateDecide Reconciliation CandidateA
Decide a reconciliation candidate from
list_reconciliation_candidates. Mutating.
kind is assets, attackers or components; own_qid /
inherited_qid are the pair's qualified ids ("child:A1",
"parent:A1").
decision="apply"records that the descendant's own entity IS the inherited one: the own entity stays in the model and is left out of its composed view, so the inherited entity is canonical and credit keys on it. The record is dropped when the pair stops matching (an edit, a re-parent). Aheuristic-tier candidate is refused unlessconfirm_heuristic=Trueacknowledges its structural divergence. The server re-validates the pair (400 when the model has moved since: refresh the list). Bumps the model version; returns{model, controls_carried, controls_orphaned, orphaned_control_ids},modelbeing its id, version and title.decision="reject"records "these are NOT duplicates" at org scope, so the pair leaves the active queue for everyone. Idempotent on the pair; no new version. Returns the record; keep itsid.decision="unreject"removes the rejectionrejection_id(fromlist_reconciliation_candidates(disposition="rejected")), returning the pair to the queue. Returns{ok: true}.
503 where composition is not available on the backend.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | No | ||
| own_qid | No | ||
| decision | Yes | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| rejection_id | No | ||
| inherited_qid | No | ||
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_heuristic | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses version bumping on apply, no new version on reject, idempotency on the pair, org-scoped visibility of rejections, the heuristic-tier refusal gate requiring confirm_heuristic, server re-validation with 400 on stale models, and 503 when composition is unavailable. It even names what record gets dropped when the pair stops matching.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The mutating and input-tool facts are front-loaded, and the three decisions are cleanly bulleted so an agent can scan to its branch. It is dense and somewhat long, but almost every clause adds operational detail (refusal gate, error codes, return shape) rather than filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For an 8-parameter mutating tool with no annotations and no schema descriptions, this is close to complete: preconditions, decision semantics, error codes, heuristic confirmation, version effects, and return payloads are all covered. An output schema exists, yet the description still names the key response fields, so an agent knows what it gets back.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% across 8 parameters, and the description compensates for most of them: kind enumerates assets/attackers/components, own_qid/inherited_qid are documented with concrete example formats ('child:A1'), decision values are explained semantically, and confirm_heuristic and rejection_id are given meaning and provenance. model_id and server_version are required but their roles are only implied by the 400 re-validation note, not stated explicitly.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb+resource ('Decide a reconciliation candidate') and immediately ties it to the sibling that produces its input, list_reconciliation_candidates. The 'Mutating.' flag plus the per-decision breakdown make it unmistakable against read-only siblings like list_reconciliation_candidates.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Each decision value is given a clear condition: 'apply' when the descendant's own entity IS the inherited one, 'reject' for 'these are NOT duplicates' at org scope, 'unreject' to pull a rejection_id from list_reconciliation_candidates(disposition="rejected"). It also flags recovering from a 400 by refreshing the list. It does not compare against adjacent decision tools such as decide_inventory_pair or reconcile_model, which keeps it from a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
declare_behavioural_linkDeclare Behavioural LinkA
Declare the asset or trust boundary a behavioural element or zone is. Mutating; creates no model version.
The link is checked on every read: one whose asset lacks the property the element carries is kept and asked about. A link that counts changes what the analysis reaches, so the judgements it re-keys are queued, charged to the caller.
A program's declaration is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation
policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and
parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
Returns the links as get_behavioural_links does, with declared.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| node_id | Yes | The element or zone, from ``get_behavioural_links``. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| entity_id | Yes | The asset or trust boundary it is. | |
| component_id | No | Optional component the node belongs to. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses that the operation mutates, creates no model version, is checked on every read, re-keys judgements that are queued and charged to the caller, and can be refused with a 403 plus escalation_id under delegation policy. That is unusually rich disclosure of side effects and authorization behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded, but the body is dense, jargon-heavy and awkwardly line-broken, with at least one convoluted sentence ('one whose asset lacks the property the element carries is kept and asked about'). Information density is high, but readability suffers.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values needn't be detailed, and the description covers mutation semantics, authorization failure and the escalation route. What is missing is what happens to an existing/conflicting link and any reversal path, which would matter for a declare operation. Mostly complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 80%, so the schema already documents node_id, model_id, entity_id and component_id. The description adds only marginal meaning beyond that ('the asset or trust boundary it is' partially restates the entity_id field), so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('Declare') and resource ('the asset or trust boundary a behavioural element or zone is'), and ties the input to get_behavioural_links. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from accept_behavioural_link_proposals or the other link-related siblings, so an agent must infer the boundary. Clear but not sibling-differentiated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives strong procedural guidance for the failure path (403 refusal, do not retry, report the escalation_id, poll list_proposals) but never states when to prefer this tool over accept_behavioural_link_proposals or get_behavioural_links. Usage is implied rather than framed as a decision.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
declare_control_deltaDeclare Control DeltaA
Prepare the declaration of a control's delta as served: the act that makes it the control's specification. Declaring is a person's act, never a program's.
Without confirm (the default) this is the preview, and nothing is
written: the declaration the given spans and resolutions make, its
declaration_hash, each edit in words beside its quotes, the second
reading's differences and those still open, the text no quote
reaches (unquoted), the spans the text's notes suggest as committing
to nothing, what declaring does, and blocking (what stops it). Relay
the preview to the person: the differences, and which text commits to
nothing, are theirs to decide.
With confirm and the declaration_hash previewed, a program's call
is always refused with 403 and an escalation_id, whatever the
workspace delegates: it is parked for a person, who sees what it declares
and accepts or rejects it. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and
poll list_proposals. A parked declaration is withdrawn once the delta
it names changes.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| confirm | No | True to declare (a person's act). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control. | |
| placements | No | JSON array of ``{"item", "index", "span", "start", "end"}`` naming which occurrence a repeated quote stands at. | [] |
| resolutions | No | JSON array of ``{"start", "end", "choice"}``, one per difference, in order: ``choice`` is ``draft``, ``second`` or ``written`` (with ``edits``). | [] |
| nothing_spans | No | JSON array of ``{"start", "end"}`` spans of the control's text, in code points, that commit to nothing. | [] |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| declaration_hash | No | The hash the preview returned. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: preview writes nothing, confirm from a program is always refused with 403 plus an escalation_id, the declaration is parked for a person, and it is withdrawn if the underlying delta changes. These are exactly the non-obvious traits an agent needs before calling.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The two-phase structure is front-loaded and the confirm behavior is easy to find. However, the description is verbose and repeats the 'person's act' point, and it enumerates the preview payload at length even though an output schema exists, so not every sentence is maximally efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given an 8-parameter tool with an output schema, the description covers the parts that matter: the two modes, the escalation outcome, and the required follow-up (report escalation_id, poll list_proposals). An agent has enough to invoke and handle results correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is already 88%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds meaning beyond the schema: confirm is framed as 'a person's act', declaration_hash is tied to the previewed value, and the spans/resolutions are described as what 'make' the declaration. This enriches semantics the schema states only structurally.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a specific verb and resource and frames the act precisely: 'Prepare the declaration of a control's delta as served: the act that makes it the control's specification.' An agent can tell this is a declaring/specification step rather than a read. However, it never names or differentiates itself from near-identical siblings such as get_control_delta, submit_control_delta, or request_delta_second_reading, so routing still requires inference.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear when-to-use context: without confirm it is a preview that writes nothing, with confirm it triggers the person-escalation flow. It also gives an explicit behavioral rule ('Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals'), which is strong operational guidance. It stops short of naming sibling alternatives the agent might otherwise pick.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
declare_foundationDeclare FoundationA
Mark a model as a shared foundation that advertises providable controls.
Mutating: records this model as a foundation and stores its advertised controls; other models can then delegate to them (see attach_foundation). A foundation is a shared service (auth, logging, a shared datastore) whose controls other models can rely on.
Each entry in provides advertises one of THIS model's controls as providable: {"control_id": "CTRL-07", "capability_label": "Validates session tokens", "description": "..."}. A capability always advertises a control (a proven mechanism), never an objective.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the model to declare as a foundation. | |
| provides | Yes | List of advertised-control dicts. ``control_id`` is required per entry; ``capability_label`` and ``description`` describe what the control provides to consumers. | |
| visibility | No | Who may delegate to this foundation. "workspace" (default) makes it discoverable to every model in the workspace; "explicit" limits it to models explicitly attached. | workspace |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It usefully discloses that the tool is mutating ('records this model as a foundation and stores its advertised controls') and defines what a foundation is, but says nothing about permissions, reversibility, idempotency, or whether re-declaring overwrites existing controls.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose and mutation status are front-loaded, followed by supporting definition and the provides example. Every sentence is relevant, though the grammar and layering are slightly dense.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values need not be described, and the description covers the mutation and the core provides semantics. For a mutating, no-annotation tool it is nearly complete, but missing any note on permissions, side effects on other models, or overwrite behavior.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the description adds real meaning beyond the schema: it gives the exact shape of a provides entry and a key semantic constraint ('a capability always advertises a control (a proven mechanism), never an objective') that is not expressed in the schema. It does not elaborate on visibility or server_version, so not a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('mark a model as a shared foundation that advertises providable controls') and clearly distinguishes this from the sibling attach_foundation, which is the consumer side of the relationship. An agent can tell what this tool does without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explains the delegation workflow and points to attach_foundation as the counterpart, giving clear context for when this tool applies. It lacks an explicit when-not to use it or any prerequisite/ordering guidance, so it falls short of the 5 bar.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
declare_inventory_tagsDeclare Inventory TagsA
Declare the taxonomy primitives an entity of a model's inventory answers. Mutating; creates no model version; a judgment.
The declaration is bound to the entity's text: it witnesses each
primitive whatever the tagger answers, and an edit of the entity voids
it. Every pair must be one the taxonomy admits for the kind (422
inadmissible_tag); an empty list declares that the entity answers
none. 404 unknown_entity.
A program's declaration is refused with 403 and an escalation_id
unless the workspace's delegation policy names inventory_tag_declared.
Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals.
Returns {entity_id, entity_kind, tags, declared_at}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| tags | No | JSON array of ``{"primitive", "implied_type"}``. | [] |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| entity_id | Yes | The entity (e.g. "T-04"). | |
| rationale | No | Why (at most 2000 characters). | |
| entity_kind | Yes | ``asset`` or ``attacker``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses mutation semantics, that no model version is created, that declarations are bound to entity text and voided by edits, the 422 and 404 error conditions, and the 403 escalation policy. It also describes the return shape, which is unusually complete for a mutation endpoint.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core action and mutation semantics, then proceeds to admissibility, error behavior, and return shape. Every sentence adds operational value, and there is no filler or restatement of the tool name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is complex, has six parameters, no annotations, and an output schema; the description nonetheless covers mutation behavior, error conditions, authorization/escalation semantics, and return values. An agent has enough information to understand what the tool does, when it may fail, and what not to do after a 403.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is already high at 83%, so the schema does most parameter-level work. The description still adds meaning beyond the schema by explaining that tags form admissibility-checked pairs, that an empty list declares the entity answers none, and that the declaration is bound to entity text. It does not separately explain model_id or server_version, but those are covered by the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: declaring taxonomy primitives that an entity of a model's inventory answers. This is clearly distinguishable from sibling tools such as request_inventory_checks, decide_inventory_pair, and get_inventory_judgements, which inspect or decide rather than declare. It also immediately clarifies that the operation is mutating but does not create a model version.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear usage context: empty lists are meaningful, pairs must be admissible for the entity kind, and program declarations can be refused unless the delegation policy names inventory_tag_declared. It also explicitly says not to retry on 403 and instead to report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals. It does not explicitly compare this tool to sibling inventory tools, so it falls short of full when-versus-alternatives guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
delete_assertionDelete AssertionA
Permanently delete a single assertion from a control or assumption. Mutating and destructive: the assertion record is removed, not soft-deleted, and its contribution to sufficiency/verification is dropped. It does NOT itself re-run verification; the deletion queues a background re-evaluation of the control's sufficiency, which a later get_sufficiency read reports once it lands.
Use to retract a claim that was submitted in error or that get_verification_report flagged as misaligned (off-topic for the control's current description). To add assertions use submit_assertions; to inspect them first use list_assertions. Only "own" assertions can be removed here — inherited assertions come from composed models and must be managed on their source model.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | No | ID of the control the assertion belongs to (omit if it belongs to an assumption). | |
| assertion_id | Yes | ID of the assertion to delete. | |
| assumption_id | No | ID of the assumption the assertion belongs to (omit if it belongs to a control). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: it discloses that deletion is permanent and not a soft-delete, that the assertion's contribution to sufficiency/verification is dropped, that it does NOT itself re-run verification, and that a background re-evaluation is queued and later surfaced via get_sufficiency. This is exactly the behavioral context an agent needs before a destructive call.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the destructive nature and scope, then the background-re-evaluation caveat, then routing/alternatives. Every sentence earns its place and no filler is present.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values need not be described, yet the description still routes the agent to get_sufficiency for the queued re-evaluation result. For a destructive, ownership-constrained mutation tool, nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 80%, so control_id/assumption_id/model_id are already documented in the schema, and the description's 'from a control or assumption' largely restates that. It adds the ownership constraint (own vs inherited) which is behavioral rather than parameter-syntactic, so baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('Permanently delete') and a precisely scoped resource ('a single assertion from a control or assumption'), and immediately distinguishes itself from the sibling write tool submit_assertions and the read tool list_assertions. An agent can tell exactly what this does and what it is not.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use triggers ('retract a claim that was submitted in error or that get_verification_report flagged as misaligned'), names alternatives with their conditions (submit_assertions to add, list_assertions to inspect first), and adds a hard exclusion: only 'own' assertions can be removed, inherited ones must be managed at the source model.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
delete_controlDelete ControlA
Soft-delete a security control, optionally with a justification. Destructive (mutating): the control is retired, not permanently erased.
Blocks with HTTP 409 when the control is the ONLY control covering any control objective — removing it would leave that CO uncovered. Add a replacement control (or refine the threat model) before deleting.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| reason | No | Optional justification recorded in the audit trail (recommended). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control to delete. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of disclosing behavioral traits. It explicitly states that the operation is destructive/mutating, that it is a soft delete rather than a permanent erase, and that it can block with HTTP 409 under a specific coverage condition. This is substantial and goes well beyond a generic description, though it stops short of covering permissions or reversibility details.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded: the first sentence states the core action, the second clarifies destructiveness, and the third explains the blocking condition and required remedy. Every sentence contributes necessary operational information with no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity and the presence of an output schema, the description covers the essential operational context: what the operation does, its side effects, and the key failure mode. It does not explain server_version semantics or mention any other restrictions, but the core invocation context is sufficiently complete for an agent to use the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 75%, so the schema already documents most parameters. The description adds context about the justification being optional and about the 409 condition, but it does not add meaningful detail for model_id, control_id, or server_version beyond what the schema provides. This is adequate given the high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Soft-delete a security control,' which immediately distinguishes this from other control-related tools. It also clarifies the semantic nuance ('retired, not permanently erased'), removing ambiguity about the lifecycle impact. This clearly separates it from hard-delete or update operations.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context for when the tool will succeed or fail, including the HTTP 409 blocking condition and the prerequisite to add a replacement control or refine the threat model. It does not explicitly name alternative sibling tools or state when not to use the tool, but the practical guidance is strong enough to guide invocation correctly.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
delete_groupDelete GroupB
Delete a tag. Mutating; the member models are not affected.
The tag's framework selections, requirement exclusions and relevance data are deleted with it. Frameworks it propagated to its members stay selected on them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| group_id | Yes | ID of the tag to delete. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and largely does so: it declares the operation mutating, enumerates the collateral destruction (framework selections, requirement exclusions, relevance data), and explicitly bounds the blast radius (member models unaffected; propagated frameworks stay selected). It stops short of stating irreversibility or required permissions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences with the mutation status front-loaded and the destructive/who-is-affected split handled economically. No filler, though the opening 'tag' framing costs clarity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values need no explanation, and the description usefully covers side effects for a no-annotation mutation. But it omits any handling of the undocumented server_version parameter and any irreversibility/permission note that a destructive tool warrants.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50%, so the description should compensate but adds nothing about parameters. It never mentions group_id, and server_version is undocumented in both schema and description, leaving the agent without a value format or source for a required parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The verb+resource pair is muddled: the tool is delete_group and its siblings all use 'group' (get_group, create_group, add_model_to_group), yet the description says 'Delete a tag.' An agent must infer that 'tag' and 'group' are the same entity, which weakens confident selection.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no routing to or away from siblings such as delete_threat_model, delete_control, or delete_assertion. The agent gets no signal about when deletion is appropriate versus other cleanup paths.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
delete_threat_modelDelete Threat ModelA
Delete a threat model and all associated data. Destructive and permanent — cannot be undone.
Mutating: removes the model along with every version, its controls, assertions, findings, attestations, and tag/reliance memberships. Reliance edges from other models that pointed at this one are invalidated, which can move those consumers' posture.
Confirm intent before calling. To keep a copy first, use export_report (scope="model", format="archive") (a self-contained, re-importable JSON archive). Returns {deleted: True, model_id}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model to delete. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries full responsibility for behavioral disclosure. It clearly states the operation is destructive, permanent, and mutating; enumerates exactly what is removed; explains downstream effects on reliance edges and consumer posture; and documents the return value. This is exemplary transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the most critical fact ('Destructive and permanent'), then gives a concise but complete list of side effects, followed by usable guidance and the return shape. Every sentence earns its place; no filler or redundant restating of the name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is highly complete for a destructive operation: it covers permanence, affected data, indirect effects on other models, a backup path, and the response. The only notable gap is the unexplained required server_version parameter, which weakens end-to-end invocability.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 50%: model_id is described, but the required server_version parameter has no description and no enum or format guidance. The tool description adds nothing about either parameter, so an agent cannot confidently determine what server_version should be.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Delete a threat model and all associated data.' It sharply distinguishes this from sibling deletion tools by emphasizing the permanent, cascade-deleting scope, so an agent can tell it apart from delete_control, delete_assertion, delete_group, or remove_entity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear operational guidance: confirm intent before calling and export an archive if a copy is needed. It does not explicitly enumerate when not to use this tool versus nearby siblings, but the destructive scope and backup advice effectively frame when it is appropriate.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
discard_control_buildDiscard Control BuildA
Discard a model's held control build. Mutating.
A build that is queued, deferred, paused or blocked holds
the model without running. Discarding it drops everything it staged — the
model keeps its published controls exactly as they were — releases the
model, and proposes the build again so it can be started later. The
credits it already consumed are not returned. A running build must be
paused first (pause_control_generation, then wait for paused).
Returns one of:
{discarded: true, model_id, status: "discarded", proposal, status_detail}.{discarded: false, http_status: 409, code: "pause_first", status}— the build is running; pause it first.{discarded: false, http_status: 409, code: "not_held", status}— no build holds the model.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model whose held build to discard. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: it discloses what is destroyed (staged items), what is preserved (published controls untouched), side effects (model released, build re-proposed), cost (credits not returned), and a hard precondition (pause a running build first).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the verb+resource and the mutating flag, then behavior, then return shapes. Every sentence is informative, though the enumerated return block is somewhat verbose given an output schema already exists.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating tool with zero annotations, the description covers destruction semantics, side effects, credit cost, and preconditions, plus concrete success/error return codes. An agent has everything needed to call it correctly without opening the schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 50%: model_id is documented in the schema, server_version is not. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond the schema (it only refers to 'a model'), so it neither compensates for the coverage gap nor adds value. Baseline 3 for a two-param tool where the schema does the documented half.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('discard') and resource ('a model's held control build') and immediately qualifies the operation as mutating. It clearly separates itself from siblings like delete_control and start_control_build by scoping to a held (non-running) build.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly enumerates the applicable states (queued, deferred, paused, blocked) and the exclusion condition: a running build must be paused first, naming the alternative tool (pause_control_generation) and the wait condition. This is explicit when/when-not guidance with a named alternative.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
dismiss_proposed_attackerDismiss Proposed AttackerA
Dismiss the attacker the attacker closure proposes for a credential set, with why, or some zones of a part of the zones nobody stands at. Mutating; creates a model version.
The dismissal is kept on the model: the proposal is no longer offered
while it stands. zones names zones of a part (its kind is
grouped) that no attacker reaches: those alone are dismissed, and the
part stands for the rest; zone names the part where two proposals
hold the same classes. Refused with 409 not_proposed (no attacker is
proposed for exactly that set now), 409 ambiguous_proposal (name a
zone), 409 dismissed_already, 409 closure_not_offered, 422
unknown_class, 422 unknown_zone (a zone the part does not offer
now), 422 zones_of_own (zones of a class proposed on its own).
A program's dismissal is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation
policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and
parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
Returns {model_id, model_version, applies, credential_classes, counts, dismissed_set, dismissed_zones_now?}: how many proposals, dismissals and
questions the closure now holds, and what was dismissed.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| zone | No | A zone of the part, where two proposals hold the same classes; empty otherwise. | |
| zones | No | Comma-separated zones of the part to dismiss alone; empty dismisses the proposal whole. | |
| reason | Yes | Why the attacker does not apply (required). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| credential_classes | No | Comma-separated class ids of the proposal; empty for the one holding none. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so well: it discloses that the operation is mutating, creates a model version, persists the dismissal, and stops the proposal from being offered. It also documents refusal codes, escalation behavior with 403 and escalation_id, and tells the caller not to retry but to poll list_proposals.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The action is front-loaded in the first sentence, and the remaining detail is operationally relevant. The prose is dense and somewhat awkward in places, but most sentences earn their place by covering side effects, refusal conditions, and escalation flow.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex mutating tool with six parameters and an output schema, the description is complete enough: it covers side effects, parameter selection, failure modes, escalation handling, and post-failure guidance. It does not need to explain return values because an output schema exists.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is high at 83%, so the schema already explains most parameters. The description adds useful meaning for zone and zones, including that zones dismiss only named zones where no attacker reaches, while zone names a part where two proposals hold the same classes.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific mutating action: dismiss the attacker proposed for a credential set, optionally for zones. The resource and action are clear, though the phrasing is jargon-heavy and it does not explicitly differentiate itself from siblings like keep_attacker_whole or split_grouped_attacker.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives operational conditions for using zone versus zones and explains refusal cases, but it does not explicitly say when to choose this over sibling tools such as keep_attacker_whole or split_grouped_attacker. Usage is implied through parameter behavior and error handling rather than stated as decision guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
edit_assetEdit AssetA
Edit an existing asset. Only provided fields changed.
When changing identity fields, hold to the asset authoring
contract: name the data/resource protected and its security
property, not a mechanism — otherwise the result is flagged with a
quality_warning (see add_asset). There is no status field to
set.
The composed impact is server-derived from the factor fields;
there is no way to set it directly. To change the rating, set
factor values (the platform composes the new rating) and supply
change_reason documenting the operator override of the
LLM-generated factors. The reason is captured in the
rating-revision audit trail. Over a rating held pending
(rating_pending on get_entity), a factor edit settles the pair
with the rating it sets, a judgment (rating_reconfirmed) a program
makes only under a delegation rule, else parked whole for a person.
New words (name, description, security properties) are rated for: one
rating call, at your cost; a rating a person chose is kept and the new
one held pending beside it. Adopting a quality check's advice is
your own edit of the words, stated with its change_reason.
LLM-gated on identity-bearing fields (name, description, security_properties). Factor and notes edits skip the gate.
Outcomes when identity fields change:
Accepted edit (LLM classifies as
preserve) —{model, entities, controls_carried, ...}: the model's id, version and title, and the asset as it now stands.Rejected edit (LLM classifies as
replace/ambiguous) —{"accepted": False, ...}; nothing saved. Soft-delete + add-new instead.
Editing a soft-deleted asset is rejected — restore_entity (entity_type="asset")
first. 503 on evaluator outage or when the rating call for new words
fails (nothing saved), 502 on malformed response, 400 when factor
fields are sent without change_reason, 409 when the model changed
since it was read (read it again and send the edit again).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | No | New name (optional). | |
| notes | No | New notes (optional). | |
| asset_id | Yes | ID of the asset (e.g., "A1"). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| description | No | New description (optional). | |
| blast_radius | No | "Isolated" | "Multiplicative" | "Cascading". | |
| change_reason | No | Required when any factor field is supplied — documents the operator override of LLM-generated factors for the audit trail. | |
| recoverability | No | "Trivial" | "Manageable" | "Permanent". | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| usage_subscore | No | "None" | "Low" | "High". | |
| impact_rationale | No | New rationale (optional). | |
| regulatory_scope | No | "None" | "Notification" | "Legal". | |
| integrity_subscore | No | "None" | "Low" | "High". | |
| security_properties | No | Comma-separated properties (optional). | |
| availability_subscore | No | "None" | "Low" | "High". | |
| confidentiality_subscore | No | "None" | "Low" | "High". |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so: it discloses the LLM quality gate, server-derived impact, required change_reason for factor edits, rating-pending settlement behavior, rating costs, accepted/rejected outcomes, and HTTP error conditions. This is unusually transparent for a mutation tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The definition front-loads its purpose and uses a bullet list for accepted/rejected outcomes, which helps structure the complex behavior. However, several paragraphs are dense and clause-heavy, such as the rating-pending settlement sentence, so it is informative but not maximally concise.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given 16 parameters, complex state interactions, and an existing output schema, the description is complete enough: it covers prerequisites, gating, mutation semantics, outcomes, and failure modes. An agent has what it needs to call and interpret the tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 94%, so baseline is 3; the description adds useful semantics by grouping parameters into identity-bearing, factor, and notes fields, explaining that impact and status are not directly settable, and clarifying change_reason's audit role. It does not define each of the 16 parameters, but the schema already does.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence names a specific verb and resource ('Edit an existing asset') and states patch semantics ('Only provided fields changed'), so an agent knows this is a partial update rather than a create or replace. It does not directly distinguish itself from other edit_* siblings, though later references to add_asset and restore_entity help.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit when/when-not guidance: identity-bearing fields are LLM-gated, factor and notes edits skip the gate, soft-deleted assets require restore_entity first, and rejected identity edits should become soft-delete + add-new. It also names add_asset for the authoring contract, providing strong routing guidance for the key edge cases.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
edit_assumptionEdit AssumptionB
Edit an assumption. Creates a new model version. Returns {model, entities, ...}: the model's id, version and title, and
entities.assumptions the assumption as it now stands.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| description | No | New description (omit to leave unchanged). | |
| assumption_id | Yes | ID of the assumption to edit (e.g., "AS1"). | |
| linked_co_ids | No | New comma-separated CO IDs; replaces the existing linkage (omit to leave unchanged). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| clear_exclusion | No | When True, removes the predicate entirely (the assumption becomes prose-only). Mutually exclusive with the exclusion_* params — if both are sent, the exclusion_* params win. | |
| exclusion_co_ids | No | Comma-separated CO IDs the predicate matches explicitly; when non-empty, overrides the match fields. Supplying any exclusion_* param rewrites the whole predicate (unspecified fields default to "*"). | |
| exclusion_asset_id | No | "*" or a concrete asset ID. | |
| exclusion_attacker_id | No | Predicate match — "*" wildcard or a concrete attacker ID. | |
| exclusion_property_match | No | "C" | "I" | "A" | "U" | "*". | |
| exclusion_attacker_vector | No | One of "Network" | "Adjacent" | "Local" | "Physical" | "*". | |
| exclusion_asset_component_id | No | "*" or a concrete component ID. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, but it does disclose one genuinely important behavior: the edit creates a new model version rather than mutating in place. It does not cover permissions, validation failures, or undo (undo_model_change exists), so the disclosure is valuable but partial.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with the action and then the versioning side effect and return shape. No filler; only the reStructuredText markup backticks are slightly noisy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the return shape need not be explained, and the description still sketches it. However, for a 12-parameter mutation with subtle partial-update and predicate-rewrite semantics, the description says nothing about how omitted fields behave or the version-creation implications for concurrent callers, leaving it merely adequate.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 92%, so the twelve parameters — including the tricky clear_exclusion vs exclusion_* precedence and the predicate-rewrite defaults — are already documented in the schema. The description adds no parameter meaning beyond that, which is exactly the baseline case.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Edit an assumption'), which cleanly separates it from add_assumption, remove_entity, and edit_trust_boundary in the sibling list. It doesn't explicitly contrast itself with adjacent tools like convert_assumption_to_controls, but the resource naming does most of the work.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no when-to-use guidance: nothing says to prefer edit_assumption over add_assumption for a new assumption, nor when to convert to controls instead. The only implicit cue is the word 'Edit', leaving routing decisions to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
edit_attackerEdit AttackerA
Edit an attacker; only the fields given change.
capability names the operations performable from the position
("From [position], the attacker can …"), else it gets a
quality_warning. Identity fields are LLM-gated. The composed
likelihood comes from the factors. An edit of attack_vector or
privileges_required creates a model version (reachability reads
both); other factor edits are recorded as rating revisions. Over a
pending rating (rating_pending), a factor edit settles the pair, a
judgment (rating_reconfirmed). New words are rated for (one call, at
your cost); a person's rating is kept, the new one held pending, and
attested or holdings-given privileges never move. Adopting advice is
your own edit. The answer's model is the model's id, version and
title; entities.attackers the attacker as it now stands.
Attesting is a judgment: a person's edit attests what it writes
(trust_boundary_ids, privileges_required, surface_extent)
and attest_* attests the value as it stands. A program attests
only under a workspace rule for that attestation; otherwise its edit
lands unattested and the answer's attestation names the parked
escalation_id (never a 403). A refused program's extent never
lowers an attested one. "point" is REFUSED where an asset of the
attacker's objectives sits on several components and is not
split-knowledge, and never makes a universal clause existential.
400 when factor fields, surface_extent, attest_surface_extent
or attest_privileges come without change_reason; 503/502 on an
evaluator outage or malformed answer or a failed rating call. 409 when
the model changed since it was read: read it again. 409 privileges_from_holdings
for a privileges change on an attacker whose credential classes are
stated: its privileges follow from them, so say what it holds instead
(answer_attacker_credentials).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ||
| position | No | ||
| archetype | No | ||
| capability | No | ||
| attacker_id | Yes | ||
| attack_vector | No | Network | Adjacent | Local | Physical. | |
| change_reason | No | Why; required as above. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| surface_extent | No | ``whole`` (any entry of the interface reached) or ``point`` (one named entry). | |
| attest_position | No | true attests the current position. | |
| user_interaction | No | None | Required. | |
| attack_complexity | No | Low | High. | |
| attest_privileges | No | true attests the current ``privileges_required``, whatever its value. | |
| trust_boundary_ids | No | Comma-separated ids of the boundaries the attacker has crossed; replaces the set. | |
| privileges_required | No | None | Low | High. | |
| likelihood_rationale | No | ||
| attest_surface_extent | No | true attests the current extent. | |
| capability_prevalence | No | Commodity | Targeted | Rare. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does: it discloses side effects (attack_vector/privileges_required edits create a model version; other factor edits become rating revisions), pending-rating settlement, that a person's kept rating parks a new one as pending, that a program's unattested edit returns an escalation_id instead of a 403, and explicit 400/409/502/503 conditions with the 409 concurrency remedy.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Length is justifiable for an 18-parameter mutation with versioning and attestation semantics, and the first sentence front-loads the core contract. But the body is an undifferentiated block of jargon and doubled-backtick markup with error codes crammed into the final paragraph, which slows an agent that only needs the happy path.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Covers the mutation's side effects, attestation paths, refusal conditions, error taxonomy and concurrency remedy, and even explains what the answer contains (model id/version/title, entities.attackers, attestation.escalation_id) despite an output schema existing. An agent has enough to call this correctly and interpret failures.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
At 61% schema coverage the schema handles several fields, but the description adds meaning the schema does not: change_reason is mandatory for factor fields, surface_extent and the attest_* flags; 'point' is refused under a stated condition; capability must name operations or earns a quality_warning. Position, archetype, likelihood_rationale and capability_prevalence remain unexplained.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb+resource plus the key semantic ('only the fields given change'), which immediately signals partial-update behavior and distinguishes it from add_attacker. It names answer_attacker_credentials as the correct tool for the privileges-from-holdings case, but the differentiation is buried in the error paragraph rather than stated up front.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives real conditional routing: use attest_* to attest a value as it stands, use answer_attacker_credentials when privileges follow from stated credential classes, and 'point' extent is refused in a specific configuration. It does not, however, state when to use edit_attacker versus add_attacker or reevaluate_threat_model_factors/settle_entity_rating, both of which touch similar rating semantics.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
edit_behavioural_elementEdit Behavioural ElementA
Replace, or add, one element of a model's behavioural model. Mutating; creates a model version (none when the edit changes nothing).
The element is kept as a person wrote it, so a later extraction keeps it.
It changes the model's ir_hash, which voids a confirmation: confirm
again with confirm_behavioural_model. The result must still be a
valid model (422 otherwise), and a build holding the model refuses it
(409).
A program's edit is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation policy
admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and parked for
a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
Returns the behavioural model as it now stands, with changed.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| element | Yes | JSON object, the whole element including its ``id``; it replaces the element of that id, or adds one. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| collection | Yes | The collection of ``get_behavioural_model``'s ``ir`` the element belongs to. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: mutation semantics, model-version creation, ir_hash change and its effect on confirmations, 422 for invalid results, 409 when a build holds the model, 403 with escalation_id parking the edit for a person, and the no-retry instruction. This is exactly the behavioral disclosure an agent needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the action ('Replace, or add, one element') then layers error and delegation behavior. Dense but every sentence conveys a distinct behavioral fact; only the density keeps it from a 5.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Covers mutation consequences, validity and build-locking error paths, authorization/escalation flow, follow-up confirmation, and the return shape. An output schema exists, so the brief note on the return is a bonus rather than a gap. Nothing an agent needs to invoke this correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 75%, so the schema documents most parameters. The description confirms the element is stored as written and must yield a valid model, but adds little about model_id, collection, or server_version beyond what the schema states. Baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and scope: 'Replace, or add, one element of a model's behavioural model.' That single-element surgical edit is clearly distinguished from whole-model operations among siblings like extract_behavioural_model and confirm_behavioural_model, which it names.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides strong operational context: the required follow-up of 'confirm_behavioural_model' after the ir_hash change, and explicit handling for the 403 case ('Do not retry... report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals'). It does not explicitly state when to prefer this over other edit/add siblings such as add_asset, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
edit_componentEdit ComponentA
Edit a component's properties.
Per-component level grades are orthogonal axes — set whichever
apply to the program the component is in scope for. Leave a field
unset (None) to keep the current server-side value; backend
treats absent fields as "unchanged".
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| eal | No | Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level (1-7). For components subject to CC certification. | |
| name | No | New name (empty = unchanged). | |
| path | No | New path (empty = unchanged). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| repo_url | No | New repo URL (empty = unchanged). | |
| target_sl | No | IEC 62443 target Security Level (1-4). For industrial / OT components that need a 62443 zone target. | |
| fips_level | No | FIPS 140-3 Security Level (1-4) for the cryptographic module embedded in this component. | |
| component_id | Yes | ID of the component (e.g., "CMP1"). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| trust_boundary_ids | No | New trust boundary IDs (comma-separated, empty = unchanged). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden. It meaningfully explains the non-obvious partial-update behavior ('backend treats absent fields as unchanged') and clarifies that grade fields are independent orthogonal axes. This goes well beyond a bare 'edit a component', though it does not cover permissions, validation, or side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded with the core purpose, then adds only the essential behavioral nuances. The 'orthogonal axes' metaphor is slightly dense but earns its place by framing the partial-update model. It is not bloated.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description plus a 90%-covered schema is largely sufficient for calling the tool: required IDs are in the schema and partial-update semantics are stated. However, it lacks guidance on how this tool relates to sibling edit tools, and it leaves the required server_version parameter unexplained. The presence of an output schema mitigates some of the gap, but the overall guidance is not fully complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 90%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds valuable semantics beyond the schema by explaining that per-component grades are orthogonal and that leaving fields unset preserves server-side values. This clarifies how to handle the nullable grade fields and the empty-string fields in practice.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Edit') and the resource ('a component's properties'), which distinguishes it from other edit_* siblings that target different resources. However, it does not explicitly differentiate itself from sibling tools by scope or use case, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives solid operational guidance about partial updates ('absent fields are unchanged') and when to set grade fields ('set whichever apply'), but it does not explicitly say when to use this tool versus alternatives like edit_asset or edit_trust_boundary. Usage context is implied rather than stated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
edit_evidenceEdit EvidenceA
Attach or detach an auxiliary evidence item (doc, link, artifact reference) on a control. Mutating.
Evidence is contextual metadata only: it does NOT count toward a control's implementation status, and removing it changes neither the status nor any assertion. Only assertions prove controls.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | No | add — optional file path or URL pointing at the artifact. | |
| type | No | add — "code", "test", "config", "document" or "link" (default "code"). | code |
| label | No | add — human-readable description of the item (required). | |
| action | Yes | "add" attaches an item; "remove" detaches one. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control. | |
| evidence_index | No | remove — zero-based position of the item in the control's ``evidence`` array (read it with ``get_controls(control_id=...)``; default 0, the first item). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and largely meets it: it declares the operation mutating and, more valuably, states the non-effect of removal on status and assertions - a semantic trait an agent could otherwise guess wrong. It still omits permission requirements, whether edits are auditable/undoable, and any failure modes.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, followed by a one-word mutation flag, then the semantic caveat. The caveat is slightly restated twice ('removing it changes neither the status nor any assertion' / 'Only assertions prove controls'), but both sentences carry distinct weight and nothing is padded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Eight parameters at 88% schema coverage plus an output schema mean structured fields handle details; the description supplies exactly the missing conceptual layer - that this is a mutation of contextual metadata with no effect on control implementation status - which is what an agent needs to decide whether to call it.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 88%, so the schema already documents the action enum, item type values, and the zero-based evidence_index. The description adds only a high-level gloss (attach vs detach, what an item is), which is marginal beyond the structured data, so baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a concrete verb pair (attach/detach), the resource (an auxiliary evidence item), the item kinds (doc, link, artifact reference), and the parent object (a control). The closing line distinguishes evidence from assertions, which is exactly the boundary that separates this tool from assertion-oriented siblings in the list.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The statement that evidence 'does NOT count toward a control's implementation status' and that 'only assertions prove controls' implicitly tells the agent when this tool is appropriate versus proof-bearing tools. However, there is no explicit when-to-use rule, no prerequisite call chain (e.g., read evidence_index via get_controls before removing), and no named alternative.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
edit_trust_boundaryEdit Trust BoundaryA
Edit a trust boundary. Creates a new model version. Returns {model, entities, ...}: the model's id, version and title, and
entities.trust_boundaries the boundary as it now stands.
Attesting the seal is a judgment: a person's edit attests it; a
program's only under a workspace rule delegating seal_attested,
otherwise the edit lands with the seal unattested and the answer's
attestation names the parked escalation_id (never a 403). Any
change to passes, crosses, neighbors or sealed voids an
attested seal: the attestation is of the content as it stood.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| tb_id | Yes | ID of the trust boundary (e.g., "TB1"). | |
| passes | No | New comma-separated AttackVector values the boundary allows through (subset of "Network,Adjacent,Local,Physical"). Use the empty string to set "blocks all"; omit to leave unchanged. Reach-relevant — narrowing or widening this set can flip CO verdicts. | |
| sealed | No | New isolation flag. True declares NO lateral ingress (the only way in is crossing the perimeter — an air-gap / segmented enclave), which lets reachability decisively rule the boundary unreachable; False assumes a lateral pivot is possible. Reach-relevant — changing it can flip CO verdicts. Setting it attests the seal, as above. Omit to leave unchanged. | |
| crosses | No | New comma-separated asset IDs. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| description | No | New description. | |
| seal_source | No | "attested" | "unattested". Only an attested seal lets reachability decisively rule an objective unreachable past the boundary; an unattested (default or generated) seal is treated as pivotable. Use "attested" to attest a boundary already marked sealed without re-toggling it; "unattested" retracts. An attested seal implies ``sealed``. Requires ``change_reason``. | |
| change_reason | No | Required when ``passes``, ``sealed``, or the seal attestation actually changes. Captured in the audit trail; documents why the boundary's vector filter, isolation claim, or attestation changed. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses the mutation side effect (new model version), that the call succeeds even when the seal cannot be attested by returning a parked escalation_id instead of a 403, and that editing passes/crosses/neighbors/sealed voids an attested seal. This is exactly the non-obvious behavior an agent needs before calling.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose, side effect and return shape, then the attestation caveats. The second paragraph is dense and slightly convoluted in phrasing but every sentence conveys a distinct behavioral rule rather than filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, yet the description also sketches the return shape, and it covers the mutation, attestation and audit-reason implications well. Minor gaps remain: no mention of permissions needed or concurrent-edit behavior, though 'omit to leave unchanged' in the schema covers partial-update semantics.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 89%, so baseline is 3, but the description adds genuine cross-parameter meaning the schema cannot: setting sealed implicitly attests the seal, seal_source requires change_reason, and change_reason is mandatory when passes/sealed/attestation actually change. It does not address tb_id or model_id, but those are self-evident from their schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ("Edit a trust boundary") and immediately adds that it creates a new model version plus the shape of the response. It is clearly distinguishable from add_trust_boundary by the verb, but it never explicitly contrasts with the add/restore siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when it applies (editing an existing boundary) but names no alternative and gives no exclusion rules — nothing tells the agent to prefer add_trust_boundary for creation or which sibling to use for other boundary operations. The guidance about "Use 'attested' to attest a boundary already marked sealed" is parameter usage, not tool selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
export_reportExport ReportA
Export a threat model or a tag as a downloadable document. Read-only; no side effects on the source.
scope selects what is exported and how scope_id is read; format selects the representation:
scope="model"(scope_id= model id) supportsformat∈ {csv,pdf,html,archive}:csv— the model's current state rendered as CSV; returned inline as UTF-8 text incontent.pdf/html— rendered document returned base64-encoded incontent_b64(withcontent_type). Runs as a server-side job; progress is reported automatically while it completes, which may take time for large models.archive— the self-contained, independently-verifiable JSON audit bundle of the model's current state: its latest version and controls, live assertions (with Tier 1 / Tier 2 verdicts and attested flags) and the runs behind them, open findings and those a person closed, risk acceptances and other decisions in force, assumption overrides, attestations, and instance sufficiency signatures; each control's per-clause evidence basis travels with it. Earlier versions, activity and chat are not in it. Those verdicts are the origin's record of what it claimed, which is what a third party checks against the signatures; an importing workspace credits what its own verification establishes (seeimport_threat_model_archive). Returned as{..., "envelope": <dict>}; feed the envelope toimport_threat_model_archiveto restore it into any workspace. Model scope only.
scope="tag"(scope_id= tag id) supports onlyformat="html": the signed auditor report, every member model's report after the reliance edges among the members (each with its status and whether it credits its objective), in one HTML document returned inline incontent.csv,pdf, andarchiveare rejected for tag scope.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| scope | Yes | export boundary — "model" or "tag". | |
| format | No | "csv" (default), "pdf", "html", or "archive". Tag scope requires "html"; "archive" is model-only. | csv |
| scope_id | Yes | id of the model or tag selected by ``scope``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: it declares read-only/no side effects, discloses that pdf/html run as a potentially slow server-side job with automatic progress reporting, specifies the exact return fields per format (content, content_b64 + content_type, envelope), and enumerates what the archive does NOT include (earlier versions, activity, chat).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the purpose and safety note, then organized as a clean scope→format matrix. The archive bullet is dense and long, but every clause conveys behavior an agent needs (contents, exclusions, return shape, downstream tool); minor verbosity rather than padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, yet the description still pins down the format-dependent return keys, which is exactly the ambiguity an output schema alone would leave. For a read/export tool with two enums and a cross-field constraint, nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, but the description adds substantial meaning beyond it: it explains that scope determines how scope_id is interpreted, which format values are legal per scope, and what each format's payload actually is. It documents the interaction the flat schema cannot express.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource (export a threat model or tag as a downloadable document) and immediately bounds scope to two entity types. It also names the counterpart tool (import_threat_model_archive), so an agent can place it in the workflow without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use mapping: which format applies to which scope, and explicitly states that csv/pdf/archive are rejected for tag scope. It routes to import_threat_model_archive for restoring an archive. It stops short of stating when to prefer a different export/report tool (e.g. get_compliance_report, get_verification_report), so not a full 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
extract_behavioural_modelExtract Behavioural ModelA
Give a model that has no behavioural model one. Mutating only with
confirm_estimate=True; a paid action then.
The extraction is paid for by whoever requests it, so it is estimated first and the estimate is RELAYED TO THE PERSON before it is confirmed. Never confirm on your own.
Call with
confirm_estimate=False(the default): nothing is charged or written. The answer carries theestimate(the extraction, the existing controls' deltas and checks, the link-matching call and the re-judgement, by part), themodel_versionandset_revisionthe model stands at, andnoticeson what the extraction changes: judgements of the groups the threats reach are asked again, and posture can move down as well as up. Show all of it to the person.Once they agree, call with
confirm_estimate=Trueand those two values. The extraction is queued and the call returns at once (queued,extraction.job): it can take an hour on a long description. Pollget_behavioural_modeluntilextraction.jobis null; a new model version then holds the result (itsstatusmay beneeds_answers). Read the proposals withget_behavioural_links.
Refusals come back as data, {confirmed: false, http_status, code, message}: 409 has_behavioural_model (read it with
get_behavioural_model), 409 extraction_running (one is queued or
running: poll it), 409 review_stale (the model or its controls
changed since the estimate: confirm again with the values returned), 402
(the balance cannot cover the estimate). A 404 means the caller may not
start paid actions on the model.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| set_revision | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the estimate's value. | |
| model_version | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the estimate's value. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_estimate | No | False (default) estimates; True extracts. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses this is a paid, mutating action only when confirm_estimate=True, that the requester is charged, that the estimate must be relayed to a human before confirmation, that the operation is queued and may take an hour, that polling is required, and that op... refusals return as {confirmed, http_status, code, message} with specific 409/402/404 semantics. These are exactly the behavioral traits an agent needs and that structured fields do not supply.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but front-loaded and organized into a purpose statement plus two numbered steps followed by refusal handling. Given the multi-step, asynchronous and paid nature of the tool, most sentences earn their place; the heavy use of double-backtick code formatting and the dense refusal enumeration add some reading overhead.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex, paid, asynchronous mutation with an output schema present, this is complete: it covers preconditions, both call modes, the queued job and its polling loop, the returned estimate fields and notices, downstream siblings to use, and every relevant error code including a permission-implication note for 404.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 80%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning: confirm_estimate=False estimates while True extracts, and set_revision/model_version are the values that must be carried forward from the estimate payload returned in step 1. The only parameter left unexplained is server_version, which the description also ignores.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence 'Give a model that has no behavioural model one' states a specific verb (extract/give) and resource (behavioural model) with a clear scope restriction (only models that lack one). It distinguishes itself from the read-only sibling get_behavioural_model, which the description explicitly points to when the 409 has_behavioural_model refusal fires. An agent can separate this from edit_behavioural_element/confirm_behavioural_model without opening schemas.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It lays out an explicit two-step protocol: first call with confirm_estimate=False, relay the estimate to the person, then call with confirm_estimate=True and the returned values, and it explicitly forbids confirming on your own. It also names alternatives via the refusal codes (poll with get_behavioural_model, read proposals with get_behavioural_links) and the condition under which each applies.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
generate_from_behavioural_modelGenerate From Behavioural ModelA
Generate the threat model of a model awaiting its first generation, from its behavioural model. Mutating; saves the model's next version.
A generation where the platform models what the system does saves the
model first (generate_threat_model answers extracting or
needs_answers). Once get_behavioural_model reports
generation_ready: true, call this with its model_id: the
inventory steps run from the stored description and the answers to its
questions. It takes no description. Progress is reported automatically;
it takes minutes.
Answer: as generate_threat_model's, controls_status and the
proposed control build included; needs_answers with the
questions when it stopped on questions.
Refusals come back as data, {generated: false, http_status: 409, code, message}: not_awaiting_generation (the model has been generated,
or its behavioural model still asks questions or is being extracted:
read get_behavioural_model, and refine a generated model with
refine_threat_model), generation_in_progress (another generation
of the model is running: do not start another; poll
get_behavioural_model, whose generation_ready turns false and
whose version moves when it saves). A model that is not there is a 404
error.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | The model, as ``generate_threat_model`` returned it. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses that the operation is mutating and saves the model's next version, that it takes minutes and reports progress automatically, and it explains refusal codes and 404 behavior in detail.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose and precondition are front-loaded, and the later paragraphs focus on return states and refusal handling. It is dense and useful, though longer than strictly necessary for a two-parameter tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex mutating generation tool with no annotations and an output schema, the description covers when to call it, what state it requires, side effects, timing, return states, and refusals. The only minor omission is `server_version`, which is a schema field rather than the central interaction concern.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 50%, and the description clarifies that `model_id` comes from a `get_behavioural_model` result with `generation_ready: true`. However, `server_version` is neither described in the schema nor mentioned in the description, leaving half the parameters undocumented.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: generate the threat model of a model awaiting its first generation from its behavioural model. It explicitly distinguishes this first behavioural-model-based generation from `generate_threat_model`, whose `extracting`/`needs_answers` states precede it.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives an explicit precondition: call this only once `get_behavioural_model` reports `generation_ready: true`, using its `model_id`. It also routes the agent away from this tool when the model is already generated, still asking questions, or being extracted, naming `get_behavioural_model` and `refine_threat_model` as alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
generate_functional_objectivesGenerate Functional ObjectivesA
Derive capabilities, functional objectives, and the concrete tests to implement from the feature spec.
Capabilities are the behaviours the feature must deliver; each is walked
against a taxonomy of operating conditions (nominal, boundary, invalid
input, dependency failure, concurrency, …) to produce testable
Given-When-Then objectives — and then a concrete, implementable test is
specified for each objective (so the agent implements the tests rather than
deciding what to test). Requires a Pro plan. Billable — may take some time.
refresh=true re-derives from scratch, replacing prior generated (not
manually authored) capabilities, objectives, and tests.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| refresh | No | Re-generate from scratch instead of serving cached output. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full disclosure burden and does so well. It explains side effects: refresh=true re-derives from scratch and replaces prior generated content while preserving manually authored content. It also discloses billing, time cost, and the systematic taxonomy-driven process.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose, then adds a precise definition of the internal concepts, and finishes with operational constraints. Every sentence earns its place, and the length is appropriate for the complexity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity and the presence of an output schema, the description covers the input requirements, workflow, output nature, side effects, and usage constraints. An agent has enough context to invoke the tool correctly and understand its consequences.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema describes model_id and refresh, and the description adds meaningful depth to refresh by specifying that it replaces prior generated (not manually authored) capabilities, objectives, and tests. However, server_version remains undocumented in both the schema and description, so coverage is not complete.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb, 'derive', and names the resource: capabilities, functional objectives, and concrete tests from a feature spec. It clearly distinguishes this generation tool from retrieval siblings like get_functional_objectives by emphasizing that it creates testable Given-When-Then objectives and implementable tests.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives useful context about when to use the tool (from a feature spec, requires Pro plan, billable, may take time) but does not explicitly contrast it with related alternatives like get_functional_objectives, add_functional_test, or import_functional_tests. Usage is implied rather than explicitly routed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
generate_threat_modelGenerate Threat ModelA
Generate a threat model from a feature description: trust boundaries, assets (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Usage), capability-defined attackers, the control objective matrix and assumptions. A multi-step pipeline; progress is reported automatically.
Similar models: where an existing model of the workspace overlaps
the description, nothing is generated: {"similar_models": [{"id", "title", "reason"}], "suggestion"}. Refine a candidate with
refine_threat_model (usually right: it keeps controls and history),
or retry with force=True once the operator confirms it is distinct.
Saved first: where the platform models what the system does, the
model is saved holding the description and generated from it later.
extracting: true (model_id, job): its behaviour is extracted
in the background. needs_answers: true (model_id,
questions): RELAY THE QUESTIONS TO THE PERSON and answer them with
answer_behavioural_questions. Then poll get_behavioural_model
until generation_ready is true and call
generate_from_behavioural_model with the model_id (next says
so). No control build is proposed until then. Deprecated: model_id
here; with an empty description it does the same, with one it is
refused (resume_takes_no_description).
Answer: {model_id, version, title, asset_count, attacker_count, control_objective_count, controls_status, ...}. proposed: a build
is proposed (proposal: what it builds, estimated_credits, the
model_version, set_revision and scope_revision a start
names); review it with the user, then start_control_build with
confirm_estimate=True. none_owed: nothing is owed;
unavailable / error: read get_control_generation_status. A
governor at warning or exhausted: relay it; queued work
resumes at resets_at, never dropped.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | No | Skip the similar-model detection and always create a new model. Default False: the check fires unless the operator or agent has explicit reason to bypass it. | |
| model_id | No | Deprecated: use ``generate_from_behavioural_model``. With an empty ``feature_description`` it does the same; with a description it is refused (``resume_takes_no_description``). | |
| parent_id | No | Optional ID of an existing model to wire the new model under as a child on the recursive composition tree. The child then inherits the parent's topology and participates in composition (delta / inherited control credit). Default None: the model is created flat. | |
| provenance_ref | No | Branch or tag name at that commit (optional). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| provenance_kind | No | Where the description came from, one of ``code``, ``ticket``, ``document``, ``manual``, ``mixed``. Empty (default) records nothing. For an existing repository pass ``provenance_kind="code"`` with ``provenance_repo_url`` and ``provenance_commit_sha`` (the HEAD you gathered from): the code is then authoritative and the model follows it. Any other kind means the description is intent and the code is measured against it. The same record can be set later with ``update_threat_model``. | |
| feature_description | Yes | Description of the feature or system to threat model. Can be a few sentences or a detailed spec. | |
| provenance_repo_url | No | Repository URL the description was gathered from (``code`` kind). | |
| provenance_commit_sha | No | Commit SHA the description was gathered at (``code`` kind). | |
| provenance_source_ref | No | Identifier of the ticket or document the description came from (``ticket`` / ``document`` kinds). | |
| provenance_source_url | No | URL of that ticket or document. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses the multi-step pipeline, automatic progress reporting, similar-model suppression behavior, background extraction, deprecated model_id handling, response branches such as proposed/none_owed/unavailable/error, governor states, and queued-work resumption. It goes well beyond a bare operation description.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long and dense, but it is front-loaded with the core purpose and organized under clear bold headings for similar-model handling, saved-first behavior, and response branches. For a complex multi-step pipeline with many edge cases, most sentences earn their place, though the density is near the upper limit.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity, 11 parameters, no annotations, and an existing output schema, the description is complete enough for an agent to understand generation, fallback paths, deprecations, response branches, and next actions. It does not need to explain raw return values because the output schema covers that, but it still provides useful workflow context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 91%, so the schema already documents most parameters in detail. The description reinforces force usage and deprecated model_id behavior, but it does not add much parameter-level semantics beyond what the schema provides, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Generate a threat model from a feature description', and names the exact outputs (trust boundaries, assets, attackers, control objective matrix, assumptions). It also distinguishes the tool from siblings by calling out refine_threat_model and generate_from_behavioural_model as alternative paths.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit when-to-use and when-not-to-use guidance: overlap with existing models suppresses generation and routes to refine_threat_model or force=True after operator confirmation. It also lays out the saved-first flow, including relaying questions via answer_behavioural_questions and polling get_behavioural_model before calling generate_from_behavioural_model.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_assertion_typesGet Assertion TypesA
List the assertion types submit_assertions accepts, with their params.
Read-only. Returns the catalogue as structured data: every type, what it
proves, its soundness class, which params it requires, which it
accepts (an array-valued param carries its item_schema), and a
worked example. soundness_classes defines the five classes by the
fact a pass establishes, weakest to strongest — presence,
under_approximating_scan, existential_witness,
sound_over_approximation, by_construction — and
sound_classes names the two that can credit a for-all clause.
covers gives the accepted form of a binding declaration.
Call this before writing assertions. submit_assertions names the types and their required params in its own description, but descriptions are prose a client may present only in part, and a half-list reads exactly like a whole one. This returns data, so what you get back is the complete contract.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| types | No | Optional comma-separated type names to return (e.g. "file_exists,pattern_absent"). Omit for all of them. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It states "Read-only" and describes the return payload in detail: every type, what it proves, its soundness class, required/optional params, item_schema for array params, a worked example, and the semantics of soundness_classes, sound_classes, and covers. This goes well beyond a generic list call and gives the agent a clear expectation of behavior and output structure, even without an output schema reference.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is longer than typical, but every sentence contributes meaningful detail: purpose, output semantics, and usage rationale. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and then expands. While slightly verbose, it avoids redundancy and earns its length through dense, relevant content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has an output schema, so return-value details could be omitted, but the description still explains the output's semantic structure, which is valuable. The main gap is the unexplained server_version parameter, but the tool itself is simple and well-contextualized. Overall, the description is sufficient for correct invocation, with only that minor parameter gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has only 50% coverage, with server_version lacking any description. The tool description does not mention either of the tool's own parameters (types, server_version), so it adds no semantic value beyond the schema. Since the description is expected to compensate for schema gaps, the failure to explain server_version is a significant omission, leaving the agent without guidance on a required parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a precise statement of purpose: "List the assertion types submit_assertions accepts, with their params." It clearly specifies the resource (assertion types) and the action (list), and immediately connects to the sibling tool submit_assertions, distinguishing itself as the authoritative catalogue. This is unambiguous and fully differentiates the tool from its siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit guidance: "Call this before writing assertions." It explains why this tool is preferred over relying on submit_assertions' prose description, noting that prose may be partially presented and a half-list reads like a whole one. This provides a clear when-to-use directive and justifies why the structured data is superior, covering the alternative explicitly.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_behavioural_attackersGet Behavioural AttackersA
Read the attacker closure of a model: the attackers its behavioural model says are missing from the inventory, and what its attackers hold. Read-only: no model is called and nothing is written.
Returns {applies, credential_classes, proposals, dismissed, dismissed_zones, reported, splits, dismissed_splits, questions}.
applies is false where the closure is not offered (a model with no
inventory, or whose behavioural model decides nothing yet);
computing while what the threats reach is still being analysed, when
nothing is proposed. Each of proposals is an attacker no attacker of
the inventory stands for: its kind (own: a class proposed on its
own; grouped: a part of the zones nobody stands at, the zones of one
capability, with an entries row per zone), credential_classes,
privileges_required, capability, objectives and zones;
add it with add_proposed_attacker or dismiss it, or some zones of a
part, with dismiss_proposed_attacker. Two parts may hold the same
classes: name one by a zone of it. Each of splits is an attacker
standing for zones of several capabilities, offered split into its
parts (each listed as a proposal is), with objectives_added,
objectives_removed and ratings: split it with
split_grouped_attacker or keep it whole with keep_attacker_whole.
dismissed, dismissed_zones and dismissed_splits carry
reason, dismissed_by and dismissed_at. reported lists
narrower holders beside an attacker that stands for them. questions
ask what an attacker holds: answer each with
answer_attacker_credentials. Relay the proposals and splits to the
person before acting on them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so well: it declares the tool read-only, states that no model is called and nothing is written, and explains edge cases like applies=false and computing states. This is exactly the kind of safety and operational context an agent needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long and dense, but it is front-loaded with the purpose and read-only guarantee before diving into return fields. Most sentences earn their place by defining output semantics and next actions, though bullet-style formatting would improve scanability.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Because an output schema already exists, the description need not detail return values, yet it does so thoroughly. It is complete enough for an agent to call the tool correctly and understand the response, with only minor redundancy against the schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50%: model_id is documented, but server_version is not. The description implies a model is targeted ('of a model') but adds no explicit parameter semantics, so it neither compensates for the gap nor repeats the schema. A baseline 3 reflects adequate but thin parameter guidance.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Read the attacker closure of a model,' and explains exactly what that closure contains (missing attackers and what attackers hold). It clearly separates itself from the action-oriented siblings by being read-only, but it never explicitly contrasts itself with other read siblings like get_behavioural_threats or get_behavioural_model.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives strong follow-up routing: proposals go to add_proposed_attacker or dismiss_proposed_attacker, splits to split_grouped_attacker or keep_attacker_whole, and questions to answer_attacker_credentials, plus the instruction to relay proposals to a person before acting. It does not explicitly state when to choose this tool over other read tools, but the context is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_behavioural_linksGet Behavioural LinksA
Read the links from a behavioural model's elements and zones to the model's assets and trust boundaries. Read-only; no side effects.
Returns {nodes, links, proposals, proposals_hash, questions, repair}:
each link says whether it counts toward the analysis; proposals are
matches a person is shown (an empty entity_id is a node nothing
matched); proposals_hash is what accept_behavioural_link_proposals
names; questions are the open link questions (also on
get_review_queue as behavioural_link rows). A link is declared
for one node with declare_behavioural_link.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so reasonably: it explicitly declares 'Read-only; no side effects' and explains the shape and meaning of the returned fields (proposals semantics, empty entity_id meaning, questions overlap with get_review_queue). It omits auth/permission requirements, but the read-only declaration is the key behavioral fact.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose and read-only property are front-loaded in the first sentence; the second sentence is dense but each clause about the return payload carries distinct information. Slightly long but no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so explaining return values is technically optional, yet the description adds useful semantics on top. Combined with the explicit read-only note, an agent has enough to call this correctly; the only real gap is the undocumented server_version parameter.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50% (model_id is documented, server_version is not), so the description should compensate but adds no parameter-level meaning at all. Neither model_id nor server_version is clarified or constrained beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Read the links from a behavioural model's elements and zones to the model's assets and trust boundaries'), which is precise enough to separate it from siblings like declare_behavioural_link and accept_behavioural_link_proposals.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides clear routing context: it notes that a link is declared via declare_behavioural_link and that proposals_hash is consumed by accept_behavioural_link_proposals, so the agent can infer when to use this read tool vs the mutation siblings. It stops short of an explicit 'use this when / not when' statement.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_behavioural_modelGet Behavioural ModelA
Read a model's behavioural model: what the system does, as elements, actions and zones taken from its description. Read-only.
status: none (extract_behavioural_model gives it one),
needs_answers, extracted, confirmed, stale (the
description changed since) or extracting. questions are the open
ones, answered with answer_behavioural_questions; one carrying
structured takes a structured answer, one with awaiting_fix was
answered. pending_answers: collected, not extracted. ir_hash is
what confirm_behavioural_model names. waiting_on:
extraction, acceptance, answers, generation or
nothing. extraction.job: the extraction running in the
background (null when none), its progress (pass, calls done and
expected, estimated finish); extraction.dropped_elements: what it
could not keep, with the sentence to answer. generation_ready: call
generate_from_behavioural_model.
view="status" serves no IR and no questions: use it to follow an
extraction. view="questions": that and the open questions from
offset, limit of them (default 50, at most 200), with total
and next_offset. wait_seconds (0 to 50) waits for the job's
state, pass or calls completed to change, sending progress ("call 3 of
5: actions") meanwhile; at once when no job runs. Read again after
poll_after_seconds.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| view | No | ``full`` (default), ``status`` or ``questions``. | full |
| limit | No | ``questions`` view only. | |
| offset | No | ``questions`` view only. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| wait_seconds | No | 0 (default) answers at once. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full load and does so: it declares the operation read-only, enumerates the full status state machine (none/needs_answers/extracted/confirmed/stale/extracting), explains waiting_on, and discloses long-poll semantics for wait_seconds (waits on job state/pass/calls, sends progress like 'call 3 of 5: actions', returns at once when no job runs). The extraction.job/dropped_elements behaviour and the stale-on-description-change condition are exactly the kind of side context annotations could not convey.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The opening sentence is well front-loaded, but the body becomes a dense backtick-heavy enumeration of status fields (ir_hash, pending_answers, waiting_on, extraction.job, extraction.dropped_elements, generation_ready) in a single undifferentiated block. Since an output schema exists, much of that is duplicated structured data; the genuinely additive parts (cross-tool routing, polling behaviour) are buried mid-paragraph.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read tool with an output schema, the description supplies what the schema cannot: state semantics, sibling handoffs, and polling/pacing guidance. The one gap is the dangling reference to poll_after_seconds, which the schema does not define as an input, leaving the re-read cadence slightly ambiguous.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the baseline is 3; the description earns an extra point by adding meaning the schema lacks — view enum semantics are explained functionally (status serves no IR/questions), limit is bounded ('at most 200') and defaulted, and wait_seconds gains behavioural meaning beyond its terse schema line ('0 (default) answers at once'). Minor deduction: it references poll_after_seconds, which is not an input parameter in the schema, leaving the reader unsure whether that is an input or an output field.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Read a model's behavioural model') and immediately scopes it ('as elements, actions and zones taken from its description'), which separates it from the write-side siblings it names (extract_behavioural_model, confirm_behavioural_model, answer_behavioural_questions). An agent can distinguish it from every neighbour without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit per-view routing: 'view="status" serves no IR and no questions: use it to follow an extraction', and view="questions" for the question list. It also states the downstream trigger ('generation_ready: call generate_from_behavioural_model'), so the next step is unambiguous. There is no explicit statement of when NOT to use it (e.g. versus get_threat_model or query_threat_model), which keeps it off a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_behavioural_threatsGet Behavioural ThreatsA
Read the possible threats the behavioural analysis finds for each control objective of a model. Read-only: nothing is judged, written or paid for.
The analysis runs over the model with no controls applied. Per objective
it returns its standing, each obligation's result, the threats
(rule, obligation, elements), the default_questions whose answers
would remove them, and the grounds the analysis rests on. Returns
decides: false while the behavioural model is absent, asks an owner
question, or has not been extracted.
A page at a time, in the model's order of objectives: offset and
limit (default 25, at most 200), co_id one objective (404
unknown_objective for one the model does not hold live),
standing only the objectives of that standing (possible_threat,
undecided, ...). The answer carries total (the objectives
matching), next_offset (where the next page starts, null at the end)
and truncated (the page was cut short to stay under the size a
client can take; read on from next_offset).
A possible threat is not a finding yet. RELAY IT TO THE PERSON with its
default questions first: an answer that settles a default removes the
threat, and only a threat the person confirms is worth a control. Answer
with answer_behavioural_questions.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_id | No | One objective (e.g. "CO5"); empty for every one. | |
| limit | No | Objectives per page (default 25, at most 200). | |
| offset | No | The first objective of the page (default 0). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| standing | No | Only objectives of this standing; empty for every one. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description carries the full burden and does so: it declares read-only ('nothing is judged, written or paid for'), explains the analysis runs with no controls applied, enumerates the returned fields, and discloses that it returns decides:false when the behavioural model is absent, asks an owner question, or has not been extracted. It also flags the 404 unknown_objective case and the truncation/next_offset pagination contract.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with a one-line purpose, then behavior, then pagination parameters, then the workflow warning — a sensible ordering with no filler. The pagination paragraph is dense and partly duplicates schema text, which is the main thing keeping it from a 5.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read tool with six parameters and a rich output shape, the description covers what is returned (standing, result, threats, default_questions, grounds), the decides:false states, and the total/next_offset/truncated envelope, so an agent knows both what it gets and how to continue paging.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the baseline is 3; the description goes further by giving the error semantics for co_id ('404 unknown_objective for one the model does not hold live') and example standing values ('possible_threat', 'undecided', ...) that the schema leaves as a bare string. The page-size and offset details largely restate the schema, so it is not a full 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence gives a specific verb and resource: 'Read the possible threats the behavioural analysis finds for each control objective of a model.' It is scoped distinctly from siblings like get_behavioural_model or get_findings_risks by naming 'possible threats' (not findings) and 'per control objective', so an agent can tell what it returns without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Strong downstream routing: 'A possible threat is not a finding yet. RELAY IT TO THE PERSON with its default questions first' and 'Answer with answer_behavioural_questions' tell the agent exactly what to do after calling. It lacks an explicit negative case (when to prefer get_behavioural_model or query_threat_model instead), which keeps it just short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_capabilitiesGet CapabilitiesA
A model's capabilities (behaviours the feature must deliver), or one of them. Read-only.
Without capability_id: every capability, each with its id,
name/description and a summary of its component and asset bindings.
With it: that capability with its bound components and assets.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| capability_id | No | Optional; omit to list every capability. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it does disclose a key trait: 'Read-only', which is the safety profile an annotation would normally supply. It also describes what each mode returns (ids, names, binding summaries). It omits auth/permission and error behavior, so it is not fully exhaustive.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short, front-loaded paragraphs with the list/single split clearly separated. Every sentence adds information and nothing is padded, though the parenthetical definition is slightly redundant with the title.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need not be exhaustively explained, and the two required params plus the optional one are adequately covered. The description is complete enough to call the tool correctly, with only minor gaps around permissions and alternatives.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%: model_id and capability_id are documented in the schema, while server_version is not. The description clarifies capability_id's effect on the result shape, but that largely restates the schema's own 'omit to list every capability' note, and server_version remains unexplained.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource (fetch a model's capabilities) and defines the term inline ('behaviours the feature must deliver'). It clearly separates the two modes (list all vs. single with bindings). It does not, however, distinguish itself from similarly-scoped siblings like get_control_objectives or get_functional_objectives.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives mode-selection guidance tied to capability_id (omit to list all, provide for one with bindings), which is useful implied usage. It offers no guidance on when to prefer this tool over sibling capability/objective tools, and no prerequisites or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_compliance_reportGet Compliance ReportA
Compliance gap-analysis report for one framework at a chosen scope. Read-only; no side effects. Requires PRO tier.
Evaluates every framework requirement against the mapped controls in scope and classifies each as covered, partial, uncovered, unmapped, or excluded, then returns coverage counts plus per-requirement rows. The framework must first be activated at the same scope via select_compliance_frameworks (with the matching scope), otherwise there is nothing to report on.
scope selects the boundary and how scope_id is read:
"model"— a single threat model (scope_id= model id)."tag"— rolled up across every member model of a tag (scope_id= tag id).
Filtering / pagination:
level— level filter for level-aware frameworks; returns only requirements at or below this level (e.g. 1 for L1 only). Omit (or 0) for all levels. Honored for all scopes.status— one of "covered", "partial", "uncovered", "unmapped", "excluded"; empty = all statuses. Model scope only.offset/limit— per-requirement row pagination; offset skips the first N rows, limit caps rows returned (0 = no explicit limit). Model scope only.
A tag report is neither paginated nor status-filtered; passing status, offset, or limit with scope="tag" raises an error rather than silently returning unfiltered rows.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| level | No | optional level filter; omit for all levels. | |
| limit | No | max requirement rows to return, 0 = no explicit limit (model scope only). | |
| scope | Yes | report boundary — "model" or "tag". | |
| offset | No | skip the first N requirement rows, pagination (model scope only). Default 0. | |
| status | No | optional per-requirement status filter (model scope only). | |
| scope_id | Yes | id of the model or tag selected by ``scope``. | |
| framework_id | Yes | framework to report on (already selected at this scope; see ``list_compliance_frameworks``). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description carries the full burden and does so: read-only, no side effects, PRO tier requirement, the semantics of how scope_id is interpreted per scope, and a documented error path for invalid scope/filter combinations. This is well beyond what structured fields provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core purpose and safety profile, then cleanly sectioned into scope and filtering/pagination blocks. Slightly long, but nearly every line carries operational detail that affects a correct call.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values need no explanation, yet the description still clarifies the shape (coverage counts plus per-requirement rows). All required params, scope behavior, and error conditions are covered for a complex 8-param, 4-required tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is already high (88%), but the description adds real meaning: how scope_id is read under each scope value, that level returns requirements at or below the given level, the exact status enum values, and that offset/limit/status are model-scope only.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource+scope: a read-only compliance gap-analysis report for one framework at a chosen scope, and enumerates the classification outcomes (covered/partial/uncovered/unmapped/excluded). This clearly differentiates it from siblings like check_control_gaps and get_verification_report.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states the prerequisite that the framework must first be activated at the same scope via select_compliance_frameworks, names the follow-up tool (list_compliance_frameworks) for framework ids, and specifies the exact error behavior when status/offset/limit are passed with scope="tag".
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_compositionGet CompositionA
A model's composed view: its own entities with everything inherited from its ancestors on the recursive tree. Read-only.
view selects what is returned:
overview(default, ~1-2KB, read it first):{model_id, model_version, flag_enabled, tree: {parent_id, ancestor_chain, depth, child_ids}, counts: {entities, control_objectives, reconciliation_candidates}, warnings}.entities: the effective entity set keyed by kind (trust boundaries, components, assets, attackers, attack paths), each entry{kind, qualified_id, owner_model_id, owner_title, origin, entity}. Paginated (page,page_size);kind(e.g."attackers") keeps one kind.objectives: effective COs{co_qid, asset_qid, attacker_qid, security_properties, origin}, whereoriginisown,cross(inherited, with a local asset or attacker) orinherited.coverage: per effective CO{co_qid, is_covered, own_credit, inherited_credit, contributing_controls}— the composed figures, not the per-modelget_verification_report. Paginated;originfilters by contributing-control origin.attack_paths:{effective_paths, lattice_positions, authored_paths, suggestions: {missing_path, dangling_path}}against the composed topology.
Where composition is not available, every view returns its shape empty
with flag_enabled: false rather than an error. Composed reachability
is get_reachability_verdicts(composed=True).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | No | ||
| page | No | ||
| view | No | overview | |
| origin | No | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| page_size | No | ||
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it declares 'Read-only', specifies that unavailable composition returns an empty shape with flag_enabled=false rather than an error, notes pagination on the entities and coverage views, and gives an overview size hint (~1-2KB). It omits permission/auth prerequisites and error behavior for invalid model_id, so not exhaustive.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose and read-only status are front-loaded, then the bulk is a per-view bullet list where every entry earns its place by telling the agent which view to pick. Given five distinct return modes, the length is proportionate and no sentence is filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 7-parameter tool with an output schema (so return values need not be described), the definition covers behavior, view selection, edge cases, and pagination well enough to call correctly. The only omissions are the undocumented server_version and model_id semantics.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it largely does: it fully documents the view enum with the return shape of each mode, explains kind as a single-kind filter, origin as a contributing-control-origin filter, and notes page/page_size as pagination. model_id is only implied and server_version is never mentioned, leaving a small gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific resource and scope: the model's composed view combining its own entities with everything inherited from ancestors on the recursive tree. This distinguishes it from per-model read tools like get_verification_report and get_control_objectives, which it explicitly contrasts.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives clear sequencing guidance ('overview ... read it first') and routes the agent away from misuse by naming alternatives: coverage is the composed counterpart to per-model get_verification_report, and composed reachability belongs to get_reachability_verdicts(composed=True). It stops short of an explicit 'use this when / do not use this when' statement, but the routing is strong.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_control_assumption_groupsGet Control Assumption GroupsA
Get the current assumption group structure for a control.
Assumption groups define alternative sets of external claims that can satisfy a control:
Within a group: AND — all assumptions must be active and attested
Across groups: OR — any complete group is sufficient to mark the control as externally handled
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control (e.g., "CTRL-03"). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the behavioral burden. It explicitly indicates a read-only operation ('Get') and adds meaningful domain behavior: assumptions within a group are ANDed, groups are ORed, and a complete group marks the control as externally handled. It does not discuss auth or error cases, but the getter nature and semantics are transparent enough for an agent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded with the purpose, followed by a concise bulleted explanation of the AND/OR semantics. Every sentence adds value and no filler exists.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only control query with an output schema, the description gives the essential domain model: assumption groups, external claims, AND within groups, OR across groups, and the effect on externally-handled status. It could additionally state that this is the read counterpart to set_control_assumption_groups, but the sibling names already make that connection.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already describes model_id and control_id, but server_version is undocumented, and the description adds no parameter-level detail. With 67% schema coverage, the description does not need to restate everything, but it also does not compensate for the missing server_version context.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific verb ('Get') and a resource ('assumption group structure') scoped to a control, then defines exactly what that structure means with an AND/OR explanation. This clearly distinguishes it from write-oriented siblings like set_control_assumption_groups.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The word 'Get' and 'current' provide clear retrieval context, and the description implies when an agent would want to inspect the assumption group structure. It does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, so it falls short of full routing guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_control_deltaGet Control DeltaB
Read the delta of a control: the edits to the behavioural model that the control's own text commits to. Read-only; no side effects.
The delta is served for the control's text as it stands. status is
absent (none), pending (not checked yet), checked, failed
or declared (a person declared it). Returns {status, edits, unexpressed, applies, expressible, declared_by, rendered, unquoted, second_reading, declaration, cross_check, ...}: rendered is each
edit in words beside its quotes, unquoted the text no quote reaches.
Once a person declares the delta, the control's sufficiency is judged
against the declaration's commitments, not a reading of its text, and
cross_check says whether the text may commit to more than they
state: completed (false until the control's next sufficiency
evaluation asks it) and findings, each dismissed or open. The
control reads sufficient only once its cross-check completed and every
finding is dismissed. RELAY OPEN FINDINGS TO THE PERSON: dismissing one
is a person's act, made in the app, never a program's; the other exit
is a new draft declared again.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control (e.g. "CTRL-01"). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full load and does substantial work: it declares read-only/no-side-effects, enumerates the meaning of each 'status' value, explains that sufficiency is judged against a declaration once made, and states explicitly that dismissing a finding is a person's act 'made in the app, never a program's.' It omits permission/auth requirements and any rate or cost characteristics, but the side-effect and human-gate disclosures are unusually thorough.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded, but the bulk of the text is an exhaustive walkthrough of the return payload even though an output schema already exists. The single most operationally important instruction (relay findings, never dismiss programmatically) is buried at the very end and the prose is dense with dangling references ('...' in the field list).
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Because an output schema exists, the long return-value narration is largely redundant, and the description leaves gaps in usage routing and parameter meaning. It is complete on the conceptual behavior of the delta (status, cross_check, sufficiency gating), which is the genuinely non-schema knowledge, so it is adequate but not fully sufficient for a tool with many adjacent siblings.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67% and the description adds nothing about any of the three required parameters — no meaning, format, or constraints for model_id, control_id, or the undocumented server_version. All parameter meaning rests on the schema, and one parameter has none.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource and even defines the jargon: 'Read the delta of a control: the edits to the behavioural model that the control's own text commits to.' The 'Read-only; no side effects' clause implicitly separates it from the write-side siblings submit_control_delta and declare_control_delta, though it never names them.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description never says when to call this tool versus submit_control_delta, declare_control_delta, or request_delta_second_reading. The only imperative, 'RELAY OPEN FINDINGS TO THE PERSON,' is an in-app human action, not a condition for invoking the tool. Usage is left entirely to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_control_generation_statusGet Control Generation StatusA
A model's proposed control build and its last started one. Read-only.
A build runs only when started. proposal (or null): mode,
objective_count, estimated_credits (estimate_basis
history|bootstrap), the model_version / set_revision /
scope_revision start_control_build names, and what to review:
flagged_entities, pending_attestations (attestations that would
remove objectives from the build); flags_evaluated /
attestations_evaluated false when not computed. Poll until
terminal; hint names the next act.
status: queued | generating | deferred | pausing | paused | blocked | complete | failed | skipped | discarded | none. deferred
waits for the budget reset; paused keeps its work until
resume_control_generation or discard_control_build. blocked
has code (dependency_unavailable or analysis_incomplete),
message, retry_after_seconds: relay it and retry with
resume_control_generation, never regenerate_controls (re-bills).
Running: ready_cos / target_cos are progress, not coverage.
selfheal_activity is a SAMPLE of a strengthening round: read
refining_total / authoring_total / set_aside_total;
set_aside waits for a person, NOT a failure.
complete: figures come from diagnosis: covered,
uncovered, undecided (strengthen_controls), judging
(wait), not_judged (judge_objectives), no_group (group),
grouping, no_control (start the build), awaiting_attestation
(attest), awaiting_assumption (review queue), mitigated_elsewhere
(nothing owed). covered_cos of judged_cos;
awaiting_judgement_cos = not_judged + judging;
excluded_cos, dispositioned_cos the rest. analysis_pending:
figures may still move.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ||
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations the description carries the full burden and does: read-only, poll-until-terminal behavior, deferred vs paused semantics, blocked codes with retry_after_seconds, that `set_aside` waits for a person and is NOT a failure, and that figures may still move while analysis_pending.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The text is dense and front-loaded around status, but it is very long and much of the field-by-field enumeration overlaps what the output schema already documents. It is structured, yet several clauses could be relocated to the output schema without loss.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values needn't be explained, and the description nonetheless covers state transitions and next-step routing thoroughly. The main gap is that the required input parameters are left completely undocumented.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 2 required parameters (model_id, server_version) at 0% description coverage, and the description never mentions either one or how they are supplied. It therefore does not compensate for the coverage gap as required at this level.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states the resource precisely ('a model's proposed control build and its last started one') and marks it read-only, so the agent knows this is the status/proposal view. It distinguishes itself from siblings by naming what other tools do (resume, discard, regenerate). The verb is only implied, but the scope is unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit operating instructions: poll until terminal, hint names the next act, and for `blocked` relay the message and retry with `resume_control_generation`, never `regenerate_controls` (re-bills). Several statuses are mapped to the sibling to invoke next, which is exactly the routing an agent needs.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_control_objectivesGet Control ObjectivesA
Get the control objective matrix, or one control objective. Read-only.
Two modes, selected by whether co_id is set:
Matrix mode (
co_idomitted) — returns the model's COs, each with references to the controls that cover it. By default returns a compact summary (total count only); passoffset/limitto page through full CO records.Single mode (
co_idset) — returns that one CO's typed fields, the IDs of any controls that map to it, and the deterministic reachability verdict (the structural derivation that backs any reach claim on the CO). Tombstoned COs (removed: true) are returned with the flag set; the verdict is omitted because reach state is frozen at the removal version.offset/limitare ignored in this mode.
For pass/fail assurance scoring use assess_model.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_id | No | If set, single mode — return this one control objective (e.g. ``CO3``) with its verdict. If omitted, matrix mode. | |
| limit | No | Matrix mode — max to return (0 = summary only, no per-CO records). | |
| offset | No | Matrix mode — skip the first N control objectives. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it does so thoroughly: read-only semantics, mode-dependent return contents, tombstone handling, verdict omission, and ignored parameters are all disclosed. This goes well beyond a minimal 'gets data' phrasing.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-organized with a short opening summary followed by clear bullet-style mode breakdowns. Every sentence carries useful information, and the critical read-only and mode-selection cues are front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description fully covers the tool's behavioral complexity: mode selection, pagination, summaries vs full records, tombstone behavior, verdict semantics, and a pointer to the correct sibling. An output schema is present, so the description need not restate return values, and an agent has enough information to invoke this tool correctly in either mode.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 80%, so the schema already documents most parameters. The description adds meaningful context beyond the schema by explaining that co_id selects the mode, that limit=0 means summary-only, and that offset/limit are ignored in single mode.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies the resource (control objective matrix or a single control objective) and the action (Get), and it explicitly frames the operation as read-only. It also distinguishes itself from the sibling assess_model by routing pass/fail assurance scoring to that tool.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It specifies exactly when to use each mode based on whether co_id is set, describes defaults for matrix mode, and states that offset/limit are ignored in single mode. It also explicitly names assess_model as the alternative for pass/fail assurance scoring.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_controlsGet ControlsA
A model's controls, or one control. Read-only.
Without control_id: {controls, total, returned}, the published
set, filtered by status, co_id and component_id and paged by
offset / limit. Orphaned controls (every mapped CO tombstoned)
are left out unless include_orphaned=True, soft-deleted ones unless
include_deleted=True. summary_only=True returns only id,
description, status, verification_status, assertion_count, co_ids,
assumption_groups and attestation_dependency. An empty list on a new
model means its proposed build was never started
(get_control_generation_status); while a build holds the model the
list is the last published set, with a building marker.
With control_id: that control, with an orphaned flag; version
reads it as of a model version (0 = latest).
An objective id on a control is an ATTACHMENT, not credit: only a member
of a required mitigation group earns any, and a control that is
defense-in-depth everywhere can be implemented and verified without
moving an objective. Read get_mitigation_groups before evidence work.
status is the operator's (not_implemented / implemented /
verified); verification_status is the EVIDENCE: verified
(both tiers pass and the assertions cover the whole description),
partially_verified (a tier failed, clauses are unproven, or an
attestation EXPIRED — get_sufficiency says which; the fix is more
assertions or a narrower description, never a recompute), pending,
unverified (none submitted). A for-all clause is credited only by a
sound type bound with covers; get_control_work_order lists what
each clause needs. status="implemented" finds what still needs
evidence. Only this model's own controls are listed; inherited ones are
counted by assess_model.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_id | No | ||
| limit | No | ||
| offset | No | ||
| status | No | ||
| version | No | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| control_id | No | ||
| component_id | No | ||
| summary_only | No | ||
| server_version | Yes | ||
| include_deleted | No | ||
| include_orphaned | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full disclosure burden and largely meets it: read-only nature, default exclusion of orphaned/soft-deleted rows via include_orphaned/include_deleted, the summary_only projection, the 'building' marker while a build holds the model, and version=0 meaning latest. It omits any permission/auth or rate-limit context, which keeps it short of a 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded and the 'Without control_id / With control_id' split gives useful structure. The later paragraphs on objective attachment, mitigation groups, and clause crediting are dense and somewhat tangential to invoking this reader, so it runs longer than strictly needed.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 12-parameter domain-specific tool the coverage is strong: return shapes are sketched, filter semantics are defined, and follow-up tools are named for the edge cases it flags. An output schema exists, so the return-value detail is redundant but not harmful.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does: control_id as the mode switch, status with its enum values, co_id/component_id/offset/limit as filters and paging, include_orphaned/include_deleted defaults, summary_only, and version semantics (0 = latest). Only the self-evident required ids (model_id, server_version) go unmentioned.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence states a specific resource and scope ('A model's controls, or one control') and immediately flags the operation as read-only. It cleanly separates the two modes (list without control_id, single entity with control_id), so an agent can distinguish it from neighbors like get_control_work_order or list_assertions.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives real operational routing: read get_mitigation_groups before evidence work, consult get_control_generation_status when the list is empty, and use status="implemented" to find what still needs evidence. It does not, however, explicitly say when to prefer this over sibling readers such as get_control_work_order or get_sufficiency.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_control_work_orderGet Control Work OrderB
The work order for one control: the ticket to read BEFORE implementing it. Read-only.
Returns {model_id, model_version, control, objectives, max_tier, scan_brief, assertion_contract, acceptance_criteria, required_evidence, steps, reconcile_rules, delegation, open_proposals, provenance}:
where to look, what counts as proof (assertion_contract: the types
by soundness class, the evidence and universal_rule, the
sound_types the platform takes, what to submit with, when the
control counts as verified), what to do when the code disagrees with
the model, what this agent may decide alone (delegation), and
whether code or description is authoritative (provenance).
Where the order names a required class for a clause,
required_evidence holds one entry per such clause: its clause,
the clause_id to put in covers, its quantifier, the
required_class, what is missing, and a suggested_submission
skeleton. The skeleton is a fill-in, not a submission: replace its
<...> placeholders; one left unfilled is refused, by this client and
again by the platform, since it would record a claim nothing backs. A
for-all clause takes [by_construction, sound_over_approximation]:
prefer typed_boundary (the type the sinks accept, its
constructors), else sink_default_deny (the sinks, the safe forms, a
reviewed allowlist). When the bound evidence is the wrong CLASS,
missing says so. acceptance_criteria is GENERATED from those
entries, so a clause that must hold at every site reads as such and no
number of tests closes it.
A type's soundness is the class to branch on; behavioral is a
compatibility field for readers written before the classes.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ||
| control_id | Yes | ||
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it does substantial work: it declares read-only behavior, describes the returned contract fields, and explains validation rules such as unfilled placeholders being refused by both client and platform. It omits auth requirements and error modes, but for a read-only tool this is a strong disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded, but the description is a dense wall of domain-specific prose. Most sentences are relevant to the work-order contract, yet the lack of formatting and heavy nesting make it harder to scan than necessary.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the description need not explain return values, though it still does at length. The critical gap is input guidance: with no annotations and no parameter descriptions, an agent receives no help understanding the three required inputs, leaving the definition incomplete for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 0% description coverage for three required parameters: server_version, model_id, and control_id. The description does not explain what any of these inputs mean or what format they expect, so it adds no semantic value beyond the bare schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific resource and scope: 'The work order for one control,' and clarifies it is the ticket to read before implementing it. It distinguishes itself from mutation-oriented siblings by explicitly saying 'Read-only,' but it does not name any alternative tool for comparison.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear timing guidance: read this 'BEFORE implementing' the control. That is a useful usage context, but it provides no explicit exclusions or alternative tools for when this is not the right call.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_cwe_catalogGet Cwe CatalogA
Get the platform's CWE reference catalog status.
Returns {enabled, current_version, entry_count, versions}. When CWE
classification is not turned on for this instance, enabled is false
and the rest is empty — this is a normal informational response, not an
error.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations supplied, the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It does so by explaining the returned fields and, importantly, calling out the disabled-CWE edge case as a normal informational response rather than an error. It does not discuss authentication or side effects, but for a read-only status tool the main behavioral surprise is covered.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded: the first sentence states action and resource, the second gives the return shape, and the edge-case clarification earns its place. There is no filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
This is a simple status tool and the description covers return semantics and the disabled-case behavior, aided by the presence of an output schema. However, the complete absence of server_version guidance is a real gap: an agent cannot reliably know what to pass for a required field.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has one required parameter, server_version, with 0% schema description coverage, and the description never mentions it or explains what values or formats are expected. The description adds no meaning beyond the bare property name.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific action ('Get') and resource ('platform's CWE reference catalog status'), and further clarifies what is returned (`{enabled, current_version, entry_count, versions}`), which distinguishes it from sibling CWE-related tools like get_model_cwe_tags or classify_model_cwe.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool is used when an agent needs CWE catalog status, such as checking whether CWE classification is enabled, but it gives no explicit when-to-use guidance, exclusions, or alternatives. The sibling list contains related tools, but the description does not route between them.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_design_leverageGet Design LeverageA
Rank what eliminating each attacker position or asset BY DESIGN would remove from the matrix. Call this when deciding whether to change the design instead of implementing controls: it shows which single design change retires the most critical and high at-risk objectives. Read-only; no side effects.
Each row in ranked is an attacker or asset with the objectives its
removal would take out of the matrix (objectives_removed, broken
down by tier in removes), how many of those are currently at risk
(removes_at_risk / removes_at_risk_by_tier), and the controls
that would be retired. Rows are ranked by critical, then high, at-risk
objectives removed. design_move (a concrete change of design that
would eliminate the row) is filled only when include_design_moves
is true. To act on a row, raise a design_change proposal with
create_proposal; never apply a design change yourself.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| top | No | Number of rows to return. Default 5. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| include_design_moves | No | Also author a ``design_move`` per row. Default False. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations to inherit safety traits, the description carries the full burden, and it does well: it declares 'Read-only; no side effects,' explains the ranking order, discloses that design_move is populated only when include_design_moves is true, and describes the per-row fields. It does not cover edge cases such as empty results, tie-breaking, or failure behavior, which keeps it one step short of excellent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is rich but tightly organized: purpose, invocation context, output semantics, and the follow-up action rule each occupy clear, purposeful sentences. There is no filler, tautology, or unnecessary repetition, and the important 'never apply a design change yourself' rule is included without bloat.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only analytical tool with an output schema, the description supplies the call context, ranking semantics, row field meanings, and the required next step via create_proposal. It does not define the matrix or critical/high at-risk terminology, and server_version remains undocumented, but overall it is well above the minimum needed for an agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, so model_id, top, and include_design_moves are already documented in the schema. The description adds useful context by clarifying that design_move is filled only when include_design_moves is true, but it does not explain server_version or provide additional parameter-level detail beyond the schema, placing it at the baseline 3.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence states a specific action: ranking what eliminating each attacker position or asset BY DESIGN would remove from the matrix. It clearly distinguishes this from remediation-focused tools by framing the purpose as changing design instead of implementing controls, and it anchors the follow-up action to create_proposal.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly tells the agent when to call it: 'Call this when deciding whether to change the design instead of implementing controls.' It also gives clear post-call guidance by instructing the agent to raise a design_change proposal and never apply a design change itself. However, it does not name sibling alternatives or state explicit when-not-to-use conditions, so it stops short of full exclusion guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_entityGet EntityA
Get a single entity of any core type by ID. Read-only.
Dispatches on entity_type to the per-type read and returns that
type's native record as-is (not wrapped in an array):
asset— the asset's typed fields. Soft-deleted assets carrydeleted: true; the caller decides whether to surface them.entity_ide.g.A-01. A live asset or attacker also carriesquality: the quality check'soutcome(clean,advice,defect,question,invalid, oruncheckedwhile none answers it as it stands), thewarning, theproposedcorrection or thequestion, and theinput_hashthatapply_entity_proposalsandanswer_entity_questionname.attacker— the attacker with its factor decomposition, itssurface_extent(unset/point/whole) andsurface_extent_source, which says whether a person attested it. Soft-deleted attackers carrydeleted: true.entity_ide.g.T-03.component— the component. Speculative components (repo_url="") are returned as-is: the empty repo IS the lifecycle state, not an error.entity_ide.g.CMP-01.trust_boundary— the boundary incl. itspassesset (closed-vocabulary subset of{Network, Adjacent, Local, Physical}).entity_ide.g.TB-Net.assumption— the assumption with its override applied (mirrorslist_assumptions' merge for one entity: typed fields, the structuredexclusionpredicate when present, and the override layer — status / justification / linked CO IDs). Soft-deleted assumptions carrydeleted: true.entity_ide.g.AS-01.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| entity_id | Yes | ID of the entity to fetch. | |
| entity_type | Yes | Which entity to read — one of ``asset``, ``attacker``, ``component``, ``trust_boundary``, ``assumption``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it declares read-only, states that soft-deleted records come back with deleted: true and that surfacing them is the caller's call, and warns that speculative components (repo_url="") are a lifecycle state, not an error. Missing is what happens when the ID is absent or mismatched with entity_type.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The lead sentence is tight and front-loaded, but the five-bullet enumeration of return fields is long and partly redundant given an output schema exists. The density of per-type field detail (quality sub-fields, surface_extent_source) crowds out more actionable routing guidance.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Rich on entity_type dispatch, ID formats, and soft-delete/speculative-state semantics, and an output schema covers the record shape. The remaining gap is failure behavior for missing or mismatched IDs, which an agent would want before calling.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the description goes well beyond it by giving concrete ID formats per type (A-01, T-03, CMP-01, TB-Net, AS-01) and spelling out what each entity_type value returns. model_id is left entirely to the schema and server_version is unexplained, keeping it short of a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Get a single entity of any core type by ID'), declares it read-only, and explains the dispatch mechanism on entity_type. The per-type breakdown makes it unmistakable versus siblings like query_threat_model or list_assumptions.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is implied by 'by ID' and reinforced by the note that the assumption branch mirrors list_assumptions' merge for a single entity, but there is no explicit statement of when to prefer this over query_threat_model or a list tool, and no note on erroring for an unknown ID.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_findings_risksGet Findings RisksA
Workspace-scoped triage dashboard: open findings, active risk acceptances, and at-risk Control Objectives across every model the workspace can access.
Use this as the entry point when an operator asks "what's open?" or "what should I work on next?" — one round-trip returns all three categories with model context and risk dimensions (severity, status, risk_tier, owner, review_by) so the agent can triage without per-model fan-out. The endpoint is read-only and fast; it composes from existing per-model queries server-side.
Returns the envelope verbatim: {workspace_id, evaluated_at, models, findings, risk_acceptances, at_risk_cos, summary}.
summary carries totals (open_findings, total_findings,
active_risk_acceptances, total_risk_acceptances,
at_risk_cos) for quick health-check responses.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, and it delivers: it explicitly states the endpoint is read-only and fast, composes server-side from existing per-model queries, and returns the envelope verbatim. This gives an agent a clear mental model of the operation's safety and behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured: purpose first, usage trigger second, return envelope third. Each sentence adds substantive information, and there is no filler or redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers scope, contents, usage context, and return shape in enough detail for an agent to understand what the tool provides. The only notable missing context is the meaning of 'server_version' and how it relates to workspace-triage behavior.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The sole required parameter 'server_version' has no schema description and no coverage in the tool description. The description never mentions the parameter, its purpose, format, or allowed values, leaving the agent to guess what to pass. With 0% schema description coverage, the description needed to compensate and did not.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies a specific resource ('workspace-scoped triage dashboard') and enumerates exactly what it returns: open findings, active risk acceptances, and at-risk Control Objectives across every model. This distinguishes it from siblings like list_findings and list_risk_acceptances by emphasizing the aggregate, multi-model scope.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives an explicit trigger ('what's open?' or 'what should I work on next?') and positions the tool as the entry point, with the benefit of no per-model fan-out. It does not explicitly name an alternative tool or state when not to use it, so it falls just short of a full 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_functional_coverageGet Functional CoverageA
A model's functional coverage report, or just its actionable gaps. Read-only.
By default the whole picture: per-objective state (verified / covered /
failing / untested), the Capabilities × Conditions matrix, and the
applicable / missing-objective / not-applicable cell accounting. With
gaps_only=True only what needs action: applicable conditions with no
objective yet, and objectives that are failing or have no passing test.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| gaps_only | No | Return only the actionable gaps (default False). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description carries the full burden and does well: it explicitly declares 'Read-only' and enumerates what each mode returns. It doesn't discuss permissions, cost, or latency, but for a read-only report the safety profile is adequately disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose and the read-only flag, then the default behavior, then the gaps_only behavior. The matrix and cell-accounting enumeration is dense but each clause maps to real return content, so little is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists so return values needn't be spelled out, yet the description helpfully sketches them anyway. Parameter meaning is covered for the one non-obvious flag, making the definition complete enough to call correctly despite the two undocumented-by-description identifiers.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%, and the description meaningfully expands gaps_only beyond the schema's terse 'Return only the actionable gaps' by defining a gap as applicable conditions with no objective, failing objectives, or objectives lacking a passing test. This adds genuine semantic value, though server_version and model_id rely on the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific resource ('functional coverage report' for a model) and distinguishes its two modes (full picture vs. actionable gaps). It is clear, but it doesn't differentiate itself from near-siblings like get_functional_objectives, get_sufficiency, or get_verification_report, which also surface coverage-adjacent views.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is implied through the two-mode explanation: default for the whole picture, gaps_only=True when only actionable items matter. However, it never states when to choose this tool over the many sibling reporting/gap tools (check_control_gaps, get_sufficiency), leaving cross-tool selection to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_functional_objectivesGet Functional ObjectivesA
List a model's functional objectives, or fetch one by id. Read-only; no side effects.
A functional objective is a Capability × Condition test plan expressed as a
Given-When-Then statement. functional_objective_id selects the behaviour:
omitted / empty string -> list every functional objective for the model (the full functional test plan).
a functional-objective id -> return just that one objective's detail, including its capability, condition, Given-When-Then statement, and current test state.
For pass/fail coverage state across all objectives use
get_functional_coverage; for the actionable gaps pass it
gaps_only=True.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model whose functional objective(s) to read. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| functional_objective_id | No | Optional. Omit (or pass "") to list every objective; pass an id (from a prior list call) to fetch that one. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden and does state 'Read-only; no side effects,' which is the key safety signal. It also discloses what the single-object fetch returns (capability, condition, Given-When-Then, test state), though it says nothing about auth requirements or pagination on the list path.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action and the read-only note, then a bulleted enumeration of the id-selection behavior. The definition sentence for 'functional objective' earns its place, but the prose is slightly longer than strictly needed.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read tool with an output schema, the description needn't explain return values, and it covers the list-vs-fetch duality plus the sibling alternative. The only omissions are auth/pagination behavior and any treatment of server_version.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%, and the description adds real meaning beyond the schema by spelling out the empty-string/omitted sentinel behavior and where the id comes from ('from a prior list call'). model_id is only implicitly covered, and server_version is never discussed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('List a model's functional objectives, or fetch one by id') and explicitly defines what a functional objective is, which lets an agent distinguish it from generic objective tools. It also names the sibling get_functional_coverage and the exact condition that routes there.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use branching: omitted/empty id -> list the full test plan, an id -> fetch one objective's detail. It also names the alternative tool (get_functional_coverage) and the parameter (gaps_only=True) that selects it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_functional_satisfaction_groupsGet Functional Satisfaction GroupsA
Read the satisfaction-group structure for a functional objective. Read-only; no side effects.
A satisfaction group is a set of functional tests that together satisfy the objective: AND within a group (every test in the group must be verified), OR across groups (any one complete group satisfies the objective). Returns the current numbered groups plus any tests associated with the objective but not placed in a group.
Use before set_functional_satisfaction_groups to see the current structure, or to trace why an objective is / isn't satisfied. This is the functional analog of get_control_assumption_groups / get_mitigation_groups.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| functional_objective_id | Yes | The objective whose groups to read. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full burden. It discloses read-only/no side effects, explains the AND/OR group semantics, and states what the return includes (numbered groups plus unplaced tests). This is valuable behavioral context beyond a bare 'get'.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise and well-structured: front-loaded purpose, then semantics, then usage guidance. Every sentence adds unique value with no repetition or fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is an output schema, so return details are covered elsewhere. The description sufficiently covers the tool's role, semantics, read-only nature, and relationship to siblings. Minor gap: no mention of error conditions or prerequisites, but not critical for this simple get operation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67% (server_version lacks a description). The description reinforces the meaning of functional_objective_id by explaining what a satisfaction group is, but doesn't add new details about server_version or model_id beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states a specific verb ('Read') and resource ('satisfaction-group structure for a functional objective'). It distinguishes itself from siblings by explicitly positioning itself as the functional analog of get_control_assumption_groups / get_mitigation_groups and by implying the read counterpart to set_functional_satisfaction_groups.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It provides explicit usage context: 'Use before set_functional_satisfaction_groups to see the current structure, or to trace why an objective is / isn't satisfied.' It also names the sibling alternatives, making the selection decision clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_groupGet GroupA
Get one tag by ID, with its member model ids. Read-only; no side effects.
Returns {id, workspace_id, name, description, created_at, model_ids}.
Discover tag IDs with list_groups.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| group_id | Yes | ID of the tag. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations supplied, the description carries the full burden and does state the safety profile ('Read-only; no side effects'), which is exactly the behavioral fact an agent needs before calling. It stops short of permissions or error behavior (e.g., what happens for an unknown ID), so it is solid but not exhaustive.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, each earning its place: purpose, safety profile, return shape, and ID discovery. The scoping verb phrase is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so restating the return fields is redundant but harmless, and the description adds the safety profile and the ID-discovery path an agent needs. The main remaining gap is that server_version is unexplained and the group/tag naming is never reconciled.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 50%: group_id is already documented in the schema, and server_version has no description anywhere. The description's 'by ID' adds no syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Get one tag by ID, with its member model ids'), and the phrase 'one ... by ID' distinguishes it from the sibling list_groups, which it names. The only wrinkle is the group/tag terminology mismatch between the tool name (get_group) and the description ('tag'), which adds minor ambiguity about whether these are the same entity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly tells the agent how to obtain a valid ID ('Discover tag IDs with list_groups'), which routes it to the right sibling for the prerequisite step. There is no explicit when-not guidance, but for a simple fetch-by-ID tool the context is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_group_dependenciesGet Group DependenciesA
The reliance edges among a tag's member models. Read-only; no side effects.
Returns {tag_id, tag_name, models, edges, total}: one row per edge a
member declared on another model's control (manage_reliance /
attach_foundation), with both models' titles, the mode
(delegated or relied_upon), the source objective or control, the
provider control, its status (draft, active, broken,
rejected), validation_verdict and credit_state (whether it
credits its objective now). Empty when no member relies on another.
Use it to review the cross-model dependencies of a product or audit
scope before an auditor export, or to find broken edges. A model's own
edges, in both directions, are list_reliance.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| group_id | Yes | ID of the tag. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden and does so: it declares read-only/no side effects, describes the empty-result case ('Empty when no member relies on another'), and explains edge direction via the mode values (delegated vs relied_upon) plus which calls create edges.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the purpose and the read-only guarantee, then the return shape, then usage. The return-field enumeration is dense but each field (mode, status, validation_verdict, credit_state) carries semantic weight; slightly longer than strictly necessary given an output schema exists.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only audit/query tool with an output schema present, the description covers purpose, invocation context, edge semantics, and enumeration values. Nothing an agent needs in order to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 50%: group_id is documented as 'ID of the tag' but server_version is undocumented. The description adds context by using tag/member-model terminology consistently, tying the unspecified group_id to the tag concept, but it never explains server_version or parameter format. Baseline 3 is appropriate given partial coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific resource and scope: 'the reliance edges among a tag's member models,' and explicitly contrasts with the sibling list_reliance, which covers a single model's own edges in both directions. An agent can distinguish the two without opening either schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives concrete when-to-use cases ('review the cross-model dependencies of a product or audit scope before an auditor export, or find broken edges') and names the alternative (list_reliance) with the condition that selects it. No inference required.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_inventory_judgementsGet Inventory JudgementsA
Read what the per-entity checks found about a model's inventory. Read-only: no model is called and nothing is queued.
Returns {model_id, version, duplicates, tags}. duplicates, per
kind (assets, attackers): groups (shown as one entity: both
sides' current checks say so, their texts are identical, or a person
decided it), disputed and one_sided (one check says the same and
the other does not, or only one side answered), overlaps (part and
whole), decided (the decisions in force), status (complete
when every pair a check is owed for is covered, partial with
uncovered counting the rest as queued, failed or never asked,
not_evaluated with a reason) and legacy (a report from
before the per-entity checks). tags: the entities whose tags are
neither current nor declared (unchecked) and the declarations in
force. The same rows reach get_review_queue as
inventory_judgement.
Relay a disputed pair to the person; decide_inventory_pair records
the decision and request_inventory_checks asks for the checks owed.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden and largely meets it: 'Read-only: no model is called and nothing is queued' discloses the absence of side effects and computational cost, and the status vocabulary (complete/partial/not_evaluated with reason, legacy) explains what missing coverage means. It does not discuss payload size, permissions, or whether results are cached/stale beyond the legacy case.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded correctly — purpose and read-only guarantee come first. But the middle is a dense, punctuation-heavy enumeration of every returned field and status value, which partly duplicates the declared output schema and crowds out operational guidance. It is information-dense rather than concise; several clauses (e.g. the full definition of one_sided/disputed) could be trimmed given the schema exists.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the long return-value walkthrough is largely redundant, while the genuinely missing pieces — the meaning of server_version, and an explicit rule for choosing this tool over get_review_queue — remain unaddressed. The semantic gloss on statuses is valuable, but the description allocates its length poorly relative to what an agent actually needs to call it.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 50%: model_id is documented in the schema, while server_version is undocumented in both schema and description, so an agent has no idea what value to supply for a required parameter. The description only alludes to 'a model's inventory' and adds nothing about either parameter's format or source. For a 2-required-param tool with a required opaque parameter, this leaves a real invocation gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: read the results of per-entity checks about a model's inventory, and explicitly notes what it is not ('no model is called and nothing is queued'). The term 'inventory judgements' is domain jargon that an outsider cannot decode from the name alone, but the body defines it. Sibling differentiation is implicit rather than explicit — decide_inventory_pair and request_inventory_checks are named as the action counterparts.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives clear routing context: disputed pairs go to a person, decide_inventory_pair records the decision, request_inventory_checks requests the checks owed, and the same rows surface via get_review_queue. That is a usable map of alternatives. It stops short of stating when NOT to use this tool (e.g. versus reading a batch through get_review_queue).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_mitigation_groupsGet Mitigation GroupsA
Get the current mitigation group structure for a control objective.
Returns the grouped view of controls for this CO with details (id, description, status) for each control:
groups: numbered groups (within=AND, across=OR)
defense_in_depth: tracked but not required for mitigation
unmapped: model controls not mapped to this CO (available for assignment)
Use cases:
Before set_mitigation_groups to see the current structure
When reviewing a CO's assessment to understand why it is at_risk or mitigated
When deciding which unmapped controls to assign to a CO
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_id | Yes | ID of the control objective (e.g., "CO5"). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does a solid job: it discloses the output categories (groups, defense_in_depth, unmapped), the semantics of grouping (within=AND, across=OR), and that unmapped controls are available for assignment. It does not explicitly state that the operation is read-only, but 'Get the current structure' and the use case 'Before set_mitigation_groups' make this clear.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well structured and front-loaded: purpose first, then return details as a compact list, then concrete use cases. Every segment earns its place and the overall length is appropriate for the tool's complexity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers the key semantics an agent needs: what the return groups mean, why defense_in_depth is tracked but not required, and how unmapped controls are used. With an output schema present, the lack of detailed return-field explanations is acceptable, though the description could more fully explain the within/across AND/OR logic.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 67%, with co_id and model_id already documented in the input schema. The description adds no additional meaning for the parameters themselves and does not explain server_version, which is undocumented even though it is required. This is adequate but not improved beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool retrieves the current mitigation group structure for a control objective and specifies the returned grouped view with details. It is not a tautology and is distinguishable from generic 'get' tools, though it does not explicitly contrast itself with similar group-fetching siblings like get_control_assumption_groups or get_functional_satisfaction_groups.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
A dedicated 'Use cases' section explicitly tells the agent when to call this tool: before set_mitigation_groups, when reviewing a CO's assessment, and when deciding which unmapped controls to assign. It gives clear context but does not state when not to use it or name alternative group-fetching tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_model_checkGet Model CheckA
Read a model's model check: the live one, else the latest. Read-only.
status is queued, extracting (the independent extraction),
running, pausing, paused, differences (the independent
extraction disagreed with the confirmed model: cross_check.questions
are the questions to answer with answer_behavioural_questions, and no
model check ran), complete, incomplete, failed,
discarded, or none when the model has never had one. terminal
says whether it has stopped. Beside it: the obligations and
scope it covers, the estimate confirmed, the results of its
runs, machine_seconds and error_message. A result that did not
complete reports no violation up to the depth reached and credits
nothing.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden, and it does so well: it declares 'Read-only,' documents the full status state machine including 'terminal,' and explains the consequential semantics of an incomplete result ('reports no violation up to the depth reached and credits nothing'). It stops short of permissions, pagination, or what happens if no check exists beyond the 'none' status.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose and the read-only flag in the first two sentences, then a dense but non-redundant enumeration of status values. The long status list is verbose yet each entry earns its place by defining a distinct lifecycle state.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the description is not obliged to explain return shape, yet it usefully supplies the semantic meaning of statuses that a schema cannot convey. Given a no-annotation read tool, the main residual gap is routing guidance relative to request_model_check and manage_model_check.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 50%: model_id is documented but server_version is not. The description says nothing about either parameter — it is entirely devoted to return-value semantics, so it does not compensate for the undocumented half of the input.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence states a specific verb and resource with disambiguation: 'Read a model's model check: the live one, else the latest.' The 'live one, else the latest' fallback rule is exactly the kind of scope detail that separates this from sibling readers like get_threat_model or get_control_generation_status.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is only implied: the 'differences' status routes the agent to answer_behavioural_questions, which is a useful conditional pointer. But there is no explicit statement of when to call this versus request_model_check, manage_model_check, or how it relates to polling after a check is requested.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_model_cwe_tagsGet Model Cwe TagsA
List CWE weakness classifications tagged onto a model's control objectives.
Each tag's name/description are resolved from the platform's CWE catalog,
never model-authored. A tag whose CWE id has since been deprecated,
redefined, or removed by MITRE carries a stale reason (missing /
deprecated / changed) — re-run classify_model_cwe to refresh
it. 404s if CWE classification is not enabled on this instance.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model to inspect. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries full responsibility for behavior disclosure. It does so thoroughly: tags are resolved from the platform CWE catalog and never model-authored, stale tags are characterized with specific reasons (missing/deprecated/changed), and a 404 is documented when the feature is disabled. This is strong behavioral context for a read-only list tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose, and every subsequent sentence adds meaningful behavioral or error context. It is compact, avoids repetition of the tool name, and contains no filler or redundant restatement of the input schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return-value details do not need to be repeated. The description covers purpose, data provenance, stale semantics, refresh action, and the relevant 404 error condition. The main gap is the undocumented required server_version parameter, which prevents full completeness for an agent trying to invoke the tool correctly without further context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 50%, with server_version left completely undocumented in both the schema and the description. The description indirectly clarifies model_id by discussing 'a model's control objectives,' but it adds nothing to explain the required server_version parameter. With low schema coverage, the description should compensate for the gap and does not.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'List CWE weakness classifications tagged onto a model's control objectives.' This clearly states what the tool does and separates it from the related classify_model_cwe sibling by referencing that tool for refreshing stale tags. However, it does not explicitly contrast itself with get_cwe_catalog, so it stops short of full sibling differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly names classify_model_cwe as the action to re-run when a tag is stale, which gives the agent a condition-based routing choice. It also notes the 404 failure mode when CWE classification is not enabled. It does not provide broader when-to-use versus when-not-to-use guidance relative to other catalog-related siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_objective_groupingGet Objective GroupingA
What grouping a model's objectives by asset groups would do, before it is done. Read-only: the groups are formed on a copy, and nothing is written or judged.
Assets that are the same for every objective (the same security properties, impact, components, exposure and split knowledge) can be judged together: one objective per group and attacker instead of one per asset. Each asset keeps its id and stays in the inventory, marked with its group.
Returns grouped (whether the model's objectives are grouped now),
available (whether grouping may be turned on for this model),
groups (each group the restructure would form, by the id it would
keep, or new, with its members), objectives_now and
objectives_after, and model_version, the version
set_objective_grouping names.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the safety context itself and does so clearly: 'Read-only: the groups are formed on a copy, and nothing is written or judged.' It also explains that assets retain their ids and inventory membership, which clarifies the non-destructive behavior. It stops short of describing permissions, failure modes, or computational costs, which keeps it from a 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose and the read-only guarantee. The later explanation of grouping semantics and return fields is mostly useful, though the return-field list partly duplicates the output schema and makes the description longer than strictly necessary.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has an output schema, so the description does not need to document return values in full; nevertheless it explains the grouping model and preview behavior well enough for correct invocation. The main gap is the unexplained server_version input, and there is no annotation coverage to fill that in.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 50%, and the description does not compensate for the undocumented parameter. model_id is at least implied by 'a model's objectives,' but server_version is not explained anywhere in the description or schema, leaving an important input opaque.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific preview behavior: it returns what grouping a model's objectives by asset groups would do before it is applied. It also clearly distinguishes itself from the mutating sibling by calling the operation read-only and by referencing set_objective_grouping as the tool that names the model version.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'before it is done' establishes the core use case: preview the grouping outcome before applying a change. The reference to set_objective_grouping further signals the relationship to the setter, though the description does not explicitly say when to prefer this tool over other group-inspection siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_reachability_verdictsGet Reachability VerdictsA
Per-CO reachability verdicts, over this model alone or the composed tree. Read-only; derived each time, never stored.
composed=False (default): derived from this model's own structure
(components, asset.component_ids, trust_boundary.passes, each
attacker's trust_boundary_ids and vector, assumption exclusion
predicates), deterministic, the derivation an auditor re-runs.
co_id returns one verdict (404 if absent or tombstoned). Returns
{model_id, model_version, verdicts: [{co_id, kind, reason, narration, boundary_id?, assumption_id?}]}; kind is reachable,
unreachable or indeterminate.
composed=True: the same derivation over the model with everything
it inherits from its ancestors, for a child on the composition tree.
Paginated (page, page_size); kind_filter keeps one kind;
co_id is ignored. Returns {model_id, flag_enabled, verdicts: [{co_qid, asset_qid, attacker_qid, kind, reason}], total, page, page_size}, empty with flag_enabled: false where composition is
not available.
An indeterminate verdict names the missing structure:
attacker_unpositioned (edit_attacker with
trust_boundary_ids), asset_unbounded
(assign_to_components(target_type="asset")), no_shared_boundary
(reposition the attacker, rescope the asset, or an add_assumption
exclusion), missing_entity (restore it, or remove the CO).
model_coherence_report presents the same gaps as findings.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| page | No | ||
| co_id | No | ||
| composed | No | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| page_size | No | ||
| kind_filter | No | ||
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so richly: it discloses read-only status, that verdicts are derived each time and never stored, determinism, 404 behavior for absent or tombstoned COs, pagination behavior, `flag_enabled: false` when composition is unavailable, and the meaning of each `kind`. It also enumerates the indeterminate-verdict reasons and points to the corrective actions for each.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose and then organized by mode, which is appropriate for a complex two-mode tool. It is long but mostly information-dense, with each section explaining distinct behavior. Some return-shape detail may overlap with the output schema, but the structure remains readable and useful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 7-parameter tool with no annotations, 0% schema coverage, and compositional behavior, the description is unusually complete. It covers both modes, parameter interactions, return behavior, error conditions, and the follow-up actions for indeterminate verdicts. An agent has enough context to invoke the tool correctly in either mode.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it explains five of the seven parameters in meaningful behavioral terms: `composed`, `co_id`, `page`, `page_size`, and `kind_filter`. It does not explain `server_version` or `model_id`, though `model_id` is likely self-evident. The default behavior for `composed` and the interaction between `co_id` and composed pagination are especially well covered.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: per-CO reachability verdicts over a model alone or the composed tree. It immediately distinguishes the two scopes (`composed=False` vs `composed=True`) and notes the read-only derived nature of the result. An agent can tell what this tool returns without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit mode-specific context: `composed=False` derives from the model's own structure, while `composed=True` is for a child on the composition tree. It also explains that `co_id` returns one verdict in the default mode and is ignored in composed mode, and that `kind_filter` keeps one verdict kind. It stops short of naming a preferred alternative beyond noting that `model_coherence_report` presents the same gaps as findings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_remediation_leverageGet Remediation LeverageA
Remediation-leverage plan for a model: which controls to implement first to close the most control objectives with the least work.
Returns the model's not-yet-satisfied controls ranked by how many
control objectives each one closes (ranked), plus a greedy
minimal fix order — the sequence of controls that reaches the most
mitigated objectives with the fewest controls (greedy_plan) — and
a summary of the collapse (total objectives, currently mitigated,
how many controls the plan needs). Use to prioritize implementation
work: a single call tells the agent which controls give the highest
leverage, so it can tackle the shortest path to coverage instead of
fixing objectives one at a time. Read-only.
Composed models: each entry in ranked and greedy_plan also
carries its owning model — owner_model_id and owner_model_title
— and an inherited flag. inherited is true when the control is
authored on an ancestor model, meaning the fix lands on that model
rather than the one being assessed; summary.inherited_candidate_controls
counts them. Surface the owning model so the operator knows which
high-leverage fixes belong to a parent model. A flat (non-composed)
model reports every control as owned by the assessed model.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It states the operation is read-only, explains the returned structures, and highlights composed-model behavior: owner_model_id, owner_model_title, inherited flag, and summary.inherited_candidate_controls. This goes well beyond the schema and helps the agent understand side effects and ownership semantics.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is information-dense but every section earns its place: core output, use case, and composed-model nuance. The front-loaded first paragraph gives the essential purpose and returns, while later details address edge cases. It could be tightened slightly, but the structure is logical and not padded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool complexity and existing output schema, the description covers the main outputs, the use case, read-only behavior, and composed-model edge cases. The only notable gap is the missing semantics for server_version, which would matter for an agent trying to invoke this correctly in varied environments.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema only describes model_id as 'ID of the threat model' and leaves server_version undescribed. The tool description does not clarify server_version at all and adds no parameter-level detail beyond what the schema already provides. With 50% schema description coverage, this leaves one required parameter semantically opaque.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states that this tool returns a remediation-leverage plan ranking controls by leverage and a greedy minimal fix order. It is specific about the resource (a model) and the output shape (ranked, greedy_plan, summary), making it distinguish itself functionally from most siblings, though it does not explicitly name or contrast an alternative tool.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly says 'Use to prioritize implementation work' and explains that a single call gives the shortest path to coverage, contrasting with fixing objectives one at a time. It gives clear context for when to call this tool, but does not discuss when not to use it or name a specific alternative tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_review_queueGet Review QueueA
Returns the workspace's review queue: what needs a decision or a re-check, ranked. Read-only; no side effects.
Each row carries an item_type, one of escalation (a judgment an
agent was refused and parked for a person), proposal (an open change
of scope or design, or an assumption proposal: a precondition a
strengthening run found only the environment can meet),
unaccepted_assumption (an assumption something depends on that is
not accepted — never attested, lapsed, or its text changed since it was
attested — with the controls and objectives that wait on it),
open_assumption, behavioural_question (an open question about
what the system does, answered with answer_behavioural_questions),
behavioural_link (an element of the behavioural model not yet linked
to an asset or trust boundary, or linked to one that lacks the property
at stake; see get_behavioural_links), not_applicable_refuted (a
person's statement that a property does not apply to an asset, which
the behavioural model contradicts: under a confirmed model it no longer
counts, under an unconfirmed one it still does; ask the person to revise
or revoke it, or to confirm the model), position_disagreement (an
attested attacker position a producer would place elsewhere),
behavioural_attacker (get_behavioural_attackers),
inventory_judgement (get_inventory_judgements), or
stale_control (an implemented/verified
control whose assertions have not been checked in 90+ days). Rows are
ranked: escalations, then proposals and the behavioural rows by risk
tier, then position disagreements, unaccepted assumptions, open
assumptions and stale controls. Escalations
and proposals are decided with decide_proposal; an unaccepted
assumption is accepted with submit_attestation; for each stale
control, verify its assertions against the codebase. Accepting an
assumption is a person's judgment unless the workspace delegates it.
Start here for periodic maintenance.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, but the description explicitly declares read-only/no side effects and discloses ranking order and decision semantics per row. It also notes assumption acceptance is a person's judgment unless delegated, though it omits auth, rate, and pagination details.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the core return and read-only property, then enumerates item types. The length is substantial but justified by the many row types; structure would benefit from bullets but remains organized.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex aggregate queue with an output schema present and no annotations, the description supplies item semantics and next actions. It omits parameter context and auth details, but covers enough for correct interpretation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The sole required parameter server_version has zero schema description coverage and is never mentioned in the description, so the agent gets no meaning for it. With one undocumented parameter, the description fails to compensate for the schema gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Returns the workspace's review queue ranked, and enumerates item_type values with what each represents. This clearly distinguishes it from narrow sibling getters and makes clear it is an aggregate decision queue.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Says 'Start here for periodic maintenance' and routes each row type to the tool that resolves it (decide_proposal, submit_attestation, etc.). It provides strong when-to-use context, though it does not state explicit when-not or contrast with listing siblings like list_proposals.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_risk_viewGet Risk ViewA
Prioritized Risk View — one row per live Control Objective — at a chosen scope. Read-only; no side effects.
scope selects the aggregation boundary and how scope_id is interpreted:
"model"— a single threat model (scope_id= model id). One row per live CO with derived risk tier, asset impact, attacker likelihood, control coverage counts (coverage_ratio), and open-finding count (open_findings). Tombstoned COs are excluded; pair withget_threat_modelif historical context is needed. Use to triage which COs need attention on one model — a single call ranks the work, no per-CO fan-out."tag"— every member model of a tag (scope_id= tag id). The same row shape withmodel_idandmodel_titleadded per row, so rows can be grouped by source model without an extra lookup, and delegation-aware (delegation_mitigated/delegating_controls): a CO mitigated via a verified cross-model delegation reads as covered, consistent with each model's own assessment. Use for a product, portfolio or audit-scope posture rollup.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| scope | Yes | aggregation boundary — "model" or "tag". | |
| scope_id | Yes | id of the model or tag selected by ``scope``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it declares 'Read-only; no side effects,' states that tombstoned COs are excluded, discloses the row shape (coverage_ratio, open_findings, risk tier, asset impact, attacker likelihood), and explains the delegation-aware semantics that make a cross-model-mitigated CO read as covered. These are non-obvious behavioral traits an agent could not infer from the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded one-line summary followed by a clean two-bullet breakdown. Dense but almost every clause carries information; the embedded field lists in the 'model' bullet are slightly heavy, keeping it just short of maximally tight.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 3-parameter read tool with a low-complexity schema and an output schema that covers return structure, the description supplies everything an agent needs: purpose, scope semantics, exclusions, and delegation handling. Nothing material is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%, but the description compensates richly by defining how scope_id is interpreted under each scope value ('model id' vs 'tag id') and what the resulting rows contain per scope. This adds meaning well beyond the terse schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Names a specific resource and return grain: 'Prioritized Risk View — one row per live Control Objective — at a chosen scope.' This distinguishes it from siblings like get_controls, get_findings_risks, and get_compliance_report without needing to open any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly enumerates both scope modes and when each applies: 'model' for triaging one model's COs ('a single call ranks the work, no per-CO fan-out'), 'tag' for product/portfolio/audit-scope rollups. It also names the paired tool (get_threat_model) for historical context, giving clear when-not guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_scan_promptGet Scan PromptA
Get guidance prompts for scanning a codebase. Read-only; no side effects.
kind selects which scan brief to return:
"security"(default) — prompts telling the agent what evidence to look for per security control; only NOT_IMPLEMENTED controls are included (implemented ones need no scan). Use this to drive a gap-discovery pass, then record what is missing withsubmit_findingsand what is present withsubmit_assertions. Passcontrol_idto scope the prompt to one control; empty (default) returns prompts for all not-yet-implemented controls."functional"— the agent brief for implementing functional-conformance tests. Generation specifies the functional tests, so for each test not yet verified this returns its implementation brief and the objectives it proves; it also reportsobjectives_without_tests(regenerate or add a test) andmissing_objectives(applicable conditions with no objective yet). Drive test implementation from it, then callsubmit_assertions(functional_test_id) with TEST_EXISTS + TEST_ATTESTED assertions so CI verifies each test; read the resulting pass/fail state viaget_functional_coverage.control_iddoes not apply to this kind and is ignored.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | No | "security" (default) or "functional" — which scan brief. | security |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | No | Security kind only — optional single control to scope the prompt to. Empty (default) returns prompts for all not-yet-implemented controls. Ignored when kind="functional". | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so reasonably: it declares "Read-only; no side effects" and discloses filtering behavior (only NOT_IMPLEMENTED controls included) and that control_id is ignored for functional. It omits auth/permission requirements and pagination/size characteristics, but for a read-only prompt getter these are minor.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose followed by clearly delineated bullets per kind. It is on the longer side, but each clause carries mode-specific workflow information rather than restating the name, so the length is largely earned.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 4-parameter tool with an output schema, the description supplies the missing context an agent needs: what each kind returns, how control_id interacts with each kind, and which downstream tools consume the result. Nothing needed to invoke it correctly is absent.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75% and the schema already documents kind and control_id, but the description adds meaningful semantics: default resolution of empty control_id ("returns prompts for all not-yet-implemented controls"), the mode-scoped applicability of control_id, and the effect of each kind on returned content. This goes beyond the schema text.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Starts with a specific verb+resource ("Get guidance prompts for scanning a codebase") and then precisely distinguishes the two modes it serves: security briefs vs functional briefs. An agent can tell exactly what the tool returns and how the two kinds differ without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit when/when-to-use for each mode: security to "drive a gap-discovery pass", functional to "drive test implementation", each with the follow-up calls (submit_findings, submit_assertions, get_functional_coverage). It also states control_id does not apply to the functional kind, closing off a misuse path.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_setup_statusGet Setup StatusA
Get the workspace onboarding checklist with completed and pending steps. Read-only.
Call this before suggesting or performing setup actions so already-done steps aren't repeated; mark a step done with complete_setup_step. Takes no arguments beyond the version header.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and clearly states the operation is read-only. It also clarifies that the only parameter is a version header, preventing an agent from expecting functional arguments. This is meaningful behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences with zero waste. The purpose is front-loaded, the usage guidance follows immediately, and the parameter clarification is concise. Every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only status tool with an output schema, the description gives enough context: what it returns, when to call it, and what arguments it needs. Nothing essential is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, but the description compensates by explaining that the tool 'takes no arguments beyond the version header,' which directly clarifies the sole required parameter, server_version. It doesn't specify format details, but it correctly prevents misuse.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Get') and resource ('workspace onboarding checklist') and clearly distinguishes the tool from the large sibling set. It also names the complementary mutation tool, complete_setup_step, which helps an agent understand the tool's role.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit usage guidance: call this before suggesting or performing setup actions to avoid repeating completed steps. It does not explicitly list exclusions or alternative query tools, but the context is clear and actionable.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_sufficiencyGet SufficiencyA
Whether the submitted assertions of one control, or of one functional test, together prove it. Read-only; name exactly one id.
For a control this explains verification_status: "partially_verified". status is sufficient | insufficient | pending, with freshness (fresh | stale | pending) beside it;
insufficient carries details naming EACH uncovered clause and the
evidence that would close it. A soundness_tier is the weakest
clause's tier: a control is proven no more strongly than its thinnest
clause. It is composed over the evidence as it stands now
(strength_basis: now), beside soundness_tier_at_evaluation, and
clause_strength lists each clause's tier now and when judged, with
each piece of evidence marked passes_now: relay a clause whose
evidence no longer passes. Reading does not queue a re-evaluation. For
the whole model use get_verification_report.
commitments is what it was checked against: a person's declaration
(basis: "declaration"; an open cross-check finding keeps it
insufficient: get_control_delta) or a reading of the text.
Act by submitting the named assertions; a clause describing a mechanism
the system does not use calls for refine_control, not evidence.
get_control_work_order serves the per-clause list: where the order
names a required class for a clause, required_evidence carries the
clause id for covers and a suggested_submission skeleton whose
<...> placeholders you replace. For a for-all clause prefer
typed_boundary, else sink_default_deny. class_mismatch means
the bound evidence is the wrong CLASS and more of it will not help. An
attestation covers an existential clause, never a for-all one; that
clause's only other exits are a risk acceptance or a not-applicable
disposition.
For a functional test it is whether its evidence proves the objectives it is associated with, with the reasoning; it can read pending or absent until evidence is submitted.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ||
| control_id | No | ||
| server_version | Yes | ||
| functional_test_id | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it discloses real behavioral traits: read-only, 'reading does not queue a re-evaluation', staleness semantics, and the rule that a control is only as strong as its thinnest clause. Some of the text describes output fields that the output schema already exposes, but the 'does not queue a re-evaluation' note and the insufficiency/evidence-closure semantics go beyond the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose and routing are front-loaded, which is good, but the body is dense and spends a large share of its length narrating output fields (status, freshness, soundness_tier, clause_strength, passes_now) that the output schema already carries. The reStructuredText double-backtick littering also hurts readability.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the description supplies the interpretation an agent needs to act on them. With no annotations it correctly discloses the read-only and non-re-queuing behavior, and it explains how to move a control from insufficient to sufficient. The only material gap is the undocumented model_id/server_version parameters.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It does add the critical constraint 'name exactly one id', implying mutual exclusivity between control_id and functional_test_id, which the schema does not convey. However, it says nothing about server_version or model_id, leaving two required parameters unexplained.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening states a specific verb+resource ('whether the submitted assertions of one control, or of one functional test, together prove it') and marks it read-only. It explicitly contrasts itself with get_verification_report for the whole model, so an agent can differentiate it from the sibling. It is slightly diluted by the density of the surrounding return-field prose, but the core purpose lands clearly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It routes the agent broadly: use get_verification_report for the whole model, act by submitting assertions, use refine_control when a clause describes an unused mechanism, consult get_control_work_order for per-clause lists, prefer typed_boundary for for-all clauses. It also states the when-not case (a mechanism the system does not use is not evidence) and names relevant siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_threat_modelGet Threat ModelA
Get a threat model by ID: its trust boundaries, assets, attackers, assumptions and components. Read-only.
The answers to its questions are counted (clarification_count) and
left out unless include_clarifications=True, which pages them
(clarifications_offset, clarifications_limit: default 50, at most
200; clarifications_next_offset null at the end). A read over 200,000
characters is cut, and cuts says what and how to read it: the
objectives, then the clarifications, then each entity collection,
largest first, kept as rows that name its entities.
include_inventory_completeness=True (latest version only) adds
inventory_completeness: how much of the inventory the claims rest on,
with bounded_by (the entities holding the tier down) and
grounding_gaps, keyed by entity id. Each gap names a ground the
entity lacks (position, privileges, extent, components,
flagged, inherited), a detail, and acts: each act's
mcp_tool and mcp_arguments (that tool's arguments, the entity
named and lists comma-separated; fields is the REST body), a value
in angle brackets being yours to fill. Taking every listed act grounds the entity; a gap with no
act says no act can supply it on this deployment. An attestation an act
names is a judgment (see edit_attacker). null when the record
could not be read.
Important for agents reading model state:
Assets and attackers may carry
deleted: true(soft-deleted). Exclude these when showing "what's in the model now"; include them only when discussing history or offering restore. Restore an entity viarestore_entity (entity_type="asset")/restore_entity (entity_type="attacker").Control objectives may carry
removed: true(tombstone — the (asset, attacker) pair was removed in a later version). Exclude these from coverage math and LLM prompts; they exist to keep CO IDs stable so controls referencing them can be detected as "orphaned" rather than silently rebinding.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| version | No | Optional specific version number. Defaults to latest. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| include_cos | No | Include control objectives inline (default False: the answer carries no ``control_objectives`` key; read them with ``get_control_objectives``). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| clarifications_limit | No | Answers per page. | |
| clarifications_offset | No | The first answer of the page. | |
| include_clarifications | No | Include a page of the answers to the model's questions (default False). | |
| include_inventory_completeness | No | Add the completeness record and its ``grounding_gaps`` (default False). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses read-only status, pagination defaults and limits, the 200,000-character cut behavior via cuts, null behavior when the record cannot be read, soft-delete and tombstone semantics, and the latest-version constraint for inventory completeness.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long and dense, but it is front-loaded with the core purpose and organized into behavior, agent warnings, and edge-case semantics. Most sentences add real value for a complex retrieval tool, though some of the detailed return-value explanation could be trimmed given the presence of an output schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool is complex, with eight parameters and no annotations, and the description covers the operational constraints an agent needs to call it correctly. Although an output schema exists, the description adds useful context about truncation, pagination, and special record states, so nothing critical appears missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is high at 88%, so the schema already defines most parameters. The description still adds meaningful semantics beyond the schema, notably clarifications pagination maximums and end-of-page signaling, latest-version restriction for inventory completeness, and the use of angle-bracket placeholders in grounding_gaps actions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: retrieve a threat model by ID, including its trust boundaries, assets, attackers, assumptions, and components. It is far from tautological and clearly distinguishes this from list-oriented tools, but it does not explicitly explain how it differs from a sibling such as query_threat_model.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear usage context by labeling the operation read-only and by providing explicit guidance for agents reading model state, including how to treat soft-deleted assets/attackers and tombstoned control objectives. It also explains when include flags change the result, but it does not directly route the agent between this tool and alternatives such as query_threat_model or get_entity.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_verdict_divergenceGet Verdict DivergenceA
Where the LLM's verdicts disagree with the model's authored state.
Two coverage divergence kinds, distinguished by the LLM's p_covers
(probability the control covers the CO), shown as "model confidence":
missing_mapping: HIGH p_covers, but the CO is NOT mapped — the LLM is confident the control covers it, so it should be mapped. Accepting ADDS the mapping.spurious_mapping: LOW p_covers, but the CO IS mapped — the LLM is confident the control does NOT cover it, so the mapping is likely wrong and inflates apparent coverage. Accepting REMOVES the mapping. Only confident rows surface; the uncertain middle band is dropped. So a ~100%-confidence row is a strong "add" and a ~0%-confidence row is a strong "remove" — both are actionable, in opposite directions.
Rows are sorted by confidence, so the strongest calls come first. Each
section is paginated: its pagination.filtered_total reports the full
count, so when it exceeds the rows returned, raise limit (up to 500) or
page with offset to review every divergence — not only the first page.
Also returns group_sufficiency divergences (observation-only). Apply
coverage rows with resolve_verdict_divergences(action="accept"); set
aside rows the structural model got right with
resolve_verdict_divergences(action="dismiss").
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | No | Optional filter — "missing_mapping", "spurious_mapping", or "group_sufficiency". Empty returns all kinds. | |
| limit | No | Max rows per section (clamped to 1-500, default 100). Set to 500 to pull an entire section in one call. | |
| offset | No | Skip the first N rows of each section, for pagination. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| include_dismissed | No | When true, return ONLY previously-dismissed rows (the undo view) instead of the active list. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and does so well: only confident rows surface, the uncertain middle band is dropped, rows are sorted by confidence, and accepting a row either ADDS or REMOVES a mapping depending on kind. It also discloses pagination semantics (pagination.filtered_total) and the limit clamp. This is rich behavioral disclosure beyond any structured field.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded and the bulleted breakdown of the two kinds is scannable. It runs long, and the sentence restating that ~100% confidence means 'add' and ~0% means 'remove' is partly redundant with the bullets above it, but overall the structure is efficient for the workflow described.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need not be re-explained, yet the description still supplies the operational context an agent needs: the two-kind model, direction of effect, confidence sorting, pagination, and the resolve/dismiss resolution path. Nothing required to call this correctly or act on its output is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is already 83%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds genuine value beyond the schema: it explains the meaning of the two kind values and group_sufficiency, and clarifies limit (raise up to 500 to pull a whole section) and offset in terms of per-section pagination. The include_dismissed undo-view semantics are left to the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening line precisely defines the resource: rows where the LLM's verdicts disagree with the model's authored state. It names the two divergence kinds (missing_mapping, spurious_mapping) and explicitly distinguishes this read-only retrieval tool from the sibling that acts on it, resolve_verdict_divergences. An agent can tell what this returns and how it differs from get_sufficiency or model_coherence_report without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear routing guidance: apply coverage rows via resolve_verdict_divergences(action="accept"), set aside model-correct rows with action="dismiss", and treat group_sufficiency as observation-only. It also instructs when to raise limit or page with offset. It stops short of an explicit 'use this when X instead of Y' statement versus sibling diagnostic tools, but the next-step guidance is strong.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_verification_reportGet Verification ReportA
Get verification report with summary stats and sufficiency gaps.
Returns tier1/tier2 pass/fail/pending counts, per-control verification status, and sufficiency details.
Each per-control sufficiency block carries:
status:"sufficient" | "insufficient" | "pending" | "stale"."stale"means the stored verdict no longer reflects the current control description, active assertion set or the rules it was computed under. Reading does not queue a re-evaluation: the write that changed a control queues its own. Call this tool again later for the refreshed verdict.details: human-readable LLM reasoning.misaligned_assertion_ids: assertions whose stated subject is off-topic for the control's current description (common after a control has been refined or regenerated). Treat as a directive: rebind to the right control, supersede viadelete_assertion, or rewrite. Do NOT treat them as evidence. A non-empty list forces the verdict to"insufficient".stale: boolean shortcut forstatus == "stale", kept distinct so an INSUFFICIENT verdict that's also stale (the prior insufficient decision was computed under outdated inputs) can be flagged without overloadingstatus.
A drift item means the accepted evidence changed (a test's definition, a witness's scope or allowlist) and its verdict was withdrawn until reviewed again.
By default returns summary only (no per-assertion details). Set summary_only=False to include full assertion details and drift items.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Max control entries to return (0=all). | |
| offset | No | Skip first N control entries. | |
| status | No | Filter by verification status: "verified", "partially_verified", "pending", "unverified". | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| summary_only | No | Omit per-assertion details and drift items (default True). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations the description carries the full load, and it delivers meaningful semantics: what 'stale' means, that reading does not queue a re-evaluation, that misaligned_assertion_ids is a directive (not evidence) and forces 'insufficient', and what a drift item implies. It still omits permission/auth requirements and rate-limit behavior, so not a 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, but the bulk of the text is spent describing return structure (sufficiency blocks, stale flag, drift items) even though an output schema exists and already governs those fields. The status/drift semantics partly justify the length, but the block is longer than it needs to be.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read tool with an output schema, the description supplies the non-schema semantics an agent needs (stale semantics, re-evaluation timing, misaligned-assertion handling, default truncation). Only the sibling-selection guidance and any access prerequisites are missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the baseline is 3. The description restates summary_only's effect in slightly richer terms (assertion details plus drift items) but adds nothing about limit/offset/status semantics beyond the schema's own text.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Get verification report') and enumerates the payload: tier1/tier2 pass/fail/pending counts, per-control verification status, and sufficiency details. That is enough to distinguish it from read-only siblings, though it never names an alternative like get_sufficiency or get_reachability_verdicts to sharpen the boundary.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The default-vs-full behavior is spelled out ('By default returns summary only... Set summary_only=False to include full assertion details and drift items'), which is real invocation guidance. But there is no when-to-use-this-vs-get_sufficiency reasoning and no exclusions, so usage is only implicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
import_compliance_frameworkImport Compliance FrameworkA
Import a custom compliance framework. Requires PRO tier.
Use this when your customer's program (regulatory, contractual, or internal) is not covered by Mipiti's built-in frameworks. After import, the framework is selectable on threat models exactly like a built-in.
Fields: name (required), version, description,
requirements (required, non-empty), level_definitions.
Each requirement takes id and description (required), level
(integer, default 1), the optional grouping chapter_id /
chapter_name / section_id / section_name / title,
scope (component, the default, or system: covered if ANY
model satisfies it) and level_specific_text (per-level text).
level_definitions and level_specific_text are keyed by the
level as a string integer ("1", "2"): the key is the ordinal the
level <= target_level filter compares, so a non-integer key is
refused (400). Labels ("Baseline", "SL3") go in each value's name.
A level value is {"name", "description", "source"}, where source
is authoritative (paraphrased from the published standard) or
mipiti_convention (tiers you defined).
Example::
{
"name": "ACME Tiered",
"level_definitions": {
"1": {"name": "Baseline", "description": "Minimum.",
"source": "mipiti_convention"}
},
"requirements": [
{"id": "ACME-PWD", "description": "Passwords meet policy",
"level": 1, "level_specific_text": {"1": "Min 8 characters."}}
]
}| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| framework_json | Yes | The framework body as a JSON string. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses the PRO-tier entitlement requirement, the post-import state ('selectable exactly like a built-in'), and explicit error behavior (non-integer level keys are refused with 400). It omits what happens on duplicate framework names or whether import is idempotent, which is a meaningful gap for an import mutation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The definition is long but front-loads purpose, then entitlement, then usage condition, then field semantics, closing with a concrete example. Nearly every sentence conveys non-obvious payload structure, so the length is largely justified, though the field-by-field density could be tightened.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values needn't be explained, and the description covers the important non-schema behavior (entitlement, post-import availability, error codes) plus a full example of the payload. The main residual gap is documentation of server_version and duplicate-name handling, but overall it is sufficient to invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is low (50%) and the schema only says framework_json is 'the framework body as a JSON string', so the description must compensate. It does so thoroughly, documenting required vs optional fields, nested requirement semantics (scope 'any model' vs 'all'), level key ordinality, and the level value shape. The second parameter, server_version, remains entirely undocumented by both schema and description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('import a custom compliance framework') and scopes it against the alternative path ('not covered by Mipiti's built-in frameworks'). It also clarifies the post-import behavior ('selectable on threat models exactly like a built-in'), which lets an agent distinguish it from siblings like list_compliance_frameworks or select_compliance_frameworks.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
'Use this when your customer's program (regulatory, contractual, or internal) is not covered by Mipiti's built-in frameworks' gives a clear triggering condition for the tool. It stops short of explicitly naming list_compliance_frameworks as the prerequisite check or naming an exclusion, but the context is unambiguous.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
import_controlsImport ControlsA
Import existing security controls into a threat model.
Accepts structured JSON or free-text. Controls are auto-mapped to COs and deduplicated against existing ones. The parse/map/dedup runs as a background job (polled for progress), then — because this mutates the model — you are asked to confirm before the controls are saved.
The saved controls are added to the model's current controls as one
change (undoable with undo_model_change); no model version is
created, and it is refused while a control build holds the model. Nothing
runs for them unprompted: the result's awaiting_judgement lists them,
and the mitigation groups they join credit nothing and read awaiting
judgement until judge_imported_controls is called (estimate first,
then confirm_estimate=True).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| auto_map | No | Auto-map controls to COs using LLM (default: True). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| free_text | No | Free-text controls (narrative/CSV/bullets). | |
| source_label | No | Origin label (e.g., "ISO 27001"). | |
| controls_json | No | JSON array of {description, co_ids?, framework_refs?}. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description fully carries the burden and delivers: background parse/map/dedup with polling, a confirmation gate before mutation, undo semantics via undo_model_change, no model version created, refusal while a control build holds the model, and the awaiting_judgement lifecycle up through judge_imported_controls. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose and the JSON/free-text input modes are front-loaded, and the workflow is layered in logical order. It is dense and slightly long, but nearly every sentence conveys a distinct behavioral fact rather than filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a high-complexity mutating import with a background job, confirmation, and judgement gating, the description covers the full lifecycle, including the undo path and the refusal condition. Since an output schema exists, it needn't explain return values, and nothing material is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents the six parameters well. The description's mention of 'structured JSON or free-text' loosely maps to controls_json/free_text but adds no format or constraint detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Import existing security controls into a threat model') and immediately distinguishes its scope by noting it maps to COs and deduplicated against existing ones, setting it apart from siblings like auto_map_controls and import_compliance_framework.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives clear context: accepts structured JSON or free-text, runs as a background job, requires confirmation before saving, and routes the agent to undo_model_change and judge_imported_controls as follow-ups. However, it never explicitly states when NOT to use it versus sibling importers (e.g., import_compliance_framework, convert_assumption_to_controls).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
import_functional_testsImport Functional TestsA
Register tests that already exist in your codebase against a model's functional objectives, so tests you already have count toward functional conformance — not only Mipiti-specified tests. Mutating (bulk).
Scan the repo's test suite and pass the tests here. Optionally associate each with the objective ids it covers (from get_functional_objectives); the platform verifies each association is applicable before accepting it and returns any it rejected under rejected_mappings. A test with no (or a rejected) association is still imported, unmapped, so it can be associated later (see suggest_functional_test_mappings / associate_functional_test). For a single hand-authored test, use add_functional_test instead.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| tests_json | Yes | A JSON array of test objects. Each object supports ``test_name``, ``file_path``, ``framework``, ``description``, ``status`` (not_implemented | implemented | verified — an operator claim; an independent CI run is what verifies it), and ``functional_objective_ids`` (list of objective ids the test covers). At least ``test_name`` or ``description`` is required per test; the rest are optional. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the behavioral burden and largely succeeds: it explicitly flags 'Mutating (bulk),' explains that associations are verified by the platform, and describes that rejected or missing associations still result in the test being imported unmapped. It does not detail side effects like idempotency or whether existing tests are overwritten, but the disclosed workflow behavior is substantial.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Every sentence earns its place: purpose, mutation warning, workflow, fallback behavior, and the alternative tool. The description is dense but well-structured, front-loading the core purpose and bulk-mutation nature before explaining details.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is thorough for a bulk-import tool with an output schema: it covers the use case, parameters' semantics for the main payload, mutation behavior, rejection handling, and routing to related tools. The unresolved server_version parameter and the lack of clarity around 'Mipiti-specified tests' prevent a perfect score, but overall it is highly usable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The description adds rich meaning to tests_json, explaining the optional fields, the status enum meanings, and association behavior beyond the schema. model_id is adequately described in the schema. However, server_version is a required parameter with no schema description and no mention in the tool description, leaving a significant semantic gap for a required input.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: 'Register tests that already exist in your codebase against a model's functional objectives' so existing tests 'count toward functional conformance.' It names the specific resource (tests/functional objectives) and distinguishes itself from add_functional_test by noting bulk import of existing tests vs. a single hand-authored test.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit guidance on when to use this tool: when importing existing tests from the codebase in bulk. It provides a clear exclusion: 'For a single hand-authored test, use add_functional_test instead.' It also explains follow-up workflows via suggest_functional_test_mappings / associate_functional_test for unmapped tests.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
import_threat_model_archiveImport Threat Model ArchiveA
Import a JSON audit archive (from export_report (scope="model", format="archive"))
into a target workspace.
Mutating: creates a NEW threat model in the target workspace. Requires
write access to that workspace. A fresh model_id is assigned on every
import, so the same envelope can be imported any number of times
without collisions; title collisions in the target workspace
auto-suffix (imported YYYY-MM-DD). Non-destructive — never
overwrites or touches an existing model.
Use to move or clone a model between workspaces or across instances;
the envelope round-trips through export_report (scope="model", format="archive")
first.
The archive carries the model's current state, and the import creates it as version 1 of a new model: its controls, live assertions, decisions in force and open findings. Earlier versions, activity and chat are not carried.
The restored model arrives UNVERIFIED. The tier verdicts on its assertions, the attested flag on a verification result, and the facts a verification run reported are the origin's record of what it claimed — kept with the model as that record, and not credited here: a verdict belongs to the run that produced it and the judge that decided it, and this workspace has neither. Verification is earned here by running it against code this workspace can reach, so plan for a restored model to read unverified until it has. The same holds for the judgements of its mitigation groups: the import queues none, and its objectives read awaiting judgement until someone asks for them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| envelope | Yes | The full archive dict returned by ``export_report (scope="model", format="archive")``. | |
| workspace_id | Yes | Target workspace to import into. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it declares the tool mutating, states the write-access requirement, explains that a fresh model_id is assigned so re-imports never collide, describes title auto-suffixing, and asserts non-destructiveness (never overwrites an existing model). It goes further by enumerating what the archive carries versus what it drops, and by warning that the restored model arrives unverified with origin verdicts kept only as a record.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The critical facts (mutating, creates new model, requires write access, non-destructive) are front-loaded before the longer provenance and verification caveats. The prose is dense and multi-paragraph, with some restatement of the envelope/export_report relationship, but given the tool's complexity nearly every sentence conveys distinct behavior.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the description still covers everything an agent needs: prerequisites, identity/collision semantics, scope of what is restored, and the important caveat that verdicts and mitigation-group judgements do not carry over. Nothing material is missing for a 3-parameter tool with a nested envelope.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 67% (envelope and workspace_id documented; server_version bare), so the description must add some value and does: it clarifies that the envelope is the archive produced by export_report and spells out what that archive contains. It adds little for server_version, but overall it enriches the two meaningful parameters beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence states a specific verb (Import) and resource (a JSON audit archive) plus its destination (target workspace), and the second sentence specifies the exact effect: creating a NEW threat model. This is clearly distinguishable from siblings like import_controls, import_functional_tests, and import_compliance_framework, which handle different artifact types.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly names the use case ('move or clone a model between workspaces or across instances') and the required counterpart tool ('round-trips through export_report (scope="model", format="archive") first'), which tells the agent where the envelope comes from. It does not, however, state any when-not-to-use conditions or contrast with the other import_* siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
judge_imported_controlsJudge Imported ControlsA
Have the imported controls awaiting their judgement judged. Mutating
only with confirm_estimate=True; may consume credits then.
Controls saved by import_controls are not judged unprompted: the
mitigation groups they join credit nothing until this runs. It judges
every objective those controls join, priced and charged as
judge_objectives prices and charges them.
Call with
confirm_estimate=False(the default). Nothing is queued and nothing is charged; the answer carriesawaiting_judgement(the control ids),co_ids(the objectives they join),scope,ungroupedandestimate. Show the user the estimate.Call again with
confirm_estimate=Trueonce they agree. The judgements are queued (confirmed: true,queued) and the controls stop awaiting (awaiting_judgementcomes back empty).
ungrouped lists objectives with no mitigation group: nothing can be
judged there until their controls are grouped with
set_mitigation_groups. When nothing awaits, the answer says so and
does nothing.
Refusals come back as data, {confirmed: false, queued: 0, http_status, ...}: 409 while a control build is running, 402 when the
balance this workspace bills to cannot cover the estimate, 503 when
judging is unavailable on this deployment.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_estimate | No | False (default) returns the estimate and queues nothing; True queues the judgements. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses that it is mutating only when confirm_estimate=True, that it may consume credits, that pricing matches judge_objectives, that it queues judgements, and it enumerates refusal statuses 409/402/503 returned as data rather than exceptions. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the mutating/credit caveat, then uses a numbered two-step list that is easy to follow. Dense but each paragraph (workflow, ungrouped, refusals) earns its place; only minor tightening is possible.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Even though an output schema exists, the description names the relevant return fields (awaiting_judgement, co_ids, scope, ungrouped, estimate, confirmed, queued) and explains refusal shapes, leaving no gap for correct invocation or interpretation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67%; the description explains confirm_estimate's two modes more fully than the schema does, and ties model_id implicitly to the target threat model. It does not add meaning for server_version, but that param is boilerplate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Have the imported controls awaiting their judgement judged') and scopes it to controls saved by import_controls, distinguishing it from judge_objectives / judge_objective. An agent can identify the distinct role this plays in the control workflow.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit two-step protocol (estimate first with confirm_estimate=False, then confirm with True), names prerequisites (controls must be grouped, otherwise use set_mitigation_groups), and states the no-op case ('when nothing awaits, the answer says so and does nothing').
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
judge_objectiveJudge ObjectiveA
Have one control objective's mitigation group judged. Mutating — queues background work and may consume credits.
Use this for an objective whose risk_reason is awaiting_judgement:
it has a built mitigation group and nothing has decided whether that group
covers the objective — never evaluated, evaluated against inputs that have
since changed, or the answer parked. The objective is not short of
controls, so generating or implementing more will not move it; what is
missing is the judgement.
This is not a repair. The judgement can come back insufficient, which
moves the objective to coverage_gap / insufficient_by_design and
names real work. That is the tool doing its job: it replaces "nobody has
looked" with an answer, and the answer may be no.
Scoped to ONE objective, which is the difference that matters against
recompute_verdicts: that tool force-enqueues every control's coverage
verdict AND every live objective's group-sufficiency verdict, which on a
large model runs to thousands of credits. This queues a single judgement.
Any credits it consumes are metered at actuals as the work runs, like
every other metered call — the account's usage is visible in its billing
panel before and after.
Judging runs in the BACKGROUND; the call returns as soon as the work is
queued. Re-read get_mitigation_groups (or assess_model /
get_risk_view) shortly after to see the objective's new state. Calling
again while a judgement is already queued is harmless and does not queue a
second one.
A refusal comes back as data rather than an error, so it can be relayed:
{queued: false, http_status: 409, ...}— controls are still being generated for this model. Pollget_control_generation_statusuntil terminal, then call again.{queued: false, http_status: 503, ...}— judging is unavailable on this deployment.{queued: false, http_status: 402, code, message}— the balance this workspace bills to cannot cover the judgement.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_id | Yes | ID of the control objective to have judged (e.g. "CO5"). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden and does: mutating, queues background work, consumes credits metered at actuals, returns before work completes, re-calling is harmless/idempotent, and refusal semantics (409/503/402) returned as data rather than errors. This is unusually complete behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the core action and mutation warning, then structures the when-to-use, the not-a-repair caveat, and refusal codes. Longer than most, but each block (background behavior, refusal codes) earns its place; minor redundancy between the credit note and the metering note.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present the description needn't detail return values, and it still covers background execution, how to observe the new state (get_mitigation_groups / assess_model / get_risk_view), and refusal payloads. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67% and the description adds little per-parameter meaning beyond the implicit 'one objective' scoping of co_id. It does not clarify server_version (undocumented in schema) or parameter format. Adequate but not compensating for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource (judge one control objective's mitigation group) and immediately names the sibling it differs from (recompute_verdicts), plus clarifies what it is NOT ('This is not a repair'). An agent can distinguish it from every sibling without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit trigger: use for an objective whose risk_reason is awaiting_judgement, with the three sub-conditions spelled out. Also gives an explicit exclusion (the objective is not short of controls, so generating/implementing more won't move it) and names the alternative recompute_verdicts with its cost difference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
judge_objectivesJudge ObjectivesA
Have judged every objective whose mitigation group has no judgement for
its current controls and none queued (the diagnosis's not_judged, or
objectives reading awaiting_judgement). Mutating only with
confirm_estimate=True; may consume credits then. Adding or
implementing controls does not move such an objective; a judgement
does. judging objectives are already queued: wait for them.
Call with
confirm_estimate=False(the default): nothing is queued or charged; the answer carriesdiagnosis,scope,ungroupedandestimate(credits,objectives,computed_at,rate_version). Show the user the estimate.Once they agree, call with
confirm_estimate=True: each objective inscopeis queued (confirmed: true,queued), metered at actuals as it runs, andstatus_detailis the fresh status.
ungrouped objectives have no mitigation group and are never judged:
group their controls with set_mitigation_groups first.
A judgement is not a repair: it can come back insufficient or undecided,
which counts the objective as uncovered or undecided, work for
strengthen_controls. judge_objective does the same for one.
Refusals come back as data, {confirmed: false, queued: 0, http_status, code, message}: 409 control_generation_in_progress
(poll get_control_generation_status), 402 insufficient_credits /
quota_exceeded (with estimated_credits), 503 (judging
unavailable). An unknown id in co_ids is a 400 error.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_ids | No | Optional comma-separated objective IDs; omit for every objective with no judgement and none queued. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_estimate | No | False (default) estimates; True queues. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses that the tool is mutating only under confirm_estimate=True, that this can consume credits metered at actuals, and enumerates refusal payloads (409 control_generation_in_progress, 402 insufficient_credits/quota_exceeded, 503, 400 on unknown co_ids as data rather than exceptions).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Well-structured with a numbered two-step list and grouped refusal codes, but the opening sentence is dense and awkwardly parsed, and the whole block is longer than strictly needed given the output schema exists. Every section is useful, so little is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating, credit-consuming batch tool with an output schema, the description covers the decision procedure, the grouping prerequisite, the sibling alternative, outcome semantics (uncovered/undecided), and full refusal handling. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75% and the schema already documents co_ids ('omit for every objective with no judgement') and confirm_estimate. The description reinforces these and adds the meaning of the estimate response subfields (credits, objectives, computed_at, rate_version), going somewhat beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (have judged), resource (objectives) and a precise scope (those with no judgement and none queued), and explicitly distinguishes itself from the single-objective sibling by noting 'judge_objective does the same for one.' An agent can pick this over judge_objective without opening either schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit two-step workflow (call with confirm_estimate=False to estimate, then True once the user agrees), plus when-not conditions: ungrouped objectives must be grouped via set_mitigation_groups first, judging objectives should be waited on, and insufficient/undecided outcomes route to strengthen_controls.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
keep_attacker_wholeKeep Attacker WholeA
Keep an attacker offered for a split whole, with why. Mutating; creates a model version.
The decision is kept on the model: the split is no longer offered while
it stands, and the attacker is left as it is. Refused with 409
split_not_offered, 409 dismissed_already.
A program's decision is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation
policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and
parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
Returns {model_id, model_version, applies, credential_classes, counts, dismissed_split}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| reason | Yes | Why it is one capability (required). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| attacker_id | Yes | The attacker to keep whole. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present the description carries the full load and does so: it declares the tool mutating, says a model version is created, explains the decision's persistence semantics (the split is no longer offered while the decision stands, the attacker is left as-is), enumerates the 409 failure modes by code, and documents the delegation/escalation path including the anti-pattern of retrying.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the action and its mutating nature, then error conditions, then escalation handling. Three short paragraphs, each doing work, though the enumerated return shape is redundant given the tool already has an output schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating decision tool with no annotations, this covers effect on state, versioning, failure codes, authorization/escalation behavior with a concrete next step, and return values. The remaining gap (undocumented server_version) is minor and largely a schema concern.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, so model_id, attacker_id and reason are already documented in the schema; the description only reinforces that a 'why' is required ('with why', 'A program's decision is a judgment'). The required server_version parameter is undocumented in both places, and the description adds no format or constraint detail beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first line names a specific verb and resource and states the scope precisely: keep an attacker that was offered for a split, whole, with a reason, and notes it creates a model version. The word 'split' signals the counterpart tool (split_grouped_attacker) but the sibling is never named, so an agent must infer the opposition rather than being routed to it.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description establishes the triggering condition (a split is offered for this attacker) and the consequence of acting, plus explicit recovery guidance for the 403 case: do not retry, report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals. It stops short of stating the inverse alternative by name ('if you want the split, call split_grouped_attacker instead') or when dismiss_proposed_attacker is preferred.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
lift_composition_entityLift Composition EntityA
Promote a shared-anchor entity from two sibling descendants to their lowest common ancestor. Mutates state across THREE models.
The operator has confirmed (via the composition lift-candidate view)
that the entity local_id_a on descendant_a_id and the entity
local_id_b on descendant_b_id are the same logical thing and
should be modeled once on the LCA. The route's model_id is the
operator's current context model — typically the LCA, but the server
accepts any ancestor of both descendants.
Conflict resolution. The server re-detects field-level and
attached-state conflicts against current live state before applying.
If new conflicts have surfaced since the operator's last candidate
fetch, the call returns 400 with the missing conflict keys; refresh
the lift-candidate view and resubmit with resolutions covering every
key. Each entry in field_resolutions / attached_state_resolutions
is "keep_a" | "keep_b" | "keep_both" (union for list/set
fields; falls back to B for scalars).
Over-application gate. The lift extends visibility to every descendant
of the LCA, not just the two source descendants. The server runs an
over-application gate that refuses lifts touching descendants outside
an acknowledged set; pass acknowledged_third_party_subtrees to
acknowledge specific subtrees, or skip_overapplication_gate=True to
override entirely after explicit operator confirmation.
Each affected model (LCA + both descendants) bumps version and emits a
model_refined activity event; a structured lift_applied event
with the full lift_event payload lands on the LCA. The audit pack
surfaces this under lift_history. Reverse it with
undo_composition_event(event_type="lift"), which previews unless
dry_run=False; the inverse operation is split_composition_entity.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | Yes | Entity kind — one of ``"assets"``, ``"attackers"``, ``"components"``. | |
| model_id | Yes | Operator's context model — the model whose composition view surfaced the candidate. Treated as a route anchor only; doesn't have to be the LCA. | |
| local_id_a | Yes | Local id of the entity on ``descendant_a_id``. | |
| local_id_b | Yes | Local id of the entity on ``descendant_b_id``. | |
| lca_model_id | Yes | Target ancestor model id (the LCA, or any ancestor higher up the chain). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| descendant_a_id | Yes | First source descendant model id. | |
| descendant_b_id | Yes | Second source descendant model id. | |
| field_resolutions | No | Optional per-field resolution map (e.g. ``{"description": "keep_both", "tags": "keep_a"}``). | |
| lca_descendant_ids | No | Optional snapshot of the LCA's descendant set used by the over-application gate. Omit to let the server compute it via BFS. | |
| skip_overapplication_gate | No | When True, bypass the gate after explicit operator confirmation. Default False. | |
| attached_state_resolutions | No | Optional per-state-key resolution map (e.g. ``{"state:assertions/AS3": "keep_b"}``). | |
| acknowledged_third_party_subtrees | No | Optional list of subtree roots the operator has acknowledged as in-scope for the lift. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and delivers: it mutates state across THREE models, re-detects conflicts against live state and can return 400 with missing conflict keys, runs an over-application gate affecting descendants beyond the two sources, bumps versions, emits model_refined/lift_applied events, and is reversible via undo_composition_event (preview unless dry_run=False). These are precisely the behavioral traits an agent needs before invoking a destructive lift.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
It is long (roughly four dense paragraphs), but it is front-loaded with the purpose and each subsequent paragraph covers a distinct concern (conflict resolution, over-application gate, side effects/undo), so nearly every sentence earns its place. Minor tightening of the conflict-resolution prose would help.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 13-parameter destructive composition tool with no annotations, the description covers preconditions, failure modes, gate overrides, side effects, audit trail, and reversal. An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and nothing an agent needs to call this safely appears to be missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 92%, which sets a baseline of 3, but the description adds meaning the schema lacks: the allowed resolution values 'keep_a' | 'keep_b' | 'keep_both' (schema declares zero enums), the semantics of keep_both as a union for list/set fields with a fallback to B for scalars, the distinction between route model_id and the true LCA, and the purpose of acknowledged_third_party_subtrees versus skip_overapplication_gate. That is substantive value beyond structured fields.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence states a specific verb+resource+scope: 'Promote a shared-anchor entity from two sibling descendants to their lowest common ancestor.' It also names the inverse sibling (split_composition_entity) and the reversal path (undo_composition_event), so an agent can distinguish it from related composition tools without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It states the precondition (operator has confirmed via the lift-candidate view that the two entities are the same logical thing), the retry condition when new conflicts surface (refresh the candidate view and resubmit), and the explicit alternatives (skip_overapplication_gate vs acknowledged_third_party_subtrees; split_composition_entity as inverse). This is close to a full when/when-not/alternatives statement.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_assertionsList AssertionsA
List active assertions for a control or assumption.
Provide exactly one of control_id or assumption_id.
Returns a flat list of assertions. Each assertion carries an origin
field: "own" for assertions submitted directly against this model's
control or assumption, "inherited" for assertions contributed through
model composition (composed models whose assertions apply here).
Inherited assertions are included in the listing.
Each assertion also carries three INDEPENDENT verdict fields. Read them together — a passing tier check is not the same as sufficient evidence:
tier1_status— mechanical check: the named file, symbol, or pattern is actually there."pass" | "fail" | "pending".tier2_status— semantic check: the cited code meaningfully implements the claim."pass" | "fail" | "pending".coherence_status— advisory consistency signal across the control's evidence set."pending"here does NOT block the control from verifying, does NOT mean a verdict is missing, and is NOT a reason to trigger a recompute.
An assertion can pass BOTH tiers while its control stays unverified,
because verification is decided per CONTROL, not per assertion: a
control verifies only when its assertions collectively cover every
clause of the control description. Read get_sufficiency for that
verdict; never infer it from the tier fields here.
Each assertion also carries covers (the objective or clause ids it
was declared to prove; empty when undeclared) and, where the platform
surfaces it, tier1_attested and evidence_provenance (whether
the run that verified it was signed and by what class of identity).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | No | ID of the control (omit if using assumption_id). | |
| assumption_id | No | ID of the assumption (omit if using control_id). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it delivers: it discloses that inherited assertions are included, that the three verdict fields are independent, that coherence_status 'pending' does NOT block verification, and that passing tiers does not mean the control verifies. It also explains the meaning of origin, covers, tier1_attested, and evidence_provenance. This is rich behavioral context beyond the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but every section earns its place: the one-of constraint, the origin field, the three verdict fields with their caveats, and the pointer to get_sufficiency. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and the most critical usage rule. Slightly verbose in the verdict-field section, but the warnings are important enough to justify the length.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has an output schema, so return values are already structured, but the description still explains the semantics of the non-obvious fields (origin, tier1_status, tier2_status, coherence_status, covers, tier1_attested, evidence_provenance). It also covers the key pitfall (per-control verification) and routes to the right sibling. For a list tool with this complexity, nothing essential is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the description adds the critical constraint that exactly one of control_id or assumption_id must be provided, which the schema only hints at via 'omit if using...'. It also clarifies the semantics of the returned fields, which helps the agent interpret results. It doesn't document server_version or model_id, but those are self-explanatory and the schema covers them.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'List active assertions for a control or assumption.' It immediately distinguishes the tool's scope (active assertions, flat list) and names the two valid target types. It also differentiates from siblings like get_sufficiency and get_verification_report by explicitly saying verification is decided per control and should be read from get_sufficiency, not inferred here.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives an explicit selection rule: 'Provide exactly one of control_id or assumption_id.' It also tells the agent when NOT to use this tool for a verdict: 'never infer it from the tier fields here' and directs to get_sufficiency. This is clear routing guidance relative to siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_attestationsList AttestationsA
List an assumption's attestation history. Read-only; no side effects.
Returns the chronological record of attestation events recorded against the assumption (each with its actor, timestamp, and status/expiry as recorded), so you can trace why the assumption is currently attested, expired, or never attested. An assumption only mitigates its control objectives while it is active AND currently attested, so use this to diagnose coverage that depends on an attestation.
To record a new attestation use submit_attestation; for the assumption's current fields (status, description) use get_entity (entity_type="assumption").
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| assumption_id | Yes | ID of the assumption whose attestation history to list. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It explicitly states 'Read-only; no side effects' and describes the chronological return of events with actor, timestamp, and status/expiry. This is strong transparency beyond what the schema shows, though it does not mention potential limits or pagination.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured and front-loaded: the core action appears in the first sentence, followed by return-value context, a practical diagnostic purpose, and clear alternatives. Every sentence contributes information an agent needs to select and invoke the tool correctly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has an output schema and only three self-explanatory parameters, so the description need not expand return types. It explains what the returned history contains, why the tool matters for coverage diagnosis, and how it relates to neighboring tools. This is sufficient for correct selection and invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 67%, leaving server_version undocumented, but the parameter name is self-explanatory. The description clarifies the role of assumption_id by explaining that it identifies the assumption whose history is returned. It does not add detail about model_id or server_version, but the schema already handles most of the meaning.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'List an assumption's attestation history.' It clearly distinguishes this from the many sibling tools by focusing on the attestation timeline of an assumption, and explicitly notes it is read-only with no side effects.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives concrete guidance on when to use the tool: to diagnose coverage that depends on an active attestation. It also names alternatives explicitly — submit_attestation for recording a new attestation and get_entity for current assumption fields — making the routing decision clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_co_dispositionsList Co DispositionsA
List the signed judgments recorded against this model's control objectives — risk acceptances, not-applicable dispositions, or both.
Read-only. Each entry carries the objective it names, the owner who signed it, the justification, the dates, and its status. Expired and revoked entries are included: a decision that lapsed is part of the audit trail, and hiding it would leave a reader unable to tell a judgment that was reviewed from one that was never made.
Read this before authoring a new judgment on an objective — an existing one may already cover it, or may have expired and need re-signing rather than duplicating.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | No | Optional filter — "risk_accepted" or "not_applicable". Omit for both. Case and surrounding whitespace do not matter. A value that is neither is rejected by name rather than matched against nothing, so a typo cannot come back as an empty list you would read as "none recorded". | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and does well: it declares the operation read-only, lists the fields each entry carries, and explains that expired and revoked entries are intentionally included for auditability. This goes beyond the schema and gives the agent important behavioral context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well structured and front-loaded: purpose first, return contents and inclusion behavior second, usage guidance last. Each sentence adds value, including the rationale for including expired and revoked entries, without excessive verbosity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given that an output schema exists and the description covers purpose, safety, return contents, and when to use it, the agent has enough context to invoke this tool correctly. Server_version is self-explanatory from the schema, and no pagination details are necessary for a list operation of this scope.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The description aligns with the schema's kind parameter by mentioning 'risk acceptances, not-applicable dispositions, or both', but the schema already documents kind in detail. It adds little for model_id and nothing for server_version, and with 67% schema coverage the description does not substantially compensate for the undocumented parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: it lists signed judgments recorded against a model's control objectives, including risk acceptances and not-applicable dispositions. It is clear but does not explicitly differentiate itself from sibling tools like list_risk_acceptances, so the distinction is mostly implicit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description tells the agent to read this before authoring a new judgment, warning that an existing or expired judgment may already cover the objective. It provides clear context for when the tool is useful, though it does not explicitly state when not to use it or name alternative tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_compliance_frameworksList Compliance FrameworksA
List the compliance frameworks available to map controls against.
Read-only; no side effects. Returns both built-in frameworks (e.g. OWASP
ASVS) and any custom frameworks in the workspace. Use this to discover
framework identifiers before select_compliance_frameworks (activate one
for a model) or import_compliance_framework (add a custom one). Takes no
arguments beyond the version guard.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full disclosure burden. It states 'Read-only; no side effects' and specifies the return scope: built-in frameworks (e.g. OWASP ASVS) plus any custom workspace frameworks. It could add slightly more nuance about the returned list's contents, but this is strong disclosure for a list tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Four concise sentences, each earning its place: purpose, behavior, usage guidance, and parameters. The core purpose is front-loaded and nothing is filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter, read-only list tool with an output schema present, the description covers purpose, behavior, workflow placement, and the parameter's role. Return-value details are covered by the output schema, so nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% (server_version has no schema-level description), so the description must compensate. It clarifies that the parameter is a 'version guard' and not a functional argument, which helps, but it does not specify the expected version value or format, leaving the agent to guess what to pass.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'List the compliance frameworks available to map controls against.' It distinguishes itself from siblings by naming select_compliance_frameworks (activate one) and import_compliance_framework (add a custom one) as the tools that follow on from this discovery call.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states the workflow: 'Use this to discover framework identifiers before select_compliance_frameworks ... or import_compliance_framework.' It names both alternatives with their purposes, so an agent knows exactly when to call this tool instead of the related ones.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_control_revisionsList Control RevisionsA
List every change to a model version's set of controls. Read-only.
Each write to a version's published controls — a build's publish, an
import, an edit, a deletion, an undo — is a set revision with its author.
Returns {model_id, model_version, latest_version, discarded, revisions, undo_target}; each revision carries revision, job_id (the
build that wrote it, if any), started_by, started_at,
controls (the ids it touched), undo_of (the revision it undid,
for an undo) and undone_by / undone_at. undo_target is the
revision undo_model_change(target="controls") would undo (null when none, and for any
version but the latest). discarded is true for a version a revert
replaced.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| version | No | Model version to read (0 = the latest live version). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it declares 'Read-only' outright and explains the semantics of non-obvious state such as 'discarded' (version replaced by a revert), 'undo_of'/'undone_by', and when 'undo_target' is null. It stops short of stating pagination, ordering, or permission requirements for reading another version.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the one-line purpose and read-only flag, then a dense but well-organized enumeration. The long field-by-field walkthrough overlaps with the existing output schema, so some content is not strictly earning its place, but the prose is tight and skimmable.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only list tool with a 3-parameter schema and an output schema, the description covers what it does, its safety profile, and the meaning of ambiguous return flags. Since an output schema exists, the extended return-value enumeration is largely redundant rather than necessary, leaving little genuinely missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 67% (version and model_id documented, server_version not), so the schema does most of the work. The description's only parameter-adjacent statement is that undo_target is null 'for any version but the latest', which hints at the version parameter's behavior but adds no new input semantics beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('List every change to a model version's set of controls') with clear scope, and the read-only audit-history framing separates it from mutation siblings like apply_control_changeset or undo_model_change. It does not explicitly name an alternative listing tool (e.g. get_controls) to route against, but the resource is specific enough that an agent can distinguish it.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no explicit 'use this when / not when' guidance. The only usage signal is the cross-reference that 'undo_target' is the revision undo_model_change(target="controls") would undo, which implies this tool is used to find an undo target, but the agent must infer that.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_decisionsList DecisionsA
List the decision ledger of a model: every judgment recorded on it (finding dismissed or remediated, risk accepted, not-applicable declared, proposal accepted / rejected / reverted, assumption accepted, behavioural model answered / confirmed, a control's delta declared, a finding of its cross-check dismissed, a seal, position, privileges or surface extent attested, escalation resolved, an inventory pair decided or an entity's tags declared), newest first, with who made it and whether it was within the workspace's delegation policy. Read-only; no side effects.
Call this BEFORE raising a proposal or asking for a judgment, so you do not propose what a person rejected or ask again for what was already decided.
The ledger is append-only. There is no tool that edits it; to undo an
accepted proposal, revert or re-decide, never edit the record. Rows
with outcome == "refused" are judgments a program was refused;
their escalation, if any, is in list_proposals. agent is null
for a person's decision.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Maximum rows to return. 0 (default) uses the server default. | |
| decision | No | Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``, ``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``, ``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``, ``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``, ``assumption_accepted``, ``behavioural_model_answered`` (an answer, an element edit or a link declared), ``behavioural_model_confirmed``, ``behavioural_delta_declared``, ``behavioural_cross_check_dismissed`` (a person set aside a finding of a declaration's cross-check), ``behavioural_confirmation_withdrawn`` (a confirmation withdrawn by a report that the code does more than the description), ``seal_attested``, ``position_attested``, ``privileges_attested``, ``extent_attested``, ``escalation_resolved``, ``drift_intent_decided`` (whether a description-drift finding was intended or a defect of the code), ``description_revised`` (a revised description accepted), ``inventory_pair_decided`` (two inventory entries decided one entity or not), ``inventory_tag_declared`` (an entity's taxonomy tags declared). Empty (default) returns every kind. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| agent_only | No | Only decisions made by a program (``agent`` not null). Default False. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| outside_policy_only | No | Only decisions made outside the delegation policy in force at the time (``within_policy`` false). Default False. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present the description carries the full burden, and it does: "Read-only; no side effects", "The ledger is append-only. There is no tool that edits it." It also disambiguates record semantics the agent would otherwise misread — `outcome == "refused"` rows are refused judgments whose escalation lives elsewhere, and `agent` is null for a person's decision.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose and the read-only/append-only constraint are front-loaded, and the later notes on refused rows and null `agent` each earn their place. The long parenthetical enumerating every decision kind is somewhat redundant with the `decision` parameter's enum in the schema, which is the main source of bloat.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return shape need not be explained; the description instead covers the things structure cannot — read-only nature, append-only immutability, correct recovery actions, and the meaning of refused/agent-null rows. For a 6-parameter list tool at 83% schema coverage, nothing an agent needs before calling is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the baseline is 3; the description still adds value by spelling out the decision kinds that the `decision` filter accepts, stating the newest-first ordering that bears on `limit`, and explaining that rows carry who made them and whether they were within policy (i.e. what `outside_policy_only` selects). It does not restate defaults or the agent_only filter explicitly, so it is an addition rather than a full override.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb+resource+ordering ("List the decision ledger of a model ... newest first") and immediately scopes what it returns (who made the decision, whether it was within delegation policy). The parenthetical enumerates the decision kinds so the agent knows exactly what class of records this covers, and it points to the sibling `list_proposals` for escalation detail, distinguishing the two.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit interventional guidance: "Call this BEFORE raising a proposal or asking for a judgment, so you do not propose what a person rejected or ask again for what was already decided." It also states the correct recovery path ("to undo an accepted proposal, revert or re-decide, never edit the record") and redirects escalation lookups to `list_proposals`, so the agent knows both when to call and where to go next.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_findingsList FindingsA
List negative findings recorded on a threat model. Read-only.
Returns finding rows with their lifecycle status; use to triage gaps or to find a finding_id for update_finding / remediate_finding. Each row carries an origin ("own" for findings recorded on this model, "inherited" for findings contributed through model composition, with inherited_from_* context); inherited findings are included in the listing.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | No | Optional lifecycle filter, one of "discovered", "acknowledged", "remediated", "verified", "dismissed", "auto_resolved". Empty (default) returns all statuses. ``auto_resolved`` is closed by the platform, not by a person: the condition that produced the finding is no longer reproduced. It is deliberately distinct from ``remediated``/``verified`` (a person fixed and confirmed it) and from ``dismissed`` (a person judged it not worth fixing) — "the gap is gone" and "the gap does not matter" are opposite statements about residual risk, so they never share a status. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | No | Optional filter to findings on one control. Empty (default) returns findings for all controls. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the behavioral burden and does so reasonably: it declares 'Read-only,' describes returned lifecycle status, and explains origin semantics including that inherited findings are included. It does not cover pagination, permissions, or rate limits, but it is substantially more transparent than a bare list operation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is three tightly structured sentences with no wasted wording. It front-loads the core operation and read-only nature, then adds usage and row-origin context in descending priority.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Because an output schema exists, the description need not explain return fields in full, and it still usefully clarifies the origin distinction for inherited findings. It is complete for a read-only list tool, though it omits edge-case behavior such as pagination or empty results.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 75%, so the schema largely documents the parameters, including the rich status filter semantics. The description adds no direct parameter-level guidance for status, model_id, or control_id, so a baseline 3 is appropriate rather than credit for compensating beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: 'List negative findings recorded on a threat model.' It also distinguishes this read-only listing from write-oriented siblings by naming update_finding and remediate_finding as consumers of the returned finding_id. An agent can identify what the tool does without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear usage contexts: 'use to triage gaps or to find a finding_id for update_finding / remediate_finding.' It does not explicitly state when not to use this tool or name a direct alternative such as get_findings_risks, so it falls short of full when/when-not guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_groupsList GroupsA
List the workspace's tags. Read-only; no side effects.
A tag is a named, overlapping grouping of threat models, for audit
scopes, products, ad-hoc selections or portfolios. A model may carry many
tags, and a tag never affects posture or credit. Returns {"tags": [...]},
each with id, name, description and model_ids.
Discover tag IDs here before the tag risk, compliance, dependency or
export tools, or before adding/removing members. For a single model's
tags use list_model_groups.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden, and it does disclose that the call is read-only with no side effects and that a tag never affects posture or credit. It also describes the return payload shape. It does not cover auth requirements or pagination, so it stops short of full transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the action and read-only trait, then adds tag semantics, return shape and routing. Every sentence adds value with no padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Tag semantics, safety profile, return shape and sibling routing are all covered, and an output schema exists so return-value detail is not strictly required. The one gap is the undocumented required server_version parameter.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% for the single required parameter server_version, and the description never mentions it or its format/expected value. With an undocumented required parameter, the description does not compensate for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('List the workspace's tags') and immediately distinguishes itself from the sibling list_model_groups by scoping. An agent can tell it apart from the tag-risk/export tools without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly routes the agent: discover tag IDs here before the risk, compliance, dependency or export tools, or before add/remove membership; and it names the alternative (list_model_groups) for a single model's tags. When-to-use and alternative are both stated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_model_groupsList Model GroupsA
List the tags a given model belongs to. Read-only; no side effects.
A model may belong to many tags. Returns {model_id, tags: [...]}. Use
list_groups for every tag in the workspace.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | the model whose tags to list. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden, and it does declare 'Read-only; no side effects' plus the return shape. However it omits auth/permission requirements, pagination, and behavior when the model has no tags, so it is adequate rather than rich.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences, front-loaded with the purpose, then the read-only note, then the return shape and alternative. Every sentence earns its place with no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Output shape is covered by the description and an output schema exists; the read-only nature and the list_groups alternative are stated. The main gap is the unaddressed server_version parameter, which leaves an agent guessing about a required argument.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50%: model_id is documented in the schema while server_version is undocumented anywhere, and the description adds no parameter-level detail beyond implying a single model. With low coverage the description should compensate but does not.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('List the tags a given model belongs to') and explicitly contrasts with the sibling list_groups ('for every tag in the workspace'). An agent can distinguish this per-model listing from the workspace-wide listing without opening either schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Names an alternative (list_groups) and the condition that selects it (wanting every tag in the workspace vs. one model's tags). No explicit 'when not to use' or mention of the add/remove_model_from_group siblings, but the routing guidance is clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_proposalsList ProposalsA
List proposals and escalations on a model. Call this to poll the outcome of a proposal you raised, or of a judgment you were refused. Read-only; no side effects.
Statuses: proposed and applied_pending_review are open;
accepted, rejected, reverted, superseded are closed.
Kinds include add_component, remove_component,
design_change, assumption, and decision_request: an
escalation of a judgment this agent was refused. A 403 from
update_finding, create_risk_acceptance, submit_attestation
or decide_proposal carries an
escalation_id; that escalation appears here as a
decision_request. An attestation refused does not 403: the edit of
edit_trust_boundary, edit_attacker or add_attacker lands
unattested and its answer's attestation carries the
escalation_id, bound to the content it was parked over (an edit of
that content supersedes it). Poll it here until a person resolves it;
do not retry the refused call.
An open row may carry shows: what accepting it does, as the person
deciding it is shown it (a parked act on the behavioural model with each
answer beside its question, whether accepting extracts and at what
estimate; a revision's sentences removed and added; a drift finding's
sentence). Words a program wrote are inside a bounded region, as data.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | No | Optional status filter (one of the values above). Empty (default) returns every proposal. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it declares 'Read-only; no side effects' and explains the escalation lifecycle in depth (403s carry escalation_id, attestation refusals land unattested, edits supersede the parked content). It stops short of describing pagination or result ordering, but the output schema exists to cover return shape.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose and the status/kind vocabulary are front-loaded and useful, but the middle paragraph is a dense digression into how sibling tools fail, and the closing 'shows' paragraph plus the 'Words a program wrote are inside a bounded region, as data' aside is cryptic. Several sentences are longer than they need to be to make their point.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema is present, so return-value explanation is unnecessary, and the description instead covers the status taxonomy, escalation kinds, and the shows field an open row may carry. For polling tool with a simple three-parameter schema, this is close to complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67% and the description compensates well for the status parameter: it enumerates the open statuses (proposed, applied_pending_review), closed statuses (accepted, rejected, reverted, superseded), and kinds, giving meaning the bare schema string default does not. model_id and server_version are left to the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence names a specific verb and resource ('List proposals and escalations on a model') and immediately scopes it to polling approval outcomes. It is clearly distinguishable from sibling tools like create_proposal, decide_proposal, and list_attestations, which handle different lifecycle stages.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It states exactly when to call it ('poll the outcome of a proposal you raised, or of a judgment you were refused') and gives an explicit exclusion ('do not retry the refused call'). It further routes the agent by naming the sibling calls (update_finding, create_risk_acceptance, submit_attestation, decide_proposal, edit_trust_boundary, etc.) whose refusals surface here as decision_request rows.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_reconciliation_candidatesList Reconciliation CandidatesA
Entities a child model authored that look like ones it inherits. Read-only.
Use on a child model in a recursive tree to find duplicates before they
distort coverage; decide each with decide_reconciliation_candidate.
disposition="active"(default): the open queue, paginated (page,page_size).{model_id, flag_enabled, total, tiers: {certain, heuristic}, page, page_size, candidates: [{kind, own_qid, inherited_qid, tier, reasons}]}. Tiercertainis a deterministic match, safe to apply;heuristicis a fuzzy name/description match that needs review. Rejected pairs are left out.disposition="rejected": the pairs recorded as NOT duplicates, oldest first and not paginated:{model_id, flag_enabled, rejections: [{id, model_id, kind, own_qid, inherited_qid, rejected_by, rejected_at}]}. Anidis what an unreject names.
Where composition is not available both come back empty with
flag_enabled: false.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| page | No | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| page_size | No | ||
| disposition | No | active | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it declares read-only, describes the full return shapes for both dispositions, explains the 'certain' vs 'heuristic' tier semantics and that certain is safe to apply, notes rejections are excluded, and discloses the composition-unavailable edge case returning empty with flag_enabled: false.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the purpose and read-only hint, then uses bullets for each disposition with inline response shapes. Dense but every clause adds selection or behavioral information; slightly heavy given how much overlaps the output schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 5-parameter read tool with an output schema, the description covers trigger conditions, both modes, tier meanings, the reject/unreject flow, and the degraded empty-result case. Nothing needed to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It explains disposition values and the pagination contrast (active paginated via page/page_size, rejected not paginated), but model_id and server_version are never described and page/page_size semantics remain thin. Partial compensation only.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('list reconciliation candidates') and defines exactly what they are: entities a child model authored that duplicate ones it inherits. It distinguishes itself from the sibling decide_reconciliation_candidate by naming it as the follow-up action.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit when: 'on a child model in a recursive tree to find duplicates before they distort coverage.' It also routes the agent to decide_reconciliation_candidate for disposition, and explains which disposition value selects which result set.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_relianceList RelianceA
List a model's cross-model dependency edges, in both directions.
Read-only; no side effects. Returns {model_id, as_consumer: [...], as_provider: [...]}. Consumer edges are this model's declared delegations / reliances on other models' controls; provider edges are other models relying on this one (its blast radius if its controls change).
Use this to inspect existing dependencies before creating or deleting edges (manage_reliance / attach_foundation), or to understand what breaks if this model's controls change.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the model to inspect. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden: it discloses 'read-only; no side effects' and explains the semantic meaning of both edge directions (consumer = declared delegations, provider = blast radius). It does not mention permissions/scoping or pagination, which are the remaining behavioral gaps for a full burden-of-proof case.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the operation and read-only guarantee, then return shape, then usage. The parenthetical about blast radius and the nested parentheses around sibling tool names add some density, but every sentence contributes meaning.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only list tool with an output schema, the description covers purpose, usage, and interpretation of results (consumer vs provider edges). It is close to complete; only minor operational details (empty-model behavior, pagination/scoping) are absent.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 50%: model_id is documented in the schema, while server_version is undocumented in both places. The description implies model scope ('a model's') but adds no syntax, format, or semantics for either parameter, so the baseline 3 for schema-driven parameters applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('List a model's cross-model dependency edges') plus the scope ('in both directions'), and names the sibling mechanisms it relates to (manage_reliance / attach_foundation). An agent can distinguish it from generic dependency tools like get_system_dependencies or link_system_dependency.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says when to use it: to inspect existing dependencies before creating or deleting edges, and to understand blast radius if controls change. It names the alternative tools (manage_reliance, attach_foundation) that perform the mutations, leaving no ambiguity about read vs write routing.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_risk_acceptancesList Risk AcceptancesA
List all risk acceptances on a specific threat model — risks that an operator explicitly accepted instead of mitigating.
Each entry carries the CO id, owner, justification, status
(active / expired / revoked), and the review
deadline. Use to inspect which gaps were intentionally accepted
versus genuinely unaddressed when triaging at-risk COs.
Returns risk acceptances ONLY. An objective declared not applicable is a
different claim — it is not an accepted risk, and counting it as one would
read a "does not apply here" as "we are carrying this exposure". Use
list_co_dispositions to see those, or both together.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses entry fields, statuses, and the key semantic boundary that not-applicable objectives are excluded. It does not explicitly note side-effect-free read behavior, but 'List' strongly implies it, and the output schema covers the return structure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core function, then explains usage, and ends with an important cautionary note distinguishing acceptances from N/A dispositions. The length is justified by the conceptual subtlety, though it could be tightened slightly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values are covered. The description explains scope, entry content, and its relationship to list_co_dispositions. Missing only server_version semantics and typical list-tool constraints like pagination, which are non-essential for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50%: model_id has a schema description while server_version does not. The description reinforces model_id with 'on a specific threat model' but never explains server_version, leaving a gap in parameter understanding.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: 'List all risk acceptances on a specific threat model.' It also explicitly distinguishes this from list_co_dispositions by clarifying that non-applicable objectives are not risk acceptances, making sibling differentiation clear.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It provides explicit usage context: 'Use to inspect which gaps were intentionally accepted versus genuinely unaddressed when triaging at-risk COs.' It also names the alternative tool for non-applicable objectives and suggests using both together, giving the agent clear selection guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_threat_modelsList Threat ModelsA
List saved threat models in the current workspace.
Read-only; no side effects. Returns {items: [{id, title, version, created_at, ...}], count}. Use this to discover model IDs to pass to other tools, or for a portfolio overview.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| source | No | Filter by the system that created each model. One of "web", "mcp", "jira", "api". Omit (default "") to list all models regardless of source. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| include_assessment_summary | No | If True, include an `assessment_summary` object per model (counts of mitigated / at_risk / unassessed control objectives plus a human-readable `message`). Use for aggregate posture queries across the workspace in a single call (e.g. "which of my models are at risk?") instead of calling `assess_model` once per model. Adds roughly 100 bytes per model. Default False. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description must carry the burden of behavioral disclosure. It explicitly states 'Read-only; no side effects' and describes the return shape as {items: [{id, title, version, created_at, ...}], count}. This is strong transparency for a list operation, though it does not mention pagination, authentication, or rate limits.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences with no wasted words. It front-loads the action and resource, then states side-effect behavior, return shape, and intended use in a compact, scannable way.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is largely complete for a read-only list tool: it covers purpose, side-effect profile, return shape, and primary use cases. The main missing context is an explicit note about the required server_version parameter and guidance distinguishing this from get_threat_model for detailed model retrieval.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 67%, covering source and include_assessment_summary, but the required server_version parameter has no description. The main description adds no extra parameter-level meaning beyond the schema, so the undocumented required parameter remains a gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states it lists saved threat models in the current workspace, with a specific verb and resource. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from related siblings like get_threat_model or query_threat_model, but the term 'list' plus the focus on model IDs and portfolio overview make the core purpose unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives concrete use cases: discovering model IDs to pass to other tools and portfolio overview. It does not explicitly say when to prefer alternatives such as get_threat_model or query_threat_model, but the use cases are helpful enough to orient an agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
manage_model_checkManage Model CheckA
Pause, resume or discard a model's live model check. Mutating.
action="pause": a queued check pauses at once, a running one at its next stage (pausinguntil then). Idempotent. What it already ran is charged. Returns{paused: true, job_id, status}.action="resume": a paused check resumes at the stage it stopped in. Returns{resumed: true, job_id, status: "queued"}.action="discard": drops a queued or paused check; a running one is refused until it is paused. What it already ran is charged. Returns{discarded: true, job_id, status: "discarded"}.
A refusal comes back as data, {paused|resumed|discarded: false, http_status: 409, code, message}: not_running (no check is live),
pause_in_progress (still stopping: resume once it reads paused),
not_paused, pause_first (pause a running check before
discarding it).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | Yes | "pause", "resume" or "discard". | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and discharges it: it declares the tool mutating, states pause idempotency, discloses the side effect that work already run is charged, and specifies that refusals return as data (HTTP 409 with codes like not_running, pause_in_progress, not_paused, pause_first) rather than as exceptions. It also describes the intermediate 'pausing' state and where resume re-enters.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One lead sentence establishes verb, resource, and mutating nature, then three parallel per-action bullets each ending in the exact return shape, followed by the refusal-code list. It is dense but every clause carries operational information and nothing is repeated.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a three-parameter mutation tool with no annotations, the description covers actions, state transitions, preconditions, return payloads, and failure codes. Its one shortfall is that it restates return values that the output schema already provides, and it says nothing about permissions or how to obtain model_id.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 67% (server_version is undocumented), and the description more than compensates for the action parameter by defining each enum value's effect, timing, and result payload, which the bare enum cannot convey. model_id is left to the schema, and server_version remains unexplained in both places.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence names a specific verb set (pause/resume/discard) against a specific resource (a model's live model check) and flags the operation as mutating. It is clearly separable from read siblings like get_model_check and create-side siblings like request_model_check without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Each action's precondition is spelled out (discard refused while running until paused, resume only after status reads 'paused', pause is idempotent), which is real when-to-use guidance. It stops short of routing the agent to alternatives such as get_model_check for inspecting state or request_model_check for starting a check, so it is clear context without explicit sibling exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
manage_relianceManage RelianceA
Create, confirm or delete one cross-model reliance edge. Mutating.
action="create" declares that model_id relies on a provider
control (the target is ALWAYS a control, so credit ends at a proven
mechanism). mode is delegated (this model does not implement the
objective; pass source_objective_id) or relied_upon (this model's
own control depends on the provider's; pass source_control_id). The
provider must be in the same workspace. The edge enters draft, runs
LLM semantic validation, and carries no credit until confirmed. Returns
the edge.
action="confirm" promotes the draft edge_id to active, the
credit-soundness gate: refused unless validation returned valid; a
partial result or a mode mismatch is never silently credited.
Returns the edge.
action="delete" permanently removes edge_id, withdrawing any
credit the consumer derived from it (its coverage can move); neither
model's controls change. Returns {deleted: true, edge_id}.
list_reliance shows a model's edges and their ids.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| mode | No | ||
| action | Yes | ||
| edge_id | No | ||
| model_id | No | ||
| server_version | Yes | ||
| provider_model_id | No | ||
| source_control_id | No | ||
| provider_control_id | No | ||
| source_objective_id | No | ||
| accept_partial_as_relied_upon | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: create enters a draft state, runs LLM semantic validation, and carries no credit until confirmed; confirm is refused unless validation returned valid and never silently credits a partial or mode mismatch; delete permanently removes the edge and withdraws derived credit without altering either model's controls. These are exactly the side effects and gating rules an agent needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Well structured with a front-loaded summary followed by per-action paragraphs, so an agent can jump to the relevant action. It is somewhat verbose and repeats 'Returns the edge' three times, which slightly dilutes density.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given an output schema exists, return values need not be spelled out, yet the description still notes the edge object and the {deleted, edge_id} shape. Combined with the per-action lifecycle and validation gating, nothing material is missing for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% across 10 parameters, so the description must compensate and largely does: it defines mode values (delegated vs relied_upon) and which source id each requires, the edge_id used by confirm/delete, and the same-workspace constraint on the provider. It omits accept_partial_as_relied_upon and server_version, leaving a small gap, so not a full 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb set and resource ('Create, confirm or delete one cross-model reliance edge') and immediately flags the mutating nature. It explicitly distinguishes itself from the sibling list_reliance, which it names as the read path. An agent can tell exactly what this tool does without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Each action is given its own condition: create declares a reliance with a mode-dependent source id, confirm is the credit-soundness gate that requires valid validation, delete withdraws derived credit. It also routes to list_reliance for retrieving edge ids. It lacks explicit 'when not to use' guidance, so it falls just short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
map_control_to_requirementMap Control To RequirementA
Manually map one security control to one compliance-framework requirement. Mutating: records a control-to-requirement mapping, which re-derives that requirement's coverage in the compliance report.
Use for a single, deliberate mapping you are asserting by hand. To let the LLM propose mappings across many requirements at once, use auto_map_controls; to close gaps end-to-end (map + exclude + fill), use auto_remediate_compliance.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| notes | No | Optional free-text note explaining the mapping rationale. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| confidence | No | Provenance label recorded on the mapping: "manual" (default, operator-asserted), "llm" (machine-suggested), or "verified" (human-confirmed). | manual |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control to map (e.g. "CTRL-01"). | |
| framework_id | Yes | ID of the compliance framework. | |
| requirement_id | Yes | ID of the requirement to map to (e.g. "V2.1.1"). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations exist, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It opens with 'Mutating:' and explains the consequence: recording the mapping re-derives that requirement's coverage in the compliance report. It does not state idempotency or overwrite behavior, but the core side effect is clearly disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences: the first states the action and side effect, the second gives usage guidance and alternatives. No filler, and the most important information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present and high parameter coverage, the description covers the key decision factors: what it does, that it mutates, the resulting report effect, and when to choose an alternative. Minor omissions like overwrite semantics and the unexplained required 'server_version' parameter keep it from a perfect score.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 86%, so the schema already documents most parameters with examples. The description adds only indirect context — 'asserting by hand' aligns with the confidence default 'manual' — but offers no new parameter semantics beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description states a specific verb ('map'), resource ('one security control to one compliance-framework requirement'), and explicitly scopes to a single deliberate mapping. It distinguishes itself from siblings by naming auto_map_controls (many at once) and auto_remediate_compliance (end-to-end gap closure).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says 'Use for a single, deliberate mapping you are asserting by hand.' Names two alternatives with the exact conditions for choosing them: batch LLM proposals via auto_map_controls, and end-to-end gap closure via auto_remediate_compliance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
model_coherence_reportModel Coherence ReportA
How coherent a model's structure is: its component bindings, the repos its controls' assertions name, and whether every CO is structurally reachable. Read-only.
Pass co_id to keep only the findings about that CO (404 if it does
not exist). Each finding carries type, severity, a message
and the ids it concerns, so its fix can be called directly:
control_component_unknown,assertion_repo_orphan,control_unscoped_with_scoped_assertions:assign_to_components(target_type="control").assertion_repo_mismatch: rebind the assertion or rescope the control.asset_component_unknown:edit_assetwith correctedcomponent_ids.component_unbound: for your own code,edit_componentwith the realrepo_url. An external-zone component (a third-party service, a customer's IdP) stays unbound: the finding is a permanent marker of an external dependency, not a TODO, and client code touching it is no reason to bind it.co_attacker_unpositioned:edit_attackerwithtrust_boundary_ids.co_asset_unbounded:assign_to_components(target_type="asset").co_no_shared_boundary: reposition the attacker or rescope the asset; if the boundaries truly do not meet, that is the answer.co_missing_entity:restore_entity, or remove the CO.
An indeterminate reachability verdict means the structure it needs is
missing: supply it. It never means the objective is inapplicable, which
is a separate claim recorded with create_co_disposition.
get_reachability_verdicts returns the raw verdicts.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_id | No | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden and does so well: it discloses the read-only nature, the 404-on-missing-CO behavior, the finding shape (type, severity, message, ids), and the nuanced semantics of an indeterminate reachability verdict. Remaining gaps (pagination, size limits, server_version semantics) are minor.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded and the description is organized with bullets, but it is long and dense for a read-only report, devoting substantial space to finding-type-to-fix mappings that border on workflow documentation. The information is useful but not tightly scoped.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return-value detail is technically unneeded, yet the description still explains the finding structure and routes each finding to a fix. Combined with the reachability-verdict caveat, it is nearly complete, with the only real hole being the unexplained required parameters.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does so only for co_id (filter scope, 404 behavior, default = all). Both required parameters, model_id and server_version, are completely unexplained in the schema and the description, leaving the majority of parameters undocumented.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific purpose: reporting how coherent a model's structure is across component bindings, assertion-name repos, and CO reachability, and explicitly marks it read-only. It partially distinguishes itself from the sibling get_reachability_verdicts ('returns the raw verdicts'), but other report siblings (assess_model, get_verification_report) are not referenced.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives concrete usage context: pass co_id to scope findings, and each finding type is mapped to a specific remediation tool call (assign_to_components, edit_asset, edit_component, etc.), which is strong when-to-do-what guidance. It also clarifies the indeterminate-verdict case versus create_co_disposition. There is no explicit 'do not use this when...' exclusion, keeping it below a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
pause_control_generationPause Control GenerationA
Pause a model's background control generation. Mutating.
Use when the user asks to stop a build — for example one started by
mistake — or before deleting a model whose controls are still being
built. A running build stops at its next step (status pausing,
then paused); a queued or waiting one is paused at once. Everything
already done is kept in the build's staging copy; nothing is published,
nothing new is started or billed, and nothing resumes it except
resume_control_generation. A paused build still holds the model: to
drop it instead, call discard_control_build once it shows paused.
Pausing is idempotent.
Returns one of:
{paused: true, model_id, status, status_detail}—statusispausing(still stopping) orpaused.{paused: false, http_status: 409, code: "not_running", status}— there is no generation to pause; readstatus.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model whose control generation to pause. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses the state machine (pausing then paused), that queued builds pause at once, that completed work is only in the staging copy, nothing is published or billed, nothing auto-resumes, there is no undo other than resume, it holds the model while paused, and pausing is idempotent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the action, the mutating flag, and the primary use case, then layers consequences and the return shape in clearly separated blocks. Dense but every clause (billing, idempotency, staging copy, alternatives) carries distinct information; only the length keeps it from a 5.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutation with no annotations, the description covers triggers, state transitions, side-effect boundaries, idempotency, recovery path, sibling disambiguation, and the two possible return shapes (including the 409 not_running case). Nothing needed to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 50%: model_id is documented in the schema, and the description's framing ('a model's background control generation') corroborates that target but adds no new semantics. server_version is undocumented in both places, and the description never compensates for it.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Pause a model's background control generation') plus the mutation nature in the first line. It is immediately distinguishable from resume_control_generation and discard_control_build, which are named later.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use triggers ('user asks to stop a build — for example one started by mistake — or before deleting a model whose controls are still being built') and names the two alternatives (resume_control_generation, discard_control_build) with the condition that selects each.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
query_threat_modelQuery Threat ModelA
Ask a natural-language question about an existing threat model.
Read-only; no side effects (no new version, no mutation). Uses AI to answer questions grounded in the model's assets, attackers, control objectives, assumptions, and current security posture, returning {model_id, answer} where answer is prose.
Use this for interpretation or summary questions ("what are the biggest gaps?", "which attackers target the token store?"). Do NOT use it to change the model — use refine_threat_model for that — and prefer get_threat_model / assess_model when you need structured data (entity lists, coverage counts) rather than a written answer.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model to query. | |
| question | Yes | The natural-language question to ask. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, and it succeeds: it declares 'Read-only; no side effects (no new version, no mutation)', explains that AI is used, specifies that answers are grounded in model entities, and gives the return shape {model_id, answer}. This is unusually transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with purpose, then behavior, then usage boundaries. Every sentence earns its place, and the three short paragraphs are easy to scan for an agent deciding whether to invoke this tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is remarkably complete for a read-only query tool: it covers behavior, return shape, use cases, and sibling alternatives. The only notable omission is any explanation of the required server_version parameter, which prevents a perfect score.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The description adds useful semantics for the question parameter (interpretation/summary questions, with examples) and implies model_id must reference an existing model. However, the required server_version parameter is completely undocumented in both the schema and the description, leaving a clear gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Ask a natural-language question about an existing threat model.' It also distinguishes itself from likely siblings by explicitly saying it is not for mutation (refine_threat_model) and not for structured data (get_threat_model / assess_model).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly states when to use the tool ('interpretation or summary questions'), when not to use it ('Do NOT use it to change the model'), and which alternatives to prefer for structured data. This leaves little to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
recompute_verdictsRecompute VerdictsA
Estimate, force, or retry a model's verdict evaluation.
mode="quote"(default): read-only. The cost of a recompute, enqueueing nothing:{estimated_credits, computed_at, rate_version, informational, total_enqueueable, already_evaluated, governor}. Subjects already carrying a verdict cost nothing, so it is an upper bound. Show the operator this number before recomputing: on a large model it runs to thousands of credits.mode="recompute": mutating. Queues a fresh evaluation of every control's coverage verdict and every live objective's group-sufficiency verdict, bypassing quiet-period batching; usage is metered as it runs. Returns{model_id, model_version, enqueued_coverage, enqueued_group_sufficiency, total_enqueued, estimated_credits, quote, governor}.mode="retry_parked": re-runs only the verdicts a transient failure (outage, exhausted credits, timeout) parked, of every kind, including per-control sufficiency and coherence; nothing else is touched. Returns{model_id, model_version, retried_slots, governor}.
Work runs in the background; when governor.exhausted it is queued and
resumes at governor.resets_at, never dropped.
A recompute evaluates COVERAGE and GROUP SUFFICIENCY only. A control at
partially_verified, or coherence_status: "pending" on an
assertion, is not a reason to recompute: that verdict is computed on
assertion write and read with get_sufficiency. Recompute when
control-to-CO mappings look wrong (get_verdict_divergence). One
objective awaiting judgement is judge_objective.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| mode | No | quote | |
| model_id | Yes | ||
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description carries the full burden and does so: it labels mode='quote' read-only and mode='recompute' mutating, explains that usage is metered as it runs, that subjects already carrying a verdict cost nothing, that work runs in the background, and that a governor.exhausted run is queued and resumes at governor.resets_at rather than dropped. It also warns the operator to see the credit estimate first, which is exactly the kind of cost/side-effect disclosure an agent needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the verb and the three mode names, then bulleted per mode, with the caveats in a final block. Efficient for the amount of behavior being disclosed, though the per-mode return-object listings border on verbose and overlap the output schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a three-mode, mutating, cost-incurring tool with an output schema, the description covers mode selection, mutation/read-only semantics, cost, background execution, governor exhaustion behavior, and sibling alternatives. The only omission is model_id/server_version semantics, which is minor relative to the completeness elsewhere.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It fully documents the 'mode' enum (including the default and the distinct behavior/return shape of each value), but model_id and server_version — both required-adjacent inputs — get no explanation at all. Mode is the highest-value parameter and is well served, but the remaining gap keeps this at baseline-plus rather than high.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('Estimate, force, or retry') over a specific resource ('a model's verdict evaluation'), then breaks the three modes apart so an agent knows exactly which operation it is invoking. It explicitly differentiates itself from siblings like get_sufficiency, get_verdict_divergence, and judge_objective, so the agent can route without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use per mode (quote = read-only estimate, recompute = mutating full re-evaluation, retry_parked = only transient-failure-parked verdicts) and explicit when-NOT-to-use ('A control at partially_verified, or coherence_status: pending ... is not a reason to recompute') plus the correct alternatives for those cases. Nothing is left to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
reconcile_modelReconcile ModelA
Reconcile a threat model with the code it describes. Call this after reading the code and before (or instead of) editing the model by hand: report what changed and what you observed, and the platform decides the consequence of each observation. Mutating only where the platform applies an observation (see below).
Two inputs, both optional:
changed_paths: the file paths that changed since the model's recorded commit. For a code-derived model compute them withgit diff --name-only <commit_sha>..HEAD(thecommit_shafrom the model's provenance). The platform maps them onto components and reports which components changed, which paths no component claims, and whether a refresh is recommended.observations: what you saw in the code that the model does not say. Each observation lands in one of four buckets bykind:mechanism_named- the control's mechanism exists under another name (subject_id= control id). Follow up withrefine_controlusing thecodebase_findingsreturned inrefine_suggested.component_present- the code has a component the model lacks; include aproposal({name, repo_url?, path?, trust_boundary_ids?}).component_absent- a modelled component has no code (subject_id= component id).forbidden_behavior- the code does something the model rules out (subject_id= control id, or empty).
The platform decides the consequence. Proposals are never applied on
the agent's word, with one exception: a component change on a
code-derived model (provenance kind="code") is applied immediately
and queued for a person's review as applied_pending_review. Every
other proposal waits for decide_proposal. Forbidden behaviors
become findings. Observations the platform could not use come back in
ignored with the reason.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| repo_url | No | Repository the paths belong to (optional; helps map paths in multi-repo models). | |
| observations | No | JSON string of an **array** of observation objects, each ``{kind, subject_id?, evidence?: {paths?: [], symbols?: [], note?: ""}, proposal?: {name, repo_url?, path?, trust_boundary_ids?}}`` with ``kind`` one of ``mechanism_named``, ``component_present``, ``component_absent``, ``forbidden_behavior``. Empty/None sends no observations. | |
| changed_paths | No | Comma- or newline-separated file paths that changed since the model's recorded commit. Empty/None skips path mapping (``changed_paths`` in the response is then null). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description fully carries the behavioral transparency burden. It discloses mutation semantics ('Mutating only where the platform applies an observation'), the immediate-apply exception with 'applied_pending_review', the fallback to decide_proposal, forbidden behaviors becoming findings, and ignored observations with reasons. This is exemplary disclosure of side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but densely structured with a clear lead sentence, labeled optional inputs, and bullet-like kind explanations. Every section earns its place, and the most important guidance appears first. The formatting makes a complex set of behaviors scannable.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex reconciliation tool with no annotations, the description is remarkably thorough: inputs, observation buckets, consequences, exceptions, and ignored outcomes are all covered. The only notable omission is that server_version, a required parameter, is not explained anywhere; otherwise, an agent has enough context to invoke the tool and interpret its role in the workflow.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The description adds substantial meaning beyond the schema, especially for changed_paths (including the git diff command and provenance commit_sha) and observations (explaining each kind's meaning, required fields, and consequences). However, server_version is a required parameter with no schema description and is not mentioned in the description, leaving a small gap despite the 80% schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Reconcile a threat model with the code it describes.' It clearly distinguishes this tool from hand-editing and from related sibling tools like refine_control and decide_proposal by explaining that the platform decides consequences rather than the agent directly editing.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit usage guidance is front-loaded: 'Call this after reading the code and before (or instead of) editing the model by hand.' It also names follow-up actions ('Follow up with refine_control...'), states when proposals wait for decide_proposal, and explains the exception for code-derived models. This gives an agent clear decision rules.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
reevaluate_threat_model_factorsReevaluate Threat Model FactorsA
Re-run the LLM factor judgment on a model's live assets and
attackers: every one, those entity_ids names, only those nobody
rated (unrated_only), or only those whose rating was made for
another description of the system (stale_only, an entity's
rating_stale; with both flags, either). With entity_ids a flag
narrows to those named. The review queue's rating_stale row names the
request that re-rates its entities. Re-baselines factors after a bug fix
or description change, or rates what reads "not rated", without
regenerating the model (which would destroy controls, assertions,
components). One call per entity in scope, at your cost; an id naming no
live asset or attacker is refused (400) before any call; a scope naming
none makes no call.
A rating a model made is replaced with a fresh decomposition and its
impact / likelihood re-derived from it. A rating a person chose is never
replaced: the answer is held pending beside it (rating_pending on
get_entity), the more severe of the two in force, until someone
settles them with settle_entity_rating. Each re-rating is a rating
revision recorded with change_reason (default "LLM factor
re-evaluation"), told apart from overrides made with edit_asset /
edit_attacker. The judgment is a starting point: layer
deployment-specific factors on top with those, and a change_reason
saying why.
Per-entity soft-fail: a failure on one entity lands in
failed_entities (id, kind, reason) and the rest still
persist; 503 only when every entity in scope failed, with nothing
persisted. Soft-deleted entities are skipped.
Re-ratings keep the model version, except where an answer changes an
attacker's attack_vector or privileges_required: reachability
reads both, so the run saves one new version carrying every answer,
and a proposal reviewed before it reads review_stale. Privileges a
person attested, or that what the attacker holds gives, are no rating's:
an answer never moves them.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model to re-rate. | |
| entity_ids | No | Optional comma-separated asset and attacker ids (e.g. "A-03,T-14"); omit for every live entity. | |
| stale_only | No | Only entities rated for another description. Default False. | |
| unrated_only | No | Only entities whose ``rating_source`` is ``unrated``. Default False. | |
| change_reason | No | Optional audit-trail reason (default "LLM factor re-evaluation"). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations exist, so the description carries the full burden and does: cost model ("one call per entity in scope, at your cost"), pre-flight validation (400 on an id naming no live entity, no call made), soft-fail semantics with failed_entities and 503 only when all fail, soft-deleted entities skipped, and conditional version bumping when attack_vector or privileges_required change. It also discloses that human-chosen ratings are never overwritten but held as rating_pending with the more severe value in force, which is critical and non-obvious behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The core action and scope modes are front-loaded, followed by consequences, then edge cases — a sensible ordering. It is dense but nearly every sentence carries operational information (cost, 400, soft-fail, version bump, pending ratings); only a few phrasings could be tightened without losing meaning.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 6-parameter mutation whose output schema already covers return values, the description supplies everything else an agent needs: scoping rules, cost, error contracts, partial-failure shape, versioning side effects, and the human-rating conflict path. Nothing material is left to inference.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds genuine meaning the schema does not: how entity_ids interacts with the flags ("With entity_ids a flag narrows to those named"), and that stale_only + unrated_only together mean either. It also explains rating_stale and the 'not rated' reading behind unrated_only, and the default change_reason string.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb + resource + scope: "Re-run the LLM factor judgment on a model's live assets and attackers," then enumerates the three scope modes. An agent can tell this apart from sibling mutations like refine_threat_model, regenerate_controls, or edit_asset without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states when to use it ("Re-baselines factors after a bug fix or description change, or rates what reads 'not rated'" from the review queue's rating_stale row) and what not to use instead ("without regenerating the model (which would destroy controls, assertions, components)"). It also routes to the correct siblings: settle_entity_rating for pending human ratings and edit_asset/edit_attacker for layering deployment-specific factors.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
refine_controlRefine ControlA
Refine a control's description with AI-gated CO sufficiency check.
Two modes:
Provide
description: proposes a new description directly.Provide
codebase_findings: the platform proposes a description based on existing code that may already satisfy the control.Both can be provided: the platform evaluates the proposed description with the codebase findings as context.
The AI evaluates whether the mitigation group still collectively satisfies all mapped control objectives. If rejected, returns {accepted: false, reason, per_co} with per-CO reasoning.
A refinement is rejected when the proposed description would reduce the
protection the control currently states for an objective it is mapped to;
per_co names each objective and explains why. This is a decision, not a
transient error — re-wording the same narrowing will not pass it, and it
applies however well-motivated the narrowing is. A control is a requirement
that must be met to cover its objectives, so evidence that the system does
not currently meet it means the control is UNMET, never that the control
should ask for less.
After an accepted refinement the control's assertions are kept
and judged again against the new description in the background: an
assertion that still fits keeps counting as evidence, and one that no
longer fits is flagged as not aligned with the control. Read
get_sufficiency once that re-judgement lands, and replace the
assertions it names. The refinement itself supersedes nothing; the
response's superseded_assertions is always 0.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control to refine (e.g., "CTRL-03"). | |
| description | No | Proposed new control description (optional if codebase_findings provided). | |
| justification | No | Why this refinement is appropriate (10 to 2000 characters). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| codebase_findings | No | Description of existing code that may already satisfy this control's objective (optional). When provided without description, the platform proposes a description. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses the rejection response shape ({accepted, reason, per_co}), the rejection rule (narrowing protection for a mapped objective), that rejection is a decision rather than a transient error that re-wording will not pass, and the background re-judgement of assertions after acceptance including that `superseded_assertions` is always 0.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose is front-loaded in the first line, then modes, then rejection semantics, then the post-acceptance workflow — a logical progression. It is on the long side and the closing note about `superseded_assertions` being always 0 is somewhat tangential, but nearly every sentence carries operational content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a high-complexity, AI-gated mutation tool, the description covers mode selection, the rejection contract, the non-retryable nature of rejection, and the required follow-up call to get_sufficiency. An output schema exists, so return-value enumeration is not needed, and the description still names the rejection payload fields.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is already 83%, so the schema defines most parameters. The description nonetheless adds real meaning beyond it by explaining the interaction between `description` and `codebase_findings` (each alone triggers a different mode; together they combine), which the schema only hints at with 'optional if codebase_findings provided'.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('Refine a control's description') plus the gating mechanism ('AI-gated CO sufficiency check'), and breaks out the two operating modes by parameter. It is clear what the tool does, though it never names which sibling to use instead (e.g., regenerate_controls, strengthen_controls, remap_control), so differentiation is inferential.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly tells the agent which parameters select which behavior: provide `description` for a direct proposal, `codebase_findings` for a platform proposal, or both for context-augmented evaluation. It also states the post-acceptance follow-up ('Read get_sufficiency once that re-judgement lands'). It lacks any when-not-to-use guidance relative to sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
refine_threat_modelRefine Threat ModelA
Refine an existing threat model based on an instruction.
Updates the model's assets, attackers, trust boundaries, and control objectives based on the instruction. Creates a new version. Progress is reported automatically.
Refine CANNOT silently replace an entity's identity under a stable ID or silently drop an entity. Behavior:
Preserved entities where the LLM proposed an identity- bearing rewrite (name / description / security_properties on assets; capability / archetype / position on attackers) run through a semantic-preservation guard. Rewrites classified as
replaceorambiguous(orunavailableif the gate LLM is down) have their identity fields REVERTED to the pre-refine values. Each rejection shows up as an entry in thesemantic_rejectionsarray in this tool's return value — surface these to the operator.Entities the LLM drops from the refined output are re- appended to the model unchanged. The only sanctioned removal path is
remove_entity (entity_type="asset")/remove_entity (entity_type="attacker")(soft-delete).CO IDs are stable across refinements; pairs (asset, attacker) that disappear come back as tombstones with
removed=True(not renumbered). Controls that only mapped to tombstoned COs become orphaned at read time.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model to refine. | |
| instruction | Yes | What to change, e.g. "Add CSRF attack vectors". | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses preservation guarantees, the semantic-preservation guard, reverting identity fields, semantic_rejections, re-appending dropped entities, stable CO IDs, tombstones, orphaned controls, and the sanctioned removal path through remove_entity.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with a concise summary and then structured into clear behavior bullets. The length is justified by the non-obvious preservation, revert, tombstone, and orphan semantics it must communicate; each sentence adds needed detail.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers purpose, side effects, edge cases, and the key return artifact (semantic_rejections), and an output schema is present to define return values. It provides enough behavioral context for an agent to invoke the tool correctly, especially given the complex preservation guarantees.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already documents model_id and instruction, and the description adds some meaning by explaining what the instruction changes. However, server_version is a required parameter with no schema description and no mention in the tool description, so the parameter semantic coverage remains incomplete.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Refine'), a specific resource ('an existing threat model'), and the exact elements updated (assets, attackers, trust boundaries, control objectives), plus the fact that it creates a new version. This clearly distinguishes it from generation or query siblings like generate_threat_model or get_threat_model.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The opening sentence implies the use case: refine an existing threat model based on an instruction. However, it does not explicitly say when to use this tool over siblings like generate_threat_model or edit_asset, and it does not provide exclusion conditions or alternative routing.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
regenerate_controlsRegenerate ControlsA
Propose a regeneration of the model's controls. Starts nothing.
A regeneration re-authors controls from the current COs; its publish
creates the next model version. Controls whose descriptions survive
unchanged KEEP their implementation status, evidence, notes, assertions,
and Jira / compliance mappings. Controls whose descriptions change or
disappear are soft-deleted (still queryable via
get_controls(include_deleted=True)). When co_ids is given, only
those COs' controls are regenerated — all other controls are left as-is.
This tool records the regeneration as the model's PROPOSED build and
returns at once with status: "proposed" and proposal (mode,
objective_ids, objective_count, estimated_credits, and the
model_version, set_revision and scope_revision a start must
name). A proposal
merges with any already proposed for the model, the broader one winning.
Show the user what it would build and cost; once they agree, call
start_control_build with those values and confirm_estimate=True.
A build someone started holds the model, so this is refused (409
generation_active) until it finishes, or is resumed and finishes, or
is discarded.
To rebuild everything, omit co_ids. To fix only stale/orphaned CO
mappings without re-authoring control text, prefer remap_control
(mechanical, no LLM).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| mode | No | "batch" (default) or "per_co" (most thorough — one LLM call per CO). | batch |
| co_ids | No | Optional comma-separated CO IDs to regenerate (e.g. "CO1,CO5"). Omit to regenerate all controls. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| batch_size | No | COs per batch in batch mode (default 15). Smaller = more accurate and more granular progress, but more LLM calls. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it explains proposal merging, what happens to unchanged versus changed controls, soft-deletion, the immediate return shape, and the model-holding/refusal behavior. These details go well beyond the schema and make the side effects and state transitions clear.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the key distinction that this tool only proposes and starts nothing. It is necessarily detailed for a complex stateful operation, though it is long and repeats the co_ids omission behavior near the end.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complex proposal/build lifecycle, the absence of annotations, and the many sibling tools, the description provides a complete enough picture for correct invocation. It also explains the immediate return values and the required follow-up start_control_build call, despite an output schema existing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 80%, so the schema already documents most parameters. The description adds some co_ids semantics—only selected COs are regenerated and others are left as-is—but does not explain mode, batch_size, model_id, or server_version beyond what the schema provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: it *proposes* a regeneration of the model's controls, and explicitly says 'Starts nothing.' It clearly distinguishes itself from start_control_build and remap_control, so an agent can tell what this tool does without opening another schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit when/when-not guidance: call start_control_build after showing the user the proposal, omit co_ids to rebuild everything, and prefer remap_control for stale/orphaned mappings without re-authoring control text. It also explains the 409 generation_active refusal condition and the alternatives for resolving an active build.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
remap_controlRemap ControlA
Mechanical, non-AI-gated remap of a control's CO mappings.
Distinct from refine_control (AI-gated description edit) and
set_mitigation_groups (AI-gated CO-centric group authoring).
Use remap_control when the operator already knows the correct
co_ids and just needs to persist the mapping change — e.g.,
restoring mappings after an asset/attacker edit left the control
with stale or orphaned CO references. No LLM evaluation runs.
Rejects target co_ids that do not exist on the model or are tombstoned (the pair was removed in a later version) — map to live COs only.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_ids | Yes | Comma-separated list of target CO IDs (e.g., "CO1,CO2,CO3"). Must include at least one CO. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control to remap (e.g., "CTRL-03"). | |
| change_reason | Yes | Why this remapping is appropriate (min 10 chars). Captured in the control's version history. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It does so well by noting that no LLM evaluation runs, that the operation is purely mechanical, and that non-existent or tombstoned target co_ids are rejected. It does not discuss permissions, irreversibility, or whether existing mappings are replaced, but the core behavioral constraints are clearly disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded: the first sentence states the exact purpose, the next sentences add sibling differentiation and usage context, and the final sentence documents validation behavior. Every sentence earns its place and there is no redundant filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity, the description covers purpose, usage, alternatives, and key rejection behavior. An output schema exists, so return values do not need to be explained. The only small gap is the unexplained server_version parameter and the lack of explicit statement about whether the remap replaces all existing CO mappings or merges with them, but the overall context is strong.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 80%, so the schema already documents most parameters. The description adds extra meaning for co_ids by clarifying that targets must be live COs and that tombstoned/nonexistent IDs are rejected, which goes beyond the schema's 'must include at least one CO'. The only notable gap is server_version, which remains undocumented in both schema and description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Mechanical, non-AI-gated remap of a control's CO mappings.' It clearly names sibling tools it is distinct from (refine_control, set_mitigation_groups), eliminating ambiguity about what this tool does versus similar ones.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly states when to use this tool: when the operator already knows the correct co_ids and needs to persist a mapping change. It also provides a concrete example scenario (restoring stale/orphaned CO references) and distinguishes it from AI-gated alternatives. This leaves no doubt about selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
remediate_findingRemediate FindingA
Preview, and on confirmation apply, the platform's remediation of a finding.
Without apply it is read-only: it returns a structured diff of what
the remediation would change, shaped by the finding's kind (for
structural_duplicate_controls: which controls are kept, which
dropped, and the CO mappings and framework refs the survivor takes).
Show the operator that diff and get explicit confirmation.
With apply=True it commits the change, recording justification
(a one-line operator rationale, required) on the audit trail. Never
apply without having shown the preview: the platform records who acted
but does not enforce the preview — the agent does.
404 when the finding does not exist; 422 when its kind has no automatic remediation (resolve those with the control tools); applying a finding already remediated or dismissed is refused (409).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| apply | No | False (default) previews; True applies. | |
| finding_id | Yes | ID of the finding. | |
| justification | No | With ``apply=True``: the operator's rationale. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses the read-only vs mutating nature, the audit-trail recording of justification, the fact that the platform records who acted but does not enforce the preview, and exact error conditions (404, 422, 409).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core preview/apply distinction and then adds the confirmation, audit, and error details in tight, information-dense sentences. No sentence is wasted, and the structure mirrors the agent's decision path.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given a complex mutation with no annotations and an existing output schema, the description covers what an agent needs: preview vs commit, required confirmation, audit behavior, and failure modes. It also sketches the returned diff, so it is complete without duplicating the output schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, so the schema already documents apply, finding_id, and justification. The description adds useful meaning for apply and justification by explaining the confirmation workflow and audit-trail requirement, but it does not mention server_version at all, leaving one required parameter without semantic support.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a precise verb+resource: preview and optionally apply the platform's remediation of a finding. It clearly distinguishes the read-only preview mode from the mutating apply mode, and the scope is unambiguous relative to siblings like update_finding or auto_remediate_compliance.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit when-to-use guidance: without apply it is a preview, with apply=True it commits, and it says 'never apply without having shown the preview'. It also routes the agent away when the finding kind has no automatic remediation, telling it to resolve those with the control tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
remove_behavioural_elementRemove Behavioural ElementA
Remove an element of a model's behavioural model that the system does not have (an extraction read something the system does not hold, or put it where it is not). Mutating; creates a model version.
The removal is recorded beside the model, and every later extraction
withholds what it reads back of the element, under its id or another.
Only an element nothing else names can be removed: one an action, a
channel, a copy, a claim or a zone placement still names is refused 409
referenced, naming them; edit or remove those first. An element the
model lacks is 404 unknown_element. The removal changes the model's
ir_hash, which voids a confirmation. Writing an element under a
removed id with edit_behavioural_element withdraws the removal.
A removal narrows what the analysis reads, so it is a judgment: a
program's is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and parked for a
person unless the workspace's delegation policy admits it. Do not retry:
report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals. Remove only what
the documentation or the code shows the system does not have; never to
clear a question.
Returns the behavioural model as it now stands; removed lists every
standing removal.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| collection | Yes | The collection of ``get_behavioural_model``'s ``ir`` the element belongs to. | |
| element_id | Yes | The element's ``id``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations, so the description carries the full burden and does it thoroughly: mutating, creates a model version, changes ir_hash which voids a confirmation, removals are sticky and withhold later extraction reads, 409 referenced naming blockers, 404 unknown_element, and a 403 escalation flow with an escalation_id that must be reported and polled via list_proposals rather than retried.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action and severity, with error cases and escalation guidance following in a logical order. It is dense and slightly repetitive at points (the 'remove only what documentation shows' line restates the opening), keeping it below a 5.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Output schema exists so return values need no explanation, and the description still notes the response includes the model as it now stands with a 'removed' list. Combined with full error and escalation coverage for a mutating tool, nothing needed to invoke it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, so the schema documents most parameters already. The description adds the semantics that element_id may be matched 'under its id or another' and that collection indexes get_behavioural_model's ir, but says nothing about server_version and little beyond the schema for model_id. Baseline 3 fits.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('Remove an element of a model's behavioural model') with the scope clarified as wiping an erroneous extraction, not real content. The sibling edit_behavioural_element is explicitly contrasted (writing under a removed id withdraws the removal), so the agent can separate the two.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives when-to-use ('what the documentation or the code shows the system does not have'), explicit when-not ('never to clear a question'), prerequisites (element must no longer be named by an action, channel, copy, claim or zone placement), and the alternative path (edit/remove those first).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
remove_entityRemove EntityA
Soft-delete a single entity of any core type. Mutating: creates a
new model version. Reversible with restore_entity using the same
entity_type — the entity's ID is preserved (never reused) so a
restore reinstates the same ID and all its links. To change an
entity's fields instead of removing it, use the typed edit_* tool.
Runs as a background job, reporting progress while it waits; a job a client stops waiting for finishes or fails on its own. A removal that is refused (the entity is not found or already deleted, or it is the last live asset or attacker) fails with the reason.
Dispatches on entity_type. Per-type consequence (all derived at
read time; nothing is hard-destroyed):
asset— the asset's (asset × attacker) CO pairs are tombstoned, orphaning any controls mapped to them.attacker— control objectives anchored to this attacker are tombstoned; controls left with no live anchor become orphaned.component— controls scoped to this component have theircomponent_idcleared (the controls themselves are kept) and the component's trust-boundary contribution to asset reachability is withdrawn.trust_boundary— reachability widens: attacker vectors the boundary was filtering now pass freely and itssealed/isolation claim is dropped, so CO reachability verdicts past it can flip toward reachable/indeterminate.assumption— marked deleted (kept for the audit trail); its CO links are cleared and its attestations retired; controls whoseassumption_groupsname it keep their groups, which credit nothing through it while it is deleted.
Returns {model, entities, controls_carried, controls_orphaned, orphaned_control_ids}: the model's id, version and title, and the
entity as removed.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| entity_id | Yes | ID of the entity to soft-delete. | |
| entity_type | Yes | Which entity to soft-delete — one of ``asset``, ``attacker``, ``component``, ``trust_boundary``, ``assumption``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: mutating, creates a new model version, runs as a background job that completes even if the client stops waiting, and fails with a reason when the entity is not found, already deleted, or is the last live asset/attacker. Per-type consequences and the preserved-never-reused ID are disclosed in detail.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action, reversibility and sibling routing before the long per-type consequence block, which is bulleted and scannable. It is long for a delete tool, but nearly every sentence carries information an agent needs to predict side effects.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is complete enough to call this mutation safely: side effects per type, job semantics, failure modes, reversibility and the returned fields are all covered. Even though an output schema exists, the return summary ({model, entities, controls_carried, controls_orphaned, orphaned_control_ids}) adds useful orientation about cascade impact.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the description compensates well for the main gap by enumerating what each entity_type value actually does downstream (CO tombstoning, orphaning, reachability widening, audit retention). It also clarifies that entity_id is preserved and never reused. model_id and server_version get no semantic elaboration.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('soft-delete a single entity of any core type') and immediately distinguishes itself from two siblings: restore_entity for reversal and the typed edit_* tools for field changes. An agent can tell exactly what this does without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly names the alternatives for two adjacent intents ('Reversible with restore_entity using the same entity_type', 'To change an entity's fields instead of removing it, use the typed edit_* tool'). It gives clear context and acceptance/failure conditions, though it doesn't state outright when not to remove an entity at all.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
remove_model_from_groupRemove Model From GroupA
Remove a model from a tag. Mutating; the model itself is not deleted.
The frameworks the tag propagated to the model stay selected on it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| group_id | Yes | the tag. | |
| model_id | Yes | the model to remove. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the behavior burden and delivers two non-obvious facts: the operation is mutating but non-destructive, and the frameworks propagated to the model remain selected. It still omits auth/permission needs and reversibility.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, front-loaded with the action and its key side effect; nothing is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the description covers the main mutation semantics. Given no annotations, it could add permission or reversibility details, but what is present is largely sufficient.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 67% and the description usefully equates 'tag' with the group id and confirms model_id is the item removed, adding vocabulary meaning beyond the schema's terse descriptions. server_version remains undocumented in both.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource (remove a model from a tag) and clarifies the mutation scope. It implicitly differentiates from add_model_to_group by naming the inverse operation, but never names a sibling explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is implied by the name and the 'Remove a model from a tag' phrasing; the description gives no explicit when/when-not guidance or routing to alternatives like add_model_to_group or delete_group.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
request_delta_second_readingRequest Delta Second ReadingA
Read controls' text into deltas a second time, by a call not shown the drafts: a delta is declared only once its draft has been read twice.
Without confirm_estimate nothing is charged or written: the result
lists the controls it would read, those it skips (no_draft, or
read already) and the estimate, which must be RELAYED TO THE PERSON
first. Never confirm on your own. With it the reading is made, billed to
the caller (402 when the balance is short), and each control's outcome
is returned (usable, unusable, failed, unavailable).
Refused with 409 generation_active while a build holds the model.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_ids | Yes | Comma-separated control IDs, at most 30. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_estimate | No | True to make the reading after the person agreed. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so richly: dry-run vs billed execution, 402 on insufficient balance, 409 generation_active while a build holds the model, skipped-control reasons (no_draft, read already), and outcome values (usable, unusable, failed, unavailable). This is exactly the kind of side-effect and failure disclosure an agent needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core concept, then the dry-run/confirm split, then the refusal condition. Dense and each sentence carries information (billing, relay-to-person warning, error codes). Slightly long for the message, but nothing reads as filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating, billed operation with no annotations, this covers cost, refusal conditions, skip reasoning, per-control outcomes, and the mandatory human-relay step. An output schema exists, so return values needn't be spelled out, and the description still adds useful outcome semantics.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the schema already documents model_id, control_ids (the 30-ID cap), and confirm_estimate. The description reinforces confirm_estimate's intent but adds no syntax or format detail beyond the schema, and server_version is undocumented in both places. Baseline 3 is appropriate given the schema does the heavy lifting.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a specific verb and resource — reading controls' text into deltas a second time — and clarifies the defining constraint ('a delta is declared only once its draft has been read twice'). It doesn't name or contrast the sibling delta tools (get_control_delta, declare_control_delta, submit_control_delta), so the agent must infer the distinction, but the operation itself is unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit operational guidance: without confirm_estimate nothing is charged or written and the estimate 'must be RELAYED TO THE PERSON first. Never confirm on your own.' That is a clear when/when-not rule for the confirm flag. It stops short of positioning this tool against the other delta siblings, so it is clear context without alternative comparison.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
request_inventory_checksRequest Inventory ChecksA
Queue the checks a model's inventory lacks: the tag check of every entity whose tags are not current, and the duplicate check of every entry on a pair no current check covers. Mutating: queues background work.
Those the platform made stale are recorded as its own request, the rest
under the caller. Returns {model_id, queued, platform}: the checks
queued by kind, and the platform's share. Read the results with
get_inventory_judgements once they land.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden and mostly does: it declares the operation mutating, that work is queued in the background, that results are asynchronous and must be fetched later, and that attribution of the request differs for platform-stale items versus caller-initiated ones. It omits permissions, rate limits, and whether repeat calls deduplicate already-queued checks.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The core action is front-loaded in the first clause, and each subsequent sentence adds useful information (mutating/async nature, attribution rules, return shape, next step). It is somewhat dense and wordy in the attribution sentence, but nothing is redundant.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the return-value explanation is a bonus rather than a requirement. The description covers what gets queued, attribution, and the follow-up read, which is enough to call it correctly; the notable gap is that server_version is left entirely unexplained for a required parameter.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50%: model_id is documented in the schema and echoed in the description ("a model's inventory"), but server_version is undocumented in both the schema and the description. The description adds no meaning about what server_version controls or what format it expects, so it fails to compensate for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (queue) and precisely enumerates the two work items created: the tag check for entities whose tags are not current and the duplicate check for entries on uncovered pairs. This distinguishes it cleanly from siblings like get_inventory_judgements (reads results), declare_inventory_tags, and decide_inventory_pair.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly tells the agent what to do after calling ("Read the results with get_inventory_judgements once they land"), which names the follow-up tool and its timing. It lacks an explicit statement of when not to call it or of any preconditions, so it falls short of a full 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
request_model_checkRequest Model CheckA
Request a model check of the obligations the behavioural analysis
could not settle. Mutating only with confirm_estimate=True; a paid
action then.
A check is paid for by whoever requests it, so it is estimated first and the estimate is RELAYED TO THE PERSON before it is confirmed. Never confirm on your own.
Call with
confirm_estimate=False(the default): nothing runs or is charged. The answer carries theobligationsit would cover (each with its completionprediction), thescope, thecones(each module, its runs, andremedies/not_runwhere it may not complete or fits no runner), theestimate, themodel_versionandset_revisionthe model stands at, andnoticeson what a check does. Show all of it to the person. With nothing to check, themessagesays so: nameobligationsto check some anyway.Once they agree, call with
confirm_estimate=Trueand those two values. The check is queued (confirmed: true,job_id,status: "queued"); pollget_model_checkuntilterminal.
Refusals come back as data, {confirmed: false, http_status, code, message}: 409 not_confirmed (confirm the behavioural model first,
after reviewing it), differences_open (answer the open questions an
earlier check raised), check_active (one is live: read it),
generation_active (a build holds the model), review_stale (the
model or its controls changed since the estimate: confirm again with
the values returned), no_runner_size (every module is larger than
any runner holds: answer the defaults it rests on, or narrow the scope
or the obligations); 503 not_priced or no_runner_pool (checks
cannot run here yet); 402 (the balance cannot cover the estimate). A 404
means model checks are not available for the model, or the caller may
not start paid actions on it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| scope | No | Optional JSON object lowering some of the scope's constants, the keys the estimate's ``scope`` reports (e.g. ``{"domain": 1, "horizon": 4}``); each must be a non-negative integer at most the declared value, and those left out keep it (400 ``bad_scope`` otherwise). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| obligations | No | Optional comma-separated obligation ids to cover in place of the default (the unsettled ones the controls' groups reach). | |
| set_revision | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the estimate's value. | |
| model_version | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the estimate's value. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_estimate | No | False (default) estimates; True queues the check. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses that the action is paid, that the requestor pays, that step 1 charges nothing, that step 2 queues a job (confirmed/job_id/status), and enumerates concrete refusal codes (409 not_confirmed, check_active, generation_active, review_stale, no_runner_size; 503; 402; 404).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core purpose and the mutating condition, then organized into numbered steps. It is long and the refusal-code enumeration is dense, but nearly every sentence carries routing or prerequisite information, so little is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a paid, multi-step, gated operation with an output schema, the description supplies the flow, the confirmatory values, the async polling path, and the full refusal matrix. An agent has everything needed to call it correctly and interpret non-success responses.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is high (86%), so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning: it explains confirm_estimate as the estimate-vs-queue switch and clarifies that model_version and set_revision come from the estimate's returned values in step 2.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (request), a specific resource (model check), and the exact scope (obligations the behavioural analysis could not settle). This cleanly separates it from siblings like get_model_check (polling) and manage_model_check.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Lays out an explicit two-step protocol: call with confirm_estimate=False to estimate, show results to the person, then call with confirm_estimate=True once agreed. It also states an exclusion ('Never confirm on your own') and routes to get_model_check for polling.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
resolve_verdict_divergencesResolve Verdict DivergencesA
Accept a batch of coverage divergences as mapping changes, or dismiss a batch of divergences. Mutating.
action="accept": each missing_mapping ADDS its CO to the
control, each spurious_mapping REMOVES it, one version per affected
control. Items are validated one by one: the answer separates
applied from skipped (stale, would orphan, already so). To accept
only confident rows, filter get_verdict_divergence's coverage rows
by p_covers (near 1.0 for missing, near 0.0 for spurious) first.
reason (min 10 chars) is recorded on each control's history.
action="dismiss": the structural model was right and the LLM was
not; the model does not change. A dismissal is keyed to the row's
current verdict input, so the row reappears once its control or
objective changes. Works for coverage and group_sufficiency rows.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| items | Yes | JSON array of rows. accept: ``{"control_id", "co_id", "kind"}`` with kind ``missing_mapping`` or ``spurious_mapping``. dismiss: ``{"kind", "co_id", "control_id"?, "group_id"?}`` (control_id for coverage kinds, group_id for group_sufficiency). | |
| action | Yes | "accept" or "dismiss". | |
| reason | Yes | Why (accept: min 10 chars; dismiss: non-empty). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: it declares the tool is mutating, describes per-item validation producing applied vs skipped (stale, would orphan, already so), states that reason is recorded on each control's history, and explains that a dismissal is keyed to the row's current verdict input so it reappears once the control or objective changes. These are exactly the side-effect and persistence semantics an agent needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The core verb and mutating nature are front-loaded in the first sentence, and the action-specific blocks are clearly delimited. It is dense but every sentence carries operational information; only the formatting density slightly taxes readability.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 5-parameter mutating tool with an output schema (so return shape needn't be described), the description covers both actions, their validation outcomes, and the persistence behavior of dismissals. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 80% (baseline 3), but the description adds real meaning: it explains what each kind value does to the model ('missing_mapping ADDS its CO', 'spurious_mapping REMOVES it') and clarifies reason length thresholds per action. It doesn't document server_version, keeping it just short of a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb pair and resource ('Accept a batch of coverage divergences as mapping changes, or dismiss a batch of divergences. Mutating.'), and explicitly names the sibling get_verdict_divergence as the source of the rows to act on. An agent can distinguish this mutating resolve tool from the read-side get_verdict_divergence without opening either schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use for each action: accept means 'the structural model was right and the LLM was not' changes; dismiss means the divergence should be suppressed. It even routes the agent to filter rows by p_covers in get_verdict_divergence before accepting, which is concrete pre-invocation guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
restore_entityRestore EntityA
Un-soft-delete a single entity of any core type, reversing a prior
remove_entity. Mutating: creates a new model version. Only affects
an entity that is currently soft-deleted.
Dispatches on entity_type. Per-type effect:
asset— revives the asset's tombstoned (asset × attacker) COs with their original IDs, un-orphaning any linked controls.attacker— reinstates the attacker under its original ID, revives the COs tombstoned when it was removed, and un-orphans any controls that were anchored to it.component— reinstates the component under its original ID, restoring its trust-boundary contribution to asset reachability.trust_boundary— reinstates the boundary: the reachability it filtered re-narrows and itssealed/isolation claim is restored, so CO reachability verdicts past it can flip back toward unreachable.assumption— returns the assumption to active status; controls whoseassumption_groupsreferenced it keep their group structure intact. Its CO links are not restored (set them again withedit_assumption), and re-attestation is required before it counts anywhere it is linked or grouped.
Returns the entity-change result: {"model": {id, version, title}, "entities", "controls_carried", "controls_orphaned", "orphaned_control_ids", ...}, entities holding the entity as
restored.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| entity_id | Yes | ID of the entity to restore. | |
| entity_type | Yes | Which entity to restore — one of ``asset``, ``attacker``, ``component``, ``trust_boundary``, ``assumption``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so well. It discloses that the tool is mutating, creates a new model version, only affects soft-deleted entities, and that behavior dispatches by entity type with specific per-type effects and restoration semantics.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core action and then uses a structured per-type list that is justified by the dispatch complexity. It is somewhat long, and the return-shape sentence is less necessary because an output schema exists, but the content is organized and mostly earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating, type-dispatched restore operation with no annotations, the description provides the necessary behavioral context: soft-delete precondition, mutation/versioning impact, per-type effects, and return shape. An output schema exists, but the added return summary is still consistent and not required to be omitted.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the description adds substantial meaning for ``entity_type`` by enumerating per-type restoration effects. ``model_id`` and ``entity_id`` are documented in schema, while ``server_version`` is undocumented in both schema and description, keeping this below a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: un-soft-delete a single entity, reversing a prior ``remove_entity``. It also explicitly limits scope to currently soft-deleted entities, which cleanly distinguishes it from related entity tools such as ``remove_entity`` and the ``edit_*`` siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It clearly identifies the prerequisite condition: the entity must currently be soft-deleted. It also names the reversing operation, ``remove_entity``. However, it does not explicitly contrast usage with sibling edit or add tools beyond that condition.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
resume_control_generationResume Control GenerationA
Resume control generation that was paused, or retry one that stopped before finishing. Mutating.
Use when get_control_generation_status returns status: "paused"
(someone paused it) or status: "blocked" (blocked.code
dependency_unavailable or analysis_incomplete). A paused run
resumes at once. For a blocked one the platform checks the services it
depends on first, so a retry while one is still down costs nothing and
changes nothing.
Returns one of:
{resumed: true, status: "queued", status_detail}— the run resumes where it stopped (only the unfinished work, billed to the original generation). Pollget_control_generation_statusuntilcomplete.{resumed: false, http_status: 409, code: "pause_in_progress"}— the run is still stopping after a pause; resume once it showspaused.{resumed: false, http_status: 503, code: "dependency_unavailable", message, retry_after_seconds, ...}— still unavailable; relay the message and try again afterretry_after_seconds.{resumed: false, http_status: 409, code: "retry_too_soon", retry_after_seconds, ...}— a retry was just tried; wait.{resumed: false, http_status: 409, code: "not_blocked", status}— nothing is paused; readstatus.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model whose paused control generation to resume. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so: it declares the operation Mutating, explains that a resume continues where it stopped and is billed to the original generation, and documents the full set of outcome codes (pause_in_progress, dependency_unavailable, retry_too_soon, not_blocked) with associated HTTP statuses. This is far beyond what structured fields provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the one-line purpose and mutation flag before the usage condition and outcome list; the bulleted return shapes are scannable. It is somewhat long and duplicates return structure that the output schema likely already defines, but the error-code semantics earn most of the space.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a stateful mutating tool with no annotations and an output schema, the description supplies the missing context an agent needs: triggers, effects on billing/scope, and every terminal outcome code. The only real gap is that server_version is left entirely unexplained, which is minor for what appears to be a standard version field.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Only two parameters and schema coverage is 50%: model_id is documented in the schema, but server_version is undocumented in both schema and description. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond what the schema already states, so nothing compensates for the gap, and 3 is the baseline for a partially documented two-param tool.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Resume control generation that was paused, or retry one that stopped before finishing'), immediately flags it as Mutating, and implicitly distinguishes it from the sibling pause_control_generation by naming the resume/retry scope. An agent can tell what this does and which lifecycle state it targets without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit preconditions tied to concrete values from a named sibling: use when get_control_generation_status returns status 'paused' or 'blocked' with specific blocked.code values. It also states when calling is harmless ('a retry while one is still down costs nothing and changes nothing'), which is real when/when-not guidance. Nothing is left to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
revalidate_entity_qualityRevalidate Entity QualityA
Re-run quality validation on a threat model's existing assets and attackers, as if they were freshly generated. A fast first-pass check judges every entity; only the ones it flags get a deeper review that confirms them, sharpens their wording, or flags them for you.
Use this to apply validation improvements to an already-generated model, or to clear stale quality warnings — without regenerating the whole model (which would destroy controls, assertions, and components). It is non-destructive: an entity that should be removed is left in place with a quality warning rather than deleted, so no control objective loses its asset or attacker anchor. It creates no new model version: the re-validation is queued and runs in the background, and the refreshed warnings appear on the next read of the model.
May consume credits for the entities that need the deeper review; a model
already in good shape costs nothing. Returns at once with
{"accepted": true, "queued": <entities queued>, "model": {...}}, where
model is the id, version and title of the model as it stands before
the re-validation lands.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model whose assets and attackers to re-validate. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so exceptionally: it discloses non-destructiveness (flagged entities left in place, not deleted), that no new version is created, that it runs asynchronously in the background with results on next read, and credit-consumption behavior. It even returns the immediate response shape.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loads the core action, then layers the non-regeneration rationale, non-destructive guarantee, async behavior, and cost model. Each paragraph adds distinct value, though it runs slightly long; nothing is truly wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given an output schema exists, the description still usefully previews the return shape, and it fully covers async timing, credit cost, and non-destructiveness. An agent has everything needed to invoke correctly and set expectations.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 50% (server_version undocumented) and the description adds little parameter-level meaning beyond the schema's own model_id text. It restates 'whose assets and attackers to re-validate' but provides no guidance on server_version or format expectations, so it fails to compensate for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('re-run quality validation on a threat model's existing assets and attackers') and clarifies the scope contrast with full regeneration. An agent can distinguish this from regenerate_threat_model or reevaluate_threat_model_factors by the explicit 'as if freshly generated, without regenerating' framing.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives clear when-to-use context: apply validation improvements to an already-generated model, or clear stale quality warnings. The exclusion ('without regenerating the whole model, which would destroy controls') is implied through consequence rather than naming a specific alternative tool, keeping it just shy of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
select_compliance_frameworksSelect Compliance FrameworksA
Select (activate) compliance frameworks at a chosen scope. Requires PRO tier. Mutating.
Discover valid ids with list_compliance_frameworks (or add a custom one via import_compliance_framework); view the resulting gap analysis with get_compliance_report at the same scope. Re-calling replaces the scope's framework selection.
scope selects the target and how scope_id is read:
"model"— a single threat model (scope_id= model id). Activating a framework also kicks off background auto-remediation: it auto-maps existing controls to requirements, excludes non-applicable requirements by taxonomy, and suggests/applies new entities for the remaining gaps. The response includesauto_remediate_jobs, which run and complete on their own; re-trigger later withauto_remediate_complianceif the model changes."tag"— a tag (scope_id= tag id). Records the frameworks against the tag AND propagates them to every member model, and to every model added to the tag later, making the tag a compliance scope (e.g. an audit boundary) spanning several models.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| scope | Yes | target boundary — "model" or "tag". | |
| scope_id | Yes | id of the model or tag selected by ``scope``. | |
| framework_ids | Yes | comma-separated framework ids (e.g. "asvs-4.0,nist-csf"). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and delivers: it flags this as mutating, requires PRO tier, warns that re-calling replaces the scope's selection, and details that 'model' scope kicks off background auto-remediation jobs while 'tag' scope propagates to member and future models. This is rich behavioral context beyond what any schema field would convey.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose, alternatives, and scope semantics are front-loaded and organized with a bulleted breakdown, so the structure aids scanning. It is somewhat long, but nearly every sentence adds operational information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating, 4-param tool, the description covers prerequisites (PRO tier), scope semantics, side effects, and follow-up routes, and the existence of an output schema means return values needn't be detailed. Nothing an agent needs to call this correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the description meaningfully extends it by explaining how scope_id is read under each scope value and the side effects of each ('model' vs 'tag'). It adds real semantic depth over the enum, though framework_ids format is left mostly to the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb+resource ('Select (activate) compliance frameworks') with explicit scope, and distinguishes itself from siblings list_compliance_frameworks, import_compliance_framework, auto_remediate_compliance, and get_compliance_report by name. An agent can tell this tool apart from its neighbors without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It names the alternatives and the conditions selecting them: use list_compliance_frameworks to discover ids, import_compliance_framework for custom ones, get_compliance_report to view results at the same scope, and auto_remediate_compliance to re-trigger. It also notes PRO tier requirement and that re-calling replaces the existing selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
set_control_assumption_groupsSet Control Assumption GroupsA
Declaratively set the assumption group structure for a control.
Replaces all assumption group assignments for this control. Each group is a set of assumption IDs that together externally handle the control; any one group being fully active+attested is sufficient.
Within a group: AND — all referenced assumptions must be active and attested for the group to count as complete
Across groups: OR — any one complete group marks the control as externally handled for mitigation purposes
To clear all assumption groups (revert to "not externally handled"),
pass an empty JSON object: {}.
AI relevance gate (per group, no override): Each non-empty proposed group is evaluated independently. The behavior depends on how many groups pass:
All groups accepted → 200 success, structure persisted as submitted.
Some groups accepted (partial): the accepted groups ARE persisted (runtime OR-semantics activate immediately), the rejected groups are NOT saved, the call raises with HTTP 422 detailing both persisted_groups and rejected_groups (with per-group reasoning). Resubmit only the rejected groups with assumptions that cover the control, or sharpen those assumptions' descriptions.
All groups rejected: existing groups on this control are re-evaluated through the same gate. Relevant existing groups are preserved; irrelevant existing groups are dropped (assumptions themselves remain in the model — only this control's linkage is removed). The call raises with HTTP 422 detailing what was persisted, what was rejected, and what existing was dropped.
Empty submission ({}): clears all groups, no evaluation.
There is no force-override. To get a group accepted, choose assumptions whose descriptions actually cover the control or refine an assumption's description so coverage is explicit.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| groups | Yes | JSON object mapping group numbers to assumption ID lists. Example: '{"1": ["AS1", "AS2"], "2": ["AS3"]}' Empty object `{}` clears all groups. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control (e.g., "CTRL-03"). | |
| justification | No | Why this group structure is appropriate (10 to 2000 characters when groups is non-empty; optional when clearing, at most 2000 characters if given). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It thoroughly explains the AI relevance gate, partial persistence, HTTP 422 behavior, preservation/dropping of existing groups, and the impossibility of force-override, which is far beyond a basic mutation description.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but the complexity demands detail. Information is front-loaded with the core replacement behavior, followed by group semantics and edge cases. There is some redundancy around 'no force-override,' but the overall structure remains focused and useful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex mutation tool with no annotations, the description covers the main operation, success and failure modes, side effects on existing data, clearing behavior, and remediation guidance. Since an output schema exists, the lack of return-value detail is acceptable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 80%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds important semantic meaning beyond the schema, especially the AND-within-group / OR-across-groups interpretation and the consequence of submitting rejected groups. This enriches the groups parameter meaning beyond the schema's simple JSON mapping.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Declaratively set the assumption group structure for a control.' It clearly states the full replacement behavior, which distinguishes it from get-style or mitigation/foundation sibling tools, even though no sibling is named explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear operational guidance, including how to clear groups with an empty object, how partial acceptance behaves, and how to recover from rejected groups. It does not explicitly compare against alternatives like set_mitigation_groups, but the usage context is otherwise well defined.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
set_control_objective_calSet Control Objective CalA
Set the per-CO ISO/SAE 21434 Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL).
CAL is a 1-4 grade on each individual control objective that
expresses how much assurance the control program owes for that
specific objective. It lives on the control_objectives identity
side-table — writes do NOT create a new threat-model version, and
the value survives soft-delete + revival of the CO.
Pass cal=None (or omit it) to clear the value.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cal | No | ISO/SAE 21434 CAL grade (1-4), or ``None`` to clear. | |
| co_id | Yes | Control-objective ID (e.g. ``CO3``). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral disclosure burden. It does this exceptionally well by revealing that writes do NOT create a new threat-model version, that the value persists across soft-delete and revival, and that omitting or passing cal=None clears the value. These are non-obvious side effects an agent must know before invoking the tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is tightly structured and front-loaded with the core purpose, then adds only high-value behavioral and clearing details. The use of line breaks and code formatting for cal=None makes the critical instruction easy to parse. No sentence is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers the most important operational semantics: what CAL is, where it lives, how versioning behaves, and how to clear it. Since an output schema exists, return values need not be described. The main gap is server_version, whose purpose and allowed values are left entirely undefined, and there is no guidance on what happens if an out-of-range CAL is supplied.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the description adds meaningful semantics beyond the schema for the cal parameter: it defines the 1–4 assurance grading, ties it to per-CO obligations, and clarifies the clearing behavior. co_id also gains an example ('CO3') through the schema. However, server_version remains entirely undocumented in both schema and description, preventing a higher score.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Set the per-CO ISO/SAE 21434 Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL).' It clarifies the resource is each individual control objective and adds a distinguishing behavioral fact — writes do not create a new threat-model version and live on the control_objectives identity side-table. This differentiates it from sibling control-update tools without requiring schema inspection.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use the tool — when you need to set or clear a CAL value on a control objective — and explicitly explains the clearing behavior with cal=None. However, it does not name alternative tools or state conditions for choosing this over related siblings like update_control_status or refine_control. Usage context is present but exclusion/alternative guidance is absent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
set_functional_satisfaction_groupsSet Functional Satisfaction GroupsA
Declaratively set (replace) a functional objective's satisfaction groups. Mutating.
Replaces the objective's group structure wholesale. Each group is a set of functional tests that together satisfy the objective (AND within a group); the objective counts as satisfied when any one complete group has all its tests verified (OR across groups). Tests you want to keep associated with the objective but outside any group go in ungrouped. Unlike set_control_assumption_groups, there is no AI relevance gate — the structure you submit is applied as-is. Read the current state first with get_functional_satisfaction_groups.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| ungrouped | No | Comma-separated functional-test ids to keep associated with the objective but unassigned to any group (optional). | |
| groups_json | Yes | JSON object mapping group label to a list of functional test ids, e.g. ``{"1": ["FT-1", "FT-2"], "2": ["FT-3"]}``. Pass ``{}`` to clear all groups. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| functional_objective_id | Yes | The objective whose groups to set. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and delivers: 'Mutating' and 'Replaces the objective's group structure wholesale' clearly disclose the destructive behavior. It also explains the AND-within-group/OR-across-groups semantics and that the submitted structure is applied as-is, giving an agent a complete behavioral profile.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Four sentences with zero redundancy: mutation flag, wholesale replacement, group semantics, ungrouped explanation, sibling contrast, and a read-first tip. The verb and resource are front-loaded, and each sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool's behavioral complexity is fully covered: semantics, destructive replace behavior, ungrouped handling, and the distinction from set_control_assumption_groups. An output schema exists, so return-value details are unnecessary. Nothing critical is missing for an agent to invoke this tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 80%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds value beyond the schema by explaining the purpose of the ungrouped parameter ('keep associated with the objective but outside any group') and clarifying the group semantics: a group is a set of tests that together satisfy the objective, and any complete group suffices. This goes beyond the schema's JSON shape and examples.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb-resource pair, 'Declaratively set (replace) a functional objective's satisfaction groups,' and signals 'Mutating.' It also explicitly distinguishes itself from set_control_assumption_groups by noting the absence of an AI relevance gate, which differentiates it from its closest sibling.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit guidance to read the current state first with get_functional_satisfaction_groups, and contrasts this tool with set_control_assumption_groups ('no AI relevance gate — the structure you submit is applied as-is'). This establishes when to choose this tool over the sibling without ambiguity.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
set_mitigation_groupsSet Mitigation GroupsA
Declaratively set the mitigation-group structure for a control objective. Mutating; runs as a polled background job (an LLM sufficiency check evaluates whether the new structure satisfies the CO) and returns once complete.
Replaces ALL mitigation-group assignments for this CO. Call
get_mitigation_groups first to see the current structure and the
unmapped controls available for assignment.
Mitigation groups define alternative paths to satisfy a CO:
Within a group: AND — all controls must be implemented.
Across groups: OR — any one complete group mitigates the CO.
Defense-in-depth: tracked but not required for mitigation.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_id | Yes | ID of the control objective (e.g., "CO5"). | |
| groups | Yes | JSON object mapping group numbers to control-ID lists. Example: '{"1": ["CTRL-01", "CTRL-02"], "2": ["CTRL-03"]}'. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| justification | No | Why this group structure is appropriate (10 to 2000 characters). The gate weighs it alongside the objective and the controls' own descriptions, so state the reasoning, not evidence. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| defense_in_depth | No | Comma-separated control IDs tracked as defense-in-depth (not required for mitigation). Example: "CTRL-04,CTRL-05". |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, and it delivers: it discloses that the operation is mutating, that it runs as a polled background job with an LLM sufficiency check, that it replaces ALL assignments, and that defense-in-depth controls are tracked but not required. This is substantial behavioral disclosure for a destructive-ish mutation.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the action and mutation risk, then adds the critical call-get-first guidance, then compactly explains the group logic in bullets. Every sentence and bullet earns its place; nothing is filler or redundant with the schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutation tool with no annotations, the description covers the essential context: replacement behavior, polling/completion semantics, group logic, and parameter intent. An output schema exists, so return-value explanation is not needed. The only noticeable gap is the completely undocumented server_version parameter, which keeps this from being fully complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is high (83%), so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real meaning beyond the schema: it explains the 'justification' parameter's role in the gate ('state the reasoning, not evidence') and clarifies the defense_in_depth semantics and groups JSON structure. The undocumented server_version parameter is not addressed at all, preventing a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a precise verb and resource: 'Declaratively set the mitigation-group structure for a control objective.' It clearly distinguishes this from the read-side sibling by explicitly telling the agent to call get_mitigation_groups first to inspect current structure. The replacement semantics and group semantics make the tool's role unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives concrete usage context: call get_mitigation_groups first, note that all existing assignments are replaced, and understand the AND/OR/defense-in-depth semantics. It stops short of explicitly naming alternatives or saying when not to use this tool versus other group-setting siblings like set_control_assumption_groups, so it misses the highest bar for exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
set_objective_groupingSet Objective GroupingA
Group a model's objectives by asset groups, or stop grouping them. Mutating; creates a model version. Calls no model, so nothing is estimated: the judgements the new version re-keys are queued as for any edit.
Read get_objective_grouping first, relay the groups and the
objective counts to the person, and pass the model_version it
returned: a model that moved since is refused 409 review_stale.
Grouping is refused 409 behavioural_off where
get_objective_grouping reports available false; stopping is
never refused for it. The write gate refuses it while a control build
holds the model.
Grouping forms the groups from scratch; stopping deletes every group,
so each asset has its own objectives again. Either way the controls'
mappings move with the objectives (moved: each retired objective to
where its mappings went), each mitigation group landing as a group of
its own. A disposition on a retired objective does not carry over.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| enabled | Yes | ``true`` to group, ``false`` to stop grouping. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| model_version | Yes | The version read with ``get_objective_grouping``. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses that the tool is mutating, creates a model version, calls no model, queues judgements, and has destructive/regrouping effects on existing groups. It also explains mapping movement, mitigation group handling, and that dispositions on retired objectives do not carry over.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded, followed by usage, refusal conditions, and side effects. Some sentences are dense and multi-clause, but the operational detail is useful rather than filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex mutating operation with no annotations and an existing output schema, the description supplies the critical preconditions, failure modes, side effects, and output-related context. Nothing essential for correct invocation appears to be missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, and the schema already describes enabled, model_id, and model_version. The description adds prerequisite/refusal context for model_version and mode semantics for enabled, but server_version remains unexplained and the description does not fully compensate for that gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: grouping a model's objectives by asset groups, or stopping grouping them. It clearly distinguishes the two modes and names the related read tool get_objective_grouping.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly instructs the agent to read get_objective_grouping first, relay groups and counts, and pass the returned model_version. It also states when the call is refused with 409 review_stale, 409 behavioural_off, and while a control build holds the model.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
settle_entity_ratingSettle Entity RatingA
Settle the rating held pending for an asset or attacker. Mutating.
A rating a person chose is never replaced by a model's: where an entity's
words changed, or a re-evaluation answered over it, the model's rating is
held pending beside the person's, the more severe of the two in force.
get_entity serves the pair as rating_pending (the rating in
force and the pending one, who chose each, the words each was made for,
and pair_hash); the review queue's rating_pending row lists every
such entity. Settling is a judgment (rating_reconfirmed): a
program's is parked for a person (403 with an escalation_id: do not
retry) unless the workspace's delegation policy names it at the entity's
tier. RELAY BOTH RATINGS TO THE PERSON and settle as they choose.
choice: keep_person keeps the person's rating for the words as
they stand; take_model takes the model's; set writes another,
given in factors. A choice that changes an attacker's attack vector
or privileges saves a new model version; any other writes a rating
revision. Refused 409 stale with the current pair_hash when the
pair or the entity's words moved since it was read (read it again), 409
nothing_pending when no pair is held.
Returns {entity_id, choice, version_created}.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| choice | Yes | ``keep_person``, ``take_model`` or ``set``. | |
| factors | No | For ``set``: a JSON object of the rating's factors (an asset's subscores, blast radius, recoverability and regulatory scope; an attacker's attack vector, privileges required, attack complexity, user interaction and capability prevalence). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| entity_id | Yes | The asset or attacker (e.g. "A-03"). | |
| pair_hash | Yes | ``rating_pending.pair_hash`` as it was read. | |
| rationale | No | For ``set``: why the rating is what it is. | |
| entity_kind | Yes | ``asset`` or ``attacker``. | |
| change_reason | No | Why it is settled so (kept with the decision). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses mutation, judgment semantics, 403 escalation behavior with escalation_id and 'do not retry', two distinct 409 cases (stale pair_hash and nothing_pending), and side effects (new model version for attacker vector/privilege changes vs. rating revision otherwise). It also states what happens to the person's rating and the model's held rating.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but front-loaded with purpose and mutation status, then structures the explanation around reading the pair, settlement choices, side effects, and error cases. Some sentences are dense and parenthetical, but the length is largely justified for a complex mutation with no annotations.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given 9 parameters, 6 required, a complex domain, no annotations, and an output schema, the description covers the essential behavior: prerequisites, process guidance, permission escalation, stale-pair recovery, side effects, and return shape. An agent has enough information to call it correctly and handle its error paths.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is already high at 89%, so baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful relationships beyond the schema: it explains that choice values resolve the held pair, that pair_hash reflects the pair as read and becomes stale if the pair or entity words move, and that set writes factors. It does not add much about rationale or change_reason beyond the schema, but it substantially enriches the central choice/pair_hash semantics.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first two sentences state the specific verb ('Settle'), resource ('rating held pending'), and scope ('asset or attacker'), and immediately flag that it is mutating. It distinguishes itself from read-oriented siblings like get_entity and from other entity-quality tools by focusing narrowly on resolving a pending rating pair.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains when a pending pair exists, points to get_entity and the review queue for reading it, specifies process expectations ('RELAY BOTH RATINGS TO THE PERSON'), and covers the escalation path for programmatic callers (403 unless delegation policy names it). It also gives behavioral alternatives for each choice value, leaving little inference needed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
split_composition_entitySplit Composition EntityA
Push an ancestor-owned entity down to one or more descendants and soft-delete the ancestor's copy. Mutates state across the ancestor + every target descendant.
Inverse of lift_composition_entity. Use when an entity that
currently lives on an ancestor is in fact descendant-specific and
should be modeled separately per descendant — the operator chooses
which descendants take a copy. A new local id is minted on each
target; attached state on the ancestor's entity (assertions, jira
mappings, risk acceptances, etc.) is duplicated to every target.
The route's model_id IS the ancestor (the entity being split lives
on it). Each affected model (ancestor + every target descendant) bumps
version and emits a model_refined activity event; a structured
split_applied event with the full split_event payload lands on
the ancestor. The audit pack surfaces this under split_history.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| kind | Yes | Entity kind — one of ``"assets"``, ``"attackers"``, ``"components"``. | |
| model_id | Yes | Ancestor model id — the entity to split lives here. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| ancestor_local_id | Yes | Local id of the entity on the ancestor. | |
| target_descendants | Yes | Non-empty list of descendant model ids that should each take a copy. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses mutation, soft-deletion, state duplication across targets, new local id minting, version bumps, activity events, structured split_applied events, and audit history visibility.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core action and side-effect summary, then expands into usage context and event behavior. Every sentence adds operational value, and the length is justified by the complexity of the mutation.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers purpose, side effects, parameter routing, event emissions, and audit behavior. Since an output schema exists, return-value documentation is not the description's job, and nothing essential is missing for an agent to invoke this correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 80%, so baseline is 3, but the description adds meaningful semantics: model_id is the ancestor, the entity being split lives on it, target_descendants are the models that each receive a copy, and ancestor_local_id identifies the entity to split. This goes beyond the raw parameter names.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: it pushes an ancestor-owned entity down to descendants and soft-deletes the ancestor's copy. It also explicitly names itself as the inverse of lift_composition_entity, making its unique role clear among siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly frames when to use it: when an entity on an ancestor is actually descendant-specific and should be modeled separately per descendant. It also names the inverse operation, giving the agent a clear decision boundary against the closest alternative.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
split_grouped_attackerSplit Grouped AttackerA
Split an attacker that stands for zones of several capabilities into
the parts get_behavioural_attackers offers under splits.
Mutating; creates a model version.
Name each part by its zones as the offer lists them, which is the
split reviewed. In one write, each part is added holding what its zones
hold, its holdings attested, stating its zones, and rated as
add_attacker rates (one call per part before the write, charged to
the caller: ratings says how many); every control mapping of the
attacker's objective of an asset moves to each part's objective of that
asset with the same privilege (they owe the same obligations); and the
attacker is removed. Relay the offer to the person first. Refused with
409 split_not_offered (read the attackers again), 409
review_stale (the parts changed: read them again), 409
closure_not_offered.
A program's split is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation
policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and
parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll
list_proposals.
Returns {model_id, model_version, applies, credential_classes, counts, split, added, moved}: the closure's counts, the attacker split, the
parts' ids and the objectives whose control mappings moved.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| parts | Yes | Each part's zones, comma-separated, the parts separated by semicolons (e.g. "host;vendor_a;partner"). | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| attacker_id | Yes | The attacker to split (e.g. "T7"). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it declares the tool mutating, creates a model version, describes per-part addition, attestation, rating calls charged to the caller, control-mapping movement, attacker removal, refusal codes, and escalation handling. This is unusually complete disclosure for a destructive mutation tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core operation and avoids irrelevant fluff. It is dense and semicolon-heavy, which hurts readability, but most sentences carry necessary behavioral or procedural information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex mutating tool with no annotations, the description covers the essential context: mutation effects, side effects, cost, authorization escalation, refusal behavior, and return shape. An output schema exists, and the description still summarizes the return fields sufficiently.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 75%, so the schema already documents parts, model_id, and attacker_id. The description adds the useful semantic constraint that each part is named by its zones as the offer lists them, but it does not compensate for the undocumented server_version parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a specific verb and resource: it splits an attacker into the parts that get_behavioural_attackers offers under splits. It clearly establishes the operation and scope, though it does not explicitly distinguish this from the likely sibling alternative keep_attacker_whole.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It implies use when an offered split exists and adds important procedural guidance such as relaying the offer first, handling refusal codes, and not retrying after a 403 escalation. However, it never explicitly states when to choose split_grouped_attacker over alternatives like keep_attacker_whole or add_attacker.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
start_control_buildStart Control BuildA
Start the model's proposed control build. Mutating only with
confirm_estimate=True; consumes credits then.
A model's controls are built only by a build someone starts. Generating
or refining the model, editing an entity and regenerate_controls
each PROPOSE one; get_control_generation_status shows it as
proposal.
Call with
confirm_estimate=False(the default). Nothing starts and nothing is charged; the answer is{started: false, proposal, message}, the proposal carrying a freshestimated_creditsand themodel_version,set_revisionandscope_revisionthe model stands at. Show the user what it would build and cost, and what it lists to review.Call again with
confirm_estimate=Trueand those three values once they have reviewed the model. The build starts ({started: true, job_id, model_version, status: "queued", status_detail}) and holds the model until it publishes, fails or is discarded: other writers of the model's controls are refused meanwhile, and reads show the last published controls. Pollget_control_generation_statusuntilterminal; the publish is one step, after whichget_controlsshows the result.
Refusals come back as data:
{started: false, http_status: 404, code: "no_proposal"}— nothing is proposed for the model.{started: false, http_status: 409, code: "review_stale", proposal, model_version, set_revision, scope_revision, estimated_credits}— the model, its controls or the objectives the build would author changed since the values were read (or none were named). Review again and start with the values returned.{started: false, http_status: 409, code: "generation_active", status}— a build already holds the model.{started: false, http_status: 402, ...}— the balance this workspace bills to cannot cover the estimate.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| set_revision | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the proposal's ``set_revision``. | |
| model_version | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the proposal's ``model_version``. | |
| scope_revision | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the proposal's ``scope_revision``. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_estimate | No | False (default) returns the proposal and its estimate and starts nothing; True starts the build. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does: it discloses that the tool is mutating only when ``confirm_estimate=True``, that credits are consumed at that point, that the build locks the model ('other writers of the model's controls are refused meanwhile'), and it enumerates concrete refusal codes (404 no_proposal, 409 review_stale, 409 generation_active, 402 insufficient balance) with recovery instructions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the two-phase contract, then a bulleted refusal table – a structure that lets an agent scan to the error case it hits. It is long, and some of the verbatim response payloads duplicate what the existing output schema already provides, which is the only thing keeping it from a 5.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a credit-consuming, model-locking mutation with no annotations, this is essentially complete: side effects, the confirm gate, the locking window, the polling loop and every documented failure mode are all present. Output schema exists, so the description is not obligated to explain return values, yet it still maps them to next actions.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents most parameters and baseline is 3. The description adds genuine meaning beyond the schema by explaining that ``model_version``, ``set_revision`` and ``scope_revision`` must be carried over from the proposal returned in step 1, and by describing the default/true split of ``confirm_estimate`` in terms of side effects rather than just types.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a precise verb+resource ('Start the model's proposed control build') and immediately scopes it against siblings by noting that generating/refining the model, editing an entity and ``regenerate_controls`` merely PROPOSE a build. An agent can distinguish it from ``regenerate_controls``, ``get_control_generation_status`` and ``discard_control_build`` without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit ordered procedure: first call with ``confirm_estimate=False`` to preview cost and revisions, then call again with ``confirm_estimate=True`` once the user has reviewed. It names the polling alternative (``get_control_generation_status``) and the terminal condition, so when-to-use and what-to-do-next are both unambiguous.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
strengthen_controlsStrengthen ControlsA
Strengthen a model's controls: work on the objectives whose mitigation
groups the background judge found do not cover them (the uncovered
and undecided of get_control_generation_status's diagnosis).
Mutating only with confirm_estimate=True; consumes credits then.
not_judged objectives have nothing to strengthen from: judge them
first with judge_objectives.
Call with
confirm_estimate=False(the default): nothing starts or is charged; the answer carriesdiagnosis,scope,estimate(credits,per_objective,basis) and themodel_version/set_revisionthe model stands at. Show the user the estimate.Once they agree, call with
confirm_estimate=Trueand those two values (their review of the model as it stood). A background run starts (started: true); pollget_control_generation_status. It holds the model like any build: pausable, resumable, discardable.
A gap only the environment can close (hosting, a third party) is never
answered with a control: an accepted assumption stating it is bound
into the group; otherwise an assumption proposal waits in the
review queue (get_review_queue / decide_proposal) and the objective
counts as awaiting_assumption. A rejected one is not proposed again.
Refusals come back as data, {started: false, http_status, code}:
409 review_stale (the model or its controls changed since the
estimate: confirm again with the values returned), 409
generation_active (a build holds the model), 402 (the balance cannot
cover the estimate).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| co_ids | No | Optional comma-separated objective IDs, of those diagnosed uncovered or undecided; omit for all. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| set_revision | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the estimate's value. | |
| model_version | No | With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the estimate's value. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| confirm_estimate | No | False (default) estimates; True starts the run. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it discloses that credits are only consumed with confirm_estimate=True, that the answer carries diagnosis/scope/estimate/model_version/set_revision, that runs are pausable/resumable/discardable, and it enumerates refusal outcomes as data with specific status codes (409 review_stale, 409 generation_active, 402).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Long but justified by tool complexity, and strongly front-loaded: the purpose is in the first clause before the numbered workflow. The two-step procedure is enumerated, and the refusal section is compact and scannable. No filler sentences.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a multi-step, credit-consuming mutation with rich refusal semantics, the description covers the estimate/confirm cycle, preconditions, side effects, and error handling. Output schema exists, yet the description still usefully summarizes answer fields, leaving nothing an agent needs missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 83%, so the schema already documents most parameters. The description still adds meaning: co_ids is constrained to objectives diagnosed uncovered/undecided, and model_version/set_revision are tied to the estimate values that must be echoed back on confirmation. It does not add syntax beyond that, so not a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('strengthen a model's controls') and precisely scopes the work to objectives whose mitigation groups the judge found uncovered/undecided. It distinguishes itself from sibling tools by naming get_control_generation_status, judge_objectives, and get_review_queue in their roles.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit two-step workflow: call with confirm_estimate=False to estimate, then True to start. It names the preconditions (not_judged objectives need judge_objectives first) and the polling/alternative path (get_control_generation_status, review queue). When and when-not is fully covered.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
submit_assertionsSubmit AssertionsD
Typed claims about a control, assumption or functional test; CI checks later. get_assertion_types returns it all as data.
By class, strongest first, as name(required) [opt: optional]: [by_construction]
typed_boundary(scope, sinks, boundary_type, constructors, property) [opt: allowlist, wrappers] [sound_over_approximation]
sink_default_deny(scope, sinks, safe_forms, property) [opt: allowlist, wrappers] [existential_witness]
test_attested(test) [opt: env, mechanism] [under_approximating_scan]
pattern_matches(file, pattern) [opt: scope_start, scope_end, multiline, dotall, target]
pattern_absent(file, pattern) [opt: scope_start, scope_end, multiline, dotall, target]
no_plaintext_secret(file, patterns) [presence]
function_exists(file, name)
class_exists(file, name)
decorator_present(file, function, decorator)
function_calls(file, caller, callee)
import_present(file, module)
file_exists(file)
file_hash(file, algorithm, expected_hash, scope_file) [opt: scope_start, scope_end]
config_key_exists(file, key)
config_value_matches(file, key, pattern)
env_var_referenced(file, variable)
dependency_exists(manifest, package)
dependency_version(manifest, package, constraint)
parameter_validated(file, function, parameter)
error_handled(file, function)
middleware_registered(file, middleware)
http_header_set(file, header)
test_exists(pattern)
module_exists(file, name)
module_instantiated(file, parent, child)
port_exists(file, module, port) [opt: direction]
parameter_defined(file, parameter) [opt: module, pattern]
signal_exists(file, name) [opt: module, kind]
sva_assertion_present(file, name)
register_reset(file, signal) [opt: reset]
Each: type, params, description, repo ("/" or "no_repo"), covers beside them, never in params: the CO-NN or cls_ ids proved. A for-all clause takes only typed_boundary (sinks accept one boundary type) or, when they do not, sink_default_deny, bound with covers.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ||
| control_id | No | ||
| assumption_id | No | ||
| server_version | Yes | ||
| assertions_json | Yes | ||
| functional_test_id | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does not state that submission is a mutation, whether it requires a control/assumption/functional_test anchor, whether it is idempotent, what happens on invalid assertion_json, or what the output schema returns. The one behavioral note ('CI checks later') is vague and non-actionable.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The body is a long undifferentiated list of 30+ assertion types occupying most of the text, with the tool's actual purpose reduced to a single fragment. Structure is flat, poorly front-loaded, and buries the actionable information about required parameters and anchoring.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 6-param mutation tool with an output schema and no annotations, the description should explain anchoring (control_id/assumption_id/functional_test_id), the assertions_json payload format, and server_version. None of this is covered; the type taxonomy, however useful, does not substitute for tool-contract information.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% across 6 parameters, so the description must compensate, and it does not. It documents assertion-internal fields (scope, sinks, property, etc.) that are not input parameters, while model_id, server_version, assertions_json, control_id, assumption_id, and functional_test_id are never explained. The 'covers' rule is the only hint about anchoring, and it is cryptic.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a fragment ('Typed claims about a control, assumption or functional test; CI checks later') that gestures at purpose but never states a clear verb+resource like 'submit typed assertions for a model'. It spends most of its length on a taxonomy of assertion types rather than what the tool does. An agent must infer that this tool ingests/submits assertions.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is a single routing hint to get_assertion_types ('returns it all as data'), which is a sibling-lookup pointer rather than when-to-use-this-tool guidance. No statement of when to submit vs. list_assertions, delete_assertion, or submit_findings, and no prerequisites or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
submit_attestationSubmit AttestationA
Record that a responsible party affirmed an assumption holds.
Only for external assumptions. Non-applicability assumptions require CI verification (submit assertions + run mipiti-verify) — manual attestation is rejected for them.
An assumption with a current attestation can mitigate linked COs. When the attestation expires, those COs become at-risk until re-attested or covered by controls.
Attesting accepts the assumption, which is a judgment about the world
the platform cannot check: a program may do it only under a workspace
delegation rule for assumption_accepted; otherwise the call is
refused with HTTP 403 and an escalation_id and the attestation is
parked for a person. An attestation holds for the text it was given
for: editing the assumption's description retires it, and the
assumption must be accepted again. An assumption need not be linked to
an objective to be accepted — one bound into a control's group (see
strengthen_controls) counts only while it is accepted.
An attestation is a responsible party's claim, never a proof over every
site: it can cover an existential clause of a control (its tier reads
claimed) and never a for-all one, where only a sound witness
counts. An attestation the platform mints from CI results is no
stronger than the weakest assertion behind it. The exits for a
universal objective that cannot be proven are a risk acceptance or a
not-applicable disposition.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| statement | No | What was attested. | |
| expires_at | No | ISO 8601 expiry date (e.g., "2026-06-30T00:00:00Z"). | |
| attested_by | No | Who is attesting (name, role, organization). | |
| evidence_url | No | Optional link to supporting documentation. | |
| assumption_id | Yes | ID of the assumption (e.g., "AS1"). | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses the 403 refusal with escalation_id and that the attestation is parked for a person, that editing the assumption's description retires the attestation, and that expiry flips linked COs to at-risk. It further explains the semantics of coverage (existential 'claimed' tier vs for-all) so the agent knows what the write actually buys.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action and the exclusion, and every paragraph carries behavioral information. It is however long and drifts into conceptual prose ('a judgment about the world the platform cannot check', 'no stronger than the weakest assertion behind it') that could be tightened without losing actionable content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutation tool totalling a 7-parameter schema with an output schema present, the description covers preconditions, failure mode, side effects, lifetime, and interaction with linked COs. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing, and return values are covered by the output schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 86%, so the schema already documents model_id, assumption_id, expires_at, attested_by and evidence_url. The description adds contextual meaning around the attested statement ('holds for the text it was given for') but no new per-parameter syntax or format guidance, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('Record that a responsible party affirmed an assumption holds') and immediately scopes it apart from the sibling workflow: external assumptions only, not non-applicability ones. An agent can distinguish this from submit_assertions and submit_findings without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use ('Only for external assumptions'), when-not ('non-applicability assumptions... manual attestation is rejected'), and names the alternative path ('submit assertions + run mipiti-verify'). It also states the delegation-rule precondition that governs whether the call is allowed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
submit_control_deltaSubmit Control DeltaA
Submit a draft of a control's delta: edits to the behavioural model, each quoting the control's own text. Mutating; writes no control, set revision or model version.
Each edit's quote must be found in the control's text (a quote's
source defaults to the control), and unexpressed lists what the
text commits to that no edit states. An edit that does not check is
refused (422 delta_refused) with its failures.
A submission is a draft, never a declaration: it is checked against the
text by one call billed to the caller (402 when the balance is short), so
it can never make the analysis credit a control alone, and a program's
never replaces a delta a person declared (409 declared_by_person).
A person declares a draft with declare_control_delta.
Returns the delta as get_control_delta does, with check_ran.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| edits | Yes | JSON array of edit objects, each with a ``trace`` of quotes from the control's text. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control. | |
| unexpressed | No | JSON array of ``{"kind", "quote", "note"}``. | [] |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: it is mutating but 'writes no control, set revision or model version'; failed checks yield 422 `delta_refused`; insufficient balance yields 402; a person-declared delta yields 409 `declared_by_person`. This is exactly the behavioral context an agent needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action, then the validation and billing/conflict semantics. Dense but each clause earns its place; the parenthetical error codes aid scanning. Slightly long, but no wasted sentences.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutation tool with no annotations and an output schema, the description covers validation, billing, conflict behavior, and return shape (as `get_control_delta` does, with `check_ran`). Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is high (80%), so a baseline of 3 applies, but the description adds genuine semantic value: quotes must be found in the control's text, a quote's `source` defaults to the control, and `unexpressed` lists commitments no edit states. This clarifies the meaning of the two JSON-array parameters beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (submit) and resource (a control's delta) with scope: 'edits to the behavioural model, each quoting the control's own text.' It distinguishes itself from the sibling `declare_control_delta` by framing the output as a draft, not a declaration.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states it is 'a draft, never a declaration' and routes the agent to `declare_control_delta` for the declaration path. It clearly implies when to use it (submitting provisional edits), though it doesn't explicitly contrast against `get_control_delta` beyond the return-shape comparison.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
submit_findingsSubmit FindingsA
Record negative findings (gaps discovered while scanning a codebase against a model's controls). Mutating: persists new finding records against the model.
Use after a gap-discovery scan (see get_scan_prompt) to log where expected control evidence was NOT found. Findings are the negative counterpart to assertions (positive proof via submit_assertions): a finding says "I looked here for this and it was missing." Once submitted, drive a finding through its lifecycle with update_finding and review them with list_findings.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| findings_json | Yes | JSON string of an **array** of finding objects. Each object should carry: - ``control_id`` (str): the control the gap relates to. - ``title`` (str): short summary of the gap. - ``description`` (str): what is missing and why it matters. - ``severity`` (str): finding severity (e.g., "low"/"medium"/"high"/"critical"). - ``checked_locations`` (list): files/paths inspected. - ``checked_patterns`` (list): patterns/signals searched for. - ``expected_evidence`` (str): what implemented evidence would have looked like. Must parse as a JSON array; a single object or malformed JSON is rejected. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden of disclosing side effects. It clearly says 'Mutating: persists new finding records against the model' and notes the lifecycle with update_finding/list_findings. However, it does not mention idempotency, duplicate behavior, whether submissions can be overwritten, or any permission requirements—common gaps for a mutating tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences with no wasted words. The first sentence front-loads the core purpose and mutating nature; the second gives concrete usage context; the third adds the assertion counterpart and subsequent lifecycle tools. Every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with a detailed input schema and an existing output schema, the description is largely complete: it explains why and when to use it, what findings mean, and how to manage them afterward. The main residual gap is the under-documented server_version parameter and the lack of idempotency/duplicate caveats, but these are minor given the overall context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already documents model_id and findings_json in detail, including the JSON array format and rejection of malformed input. The description adds useful intent behind model_id and findings_json, but it does not clarify server_version, one of three required parameters that has no schema description.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Record') and resource ('negative findings... gaps discovered while scanning a codebase against a model's controls'), and explicitly distinguishes findings from assertions via submit_assertions. An agent can clearly tell this tool apart from related siblings without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly says when to use it: 'Use after a gap-discovery scan (see get_scan_prompt)' and clarifies it is for logging where expected evidence was NOT found. It also contrasts with submit_assertions and points to update_finding/list_findings for lifecycle and review, giving clear alternatives and next steps.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
suggest_functional_test_mappingsSuggest Functional Test MappingsA
Suggest which functional objectives each imported test likely covers.
For unmapped tests (imported without an association, or added without objective ids), this proposes objective mappings so you can review and apply them with associate_functional_test. It only suggests — nothing is associated until you confirm.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| test_ids | No | Comma-separated functional-test ids to map. Empty means every currently-unmapped test. | |
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It explicitly discloses the key side-effect boundary: 'It only suggests — nothing is associated until you confirm.' This directly tells the agent the tool is non-destructive and does not alter associations, which is critical for a proposal-style tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded. The first sentence states the core purpose, and the second provides exactly the necessary usage and safety context. No redundant phrasing or filler exists; every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description fully covers what the tool does, when to use it, what makes a test eligible, and the fact that no association happens until confirmation. An output schema exists, so the return shape is covered elsewhere. Nothing essential is missing for an agent to select and invoke this tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 67%, so model_id and test_ids already have meaning in the schema. The description reinforces the test_ids semantics ('unmapped tests', 'every currently-unmapped test') but adds little beyond that. The required server_version parameter remains undocumented in both the schema and the description, though coverage is high enough to keep the score at baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Suggest which functional objectives each imported test likely covers.' It clearly scopes the tool to unmapped tests and explicitly distinguishes it from the sibling apply tool, associate_functional_test, so an agent can tell them apart.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description states exactly when to use this tool: for unmapped tests (imported without an association or added without objective ids). It also names the follow-up tool, associate_functional_test, and clarifies that this tool only proposes mappings—so the agent knows this is not the action for applying them.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
undo_composition_eventUndo Composition EventA
Preview, and on confirmation apply, the undo of a lift or split.
event_type is lift or split; event_id is the forward
lift_applied / split_applied activity event's id, or the
lift_id / split_id in its payload. model_id is the model the
event was raised on (another model's event is 404).
By default (dry_run=True) it is read-only: {plan, refusal}, exactly
one non-null. plan lists the inverse operations an undo would commit
(lift: tombstone the LCA entity, restore the source copies, rewrite CO
references; split: restore at the ancestor, tombstone the target
copies). refusal lists why it cannot: state has moved since the event
(assertions submitted on the entity, objectives referencing it, an
edit). Show it to the operator.
With dry_run=False it is mutating, after explicit confirmation: the
divergence check runs again (409 with detail.refusal.reasons when it
refuses), the inverse is persisted across every affected model, and a
lift_undone / split_undone event citing original_event_id is
recorded. Returns {undone_event_id, original_event_id, applied_state_ops, models}; models is {lca_model, source_descendant_models} for a lift and {ancestor_model, descendant_models} for a split, each model its id, version and title.
503 where composition is not available.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| dry_run | No | ||
| event_id | Yes | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| event_type | Yes | ||
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: dry_run is read-only by default, dry_run=false is mutating after confirmation, divergence is rechecked with a 409, and a 503 occurs when composition is unavailable. It also discloses the exact return shapes and refusal semantics.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but front-loaded: purpose, parameter semantics, preview behavior, and mutation behavior are presented in a logical order. It is longer than ideal, but the complexity of a preview/apply undo operation justifies most of the detail.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, yet the description still explains return values, error cases, model coverage, and event recording. For a complex mutation tool with no annotations, this is complete enough for an agent to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must explain parameters; it meaningfully defines event_type, event_id, model_id, and the dry_run mode. The only gap is server_version, which is required but not described, keeping this from a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb+resource: preview/apply undo of a lift or split composition event. It clearly distinguishes the two event types and the forward event identifiers, so an agent can identify the operation without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly describes the default dry-run preview path, the explicit confirmation required for mutation, and when refusals should be shown to the operator. It does not name sibling alternatives such as undo_model_change, but the when/when-not guidance for this tool is strong.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
undo_model_changeUndo Model ChangeA
Undo the latest change to a model's controls, or revert its latest version. Mutating.
target="controls" restores exactly what the latest set revision of
the latest version replaced (list_control_revisions'
undo_target). Changes are undone latest first, one per call; the
undo is itself recorded, and the next undo goes to the change before
it. There is no redo. Verdicts the undo returns to are served again
rather than re-judged. Answers {applied: true, model_id, model_version, undone, revision, controls}: undone is the revision
undone, revision the one the undo recorded, controls the ids it
restored.
target="version" creates a new version copying the latest earlier
version not already discarded — the model, its controls and their
objective metadata — and marks the replaced version discarded. Version
numbers are never reused, and the discarded version stays readable in
the history. Findings on controls the revert removes are resolved.
Answers {applied: true, model_id, model_version, copied_from, discarded}: model_version is the new version.
A refusal comes back as {applied: false, http_status: 409, code, message}: generation_active (a build holds the model), and for
controls nothing_to_undo or set_diverged (a control the change
touched has changed since; undo the later change first), for a version
no_earlier_version.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| target | Yes | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| server_version | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it declares the tool mutating, states that the undo is itself recorded and irreversible (no redo), explains that verdicts are re-served rather than re-judged, that findings on removed controls are resolved, that version numbers are never reused, and that the discarded version stays readable. It even enumerates the 409 refusal codes with their meanings.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Well front-loaded: the core action and mutation warning come first, then per-target behavior and refusal handling. It is on the long side, and the two explicit response-shape listings duplicate what the existing output schema already conveys, which is slightly wasteful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a destructive, two-mode mutation tool with an output schema, the description covers both branches, their side effects, failure modes, and recovery guidance. An agent has everything needed to invoke it correctly and interpret both success and refusal responses.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It fully specifies the meaning and side effects of the target enum values ('controls' vs 'version'), which is the only non-obvious parameter. model_id and server_version are left undefined, but they are self-explanatory identifiers, so the gap is minor.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a precise verb+resource ('Undo the latest change to a model's controls, or revert its latest version') and immediately splits the two modes by the target parameter. It also references the sibling tool that supplies the undo_target (list_control_revisions), so an agent can tell this apart from adjacent revision/history tools without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives clear operational context: one change undone per call, latest first, no redo, and the precondition that set_diverged must be resolved by undoing the later change first. It lacks explicit guidance on when to prefer this over neighbors like undo_composition_event or discard_control_build, so it falls short of a full when/when-not/alternatives treatment.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
update_control_statusUpdate Control StatusA
Update the implementation status of a security control. Mutating.
Sets the control's status to "implemented" or "not_implemented".
Marking a control "implemented" REQUIRES at least one assertion on the
control — check its assertion_count (via get_controls) first and
submit assertions with submit_assertions if it is zero, or the call
is rejected.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | Yes | New status — "implemented" or "not_implemented". | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model the control belongs to. | |
| control_id | Yes | ID of the control to update (e.g. "CTRL-01"). | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| implementation_notes | No | Optional free-text notes recorded with the status change. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It openly states that the operation is mutating and documents a non-obvious rejection condition: marking a control implemented requires at least one assertion. It could add more about side effects or permissions, but the critical behavioral trait is covered.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three focused sentences with no filler. The core action and mutating nature are front-loaded, followed by a clearly formatted precondition block. Every sentence adds value, and the REQUIRES is emphasized without unnecessary prose.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, the description doesn't need to explain return values. Combined with the input schema, it gives an agent enough to call the tool correctly: required parameter names, permissible status values, and the critical assertion prerequisite. Minor gaps like error details or authentication are not essential for invoking the tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 80%, so the schema already documents most parameters clearly. The description adds context around the status transition and the assertion requirement, but doesn't elaborate on parameter syntax beyond what the schema provides. server_version still has no meaningful description, but the high schema coverage keeps this at baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description uses a specific verb and resource: it 'Sets the control's status to implemented or not_implemented'. It clearly distinguishes this from sibling tools like refine_control or remap_control by focusing solely on implementation status. The 'Mutating' label reinforces the action without ambiguity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit context for when to use this tool: when updating a control's implementation status. It also names prerequisite tools and conditions — check assertion_count via get_controls and use submit_assertions before marking implemented, or the call is rejected. It doesn't explicitly state when not to use this tool versus an alternative, but the guidance is clear enough.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
update_findingUpdate FindingA
Advance a finding through its lifecycle. Mutating: updates the finding's status and metadata.
Use to acknowledge, remediate, verify, or dismiss a finding previously recorded by submit_findings / list_findings. This records a MANUAL status transition — the machine-set auto_resolved state is not among the statuses it accepts; for gaps whose kind has an automatic fix, remediate_finding performs the actual cleanup instead.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| notes | No | Optional free-text notes recorded on the finding. | |
| reason | No | Optional rationale; required when dismissing (status="dismissed"). | |
| status | Yes | New lifecycle status, one of "discovered", "acknowledged", "remediated", "verified", "dismissed". ``auto_resolved`` is NOT settable here: it asserts that a condition is no longer reproduced, which is a claim only the platform can make from its own re-evaluation. Setting it by hand would forge that claim, so this tool refuses it — use ``dismissed`` (with a reason) to record that a gap does not matter, which is the judgment a person is entitled to make. | |
| model_id | Yes | ID of the threat model. | |
| finding_id | Yes | ID of the finding to update. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| remediation_assertion_ids | No | Optional comma-separated assertion IDs that evidence the fix, linking the remediation to the assertions that prove it. Empty by default. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden; it discloses that the tool is mutating, that it records a MANUAL transition, and that auto_resolved is deliberately refused because setting it by hand would forge a platform-only claim — a strong, non-obvious behavioral disclosure. It does not cover permissions/auth or reversibility, so it falls short of a 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences, front-loaded with the purpose and the mutating statement before the usage and exception details. Every sentence carries information, though the second and third run long and mix usage guidance with rationale.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, return values need not be explained, and the schema documents the parameters. The description adds the lifecycle framing, sibling routing, and the auto_resolved exclusion, leaving only minor gaps such as required permissions. Nearly complete for a mutation tool with no annotations.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 86%, so the schema already documents status, reason, notes, finding_id, and remediation_assertion_ids. The description largely restates the auto_resolved exclusion that the status field already explains, adding only the manual-vs-machine framing; at high coverage the baseline of 3 is correct.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb+resource ('Advance a finding through its lifecycle. Mutating: updates the finding's status and metadata') and explicitly distinguishes itself from submit_findings/list_findings (creation/reading) and remediate_finding (automatic cleanup). An agent can tell exactly what this tool does and does not do without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use cases ('acknowledge, remediate, verify, or dismiss a finding previously recorded by submit_findings / list_findings') and a when-not / alternative ('for gaps whose kind has an automatic fix, remediate_finding performs the actual cleanup instead'). It also names the dismissal path and its condition (with a reason). Routing is unambiguous.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
update_organizationUpdate OrganizationA
Set per-organization level grades for IEC 62443-4-1 and NIST CSF.
Admin-only: the backend requires the caller to be an admin in the organization (or a superadmin). Non-admins will get a 403; do not invoke this tool unless you've verified admin role for the target org.
target_ml is the IEC 62443-4-1 Maturity Level the organization
targets for its secure-development program (1-5). csf_tier is
the NIST CSF Tier the organization targets for its cybersecurity
risk-management posture (1-4).
Because None on the wire is indistinguishable from "field
omitted", pass clear_target_ml=True or clear_csf_tier=True
to explicitly reset a value to NULL. Omitting both the value and
its clear_* flag leaves the existing server-side value
untouched.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| org_id | Yes | Organization ID. | |
| csf_tier | No | NIST CSF Tier (1-4), or ``None`` to leave unchanged. | |
| target_ml | No | IEC 62443-4-1 Maturity Level (1-5), or ``None`` to leave unchanged. | |
| clear_csf_tier | No | Explicitly reset ``csf_tier`` to NULL. | |
| server_version | Yes | ||
| clear_target_ml | No | Explicitly reset ``target_ml`` to NULL. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full behavioral burden. It discloses the auth requirement, the 403 failure mode, the wire-level ambiguity of None, the clear_* flags for resetting values, and the behavior of leaving omitted values untouched. This goes well beyond what the schema alone conveys.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is organized into four purposeful paragraphs: purpose, auth warning, parameter definitions, and None/clear semantics. No filler; each sentence explains a behavior or precondition the agent needs before calling.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Very complete for a six-parameter tool: it covers auth, parameter ranges, reset semantics, and mutation behavior. It does not explain the required server_version parameter, which is also undocumented in the schema, so the definition has one minor blind spot.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The description adds ranges for target_ml (1-5) and csf_tier (1-4), explains the meaning of None versus omission, and clarifies the clear_* flags and their relationship to the value parameters. Schema coverage is high, but this description resolves semantics that the schema leaves ambiguous.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Set per-organization level grades for IEC 62443-4-1 and NIST CSF.' This clearly distinguishes it from the many compliance/control sibling tools and explains what 'update organization' means in this context.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It explicitly states the precondition: admin or superadmin required, and says not to invoke unless admin role is verified. It also implies the use case (updating org-level grades) and the when-not (non-admins will get a 403), so an agent can decide when this tool is appropriate.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
update_threat_modelUpdate Threat ModelA
Change a threat model's metadata: its name, its parent, where its description came from. Mutating; pass only what changes.
name(1-120 chars) renames it; no new version. Titles are unique within a workspace, case-insensitive (409 on a clash).parent_idwires it under a parent on the recursive composition tree, so it inherits the parent's topology and objectives;clear_parent=Truemakes it a tree root. Cycles (409) and chains past the platform's maximum depth (400) are refused. No new version.provenance_kind(code,ticket,document,manual,mixed) records where the description came from, with the otherprovenance_*values.codewithprovenance_commit_shameans the code is authoritative and the model follows it (reconcile_modelmeasures it against the code); any other kind means the description is intent and the code is measured against it. Bumps the model version.
Changes apply in that order. Returns {model_id, name?, parent?, provenance?}, one entry per change applied. A failure raises and
names the changes already applied.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | No | ||
| model_id | Yes | ||
| parent_id | No | ||
| clear_parent | No | ||
| provenance_ref | No | ||
| server_version | Yes | ||
| provenance_kind | No | ||
| provenance_repo_url | No | ||
| provenance_commit_sha | No | ||
| provenance_source_ref | No | ||
| provenance_source_url | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations the description carries the full burden and does so: it discloses conflict codes (409 on name clash/cycle, 400 on max depth), which changes bump the model version versus which do not, the fixed application order of changes, and the partial-failure contract ('a failure raises and names the changes already applied'). That is unusually rich mutation semantics.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the purpose and the 'pass only what changes' rule, then bulleted per-parameter detail that earns its length. Dense but every clause carries information; slightly long for an agent skimming many tools.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a mutating, 11-param tool with no annotations, it covers ordering, error codes, version effects and failure reporting, and even restates the return shape despite an output schema existing. Missing pieces are the required server_version semantics and any auth/permission prerequisites.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% across 11 params, yet the description explains name constraints, parent_id/clear_parent semantics, the provenance_kind enum values, and the meaning of provenance_commit_sha and the 'other provenance_* values'. The two required params, model_id and especially server_version (apparently a concurrency token), are left undocumented, which is the remaining gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource and narrows scope precisely to metadata (name, parent, provenance), with each field's effect spelled out. However it never names or contrasts a sibling (e.g. refine_threat_model or delete_threat_model), leaving the agent to infer which tool owns content-level changes versus metadata.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
'Mutating; pass only what changes' gives clear partial-update guidance, and per-field conditions (clear_parent=True to root, provenance_kind=code to make code authoritative) tell the agent when each argument is appropriate. Still no explicit when-to-use-this vs. the sibling refine/delete/undo tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
6 tool updates
v0.100.0- Changed
apply_entity_proposals1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / proposals / descriptionPrevious value: -"JSON array of ``{\"entity_id\", \"input_hash\"}``, each\n``input_hash`` as the verdict was read."New value: +"JSON array of ``{\"entity_id\", \"input_hash\",\n\"proposal_hash\"}``, each ``input_hash`` and ``proposal_hash`` as\nthe verdict was read."
- Added
get_objective_grouping - Changed
reevaluate_threat_model_factors1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / stale_onlyAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Only entities rated for another description. Default\nFalse.", + "type": "boolean" +}
- Added
remove_behavioural_element - Added
set_objective_grouping - Added
settle_entity_rating
3 tool updates
v0.97.0- Added
answer_entity_question - Added
apply_entity_proposals - Added
check_entity_quality
5 tool updates
v0.94.0- Changed
add_proposed_attacker1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / zoneAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "A zone of the part to add, where two proposals hold the same\nclasses; empty otherwise.", + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
assess_model1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / snapshotAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "The ``snapshot`` an earlier page named; empty (default)\nevaluates the model now.", + "type": "string" +}
- Changed
dismiss_proposed_attacker2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / zoneAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "A zone of the part, where two proposals hold the same classes;\nempty otherwise.", + "type": "string" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / zones / descriptionPrevious value: -"Comma-separated zones of the grouped proposal to dismiss\nalone; empty dismisses the proposal whole."New value: +"Comma-separated zones of the part to dismiss alone; empty\ndismisses the proposal whole."
- Added
keep_attacker_whole - Added
split_grouped_attacker
8 tool updates
v0.91.0- Added
decide_inventory_pair - Added
declare_inventory_tags - Changed
dismiss_proposed_attacker1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / zonesAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Comma-separated zones of the grouped proposal to dismiss\nalone; empty dismisses the proposal whole.", + "type": "string" +}
- Added
get_inventory_judgements - Changed
get_threat_model3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / clarifications_limitAdded value: +{ + "default": 50, + "description": "Answers per page.", + "type": "integer" +} - added
Input schema / properties / clarifications_offsetAdded value: +{ + "default": 0, + "description": "The first answer of the page.", + "type": "integer" +} - added
Input schema / properties / include_clarificationsAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Include a page of the answers to the\nmodel's questions (default False).", + "type": "boolean" +}
- Changed
list_decisions1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / decision / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``,\n``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``,\n``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``,\n``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``,\n``assumption_accepted``, ``behavioural_model_answered``\n(an answer, an element edit or a link declared),\n``behavioural_model_confirmed``, ``behavioural_delta_declared``,\n``behavioural_cross_check_dismissed`` (a person set aside a\nfinding of a declaration's cross-check), ``seal_attested``,\n``position_attested``, ``privileges_attested``,\n``extent_attested``, ``escalation_resolved``,\n``drift_intent_decided`` (whether a description-drift finding was\nintended or a defect of the code), ``description_revised`` (a\nrevised description accepted). Empty (default) returns every\nkind."New value: +"Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``,\n``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``,\n``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``,\n``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``,\n``assumption_accepted``, ``behavioural_model_answered``\n(an answer, an element edit or a link declared),\n``behavioural_model_confirmed``, ``behavioural_delta_declared``,\n``behavioural_cross_check_dismissed`` (a person set aside a\nfinding of a declaration's cross-check),\n``behavioural_confirmation_withdrawn`` (a confirmation withdrawn\nby a report that the code does more than the description),\n``seal_attested``, ``position_attested``, ``privileges_attested``,\n``extent_attested``, ``escalation_resolved``,\n``drift_intent_decided`` (whether a description-drift finding was\nintended or a defect of the code), ``description_revised`` (a\nrevised description accepted), ``inventory_pair_decided`` (two\ninventory entries decided one entity or not),\n``inventory_tag_declared`` (an entity's taxonomy tags declared).\nEmpty (default) returns every kind."
- Changed
reevaluate_threat_model_factors3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / change_reason / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional override of the audit-trail reason\n(default: \"LLM factor re-evaluation\"). Use this to thread\na higher-level reason like \"Re-eval after refinement bug\nfix shipped in vN.N.N\" when running the tool as part of a\nbroader workflow."New value: +"Optional audit-trail reason (default \"LLM factor\nre-evaluation\")." - added
Input schema / properties / entity_idsAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Optional comma-separated asset and attacker ids (e.g.\n\"A-03,T-14\"); omit for every live entity.", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / unrated_onlyAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Only entities whose ``rating_source`` is\n``unrated``. Default False.", + "type": "boolean" +}
- Added
request_inventory_checks
9 tool updates
v0.90.0- Added
add_proposed_attacker - Added
answer_attacker_credentials - Changed
answer_behavioural_questions1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / dry_runAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Return what the answers would do (``outcome``) and record\nnothing. Default False.", + "type": "boolean" +}
- Added
dismiss_proposed_attacker - Added
generate_from_behavioural_model - Changed
generate_threat_model3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / force / descriptionPrevious value: -"Skip the similar-model detection and always create a\nnew model. Default False — the check fires unless the\noperator / agent has explicit reason to bypass it."New value: +"Skip the similar-model detection and always create a\nnew model. Default False: the check fires unless the\noperator or agent has explicit reason to bypass it." - changed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Only to resume a generation that stopped on owner\nquestions (above): the model it saved. Pass it once\n``get_behavioural_model`` reports ``generation_ready: true``.\nBefore then it is not a resume, and a new model is generated."New value: +"Deprecated: use ``generate_from_behavioural_model``. With\nan empty ``feature_description`` it does the same; with a\ndescription it is refused (``resume_takes_no_description``)." - changed
Input schema / properties / parent_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional ID of an existing model to wire the new\nmodel under as a child on the recursive composition tree.\nThe child then inherits the parent's topology and\nparticipates in composition (delta / inherited control\ncredit). Default None — the model is created flat."New value: +"Optional ID of an existing model to wire the new\nmodel under as a child on the recursive composition tree.\nThe child then inherits the parent's topology and\nparticipates in composition (delta / inherited control\ncredit). Default None: the model is created flat."
- Added
get_behavioural_attackers - Changed
get_behavioural_model4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / limitAdded value: +{ + "default": 50, + "description": "``questions`` view only.", + "type": "integer" +} - added
Input schema / properties / offsetAdded value: +{ + "default": 0, + "description": "``questions`` view only.", + "type": "integer" +} - added
Input schema / properties / viewAdded value: +{ + "default": "full", + "description": "``full`` (default), ``status`` or ``questions``.", + "enum": [ + "full", + "status", + "questions" + ], + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / wait_secondsAdded value: +{ + "default": 0, + "description": "0 (default) answers at once.", + "type": "integer" +}
- Changed
get_behavioural_threats4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / co_idAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "One objective (e.g. \"CO5\"); empty for every one.", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / limitAdded value: +{ + "default": 25, + "description": "Objectives per page (default 25, at most 200).", + "type": "integer" +} - added
Input schema / properties / offsetAdded value: +{ + "default": 0, + "description": "The first objective of the page (default 0).", + "type": "integer" +} - added
Input schema / properties / standingAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Only objectives of this standing; empty for every one.", + "type": "string" +}
5 tool updates
v0.88.0- Changed
answer_behavioural_questions2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / answers / descriptionPrevious value: -"JSON array of ``{\"question_id\": \"...\", \"text\": \"...\",\n\"disposition\"?: \"...\"}``. Example: '[{\"question_id\": \"q1\",\n\"text\": \"Only the owner can delete a record.\"}, {\"question_id\":\n\"q2\", \"disposition\": \"unknown\"}]'. Empty to extract with answers\ncollected."New value: +"JSON array of ``{\"question_id\", \"text\"?, \"disposition\"?,\n\"structured\"?, \"contradicts\"?}``, e.g. '[{\"question_id\": \"q1\",\n\"text\": \"Only the owner deletes.\"}, {\"question_id\": \"q3\",\n\"structured\": {\"classes\": [\"org_admin\"]}}]'." - changed
Input schema / properties / extract_now / descriptionPrevious value: -"Extract now, with the answers given and those already\ncollected."New value: +"Extract now, with the answers collected."
- Changed
create_proposal1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / kind / descriptionPrevious value: -"One of ``add_component`` (payload ``{name, repo_url?, path?,\ntrust_boundary_ids?}``), ``remove_component`` (payload\n``{component_id}``), ``design_change`` (payload ``{target_kind:\n\"attacker\"|\"asset\", target_id, design_move}``; take ``design_move``\nfrom ``get_design_leverage``), ``assumption`` (payload ``{co_id,\ngroup_id, precondition, assumption_id?, gap?}``: a precondition\nabout the environment that only something outside this system\ncan meet, one declarative sentence; ``assumption_id`` names an\nexisting assumption that states it). A precondition a person\nalready rejected for that objective is refused."New value: +"One of ``add_component`` (payload ``{name, repo_url?, path?,\ntrust_boundary_ids?}``), ``remove_component`` (payload\n``{component_id}``), ``design_change`` (payload ``{target_kind:\n\"attacker\"|\"asset\", target_id, design_move}``; take ``design_move``\nfrom ``get_design_leverage``), ``assumption`` (payload ``{co_id,\ngroup_id, precondition, assumption_id?, gap?}``: a precondition\nabout the environment that only something outside this system\ncan meet, one declarative sentence; ``assumption_id`` names an\nexisting assumption that states it). A precondition a person\nalready rejected for that objective is refused.\n``drift_intent`` (payload ``{finding_id, intent: \"intended\" |\n\"defect\", control_id?, head_commit?}``): whether a\ndescription-drift finding was intended (the description is\nbehind the product) or a defect of the code, naming for a defect\nthe control whose passing assertion closes it.\n``description_revision`` (payload ``{description, commit_sha?,\nfinding_ids?}``): the whole description revised to what the code\nat that commit does, addressing those drift findings; accepting it\nwrites the new text and extracts the behavioural model again over\nit, billed to whoever accepts. A revision that changes the\nsentence of a finding decided a defect is accepted only by a\nperson. Propose one where ``get_behavioural_model``'s\n``drift.revision_suggested`` is true."
- Added
decide_drift_intent - Changed
decide_proposal1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / record_onlyAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Accepting parked answers to behavioural questions\nstarts the extraction they complete, billed to whoever accepts;\nTrue records them without it. Default False.", + "type": "boolean" +}
- Changed
list_decisions1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / decision / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``,\n``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``,\n``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``,\n``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``,\n``assumption_accepted``, ``behavioural_model_answered``\n(an answer, an element edit or a link declared),\n``behavioural_model_confirmed``, ``behavioural_delta_declared``,\n``behavioural_cross_check_dismissed`` (a person set aside a\nfinding of a declaration's cross-check), ``seal_attested``,\n``position_attested``, ``privileges_attested``,\n``extent_attested``, ``escalation_resolved``. Empty (default)\nreturns every kind."New value: +"Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``,\n``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``,\n``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``,\n``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``,\n``assumption_accepted``, ``behavioural_model_answered``\n(an answer, an element edit or a link declared),\n``behavioural_model_confirmed``, ``behavioural_delta_declared``,\n``behavioural_cross_check_dismissed`` (a person set aside a\nfinding of a declaration's cross-check), ``seal_attested``,\n``position_attested``, ``privileges_attested``,\n``extent_attested``, ``escalation_resolved``,\n``drift_intent_decided`` (whether a description-drift finding was\nintended or a defect of the code), ``description_revised`` (a\nrevised description accepted). Empty (default) returns every\nkind."
24 tool updates
v0.87.0- Added
accept_behavioural_link_proposals - Changed
add_attacker2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / surface_extent / descriptionPrevious value: -"``\"whole\"`` when, from its position, the attacker's\noperations range over ANY entry of the interface it reaches\n(any endpoint, request, row, file, message or frame). Recorded\nas attested by this call and requires ``change_reason``. Omit\nto leave it undeclared, which is the ordinary case."New value: +"``\"whole\"`` when, from its position, the attacker's\noperations range over ANY entry of the interface it reaches\n(any endpoint, request, row, file, message or frame). Requires\n``change_reason``. Omit to leave it undeclared, which is the\nordinary case." - changed
Input schema / properties / trust_boundary_ids / descriptionPrevious value: -"Comma-separated trust boundary IDs."New value: +"Comma-separated ids of the boundaries the\nattacker has crossed. Naming them attests the position: a\nperson's is recorded attested; a program's only under a rule\ndelegating ``position_attested``, otherwise the position lands\nsuggested and the attestation waits for a person\n(``attestation.escalation_id``)."
- Changed
add_trust_boundary1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / sealed / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional. Set True to declare the boundary has NO lateral\ningress — the only way into its zone is crossing the perimeter\n(an air-gap / network-segmented enclave). On its own this is a\nsuggestion: only an ATTESTED seal lets reachability decisively\nrule an asset unreachable instead of indeterminate, and the\nattestation is recorded with ``edit_trust_boundary``\n(``seal_source=\"attested\"`` with a ``change_reason``). Default\nFalse (assume a lateral pivot is possible). Set it only when the\nisolation is real and attestable."New value: +"Optional. Set True to declare the boundary has NO lateral\ningress — the only way into its zone is crossing the perimeter\n(an air-gap / network-segmented enclave). On its own this is a\nsuggestion: only an ATTESTED seal lets reachability decisively\nrule an asset unreachable instead of indeterminate, and the\nattestation is recorded with ``edit_trust_boundary``\n(``seal_source=\"attested\"`` with a ``change_reason``), by a\nperson or a program the workspace delegates ``seal_attested``\nto. Default False (assume a lateral pivot is possible). Set it\nonly when the isolation is real and attestable."
- Added
answer_behavioural_questions - Added
confirm_behavioural_model - Added
declare_behavioural_link - Added
declare_control_delta - Changed
edit_attacker17 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / archetype / descriptionRemoved value: -"New archetype (optional)." - changed
Input schema / properties / attack_complexity / descriptionPrevious value: -"\"Low\" | \"High\"."New value: +"Low | High." - changed
Input schema / properties / attack_vector / descriptionPrevious value: -"\"Network\" | \"Adjacent\" | \"Local\" | \"Physical\"."New value: +"Network | Adjacent | Local | Physical." - removed
Input schema / properties / attacker_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the attacker (e.g., \"T1\")." - changed
Input schema / properties / attest_position / descriptionPrevious value: -"Operator-attest the attacker's current position without\nchanging it — e.g. to confirm a fully external attacker's empty\ncrossed set so an objective blocked on an unpositioned attacker can\nbe resolved. Pass ``true`` to attest."New value: +"true attests the current position." - added
Input schema / properties / attest_privilegesAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "boolean" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "true attests the current ``privileges_required``,\nwhatever its value." +} - changed
Input schema / properties / attest_surface_extent / descriptionPrevious value: -"Record the extent already on the attacker as\nattested, without changing its value. Pass ``true`` to attest;\nrequires ``change_reason``."New value: +"true attests the current extent." - removed
Input schema / properties / capability / descriptionRemoved value: -"New capability (optional)." - changed
Input schema / properties / capability_prevalence / descriptionPrevious value: -"\"Commodity\" | \"Targeted\" | \"Rare\"."New value: +"Commodity | Targeted | Rare." - changed
Input schema / properties / change_reason / descriptionPrevious value: -"Required when any factor field, ``surface_extent``\nor ``attest_surface_extent`` is supplied — documents the\noperator override for the audit trail."New value: +"Why; required as above." - removed
Input schema / properties / likelihood_rationale / descriptionRemoved value: -"New rationale (optional)." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the threat model." - removed
Input schema / properties / position / descriptionRemoved value: -"New position (optional)." - changed
Input schema / properties / privileges_required / descriptionPrevious value: -"\"None\" | \"Low\" | \"High\"."New value: +"None | Low | High." - changed
Input schema / properties / surface_extent / descriptionPrevious value: -"``\"whole\"`` (operations range over ANY entry of the\ninterface reached) or ``\"point\"`` (one named entry). Supplying\nit attests it; requires ``change_reason``."New value: +"``whole`` (any entry of the interface reached) or\n``point`` (one named entry)." - changed
Input schema / properties / trust_boundary_ids / descriptionPrevious value: -"Comma-separated trust boundary IDs — the boundaries\nthis attacker has crossed (its position). Replaces the existing set.\nChanging it operator-attests the position, which lets reachability\ntrust it for a decisive verdict."New value: +"Comma-separated ids of the boundaries the\nattacker has crossed; replaces the set." - changed
Input schema / properties / user_interaction / descriptionPrevious value: -"\"None\" | \"Required\"."New value: +"None | Required."
- Added
edit_behavioural_element - Changed
edit_trust_boundary2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / seal_source / descriptionPrevious value: -"\"attested\" | \"unattested\". Only an operator-attested seal\nlets reachability decisively rule an objective unreachable past the\nboundary; an unattested (default/model-suggested) seal is treated as\npivotable. Use \"attested\" to attest a boundary already marked sealed\nwithout re-toggling it; \"unattested\" retracts. An attested seal\nimplies ``sealed``. Requires ``change_reason``."New value: +"\"attested\" | \"unattested\". Only an attested seal lets\nreachability decisively rule an objective unreachable past the\nboundary; an unattested (default or generated) seal is treated as\npivotable. Use \"attested\" to attest a boundary already marked sealed\nwithout re-toggling it; \"unattested\" retracts. An attested seal\nimplies ``sealed``. Requires ``change_reason``." - changed
Input schema / properties / sealed / descriptionPrevious value: -"New isolation flag. True declares NO lateral ingress (the only\nway in is crossing the perimeter — an air-gap / segmented enclave),\nwhich lets reachability decisively rule the boundary unreachable;\nFalse assumes a lateral pivot is possible. Reach-relevant — changing\nit can flip CO verdicts. Setting it records an operator attestation\nof the seal. Omit to leave unchanged."New value: +"New isolation flag. True declares NO lateral ingress (the only\nway in is crossing the perimeter — an air-gap / segmented enclave),\nwhich lets reachability decisively rule the boundary unreachable;\nFalse assumes a lateral pivot is possible. Reach-relevant — changing\nit can flip CO verdicts. Setting it attests the seal, as above.\nOmit to leave unchanged."
- Added
extract_behavioural_model - Changed
generate_threat_model1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / model_idAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Only to resume a generation that stopped on owner\nquestions (above): the model it saved. Pass it once\n``get_behavioural_model`` reports ``generation_ready: true``.\nBefore then it is not a resume, and a new model is generated.", + "type": "string" +}
- Added
get_behavioural_links - Added
get_behavioural_model - Added
get_behavioural_threats - Added
get_control_delta - Added
get_model_check - Changed
get_threat_model1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / include_inventory_completenessAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Add the completeness record and\nits ``grounding_gaps`` (default False).", + "type": "boolean" +}
- Changed
list_decisions1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / decision / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``,\n``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``,\n``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``,\n``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``,\n``assumption_accepted``, ``escalation_resolved``. Empty\n(default) returns every kind."New value: +"Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``,\n``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``,\n``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``,\n``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``,\n``assumption_accepted``, ``behavioural_model_answered``\n(an answer, an element edit or a link declared),\n``behavioural_model_confirmed``, ``behavioural_delta_declared``,\n``behavioural_cross_check_dismissed`` (a person set aside a\nfinding of a declaration's cross-check), ``seal_attested``,\n``position_attested``, ``privileges_attested``,\n``extent_attested``, ``escalation_resolved``. Empty (default)\nreturns every kind."
- Added
manage_model_check - Added
request_delta_second_reading - Added
request_model_check - Changed
start_control_build1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / scope_revisionAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the proposal's\n``scope_revision``." +}
- Added
submit_control_delta
13 tool updates
v0.85.0- Changed
add_model_to_group3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / group_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"ID of the tag or system."New value: +"ID of the tag." - removed
Input schema / properties / kindRemoved value: -{ - "description": "``\"tag\"`` or ``\"system\"``.", - "type": "string" -} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "kind", - "group_id", - "model_id" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "group_id", + "model_id" +]
- Changed
create_group4 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / kindRemoved value: -{ - "description": "``\"tag\"`` or ``\"system\"``.", - "type": "string" -} - changed
Input schema / properties / model_ids / descriptionPrevious value: -"optional initial member model ids — ``\"tag\"`` only."New value: +"optional initial member model ids." - changed
Input schema / properties / name / descriptionPrevious value: -"the group name (unique within the workspace for its kind)."New value: +"the tag name (unique within the workspace)." - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "kind", - "name" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "name" +]
- Changed
delete_group3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / group_idAdded value: +{ + "description": "ID of the tag to delete.", + "type": "string" +} - removed
Input schema / properties / tag_idRemoved value: -{ - "description": "ID of the tag to delete.", - "type": "string" -} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "tag_id" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "group_id" +]
- Changed
get_compliance_report6 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / limit / descriptionPrevious value: -"max requirement rows to return, 0 = no explicit limit (model/system scopes only)."New value: +"max requirement rows to return, 0 = no explicit limit (model scope only)." - changed
Input schema / properties / offset / descriptionPrevious value: -"skip the first N requirement rows, pagination (model/system scopes only). Default 0."New value: +"skip the first N requirement rows, pagination (model scope only). Default 0." - changed
Input schema / properties / scope / descriptionPrevious value: -"report boundary — \"model\", \"system\", or \"tag\"."New value: +"report boundary — \"model\" or \"tag\"." - changed
Input schema / properties / scope / enumPrevious value: -[ - "model", - "system", - "tag" -]New value: +[ + "model", + "tag" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / scope_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"id of the model, system, or tag selected by ``scope``."New value: +"id of the model or tag selected by ``scope``." - changed
Input schema / properties / status / descriptionPrevious value: -"optional per-requirement status filter (model/system scopes only)."New value: +"optional per-requirement status filter (model scope only)."
- Changed
get_group3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / group_idAdded value: +{ + "description": "ID of the tag.", + "type": "string" +} - removed
Input schema / properties / system_idRemoved value: -{ - "description": "ID of the system to retrieve.", - "type": "string" -} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "system_id" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "group_id" +]
- Added
get_group_dependencies - Changed
get_risk_view3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / scope / descriptionPrevious value: -"aggregation boundary — \"model\", \"system\", or \"tag\"."New value: +"aggregation boundary — \"model\" or \"tag\"." - changed
Input schema / properties / scope / enumPrevious value: -[ - "model", - "system", - "tag" -]New value: +[ + "model", + "tag" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / scope_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"id of the model, system, or tag selected by ``scope``."New value: +"id of the model or tag selected by ``scope``."
- Removed
get_system_dependencies - Removed
link_system_dependency - Changed
list_groups2 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / kindRemoved value: -{ - "description": "``\"tag\"`` or ``\"system\"``.", - "type": "string" -} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "kind" -]New value: +[ + "server_version" +]
- Changed
list_model_groups1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"the model whose groups (tags) to list."New value: +"the model whose tags to list."
- Changed
remove_model_from_group3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / group_idAdded value: +{ + "description": "the tag.", + "type": "string" +} - removed
Input schema / properties / tag_idRemoved value: -{ - "description": "the tag.", - "type": "string" -} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "tag_id", - "model_id" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "group_id", + "model_id" +]
- Changed
select_compliance_frameworks3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / scope / descriptionPrevious value: -"target boundary — \"model\", \"system\", or \"tag\"."New value: +"target boundary — \"model\" or \"tag\"." - changed
Input schema / properties / scope / enumPrevious value: -[ - "model", - "system", - "tag" -]New value: +[ + "model", + "tag" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / scope_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"id of the model, system, or tag selected by ``scope``."New value: +"id of the model or tag selected by ``scope``."
58 tool updates
v0.84.0- Removed
accept_coverage_divergences - Removed
add_evidence - Removed
apply_certain_reconciliation_match - Removed
apply_finding_remediation - Changed
attach_foundation6 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / selections / anyOfAdded value: +[ + { + "items": { + "additionalProperties": true, + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } +] - added
Input schema / properties / selections / defaultAdded value: +null - changed
Input schema / properties / selections / descriptionPrevious value: -"list of {source_objective_id, provider_control_id} dicts."New value: +"the pairs to delegate; omit to get the candidates." - removed
Input schema / properties / selections / itemsRemoved value: -{ - "additionalProperties": true, - "type": "object" -} - removed
Input schema / properties / selections / typeRemoved value: -"array" - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "model_id", - "foundation_model_id", - "selections" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "model_id", + "foundation_model_id" +]
- Removed
check_functional_gaps - Removed
confirm_reliance - Removed
create_reliance - Added
decide_reconciliation_candidate - Removed
delete_reliance - Added
discard_control_build - Removed
dismiss_verdict_divergences - Added
edit_evidence - Changed
generate_threat_model1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / provenance_kind / descriptionPrevious value: -"Where the description came from, one of\n``code``, ``ticket``, ``document``, ``manual``, ``mixed``.\nEmpty (default) records nothing. For an existing repository\npass ``provenance_kind=\"code\"`` with ``provenance_repo_url``\nand ``provenance_commit_sha`` (the HEAD you gathered from):\nthe code is then authoritative and the model follows it.\nAny other kind means the description is intent and the code\nis measured against it. The same record can be set later\nwith ``set_model_provenance``."New value: +"Where the description came from, one of\n``code``, ``ticket``, ``document``, ``manual``, ``mixed``.\nEmpty (default) records nothing. For an existing repository\npass ``provenance_kind=\"code\"`` with ``provenance_repo_url``\nand ``provenance_commit_sha`` (the HEAD you gathered from):\nthe code is then authoritative and the model follows it.\nAny other kind means the description is intent and the code\nis measured against it. The same record can be set later\nwith ``update_threat_model``."
- Added
get_capabilities - Removed
get_capability - Added
get_composition - Removed
get_composition_overview - Changed
get_control_generation_status1 field changed- removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the threat model whose control-generation status to poll."
- Changed
get_control_work_order2 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / control_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the control to implement (e.g. \"CTRL-03\")." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the threat model."
- Changed
get_controls11 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / co_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"List-mode filter — control objective ID." - removed
Input schema / properties / component_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"List-mode filter — component ID (e.g., \"CMP1\")." - removed
Input schema / properties / control_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"If set, detail mode — return this one control's full\nrecord directly (e.g. ``CTL-12``). If omitted, list mode." - removed
Input schema / properties / include_deleted / descriptionRemoved value: -"List mode — include soft-deleted controls\n(default False)." - removed
Input schema / properties / include_orphaned / descriptionRemoved value: -"List mode — include controls mapped only to\ntombstoned COs (default False)." - removed
Input schema / properties / limit / descriptionRemoved value: -"List mode — max controls to return (0 = all)." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the threat model." - removed
Input schema / properties / offset / descriptionRemoved value: -"List mode — skip the first N controls (pagination)." - removed
Input schema / properties / status / descriptionRemoved value: -"List-mode filter — \"implemented\", \"not_implemented\", or\n\"verified\"." - removed
Input schema / properties / summary_only / descriptionRemoved value: -"List mode — if True, returns only id, description,\nstatus, assertion_count, and assumed_by per control (much\nsmaller response)." - removed
Input schema / properties / version / descriptionRemoved value: -"Detail mode only — model version to read the control\nfrom. 0 (default) uses the latest. Ignored in list mode."
- Removed
get_effective_coverage - Changed
get_functional_coverage2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / gaps_onlyAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "Return only the actionable gaps (default False).", + "type": "boolean" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"ID of the threat model whose functional coverage to report."New value: +"ID of the threat model."
- Removed
get_functional_test_sufficiency - Changed
get_reachability_verdicts6 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / co_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"FLAT mode only. Optional CO id — when set, returns a single\nverdict; 404 if the CO doesn't exist or is tombstoned. Ignored\nwhen ``composed=True``." - removed
Input schema / properties / composed / descriptionRemoved value: -"When False (default), derive over this model's own\ntopology (flat). When True, derive over the composed effective\ntree (own ⊕ inherited)." - removed
Input schema / properties / kind_filter / descriptionRemoved value: -"COMPOSED mode only. Restrict verdicts to one kind —\none of ``\"reachable\" | \"unreachable\" | \"indeterminate\"``. Named\n``kind_filter`` (not ``kind``) to disambiguate from the verdict\nobject's own ``kind`` field. When omitted, all verdict kinds are\nreturned. Ignored when ``composed=False``." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the threat model." - removed
Input schema / properties / page / descriptionRemoved value: -"COMPOSED mode only. 1-indexed page number (default ``1``).\nIgnored when ``composed=False``." - removed
Input schema / properties / page_size / descriptionRemoved value: -"COMPOSED mode only. Verdicts per page (default ``100``).\nIgnored when ``composed=False``."
- Changed
get_sufficiency5 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / control_id / defaultAdded value: +"" - removed
Input schema / properties / control_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the control (e.g., \"CTRL-01\")." - added
Input schema / properties / functional_test_idAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "type": "string" +} - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the threat model." - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "model_id", - "control_id" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "model_id" +]
- Changed
get_threat_model1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / include_cos / descriptionPrevious value: -"Include control objectives inline."New value: +"Include control objectives inline (default False:\nthe answer carries no ``control_objectives`` key; read them\nwith ``get_control_objectives``)."
- Changed
import_compliance_framework1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / framework_json / descriptionPrevious value: -"A JSON string containing the framework body.\n(String not dict so the JSON shape stays explicit on the wire.)"New value: +"The framework body as a JSON string."
- Added
judge_imported_controls - Changed
judge_objectives2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / co_ids / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional comma-separated objective IDs to restrict the call\nto. Omit for every objective with no judgement for its current\ncontrols and none queued."New value: +"Optional comma-separated objective IDs; omit for every\nobjective with no judgement and none queued." - changed
Input schema / properties / confirm_estimate / descriptionPrevious value: -"False (default) returns the estimate and queues\nnothing; True queues the judgements."New value: +"False (default) estimates; True queues."
- Removed
list_capabilities - Added
list_control_revisions - Removed
list_effective_attack_paths - Removed
list_effective_control_objectives - Removed
list_effective_entities - Changed
list_reconciliation_candidates4 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / disposition / descriptionRemoved value: -"Which side of the queue to read — ``\"active\"``\n(default, open candidates) or ``\"rejected\"`` (persisted\nnot-a-duplicate decisions)." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the descendant threat model." - removed
Input schema / properties / page / descriptionRemoved value: -"ACTIVE disposition only. 1-indexed page number. Default 1.\nIgnored when ``disposition=\"rejected\"``." - removed
Input schema / properties / page_size / descriptionRemoved value: -"ACTIVE disposition only. Items per page. Default 50.\nIgnored when ``disposition=\"rejected\"``."
- Added
manage_reliance - Changed
model_coherence_report2 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / co_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"Optional CO id to scope the report to a single CO." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the threat model."
- Removed
preview_finding_remediation - Removed
preview_undo_composition - Removed
propose_attach_foundation - Changed
recompute_verdicts3 fields changed- removed
Input schema / properties / dry_runRemoved value: -{ - "default": false, - "description": "When True, return only the pre-flight estimate and enqueue\nnothing. When False (default), enqueue the recompute.", - "type": "boolean" -} - added
Input schema / properties / modeAdded value: +{ + "default": "quote", + "enum": [ + "quote", + "recompute", + "retry_parked" + ], + "type": "string" +} - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"ID of the threat model to re-evaluate (or estimate for)."
- Removed
reject_reconciliation_candidate - Added
remediate_finding - Removed
remove_evidence - Removed
rename_threat_model - Added
resolve_verdict_divergences - Removed
retry_verdicts - Removed
set_model_provenance - Removed
set_threat_model_parent - Added
start_control_build - Changed
strengthen_controls4 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / co_ids / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional comma-separated objective IDs to restrict the run\nto, of those the diagnosis lists as uncovered or undecided. Omit\nfor all of them."New value: +"Optional comma-separated objective IDs, of those diagnosed\nuncovered or undecided; omit for all." - changed
Input schema / properties / confirm_estimate / descriptionPrevious value: -"False (default) returns the estimate and starts\nnothing; True starts the run."New value: +"False (default) estimates; True starts the run." - added
Input schema / properties / model_versionAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "integer" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the estimate's value." +} - added
Input schema / properties / set_revisionAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "integer" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "With ``confirm_estimate=True``: the estimate's value." +}
- Changed
submit_assertions1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / functional_test_idAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null +}
- Removed
submit_functional_test_assertions - Changed
undo_composition_event4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / dry_runAdded value: +{ + "default": true, + "type": "boolean" +} - removed
Input schema / properties / event_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"Either the surrogate id of the forward\n``lift_applied`` / ``split_applied`` activity event, or the\nstructured ``lift_id`` / ``split_id`` carried in the event\npayload." - removed
Input schema / properties / event_type / descriptionRemoved value: -"Which forward composition event to undo. One of:\n - ``\"lift\"``: undo a ``lift_applied`` event. On success,\n persists the inverse across the LCA + every affected\n source descendant and emits a ``lift_undone`` event. The\n returned ``models`` block carries ``lca_model`` and\n ``source_descendant_models``.\n - ``\"split\"``: undo a ``split_applied`` event. On success,\n restores the ancestor's entity, tombstones the duplicated\n copies on every target descendant, persists across all\n affected models, and emits a ``split_undone`` event. The\n returned ``models`` block carries ``ancestor_model`` and\n ``descendant_models``." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionRemoved value: -"The model whose composition view originated the event.\nMust match the cited event's ``threat_model_id`` — the server\nrejects cross-model citations with 404."
- Added
undo_model_change - Removed
unreject_reconciliation_candidate - Added
update_threat_model
7 tool updates
v0.83.1- Changed
create_proposal1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / kind / descriptionPrevious value: -"One of ``add_component`` (payload ``{name, repo_url?, path?,\ntrust_boundary_ids?}``), ``remove_component`` (payload\n``{component_id}``), ``design_change`` (payload ``{target_kind:\n\"attacker\"|\"asset\", target_id, design_move}``; take ``design_move``\nfrom ``get_design_leverage``)."New value: +"One of ``add_component`` (payload ``{name, repo_url?, path?,\ntrust_boundary_ids?}``), ``remove_component`` (payload\n``{component_id}``), ``design_change`` (payload ``{target_kind:\n\"attacker\"|\"asset\", target_id, design_move}``; take ``design_move``\nfrom ``get_design_leverage``), ``assumption`` (payload ``{co_id,\ngroup_id, precondition, assumption_id?, gap?}``: a precondition\nabout the environment that only something outside this system\ncan meet, one declarative sentence; ``assumption_id`` names an\nexisting assumption that states it). A precondition a person\nalready rejected for that objective is refused."
- Changed
decide_proposal1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / expires_atAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "ISO 8601 date an accepted assumption lapses (e.g.\n\"2027-03-29T00:00:00Z\"). Applies to accepting an ``assumption``\nproposal; omitted, the acceptance lasts a year.", + "type": "string" +}
- Added
judge_objective - Added
judge_objectives - Changed
list_decisions1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / decision / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``,\n``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``,\n``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``,\n``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``,\n``escalation_resolved``. Empty (default) returns every kind."New value: +"Optional kind filter, one of ``finding_dismissed``,\n``finding_remediated``, ``risk_accepted``,\n``not_applicable_declared``, ``proposal_accepted``,\n``proposal_rejected``, ``proposal_reverted``,\n``assumption_accepted``, ``escalation_resolved``. Empty\n(default) returns every kind."
- Added
pause_control_generation - Added
strengthen_controls
1 tool update
v0.78.1- Added
resume_control_generation
3 tool updates
v0.77.1- Changed
refine_control1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / justification / descriptionPrevious value: -"Why this refinement is appropriate (min 10 chars)."New value: +"Why this refinement is appropriate (10 to 2000\ncharacters)."
- Changed
set_control_assumption_groups1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / justification / descriptionPrevious value: -"Why this group structure is appropriate (min 10 chars\nwhen groups is non-empty; optional when clearing)."New value: +"Why this group structure is appropriate (10 to 2000\ncharacters when groups is non-empty; optional when clearing, at\nmost 2000 characters if given)."
- Changed
set_mitigation_groups1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / justification / descriptionPrevious value: -"Why this group structure is appropriate (min 10 chars)."New value: +"Why this group structure is appropriate (10 to 2000\ncharacters). The gate weighs it alongside the objective and the\ncontrols' own descriptions, so state the reasoning, not evidence."
4 tool updates
v0.77.0- Changed
add_attacker2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / change_reasonAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "Required when ``surface_extent`` is supplied —\ndocuments the declaration for the audit trail." +} - added
Input schema / properties / surface_extentAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "``\"whole\"`` when, from its position, the attacker's\noperations range over ANY entry of the interface it reaches\n(any endpoint, request, row, file, message or frame). Recorded\nas attested by this call and requires ``change_reason``. Omit\nto leave it undeclared, which is the ordinary case." +}
- Changed
add_trust_boundary1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / sealed / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional. Set True to declare the boundary has NO lateral\ningress — the only way into its zone is crossing the perimeter\n(an air-gap / network-segmented enclave). A sealed boundary that\nblocks the attacker's vector lets reachability decisively rule the\nasset unreachable instead of indeterminate. Default False (assume a\nlateral pivot is possible). Set it only when the isolation is real\nand attestable."New value: +"Optional. Set True to declare the boundary has NO lateral\ningress — the only way into its zone is crossing the perimeter\n(an air-gap / network-segmented enclave). On its own this is a\nsuggestion: only an ATTESTED seal lets reachability decisively\nrule an asset unreachable instead of indeterminate, and the\nattestation is recorded with ``edit_trust_boundary``\n(``seal_source=\"attested\"`` with a ``change_reason``). Default\nFalse (assume a lateral pivot is possible). Set it only when the\nisolation is real and attestable."
- Changed
edit_attacker3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / attest_surface_extentAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "boolean" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "Record the extent already on the attacker as\nattested, without changing its value. Pass ``true`` to attest;\nrequires ``change_reason``." +} - changed
Input schema / properties / change_reason / descriptionPrevious value: -"Required when any factor field is supplied —\ndocuments the operator override of LLM-generated factors."New value: +"Required when any factor field, ``surface_extent``\nor ``attest_surface_extent`` is supplied — documents the\noperator override for the audit trail." - added
Input schema / properties / surface_extentAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "``\"whole\"`` (operations range over ANY entry of the\ninterface reached) or ``\"point\"`` (one named entry). Supplying\nit attests it; requires ``change_reason``." +}
- Changed
submit_functional_test_assertions1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / assertions_json / descriptionPrevious value: -"JSON array of assertion objects, each {\"type\": \"test_attested\" | \"test_exists\" | ..., \"params\": {...}, \"description\": \"...\", \"repo\": \"<owner>/<repo>\"}. Every assertion must carry an explicit repo, or the \"no_repo\" sentinel when the check is not tied to a repository."New value: +"JSON array of assertion objects, each {\"type\": \"test_attested\" | \"test_exists\" | ..., \"params\": {...}, \"description\": \"...\", \"repo\": \"<owner>/<repo>\"}. Every assertion must carry an explicit repo, or the \"no_repo\" sentinel when the check is not tied to a repository. These assertions count toward functional conformance; a ``covers`` declaration is refused here, because a binding to a control clause is declared on ``submit_assertions``."
11 tool updates
v0.75.0- Added
create_proposal - Added
decide_proposal - Changed
generate_threat_model6 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / provenance_commit_shaAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Commit SHA the description was gathered\nat (``code`` kind).", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / provenance_kindAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Where the description came from, one of\n``code``, ``ticket``, ``document``, ``manual``, ``mixed``.\nEmpty (default) records nothing. For an existing repository\npass ``provenance_kind=\"code\"`` with ``provenance_repo_url``\nand ``provenance_commit_sha`` (the HEAD you gathered from):\nthe code is then authoritative and the model follows it.\nAny other kind means the description is intent and the code\nis measured against it. The same record can be set later\nwith ``set_model_provenance``.", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / provenance_refAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Branch or tag name at that commit (optional).", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / provenance_repo_urlAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Repository URL the description was\ngathered from (``code`` kind).", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / provenance_source_refAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "Identifier of the ticket or document the\ndescription came from (``ticket`` / ``document`` kinds).", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / provenance_source_urlAdded value: +{ + "default": "", + "description": "URL of that ticket or document.", + "type": "string" +}
- Added
get_control_work_order - Added
get_design_leverage - Added
list_decisions - Added
list_proposals - Removed
list_workspaces - Added
reconcile_model - Added
set_model_provenance - Changed
submit_functional_test_assertions1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / assertions_json / descriptionPrevious value: -"JSON array of assertion objects, each {\"type\": \"test_passes\" | \"test_exists\" | ..., \"params\": {...}, \"description\": \"...\", \"repo\": \"<owner>/<repo>\"}. Every assertion must carry an explicit repo, or the \"no_repo\" sentinel when the check is not tied to a repository."New value: +"JSON array of assertion objects, each {\"type\": \"test_attested\" | \"test_exists\" | ..., \"params\": {...}, \"description\": \"...\", \"repo\": \"<owner>/<repo>\"}. Every assertion must carry an explicit repo, or the \"no_repo\" sentinel when the check is not tied to a repository."
2 tool updates
v0.71.1- Added
get_assertion_types - Changed
get_controls1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / control_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"If set, detail mode �� return this one control's full\nrecord directly (e.g. ``CTL-12``). If omitted, list mode."New value: +"If set, detail mode — return this one control's full\nrecord directly (e.g. ``CTL-12``). If omitted, list mode."
5 tool updates
v0.71.0- Added
create_co_disposition - Changed
get_controls1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / control_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"If set, detail mode — return this one control's full\nrecord directly (e.g. ``CTL-12``). If omitted, list mode."New value: +"If set, detail mode �� return this one control's full\nrecord directly (e.g. ``CTL-12``). If omitted, list mode."
- Added
list_co_dispositions - Changed
list_findings1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / status / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional lifecycle filter, one of \"discovered\", \"acknowledged\", \"remediated\", \"verified\", \"dismissed\". Empty (default) returns all statuses."New value: +"Optional lifecycle filter, one of \"discovered\", \"acknowledged\", \"remediated\", \"verified\", \"dismissed\", \"auto_resolved\". Empty (default) returns all statuses.\n``auto_resolved`` is closed by the platform, not by a person: the\ncondition that produced the finding is no longer reproduced. It is\ndeliberately distinct from ``remediated``/``verified`` (a person\nfixed and confirmed it) and from ``dismissed`` (a person judged it\nnot worth fixing) — \"the gap is gone\" and \"the gap does not matter\"\nare opposite statements about residual risk, so they never share a\nstatus."
- Changed
update_finding1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / status / descriptionPrevious value: -"New lifecycle status, one of \"discovered\", \"acknowledged\", \"remediated\", \"verified\", \"dismissed\"."New value: +"New lifecycle status, one of \"discovered\", \"acknowledged\", \"remediated\", \"verified\", \"dismissed\". ``auto_resolved`` is NOT settable here: it asserts that a condition is no longer reproduced, which is a claim only the platform can make from its own re-evaluation. Setting it by hand would forge that claim, so this tool refuses it — use ``dismissed`` (with a reason) to record that a gap does not matter, which is the judgment a person is entitled to make."
85 tool updates
v0.68.2- Changed
add_functional_test1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / functional_objective_ids / descriptionPrevious value: -"Comma-separated objective ids the test satisfies (at least one required; get them from list_functional_objectives)."New value: +"Comma-separated objective ids the test satisfies (at least one required; get them from get_functional_objectives)."
- Added
add_model_to_group - Removed
add_model_to_system - Removed
add_model_to_tag - Removed
assign_asset_to_components - Removed
assign_control_to_components - Added
assign_to_components - Removed
assume_control - Removed
auto_remediate - Added
auto_remediate_compliance - Added
create_group - Removed
create_system - Removed
create_tag - Added
delete_group - Removed
delete_tag - Added
export_report - Removed
export_tag_report - Removed
export_threat_model - Removed
export_threat_model_archive - Removed
get_asset - Removed
get_assumption - Removed
get_attacker - Changed
get_compliance_report9 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / framework_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"ID of the compliance framework (as listed by list_compliance_frameworks)."New value: +"framework to report on (already selected at this scope; see ``list_compliance_frameworks``)." - changed
Input schema / properties / level / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional level filter for level-aware frameworks — returns only requirements at or below this level (e.g. 1 for L1 only). Omit for all levels."New value: +"optional level filter; omit for all levels." - changed
Input schema / properties / limit / descriptionPrevious value: -"Maximum requirement rows to return. Default 0 = no explicit limit."New value: +"max requirement rows to return, 0 = no explicit limit (model/system scopes only)." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_idRemoved value: -{ - "description": "ID of the threat model.", - "type": "string" -} - changed
Input schema / properties / offset / descriptionPrevious value: -"Number of requirement rows to skip, for pagination. Default 0."New value: +"skip the first N requirement rows, pagination (model/system scopes only). Default 0." - added
Input schema / properties / scopeAdded value: +{ + "description": "report boundary — \"model\", \"system\", or \"tag\".", + "enum": [ + "model", + "system", + "tag" + ], + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / scope_idAdded value: +{ + "description": "id of the model, system, or tag selected by ``scope``.", + "type": "string" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / status / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional status filter: \"covered\", \"partial\", \"uncovered\", \"unmapped\", or \"excluded\". Empty = all statuses."New value: +"optional per-requirement status filter (model/system scopes only)." - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "model_id", - "framework_id" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "scope", + "scope_id", + "framework_id" +]
- Removed
get_component - Removed
get_control - Removed
get_control_objective - Changed
get_control_objectives3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / co_idAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "If set, single mode — return this one control objective\n(e.g. ``CO3``) with its verdict. If omitted, matrix mode." +} - changed
Input schema / properties / limit / descriptionPrevious value: -"Max to return (0 = summary only, no per-CO records)."New value: +"Matrix mode — max to return (0 = summary only, no per-CO\nrecords)." - changed
Input schema / properties / offset / descriptionPrevious value: -"Skip the first N control objectives."New value: +"Matrix mode — skip the first N control objectives."
- Changed
get_controls10 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / co_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Filter by control objective ID."New value: +"List-mode filter — control objective ID." - changed
Input schema / properties / component_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Filter by component ID (e.g., \"CMP1\")."New value: +"List-mode filter — component ID (e.g., \"CMP1\")." - changed
Input schema / properties / control_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional specific control id for detail mode."New value: +"If set, detail mode — return this one control's full\nrecord directly (e.g. ``CTL-12``). If omitted, list mode." - changed
Input schema / properties / include_deleted / descriptionPrevious value: -"Include soft-deleted controls (default False)."New value: +"List mode — include soft-deleted controls\n(default False)." - changed
Input schema / properties / include_orphaned / descriptionPrevious value: -"Include controls mapped only to tombstoned COs\n(default False)."New value: +"List mode — include controls mapped only to\ntombstoned COs (default False)." - changed
Input schema / properties / limit / descriptionPrevious value: -"Max controls to return (0 = all)."New value: +"List mode — max controls to return (0 = all)." - changed
Input schema / properties / offset / descriptionPrevious value: -"Skip the first N controls (pagination)."New value: +"List mode — skip the first N controls (pagination)." - changed
Input schema / properties / status / descriptionPrevious value: -"Filter by \"implemented\", \"not_implemented\", or \"verified\"."New value: +"List-mode filter — \"implemented\", \"not_implemented\", or\n\"verified\"." - changed
Input schema / properties / summary_only / descriptionPrevious value: -"If True, returns only id, description, status,\nassertion_count, and assumed_by per control (much smaller\nresponse)."New value: +"List mode — if True, returns only id, description,\nstatus, assertion_count, and assumed_by per control (much\nsmaller response)." - added
Input schema / properties / versionAdded value: +{ + "default": 0, + "description": "Detail mode only — model version to read the control\nfrom. 0 (default) uses the latest. Ignored in list mode.", + "type": "integer" +}
- Added
get_entity - Removed
get_functional_objective - Added
get_functional_objectives - Removed
get_functional_scan_prompt - Added
get_group - Removed
get_model_risk_view - Removed
get_reach_verdicts - Changed
get_reachability_verdicts5 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / co_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional CO id. When set, returns a single verdict;\n404 if the CO doesn't exist or is tombstoned."New value: +"FLAT mode only. Optional CO id — when set, returns a single\nverdict; 404 if the CO doesn't exist or is tombstoned. Ignored\nwhen ``composed=True``." - added
Input schema / properties / composedAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "When False (default), derive over this model's own\ntopology (flat). When True, derive over the composed effective\ntree (own ⊕ inherited).", + "type": "boolean" +} - added
Input schema / properties / kind_filterAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "COMPOSED mode only. Restrict verdicts to one kind —\none of ``\"reachable\" | \"unreachable\" | \"indeterminate\"``. Named\n``kind_filter`` (not ``kind``) to disambiguate from the verdict\nobject's own ``kind`` field. When omitted, all verdict kinds are\nreturned. Ignored when ``composed=False``." +} - added
Input schema / properties / pageAdded value: +{ + "default": 1, + "description": "COMPOSED mode only. 1-indexed page number (default ``1``).\nIgnored when ``composed=False``.", + "type": "integer" +} - added
Input schema / properties / page_sizeAdded value: +{ + "default": 100, + "description": "COMPOSED mode only. Verdicts per page (default ``100``).\nIgnored when ``composed=False``.", + "type": "integer" +}
- Removed
get_recompute_quote - Added
get_risk_view - Changed
get_scan_prompt2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / control_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional single control to scope the prompt to. Empty (default) returns prompts for all not-yet-implemented controls."New value: +"Security kind only — optional single control to scope\nthe prompt to. Empty (default) returns prompts for all\nnot-yet-implemented controls. Ignored when kind=\"functional\"." - added
Input schema / properties / kindAdded value: +{ + "default": "security", + "description": "\"security\" (default) or \"functional\" — which scan brief.", + "type": "string" +}
- Removed
get_system - Removed
get_system_compliance_report - Removed
get_system_risk_view - Removed
get_tag_compliance_report - Removed
get_tag_risk_view - Removed
get_trust_boundary - Changed
import_threat_model_archive1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / envelope / descriptionPrevious value: -"The full archive dict returned by\n``export_threat_model_archive``."New value: +"The full archive dict returned by\n``export_report (scope=\"model\", format=\"archive\")``."
- Removed
link_dependency - Added
link_system_dependency - Removed
list_functional_objectives - Added
list_groups - Added
list_model_groups - Removed
list_model_tags - Changed
list_reconciliation_candidates4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / dispositionAdded value: +{ + "default": "active", + "description": "Which side of the queue to read — ``\"active\"``\n(default, open candidates) or ``\"rejected\"`` (persisted\nnot-a-duplicate decisions).", + "type": "string" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"ID of the threat model."New value: +"ID of the descendant threat model." - changed
Input schema / properties / page / descriptionPrevious value: -"1-indexed page number. Default 1."New value: +"ACTIVE disposition only. 1-indexed page number. Default 1.\nIgnored when ``disposition=\"rejected\"``." - changed
Input schema / properties / page_size / descriptionPrevious value: -"Items per page. Default 50."New value: +"ACTIVE disposition only. Items per page. Default 50.\nIgnored when ``disposition=\"rejected\"``."
- Removed
list_reconciliation_rejections - Removed
list_systems - Removed
list_tags - Added
preview_undo_composition - Removed
preview_undo_lift_composition - Removed
preview_undo_split_composition - Changed
recompute_verdicts2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / dry_runAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "When True, return only the pre-flight estimate and enqueue\nnothing. When False (default), enqueue the recompute.", + "type": "boolean" +} - changed
Input schema / properties / model_id / descriptionPrevious value: -"ID of the threat model to re-evaluate."New value: +"ID of the threat model to re-evaluate (or estimate for)."
- Removed
remove_asset - Removed
remove_assumption - Removed
remove_attacker - Removed
remove_component - Added
remove_entity - Added
remove_model_from_group - Removed
remove_model_from_tag - Removed
remove_trust_boundary - Removed
restore_asset - Removed
restore_assumption - Removed
restore_attacker - Added
restore_entity - Added
revalidate_entity_quality - Removed
revalidate_threat_model_entities - Changed
select_compliance_frameworks5 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / framework_ids / descriptionPrevious value: -"Comma-separated framework IDs (e.g. \"asvs-4.0,nist-csf\")."New value: +"comma-separated framework ids (e.g. \"asvs-4.0,nist-csf\")." - removed
Input schema / properties / model_idRemoved value: -{ - "description": "ID of the threat model.", - "type": "string" -} - added
Input schema / properties / scopeAdded value: +{ + "description": "target boundary — \"model\", \"system\", or \"tag\".", + "enum": [ + "model", + "system", + "tag" + ], + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / scope_idAdded value: +{ + "description": "id of the model, system, or tag selected by ``scope``.", + "type": "string" +} - changed
Input schema / requiredPrevious value: -[ - "server_version", - "model_id", - "framework_ids" -]New value: +[ + "server_version", + "scope", + "scope_id", + "framework_ids" +]
- Removed
select_system_compliance_frameworks - Removed
select_tag_compliance_frameworks - Removed
set_co_cal - Added
set_control_objective_cal - Added
submit_functional_test_assertions - Removed
submit_functional_tests - Removed
unassume_control - Added
undo_composition_event - Removed
undo_lift_composition_event - Removed
undo_split_composition_event
TDQS
Scored across 163 tools
With 163 tools, many overlap in purpose: assess_model vs check_control_gaps vs get_risk_view vs get_verification_report, query_threat_model vs get_threat_model vs get_composition, and several quality/attestation tools. Descriptions help but an agent must reason across many similar reads, making misselection likely.
Almost all names follow a snake_case verb_noun or noun_report pattern (e.g. get_controls, add_asset, submit_assertions, model_coherence_report). Minor deviations like set_control_objective_cal and get_findings_risks exist but the convention is readable and predictable.
163 tools is extreme even for a rich threat-modeling platform; the surface is far beyond a well-scoped set. This volume guarantees discovery and selection burden for agents.
The surface covers generation, editing, assessment, evidence, compliance, composition, behavioural modeling, findings, and review workflows. A few lifecycle operations may be indirect (e.g. description edits via refine rather than direct update), but overall coverage is extensive.
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