Rename Threat Model

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the burden, and it explicitly discloses a key side-effect trait: it is a metadata-only operation and does not create a new version. It does not discuss permissions or failure modes, but for a simple rename these are not essential.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences with no filler; the core action and the key limitation are front-loaded and every word earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The core operation and side-effect are clear, and an output schema exists, so return values need no explanation. However, a required parameter, server_version, is left undocumented in both the schema and the description, which leaves an invocation gap; there is also no explicit routing among the many threat-model sibling tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema documentation covers 67% of parameters (name and model_id). The description adds no parameter-specific meaning and does not clarify the undocumented server_version field, so it adds no value beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ('Rename a threat model') and adds scope ('Metadata change only, does not create new version'), which distinguishes it from mutation tools like delete_threat_model or version-generating operations.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives the clear context that this tool is for renaming a threat model without creating a new version. It does not name sibling alternatives explicitly, but the no-new-version note effectively tells the agent this is not the tool for version changes.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.