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Mipiti MCP Server

by Mipiti
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Python
Hybrid

Get Threat Model

get_threat_model

Retrieve a specific threat model by ID to access trust boundaries, assets, attackers, control objectives, and assumptions for security posture management.

Instructions

Get a specific threat model by ID.

Returns the full threat model including trust boundaries, assets, attackers, control objectives, and assumptions.

Important for agents reading model state:

  • Assets and attackers may carry deleted: true (soft-deleted). Exclude these when showing "what's in the model now"; include them only when discussing history or offering restore. Restore an entity via restore_entity (entity_type="asset") / restore_entity (entity_type="attacker").

  • Control objectives may carry removed: true (tombstone — the (asset, attacker) pair was removed in a later version). Exclude these from coverage math and LLM prompts; they exist to keep CO IDs stable so controls referencing them can be detected as "orphaned" rather than silently rebinding.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
versionNoOptional specific version number. Defaults to latest.
model_idYesID of the threat model.
include_cosNoInclude control objectives inline (default False: the answer carries no ``control_objectives`` key; read them with ``get_control_objectives``).
server_versionYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.84.0
    • changedInput schema / properties / include_cos / description
      Previous value: -"Include control objectives inline."New value: +"Include control objectives inline (default False:\nthe answer carries no ``control_objectives`` key; read them\nwith ``get_control_objectives``)."
  2. First observedv0.57.0

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Without annotations the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it delivers valuable domain-specific semantics: soft-deleted entities (deleted:true) and tombstones (removed:true) and how to treat them. It stops short of stating permission requirements or output shape, but the model-state caveats are exactly the kind of non-obvious behavior an agent needs.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded purpose sentence followed by a payload list, then clearly headed agent notes. Slightly long but every line earns its place; minor redundancy between the header and body.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values needn't be explained, and the description focuses on the non-obvious entity-state semantics instead. The omission of usage routing to sibling tools is the main gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 75% and the schema already documents version, model_id, include_cos, and server_version. The description adds no parameter-level detail beyond what the schema provides, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource ('Get a specific threat model by ID') and enumerates the returned payload (trust boundaries, assets, attackers, control objectives, assumptions). This clearly distinguishes it from siblings like list_threat_models and query_threat_model.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by 'get by ID' and the restore references, but the description never explicitly states when to use this versus query_threat_model or list_threat_models. No when-not guidance or alternatives are named.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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