get_threat_model

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Discloses that returned entities may carry 'deleted: true' or 'removed: true' flags, and explains their significance. With no annotations provided, the description fully compensates by revealing all relevant behavioral traits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Well-organized with a clear purpose statement followed by structured bullet points for critical agent instructions. No redundant sentences; every part adds value.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite moderate complexity and presence of an output schema (not shown but signaled), the description covers all necessary usage nuances. The output schema handles return value details, so the description focuses on correct interpretation and handling of returned data.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 75% (3 of 4 parameters described). The description does not add extra semantic meaning beyond the schema for parameters; it relies on the schema for parameter details. Baseline 3 is appropriate given high coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Description explicitly states 'Get a specific threat model by ID' and enumerates returned components (trust boundaries, assets, attackers, etc.). Clearly differentiates from sibling tools like 'list_threat_models' by focusing on a single model retrieval.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides explicit context-sensitive guidance for agents: how to handle soft-deleted assets/attackers and tombstone control objectives. Directs to 'restore_asset' / 'restore_attacker' for restoration, and explains how to process removed control objectives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.