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Mipiti
by Mipiti

Answer Attacker Credentials

answer_attacker_credentials

Records which credential classes an attacker holds in a behavioral threat model, creating a new model version and deriving attacker privileges from those holdings.

Instructions

Say which of the behavioural model's credential classes an attacker holds. Mutating; creates a model version.

Answer from what the code or the owner shows. Empty means it holds no credential. Its privileges follow from what it holds, by rule: None with none, High when a class may invoke an action that writes what decides authority, Low otherwise; edit_attacker then refuses a privileges change (409 privileges_from_holdings). A holder of a per-tenant class is placed at every tenant-isolation boundary, suggested. Refused with 422 unknown_class (a class the model does not have), 409 closure_not_offered (get_behavioural_attackers reads applies: false), 404 no_attacker.

A program's answer is a judgment. Unless the workspace's delegation policy admits it, it is refused with 403 and an escalation_id and parked for a person. Do not retry: report the escalation_id and poll list_proposals.

Returns {model_id, model_version, applies, credential_classes, counts, attacker}: how many proposals, dismissals and questions the closure now holds (read them with get_behavioural_attackers) and the attacker as it now stands.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
model_idYesID of the threat model.
attacker_idYesThe attacker (e.g. "T3").
server_versionYes
credential_classesNoComma-separated class ids from ``credential_classes``; empty for none.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv0.90.0

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it states the tool is mutating, creates a model version, derives privileges by rule, places per-tenant holders at isolation boundaries, and explains refusal codes and escalation behavior. It also describes the returned object and how counts can be read elsewhere.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the purpose and mutation behavior, then proceeds through rules, refusal cases, and return shape. It is dense but appropriately sized for a complex mutating tool with no annotations, though the amount of error-code detail makes it slightly less concise than ideal.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the complex mutation, refusal paths, escalation workflow, and output schema, the description is complete enough for an agent to invoke the tool correctly and handle common failures. The presence of an output schema reduces the need to explain return values, yet the description still summarizes them usefully.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 75%, but the description adds important meaning beyond the schema for the key parameter, explaining that `credential_classes` is comma-separated, empty means no credential, and that holdings determine privileges and tenant placement. It does not explain `server_version`, which is the remaining schema gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb and resource: it says which credential classes an attacker holds, and explicitly labels the tool as mutating and version-creating. It also distinguishes the operation from related siblings by noting that `edit_attacker` refuses privileges changes and that readings come from `get_behavioural_attackers`.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It provides clear operational guidance: answer from code or owner evidence, use empty for no credential, and expect specific refusal modes such as 422 `unknown_class`, 409 `closure_not_offered`, and 404 `no_attacker`. It also tells the agent not to retry after a 403 escalation and to poll `list_proposals`, though it stops short of an explicit use-this-instead-of-sibling statement for all cases.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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