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trust_printer

Destructive

Add a printer hostname or IP to the trusted whitelist so network discovery flags trusted devices and warns when connecting to untrusted printers.

Instructions

Add a printer hostname/IP to the trusted whitelist.

        Trusted printers are flagged during network discovery.  Connecting
        to an untrusted printer should raise a warning.

        Args:
            host: The hostname or IP address to trust.
        

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "host": "<host>"
    },
    "name": "trust_printer"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
hostYesThe hostname or IP address to trust.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv1.5.1
    • addedInput schema / properties / host / description
      Added value: +"The hostname or IP address to trust."
  2. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare a non-read-only, destructive mutation, and the description usefully adds the downstream effect: trusted hosts are flagged during discovery and untrusted ones trigger warnings. It does not disclose idempotency, duplicate-entry behavior, persistence, or required privileges, which matter for a whitelist mutation marked destructive.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The whitelist action is front-loaded in one sentence, followed by just enough rationale to be useful. The Args block is redundant with the schema's identical field description, which is minor waste but the overall length is appropriate.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter mutation with annotations and no output schema, the description covers purpose, effect, and the single argument adequately. Missing only edge-case behavior (already-trusted host, malformed host) and any indication of the response, which are secondary for this tool's simplicity.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With a single parameter at 100% schema description coverage, the schema already documents the hostname/IP meaning. The description's Args section repeats that schema text verbatim and adds no format constraints or examples (e.g., CIDR, port, bare IP), so it meets but does not exceed the baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence states a specific verb and resource ('Add a printer hostname/IP to the trusted whitelist'), which is unambiguous. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from nearby siblings such as untrust_printer, list_trusted_printers, or register_printer, so an agent must infer the boundary from names alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains why one would trust a printer (trusted printers are flagged during discovery, untrusted connections warn), which implies the use case. It never states when to prefer this over register_printer or what to do if the host is already trusted, so guidance remains implicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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