Mipiti MCP Server
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Mipiti MCP Servergenerate a threat model for the new API endpoint"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Mipiti MCP Server
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for Mipiti — security posture platform.
Lets AI coding agents (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.) generate and manage threat models, controls, assumptions, compliance mapping, and evidence programmatically.
Hosted Endpoint (Recommended)
The Mipiti backend hosts an MCP server at https://api.mipiti.io/mcp. No installation needed — just configure your MCP client to connect.
Claude Code (quickstart)
claude mcp add --transport http Mipiti https://api.mipiti.io/mcpYou'll be prompted to log in via your browser (OAuth). That's it.
OAuth (manual config)
MCP clients with OAuth support (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor) automatically prompt you to log in via your browser. Add to your project's .mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mipiti": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.mipiti.io/mcp"
}
}
}On first connection, your MCP client opens a browser window where you approve access with your Mipiti account. Tokens refresh automatically.
API Key
For clients without OAuth support, or headless/CI environments, create an API key in Settings:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mipiti": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://api.mipiti.io/mcp",
"headers": {
"X-API-Key": "your-api-key"
}
}
}
}Standalone Package (Alternative)
If you prefer running the MCP server locally (e.g., for development or self-hosted instances), install the mipiti-mcp package. This is a thin HTTP client that calls the Mipiti API.
pip install mipiti-mcp
# Or run directly with uvx
uvx mipiti-mcpEnvironment Variables
Variable | Required | Default | Description |
| Yes | — | Your Mipiti API key |
| No |
| API base URL |
| Yes | — | Identifier for the running server's MCP surface (instructions, tool docstrings, schemas, behavior). Sent on every tool call. Clients invalidate cached MCP guidance when this changes. For local runs, any sentinel string is fine ( |
Claude Code (standalone)
{
"mcpServers": {
"mipiti": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["mipiti-mcp"],
"env": {
"MIPITI_API_KEY": "your-api-key",
"SERVER_VERSION": "local"
}
}
}
}Tools (114)
Threat Modeling
Tool | Description |
| Generate a complete threat model from a feature description. Runs a multi-step AI pipeline producing trust boundaries, assets, attackers, control objectives, and assumptions. Progress reported automatically via MCP protocol — the tool blocks until complete. |
| Refine an existing threat model based on an instruction. Creates a new version. Only affected entity types are modified — unaffected entities are preserved server-side. |
| Ask a question about an existing threat model. |
| Get the full details of a specific threat model (trust boundaries, assets, attackers, assumptions). Use |
| List all saved threat models with IDs, titles, versions, and creation dates. Supports |
| Rename a model (metadata only, no new version). Titles must be unique within a workspace (case-insensitive). |
| Permanently delete a model and all its data. |
| Export as PDF, HTML, or CSV. |
| Export the self-contained JSON audit archive (every version, controls, assertions with CI verdicts, findings, attestations, sufficiency signatures). Independently verifiable. |
| Restore an audit archive into a target workspace. Fresh |
Entity CRUD
Tool | Description |
| Targeted single-entity changes for assets. Creates a new version. |
| Same for attackers. |
Trust Boundaries
Tool | Description |
| Returns existing trust boundaries (along with assets, attackers, assumptions). Review current boundaries before adding or modifying. |
| CRUD for trust boundaries. Defines where trust transitions occur in the system architecture. Attackers are positioned at boundaries; COs are annotated with boundary reachability. Changes auto-generate boundary assumptions for newly unreachable COs. |
Controls
Tool | Description |
| List controls with current status. Use |
| List COs with which controls cover each one. Pair with |
| Mark implemented or not_implemented. Requires at least one assertion first. |
| Modify a control's description with justification. Platform evaluates whether the mitigation group still covers the COs. |
| Regenerate controls. Supports |
| Import controls from JSON or free text, auto-mapped to COs and deduplicated. |
| Soft-delete with justification. Blocked if it's the only control covering a CO. |
| AI-powered gap analysis across all controls. |
| Inspect and modify how controls are grouped into mitigation paths for a CO (AND within groups, OR across groups). Platform AI-evaluates whether proposed changes preserve CO coverage. |
| Set per-CO ISO/SAE 21434 Cybersecurity Assurance Level (1-4). Persisted on the control_objectives identity side-table; survives soft-delete + revival; no new model version. |
Assumptions and Attestation
Tool | Description |
| Returns existing assumptions (along with assets, attackers, trust boundaries). Review current assumptions before adding or modifying. |
| Add an assumption, optionally linking it to COs via |
| Update description and/or linked COs. |
| Soft-delete (preserved for audit). Linked COs are no longer mitigated by it. |
| Restore a soft-deleted assumption. Re-attestation required. |
| Record that a responsible party affirmed an assumption holds. Provide |
| Attestation history for an assumption. |
| Shorthand: mark a control as externally handled by a single assumption (writes to group 1). Counts as active for mitigation group completeness when attested. |
| Shorthand: clear externally-handled status; control reverts to not_implemented. Removes all assumption groups. |
| Inspect the current assumption group structure on a control. Groups express alternative sets of external claims (within = AND, across = OR). |
| Declaratively set the assumption group structure. Use for compound cases (e.g. "AWS KMS + quarterly review") or multiple independent paths. |
| Generate controls for assumption-covered COs and retire the assumption linkage. |
Assertions and Evidence
Tool | Description |
| Submit typed, machine-verifiable claims about system properties (21 assertion types). |
| List or delete assertions for a control. |
| Attach auxiliary metadata (docs, links). Evidence is contextual — only assertions prove implementation. |
| Shows verified, partially verified, and unverified controls with sufficiency details. |
| Quick check: do assertions for a single control collectively cover all aspects? |
| Returns targeted prompts for scanning the codebase against not_implemented controls. |
| Controls not reviewed in 90+ days. Start here for periodic maintenance. |
| Report and track negative findings (gap discovery). |
| Read-only. Returns a structured diff describing the changes a subsequent |
| Mutates state: commits the changes |
Assurance
Tool | Description |
| Deterministic assessment of all COs. Returns mitigated/at_risk/unassessed with |
| Workspace-scoped triage dashboard: open findings, active risk acceptances, and at-risk COs across every model the workspace can access. Entry point when asked "what's open?". |
| Per-model Prioritized Risk View: one row per live CO with derived risk tier, asset impact, attacker likelihood, control coverage, and open-finding count. |
| Cross-model variant of |
| All risk acceptances on a model — risks explicitly accepted instead of mitigated. Includes CO id, owner, justification, status, review deadline. |
Composition (recursive-tree effective model)
Views over the effective model — own entities composed with everything inherited from ancestor threat models on the recursive tree. Backend-gated by TREE_COMPOSITION_ENABLED; when off, read tools return a stable empty body with flag_enabled: false and the write tool returns 503.
Tool | Description |
| Index: counts + tree metadata ( |
| Effective entity set keyed by kind (trust boundaries, components, assets, attackers, attack paths). Each entry carries provenance ( |
| Effective COs tagged with origin ( |
| Per-CO coverage with credited inheritance: |
| Per-CO reachability verdicts over the composed effective topology — same kinds ( |
| Effective AttackPath set + lifted missing/dangling suggestions computed against the composed reach surface. |
| Paginated reconciliation candidates between this model and its ancestors. Tier |
| Mutating. Apply a |
| Mutating. Persist the operator's "these are NOT duplicates" decision at org scope so the candidate detector filters this pair out of the active queue on subsequent reads. Idempotent on the natural key |
| Mutating. Remove a persisted rejection by surrogate id (from |
| List the persisted rejections on a model in |
| Mutating. Promote a shared-anchor entity from two sibling descendants to their lowest common ancestor: each source's copy is soft-deleted and the inherited entity becomes canonical for every descendant of the LCA. Server re-detects field-level and attached-state conflicts against current live state; pass |
| Mutating. Inverse of |
| Read-only. Compute the inverse plan (or divergence refusal) for a prior |
| Mutating. Apply the inverse of a previous |
| Read-only. Counterpart to |
| Mutating. Mirror of |
Compliance
Tool | Description |
| Available frameworks (OWASP ASVS, ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIST CSF, GDPR, FedRAMP, PCI DSS, EU CRA). |
| Select frameworks for a model. |
| Coverage report for a selected framework. |
| AI-powered semantic mapping of controls to framework requirements. |
| Manual control-to-requirement mapping. |
| LLM-powered gap closure — proposes new assets, attackers, and controls for uncovered framework requirements. |
Components
Tool | Description |
| Components bridge trust boundaries (security architecture) to repositories (code organization). |
Systems and Workspaces
Tool | Description |
| List available workspaces. |
| Set per-organization level grades: |
| Manage systems (groups of related models). |
| Add a model to a system. |
| Cross-model dependency graph with satisfaction status for assumptions linked to other models. |
| Link a cross-model assumption to a target model — dual-path satisfaction (controls OR manual attestation). |
| System-level compliance aggregation. |
Setup and Operations
Tool | Description |
| Check which onboarding steps are done. |
| Mark an onboarding step as done (mcp_configured, mipiti_verify_installed, ci_secret_added, ci_pipeline_added). |
Development
git clone https://github.com/Mipiti/mipiti-mcp.git
cd mipiti-mcp
pip install -e ".[dev]"
python -m pytest -vLocal Testing with Claude Desktop
{
"mcpServers": {
"mipiti": {
"command": "uv",
"args": ["run", "--directory", "/path/to/mipiti-mcp", "mipiti-mcp"],
"env": {
"MIPITI_API_KEY": "your-key"
}
}
}
}License
Proprietary. Copyright (c) 2026 Mipiti, LLC. All rights reserved. See LICENSE for details.
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