Skip to main content
Glama
@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

Official

vector_store_scanner__scan_endpoint

Probe vector database endpoints for unauthenticated exposure and read-only fingerprinting across Weaviate, Qdrant, Chroma, Elasticsearch, Redis, and pgvector.

Instructions

Probe a vector-database (or vector-index-capable) endpoint for unauthenticated exposure — Weaviate, Qdrant, Chroma, Elasticsearch/OpenSearch (HTTP fingerprinting, escalating from instance info → collection/schema listing → actual stored data), Redis (RESP PING without AUTH), and Postgres/pgvector (wire-protocol SSLRequest + StartupMessage handshake, no real credentials sent). Read-only — never writes or authenticates with real credentials.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tlsNoUse https:// for HTTP-based probes (Weaviate/Qdrant/Chroma/Elasticsearch). Default: false
hostYesHostname or IP of the endpoint to probe
portNoPort to probe (defaults to the store type's conventional port, e.g. 6333 for Qdrant)
typeNoStore type to probe for. 'auto' (default) fingerprints the endpoint by trying each known type in turn.
timeoutMsNoPer-request timeout in milliseconds (default: 4000)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.1.5
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. Addedv0.1.1

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does well: it discloses read-only behavior, that no real credentials are sent, the escalating probe depth (instance info → schema listing → stored data), and concrete wire-level techniques (RESP PING without AUTH, SSLRequest + StartupMessage). It omits what a probe result contains, whether probing is detectable/alerting, and any rate or scope limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, front-loaded with purpose and constraint; the technology list is dense but each item conveys real supported-capability information. Nothing is padded or restated from the tool name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 5-parameter, no-output-schema active probing tool, the description covers scope, supported targets, method depth, and safety stance. What's missing is any indication of what the caller receives (findings, severity, evidence) and whether the agent should expect side effects or detection — notable for a network-probing tool with no output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all five parameters are already documented, including the enum and the conventional-port default. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond what the schema states (e.g., it never explains 'auto' fingerprinting order or timeout implications). Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Probe a vector-database ... endpoint for unauthenticated exposure') and enumerates exactly which store families it covers, including the protocols used. An agent can immediately distinguish this from the sibling list_patterns and from generic scanners like vulnerability_scanner__start_scan.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The use case (unauthenticated exposure of vector stores) and the hard constraint ('Read-only — never writes or authenticates with real credentials') are clear, and the escalation ladder implies scope. It does not, however, say when to prefer this over siblings or point at vector_store_scanner__list_patterns for a passive alternative, so the routing guidance is incomplete given the crowded sibling set.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Deploy Server

Other Tools