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vector_store_scanner__scan_endpoint

Probe vector database endpoints for unauthenticated exposure, fingerprinting Weaviate, Qdrant, Chroma, Elasticsearch, Redis, and Postgres/pgvector and listing exposed schemas or data read-only.

Instructions

Probe a vector-database (or vector-index-capable) endpoint for unauthenticated exposure — Weaviate, Qdrant, Chroma, Elasticsearch/OpenSearch (HTTP fingerprinting, escalating from instance info → collection/schema listing → actual stored data), Redis (RESP PING without AUTH), and Postgres/pgvector (wire-protocol SSLRequest + StartupMessage handshake, no real credentials sent). Read-only — never writes or authenticates with real credentials.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tlsNoUse https:// for HTTP-based probes (Weaviate/Qdrant/Chroma/Elasticsearch). Default: false
hostYesHostname or IP of the endpoint to probe
portNoPort to probe (defaults to the store type's conventional port, e.g. 6333 for Qdrant)
typeNoStore type to probe for. 'auto' (default) fingerprints the endpoint by trying each known type in turn.
timeoutMsNoPer-request timeout in milliseconds (default: 4000)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv0.1.1

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full safety/behavior burden and does so well: read-only, never writes, never authenticates with real credentials, Redis PING without AUTH, and Postgres SSLRequest/StartupMessage handshake with no credentials sent. The escalating probe stages are also disclosed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and resource, followed by the type list and the read-only guarantee. Dense but every clause carries information; the parenthetical escalation detail is the only slightly heavy portion.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a multi-protocol prober with no output schema and no annotations, the description covers behavior, safety posture and probe stages thoroughly. It omits what findings/results look like and failure handling, but the essentials for correct invocation are present.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents host/port/type/tls/timeoutMs with defaults. The description reinforces behavior around the enumerated types but adds no syntax or format detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb (probe) plus resource (vector-database/vector-index endpoint) and an explicit enumeration of supported store types and protocols. It is unmistakable against its sibling vector_store_scanner__list_patterns and the other scan_* tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The context for use is clear — checking a live endpoint for unauthenticated exposure — and the escalation path (instance info → schema listing → stored data) frames what the tool does. It does not, however, state when to prefer this over alternatives like list_patterns or any exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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