mcp_server_auditor__list_patterns

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full behavioral disclosure burden. It adds useful context by saying results are grouped by category, and the operation is clearly a listing/read operation, but it does not explicitly state side-effect safety, permissions, or response shape beyond grouping.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single front-loaded sentence with no wasted wording. It states the resource, scope, and grouping behavior efficiently.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a zero-parameter listing tool with no output schema, the description is nearly complete. It explains what is listed and that results are grouped by category, though it could clarify the category structure or intended discovery workflow slightly more.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool takes zero parameters, so there are no parameter semantics to document. The schema is empty and complete, and the description does not need to compensate for any parameter gaps.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb-resource pair: list all MCP server security patterns the auditor can detect. This clearly separates it from scanning tools, though it does not explicitly distinguish it from the many other list_patterns sibling tools beyond the MCP server resource scope.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied: an agent can infer this tool is for discovering supported MCP server security patterns, likely before scanning. However, the description does not explicitly state when to use it versus alternatives such as scan_text or other auditors' list_patterns tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.