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@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

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threat_rules__explain_bridge

Explains how Agent Threat Rules (ATR) complement GuardBee static MCP auditors so users understand where threat rules add context to static security analysis.

Instructions

Explain how Agent Threat Rules (ATR) complements GuardBee static MCP auditors

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.1.5
    • removedInput schema / $schema
      Removed value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"
  2. Addedv0.1.1

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the burden; it implies a read-only informational tool but never states that there are no side effects, no required credentials, or that the result is static documentation text rather than computed analysis. It is adequate for a trivial explainer but adds no explicit behavioral guarantees.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence with no filler. Nothing is wasted, though nothing beyond the core claim is included either.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema and no annotations, so the description should indicate what the caller receives (e.g., a prose/markdown explanation of ATR vs. GuardBee coverage) and roughly when it is worth calling. For a zero-arg informational tool the gap is minor but real.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool takes zero parameters, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate; the baseline of 4 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description gives a specific verb ('Explain') and a specific subject ('how Agent Threat Rules (ATR) complements GuardBee static MCP auditors'), so the agent knows this is a conceptual/positioning explainer rather than a scan or list. It does not, however, differentiate itself from siblings like threat_rules__framework_map or threat_rules__rule_stats, which could also be consulted for 'how does this fit together' questions.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No when-to-use guidance, no when-not-to-use, and no mention of alternatives such as framework_map for framework mapping or list_rules for rule inventory. The agent must infer the context from the name alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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