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@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

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owasp_scan__owasp_scan_live

Scan a live MCP server over stdio or HTTP to enumerate tools and grade toxic-flow and tool-poisoning risks (MCP03/MCP10).

Instructions

Connect to a live MCP server (stdio or HTTP), call tools/list, then grade toxic-flow + tool-poisoning (MCP03/MCP10).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlNoStreamable HTTP MCP URL
argsNo
commandNostdio command to spawn

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.1.5
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. Addedv0.1.1

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It helpfully discloses the mechanism (opens a connection, calls tools/list, grades results) and the two transports, but does not mention that the 'command' parameter spawns a local process, nor timeouts, auth requirements for HTTP endpoints, or whether the remote server is mutated in any way.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence with the mechanism and grading scope stated first; no filler, no repetition of the tool name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema and no annotations, so the description is the only source of truth, yet it says nothing about what a 'grade' result looks like, how failures/timeouts on the target server surface, or what args contains. Adequate to select the tool, thin on what to expect back.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 67% (url and command documented, args undocumented). The description adds a useful hint by pairing '(stdio or HTTP)' with those transports, but never states the key semantic that url and command are mutually exclusive alternatives, leaving the agent to infer it.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb chain (connect, call tools/list, grade) against a specific resource (a live MCP server over stdio or HTTP), and names the OWASP categories being graded (MCP03/MCP10). The word 'live' implicitly separates it from owasp_scan_path and owasp_scan_catalog, which operate on stored artifacts rather than a running endpoint.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'connect to a live MCP server' implies the usage context (you have a running server to interrogate), but there is no explicit when-not guidance and no named alternative such as 'use owasp_scan_path for local directories' or 'use tool_poisoning_scanner__scan_text for static text'.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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