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@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

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mcp_server_auditor__scan_directory

Recursively scans an MCP server codebase to detect insecure tool-definition patterns while skipping node_modules, .git, dist, and binary files.

Instructions

Recursively scan an MCP server's codebase for insecure tool-definition patterns. Automatically skips node_modules, .git, dist, and binary files.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathYesAbsolute or relative path to the directory to scan
excludeNoSkip files/dirs whose path contains one of these strings
includeNoOnly scan files whose path contains one of these strings (e.g. [".ts", "src/tools"])
maxFilesNoMaximum number of files to scan (default: 5000)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.1.5
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. Addedv0.1.1

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations present, the description must carry the behavioral burden, and it does contribute real information: recursive traversal plus automatic skipping of node_modules, .git, dist and binary files, which tells the agent results are filtered by default. It omits return shape, behavior on a nonexistent path, and the 5000-file cap interaction beyond what the schema states, so the disclosure is partial rather than complete.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, no filler, with the core action front-loaded and the default-skip behavior as supporting detail. Nothing is repeated from the schema and nothing could be cut without losing information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 4-parameter tool with no annotations and no output schema, the definition covers what is scanned and what is skipped but leaves the agent guessing about the result shape, whether maxFiles truncation is silent, and error behavior on bad paths. Adequate, but not complete for a tool whose output is consumed to make security judgments.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already explains path, include, exclude and maxFiles, making 3 the baseline. The description adds the important semantic that certain paths are excluded automatically, which qualifies how include/exclude and file counting behave, but it does not clarify precedence between those filters and the built-in skips.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (scan), modality (recursively, directory-wide) and target (an MCP server's codebase for insecure tool-definition patterns), which separates it from the many sibling scan_directory tools aimed at prompt injection, secrets, or AI code. It is clear what it does and roughly where it sits relative to siblings, though it never names scan_file/scan_text as the narrower alternatives.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent can infer 'use this when you have a directory rather than a file or text', but the description gives no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or alternative routing among mcp_server_auditor__scan_file, scan_text and scan_directory. No prerequisites or exclusions are stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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