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@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

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tool_poisoning_scanner__scan_text

Scan MCP server source code to uncover hidden instructions in tool descriptions and tools that promise read-only access but contain shell, eval, or file-write sinks.

Instructions

Scan MCP server source for tool poisoning (hidden instructions embedded in a tool's description string, read by the calling LLM as trusted context) and confused-deputy tools (a name/description promising read-only behavior while the handler has a shell/eval/file-write/env-dump sink).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
labelNoOptional label shown in findings (e.g. filename)
contentYesThe source code to scan

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv0.1.1

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It does explain the detection semantics and threat model well (what hidden instructions and confused-deputy patterns are), which is genuine added value, but it says nothing about side effects, return shape, or whether the scan is purely read-only and deterministic.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence that leads with the action and then defines the two threat categories. The parentheticals are dense but each earns its place by disambiguating jargon; it is not padded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 2-parameter scanner with no output schema and no annotations, the threat-model explanation is useful, but the definition omits routing guidance against its close siblings and any indication of what findings look like. Adequate but with visible gaps an agent would want filled.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, with 'content' and 'label' both documented in the schema, so the baseline is 3. The description adds no additional detail about parameter format, size limits, or how 'label' surfaces in findings beyond what the schema already states.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb (Scan) and resource (MCP server source) and defines precisely what it detects: tool poisoning and confused-deputy sinks. It does not explicitly contrast itself with the sibling scan_file/scan_directory variants, so an agent must infer that 'text' means raw inline source rather than a path.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the naming convention (text vs file vs directory) and by 'content' being required in the schema, but the description never states when to prefer this tool over tool_poisoning_scanner__scan_file, scan_directory, or list_patterns. No explicit when/when-not guidance is given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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