Skip to main content
Glama
@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy

Official

owasp_scan__owasp_scan_catalog

Audit MCP tools/list JSON dumps to detect toxic tool flows and tool-description poisoning (MCP03/MCP10), helping identify risky tool catalogs before exposure.

Instructions

Audit a tools/list JSON dump for toxic flows and tool-description poisoning (MCP03/MCP10).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
labelNo
catalogYesJSON string: { tools: [...] } or a bare tools array

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changedv0.1.5
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. Addedv0.1.1

TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full disclosure burden. It never states that this is a read-only audit, whether it makes network calls or just parses the supplied string, what the response contains (findings, severities, rule IDs), or any limits on catalog size — all material for an unscored mutation-adjacent tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence with zero padding; the scope and the threat categories land immediately.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a pure-audit tool with no output schema, the description should say what the agent gets back (findings, severities, threat IDs) and clarify the `label` parameter. It identifies the input conceptually but leaves the return contract entirely unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only 50% schema coverage and the description mentions no parameters at all. The schema does document `catalog` (JSON string of { tools: [...] } or a bare array), but `label` is undocumented in both schema and description, and the description does nothing to compensate for the gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ("Audit") and resource ("a tools/list JSON dump") plus the exact checks performed (toxic flows, tool-description poisoning) with MCP threat IDs MCP03/MCP10. It is clear what the tool does, but it does not distinguish itself from sibling toxic_flow_auditor__audit_catalog, which appears to overlap heavily.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use / when-not-to-use guidance. Given the crowded sibling set with near-identical candidates (toxic_flow_auditor__audit_catalog, tool_poisoning_scanner__scan_file, mcp_config_auditor__scan_inventory), an agent is left to guess which tool handles a tools/list dump.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Deploy Server

Other Tools