@guardbee/mcp-security-proxy
OfficialRelated Servers
Alternatives to @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy
No user-submitted related servers found.
Related Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceProxies MCP traffic between a client and a downstream server to enforce runtime policies on tool declarations, call arguments, and results, including allowlisting, sandboxing, secret and egress controls, and injection detection. It also includes a deterministic benchmark for measuring which security controls stop which attacks.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceEnables secure MCP traffic by filtering threats with a 3-stage detection pipeline, applying RBAC policies, and redacting sensitive data in real-time via an SSE-inspecting proxy.Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceControl-plane proxy that sits in front of MCP servers, enforcing per-identity policy (YAML/OPA/Cedar), budget limits, and an audit trail on every call. Includes real-time anomaly detection that auto-blocks a compromised agent without a human in the loop.17Apache 2.0
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnforces deterministic security policies on Model Context Protocol traffic between agents and remote MCP servers, including request validation, signed human approval, response-side credential blocking, prompt-injection flagging, and privacy-minimized auditing.-
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents and MCP clients to safely access upstream MCP servers through centralized policy enforcement, including allow/deny/approval decisions, schema pinning, circuit breakers, and audit logging.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables secure, low-latency proxying of MCP tool calls by detecting and blocking malicious requests such as path traversals and command injections, while redacting leaked credentials.15 npmMIT
TDQS
Scored across 130 tools
The module prefixes and detailed descriptions help distinguish scanners, but the set contains many overlapping scan_text/scan_file/scan_directory/list_patterns families plus multiple meta-orchestrators (owasp_scan_path, vulnerability_scanner, threat_rules). An agent must read descriptions carefully to choose between secret/prompt-leak/document scanners, OWASP meta-scans and individual auditors.
Names are consistently snake_case and mostly use a predictable module__verb_noun pattern. Minor deviations exist, such as gateway_status, scan_and_report, and baseline_server/check_server, but overall the convention is clear.
130 tools is far beyond a well-scoped set and creates a severe selection burden for an agent. Although many tools map to distinct security domains, the repeated action variants across dozens of modules make the surface extremely heavy.
Coverage is very broad, spanning OWASP MCP categories, secrets, dependencies, TLS/DNS, models, vector stores, compliance, red-teaming, and runtime gateway auditing. Some lifecycle gaps remain, such as baseline deletion/update and gateway policy mutation, but the core scanning and reporting surface is extensive.