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delete_mcp_integration

Destructive

Permanently delete an MCP integration and all servers beneath it, immediately revoking connected access; confirm nothing depends on the integration first.

Instructions

Delete an MCP integration and all servers beneath it. This is irreversible, removes connected access immediately, and should only be used after confirming nothing depends on the integration.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_mcp_integration"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesThe MCP integration ID or slug to delete

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okYesWhether the tool call succeeded and returned structured data
dataNoStructured success payload when ok is true
errorNoStructured error payload when ok is false

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changedv1.0.9
    • changedInput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
    • changedOutput schema / $schema
      Previous value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"
  2. Addedv1.0.1

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, but the description adds information annotations cannot convey: the delete is a cascade that removes all child MCP servers, and connected access is cut immediately rather than lingering. It does not cover permission requirements or whether confirmation/re-auth is enforced server-side.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences with no filler; the destructive scope is front-loaded before the safety caveat, which is the right order for an agent skimming before a destructive call.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter destructive tool with an output schema, the description covers what is destroyed, irreversibility, and the precondition for calling it. Only prerequisite/permission context is absent, which is a minor gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With a single parameter and 100% schema description coverage ('The MCP integration ID or slug to delete'), the schema carries the full burden. The description mentions no parameter detail, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Delete an MCP integration') and adds the cascade scope ('and all servers beneath it'), which distinguishes it from the sibling delete_mcp_server and delete_integration tools without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit precondition ('should only be used after confirming nothing depends on the integration'), which is meaningful guidance for a destructive call. It does not name a safer alternative (e.g., delete_mcp_server for a single server, or update_mcp_integration to detach), so it stops short of full routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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